JUDGMENT Srivastava, J. - This is a decree-holder's appeal. Two questions have been argued before us. The judgment-debtor applied under Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act and the necessary orders were passed under Section 6 of that Act. In respect of a debt incurred subsequent to the passing of the order under Section 6, the appellant obtained a decree against the judgment-debtor. She got the decree executed and wanted to have a receiver appointed in respect of a grove of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor objected to it on the ground that under Section 7 Cl. (2) of the Encumbered Estates Act it was not open to the decree-holder to proceed against that grove in execution. He also pleaded that on an earlier objection of his, the grove had been ordered to be released and the decree-holder was not entitled to have the matter reopened. The objection of the judgment-debtor was allowed by the order now under appeal. The order covered another point about the amount of a cheque also. But that portion of the order is not being questioned before us. 2. The two points urged on behalf of the appellant were (1) that Section 7, Cl. (2) did not bar the appointment of a receiver against the property of the judgment-debtor and (2) that Sec. 7(2) of the Encumbered Estates Act was ultra vires as it contravened Article 19 of the Constitution. 3. Both these points are clearly untenable. Sec. 7 (2) reads like this: "After the passing of the said order and until the application is dismissed by the Special Judge under sub-sec. (3) of Section 8 or proceedings under this Act are quashed under Section 20 or until the Collector has liquidated the debt in full under Section 23 or Section 24 or granted a mortgage under Section 25 or passed order under Section 27 or Section 28, no decree obtained on the basis of any private debt incurred by the landlord after the passing of the order under Section 6 shall be executed against any of his property, other than proprietary rights in land, which has been mentioned in the notice under Section 11 and the landlord shall not be competent without the sanction of the Collector to make an exchange or gift, or to sell mortgage or lease, any of that property." 4. It is admitted in the present case that the decree of the appellant was obtained in respect of a private debt incurred by the judgment-debtor after passing of the order under Section 6 of the Encumbered Estates Act. That being so, in view of the provisions of Sec. 7(2) of that Act it was not open to the decree-holder to proceed with execution against any of the properties of the judgment-debtor other than the proprietary rights in land. The grove against which she wanted to proceed had been mentioned in the notice under Sec. 11. The argument that though the decree-holder could not proceed in execution against the grove in view of Sec. 7(2) she could get a receiver appointed in respect of it cannot be accepted as under Section 51 C.P.C. the appointment of a receiver is one of the modes of execution. In the present case the prayer of the decree-holder for the appointment of a receiver was only a process of execution. She was in that way trying to proceed in execution against the grove of the judgment-debtor. But Sec. 7(2) was, in our opinion, a complete bar to the prayer of the appellant. 5. In the present case it is not necessary to go into the question whether the prayer of the appellant was barred by res judicata also. 6. That contention that Sec. 7(2) of the Encumbered Estates Act contravenes Article 19 of the Constitution is also unacceptable. Cl. (f) of that Article guarantees all citizens the right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property. The only property which the appellant claims is the decree and she is certainly entitled to hold and dispose of that decree. That right of her is not being affected at all. She has no fundamental right to proceed in execution against the property of the judgment-debtor in any particular manner. Sec. 7(2) cannot, therefore affect any fundamental right of the appellant. 7. Both the points urged in appeal being thus without force, the appeal must fail. It is dismissed with costs. As no one has appeared to oppose the appeal, there will be no orders as to costs.