Judgment :- This petition arises out of an application made under S. 33(2) of the industrial Dispute Act 1947, for computation in terms of money the good attendance bonus for October 1958, granted to the workers concerned by an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. Certain demands were made by a section of the workmen of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd., on 29 March 1955, on the management and this was followed by a strike notice on 5 October 1955. The workmen concerned actually went on a strike on 24 November 1955. The same day, the State Government, in exercise of their powers under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act, referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. But it would appear that an agreement was arrived at between the management and the workmen to have the dispute referred to private arbitration under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. In view of this agreement, the next day, i.e., 25 November 1955, the strike was called off. Evidently giving effect to the agreement the Government directed a reference to private arbitration. The original reference under S. 10(1)(c) stood therefore dismissed by the industrial tribunal on 29 February 1956. The private arbitration ended in an award dated 19 January 1957. On the foot of this award, a decree of Court also followed which is dated 12 April 1957. One of the reliefs awarded the workmen Before the labour court, on behalf of the management of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd., the objection was taken that the application was not maintainable under S. 33C(2). Their contention was that what was contemplated by "any benefit" in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C should be under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that, if any benefit accrued to any workman outside the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, that, should not be subject matter of an application under S. 33C(2). This view of the scope of Sub- sec. (2) of S. 33C found favour with the labour court with the result that the application for conversion of the benefit into money was dismissed. The aggrieved workman has, therefore, come up to this Court under Art. 226 of the ConstitutionFor the petitioner in this Court, it has been strenuously contended that Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C found favour with the labour court with the result that the application for conversion of the benefit into money was dismissed. The aggrieved workman has, therefore, come up to this Court under Art. 226 of the ConstitutionFor the petitioner in this Court, it has been strenuously contended that Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C is of a wide scope, uncontrolled by the provisions of Sub-sec. (1) and that any benefit, whatever the sources of it may be, provided it related to the terms and conditions of employment of a workman, which is capable of being computed in terms of money, would fall within the scope of Sub-sec. (2). In support of this contention particular reference is made to the repealed S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Sub-section (1) of this section is in terms identical with those of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section (2) of S. 20 of the 1950 Act reads "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to the rules made under this Act, be determined by that industrial tribunal, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-sec. (1)." * The point made with reference to this Sub-section is that the omission in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C of the words "under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal" is significant and points to the fact that the legislature intended to make the scope of Sub-sec (2) of S. 33C wider than what it was under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 of the 1950 Act. The point thus urged is one of some importance and require a careful scrutiny The object of S. 33C patently is to provide a cheap and speedy remedy for the workman to have the benefit of a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. VA realized through the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act. The benefit may be expressed in terms of money in which case it will directly fall under Sub-sec. (1). VA realized through the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act. The benefit may be expressed in terms of money in which case it will directly fall under Sub-sec. (1). Where it is not so, the benefit, provided it is capable of being computed in terms of money, and when so computed, the machinery provided for execution under Sub-sec. (1) will apply. A combined reading of the two sub- sections of S. 33C, prima facie, leaves the impression that "any benefit" mentioned in Sub-sec. (2) in the context of Sub-sec. (1) means any benefit due to a workman under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act. The primary object, as I said, of the entire section being to provide machinery for speedy execution, there appears to be no special reason why Sub-sec. (2) should be read de hors that purpose and as comprehending any benefit whatever awarded outside the provision of the Industrial Dispute Act. Having provided for execution of a settlement or an award under which money is due, any benefit computed under Sub-sec. (2) in terms of money is also made realizable through the machinery provided for in Sub-sec. (1). No more, in my opinion, is the scope of Sub-sec. (2). It is no doubt true that, in the 1950 Act aforesaid, the words "under a settlement or an award" occurred in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 20, and those words have been omitted in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C. But this omission, in my opinion, is apparently due to the fact that the legislature wanted to avoid redundancy. I am unable to read into the omission of those words an intention on the part of the legislature to give a wider amplitude to the words "any benefit". If that ware the intention, the legislature could have expressed it in more clear termsIn Railway Employees' Co-operative Bank, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras which arose out of an application under S. 33C(2) for computing in terms of money a benefit due to the applicant under the provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishment Act, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., had to consider the scope of that sub- section. The learned Judge, mainly basing his reasoning on the omission in Sub-sec. The learned Judge, mainly basing his reasoning on the omission in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C, the words "under an award or a decision of an industrial tribunal, " was of the opinion that the scope of Sub-sec. (2) was wider and that the application, therefore, was maintainable. On appeal from this Judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in Railway Employees' Co-operative Bank, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras [1960 - I L.L.J, 345], to which I was a party, observed "There is considerable force in the contention of Vasantha Pai for the bank (appellant) that S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act would have no application to the facts of this case and it was not intended to provide for a claim such as we have in this case ... We should not, however, be understood as accepting the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., on the point." * Though the point was not finally decided by us in that case, we, prima facie, recognized the force of the argument against the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., as to the scope of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C. On further examination I adhere to the view we were inclined to take in that case In my opinion, "any benefit" under Sub-sec. (2) means that only that which flows from a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act There are certain other considerations which seem to lend support to the above view of mine. Sri K. Rajah Ayyar, appearing for the management, contended that to interpret Sub-sec. (2) in any other manner may lead to an anomaly. He pointed out, supposing an award was passed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act partly in terms of money and partly in terms of a certain benefit computable in terms of money value, could it be said that so far as the money portion of the award was concerned, the remedy was to invoke the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, and in respect of the rest of the award not in terms of money but convertible into money, it could after such conversion be executed through the machinery of Sub-sec. 2 read with Sub-sec. (1) of S. 33C. The learned counsel states that such an intention could not be attributed to the legislature in enacting the first two sub-sections of S. 33C. 2 read with Sub-sec. (1) of S. 33C. The learned counsel states that such an intention could not be attributed to the legislature in enacting the first two sub-sections of S. 33C. The contention is not without force. The point is when a particular remedy is provided by Sub-sec. (1) with reference to the money portion of the award, there is no reason, without specific words which compel a different view, to interpret Sub-sec. (2) as of a wider scope merely because the words "any benefit" occur in that sub-section. Those words will have to be understood in the light of the object of the whole section and in the context of Sub-sec. (2) read along with Sub-sec. (1) and not read disjunctively. Otherwise, in respect of the same award, as pointed out by Sri K. Rajah Ayyar, it would mean that different remedies through different means are contemplated by the legislature which, to my mind, does not appear to be the case. One other consideration, according to Sri K. Rajah Ayyar, is that the use of the word "the" in the words "the employer" in Sub-sec. (2) as contrasted with "an employer" in Sub-sec. (1) is significant. The suggestion is that Sub-sec. (2) is, therefore, really related to and goes with or takes colour from Sub-sec. (1). But I do not think that the interpretation of the scope of Sub-sec. (2) need be rested on this groundOn behalf of the petitioner Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam invited my attention to the decision in Shree Amarsinhji Mills, Ltd. v. Nagrashana That was a case of lay-off compensation and the only question that was decided there was whether the words "any benefit" in Sub-sec. (2) would comprehend or include a claim of monetary benefit also. The precise question that falls to be decided in this case was not raised or decided in that case and it, therefore, does not afford any assistance to the petitioner. My attention was also invited to the decisions in Madanlal v. State of Bihar but this too, in my opinion, is not helpful in deciding the ambit of the words "any benefit" in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C I hold, therefore, agreeing with the labour court, that the good attendance benefit awarded under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. 1940, is not within the scope of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2) of S. 33C I hold, therefore, agreeing with the labour court, that the good attendance benefit awarded under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. 1940, is not within the scope of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition is dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. But, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.