JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai J. 1. The only contention pressed on behalf of the 18th defendant appellant was, that the execution of the final decree in the case for partition, in so far as it relates to the realization of mesne profits, is barred by limitation. The decree was passed on December 17, 1955, and being unregistered, the period of limitation for its execution expired on December 17, 1955, and being unregistered, the period of limitation for its execution expired on December 17, 1958; but the respondent, who is one of the decree-holders, pleaded that under Section 9 of the Travancore Cochin Indebted Agriculturists Relief Act, 1956 (Act 3 of 1956) and under Section 20 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (Act 31 of 1958), a cumulative period of twelve months, during which the making of an application for execution was prohibited by the Acts, has to be excluded. For the respondent to succeed, it is enough to exclude one period of six months, under either of the Acts. 2. I am of the opinion, that the order under appeal has to be sustained, on the provisions in Section 3 of Act 3 of 1956, the relevant parts of which may be extracted: Sec.3. Bar of suits and applications: (1) No suit for recovery of a debt shall be instituted and no application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt shall be made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of six months from the commencement of this Act. Explanation Iit For the purposes of this Act a suit in which a decree in respect of a debt is prayed for shall be deemed to be a suit for the recovery of a debt not withstanding that other reliefs are prayed for in such suit and a decree shall be deemed to be a decree in respect of a debt notwithstanding that other reliefs are granted in such decree: Provided that a suit for possession of land shall not be deemed to be a suit for recovery of a debt by reason merely of mesne profits being also prayed for in such suit: Provided further that nothing contained in this section shall apply to any portion of a decree other than that relating to a debt. Under sub-section (1) above, the bar is against the making of an application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt, for a period of six months from the commencement of the Act. The execution application in the present case being for the realization of mesne profits, is an application for execution in respect of a debt, but the argument was, that the decree, being for partition of property and recovery of possession with mesne profits, is a decree for property and is not severable into its component parts, a decree for property and a decree in respect of a debt, but is one and entire. There is some force in this argument, but I am of the view, that it cannot prevail on the provisions extracted above. Explanation II has clearly provided, that a decree shall be deemed to be one on respect of a debt, even though other reliefs, which are not in respect of the debt, are granted by it, and what is more, the second proviso to the Explanation Contemplates a severance of the decree into portions, and limits the operation of the bar against execution to such portions of the decree, if any, as relate to the debt. The effect of the first proviso is only to restrict the scope of Explanation Ii and to exclude suits of a specified category from the bar under Section 3(1) and not applications for execution, both suits and applications being within the purview of sub-section (1) and Explanation Ii, which, it may be observed in passing, is not the case under the corresponding provision in Act 31 of 1958. In my judgment, sub-section (1) read with Explanation II, which, it may be observed in passing, is not the case under the corresponding provision in Act 31 of 1958. In my judgment, sub-section (1) read with Explanation II and the second proviso thereto, not only permits, but also ordains a severance of a decree of the kind before me into its component parts as stated above. The view taken by the additional District Judge on appeal, is therefore correct so far as the provisions of Act 3 of 1956 are concerned. This is enough for the disposal of this appeal. The view taken by the additional District Judge on appeal, is therefore correct so far as the provisions of Act 3 of 1956 are concerned. This is enough for the disposal of this appeal. There appears to be a material difference in the corresponding provisions of Act 31 of 1958 and perhaps a different view is possible under the, as held in Imala v Ramachandran Nair (1960 K. L. T. 602). It is unnecessary to consider this aspect and 1 therefore refrain from doing so. 3. It was next argued, that the appellant might well waive the benefit of these Acts. As he had done, by not availing himself of the provisions for making payments in instalments, and that therefore to permit the respondent to rely on the above provisions in the Act, would be in effect, to force them on the appellant against his will. The question for decision is only whether the respondent is entitled to the exclusion of time from the period of limitation under Section 9 of Act 3 of 1956. This will depend on the true construction of the provisions of Section 3, and not on whether a debtor can waive the benefit of the provisions of the Act or not. On the finding that the appellant is an agriculturist which was not challenged here and on the interpretation of Section 3 of Act 3 of 1956, I am of the view, that the respondent is entitled to the exclusion of time, in computing the period of limitation. 4. No other point was raised. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.