Order:- This petition arises out of an application made under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for computation in terras of money the good attendance bonus for October, 1958 granted to the workers concerned by an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. Certain demands were made by a section of the workmen of the Buckingham & Carnatic Co., Ltd., on 29th March, 1955 on the management and this was followed by a strike notice on 5th October, 1955. The workmen concerned actually went into a strike on 24th November, 1955. The same day, the State Government in exercise of their powers under section 10 (1) (c) of the Act, referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. But it would appear that an agreement was arrived at between the management and the workmen to have the dispute referred to private arbitration under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. In view of this agreement, the next day, i.e., 25th November, 1955 the strike was called off. Evidently giving effect to the agreement, the Government directed a reference to private arbitration. The original reference under section to (1) (c) stood therefore, dismissed by the Industrial Tribunal on 29th February, 1956. The private arbitration ended in an award, dated 19th January, 1957. On the foot of this award, a decree of Court also followed which is dated 12th April, 1957. One of the reliefs awarded under the award, was the good attendance bonus for October, 1958 to the workmen. Before the Labour Court, on behalf of the Management of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co., Ltd., the objection was taken that the application was not maintainable under section 33-C (2). Their contention was that what was contemplated by " any benefit" in sub-section (2) of section 33-C should be under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that if any benefit accrued to any workman outisde the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, that could not be the subject-matter of an application under section 33-C (2). This view of the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-G found favour with the Labour Court with the result the application for conversion of the benefit into money was dismissed. This view of the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-G found favour with the Labour Court with the result the application for conversion of the benefit into money was dismissed. The aggrieved workman has, therefore come up to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. For the petitioner in this Court, it has been strenuously contended that subsection (2) of section 33-C is of a wide scope, uncontrolled by the provisions of subsection (1) and that any benefit, whatever the sources of it may be provided it related to the terms and conditions of employment of workman, which is capable of being computed in terms of money, would fall within the scope of sub-section (2). In support of this contention particular reference is made to the repealed section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Sub-section (1) of this section is in terms identical with those of sub-section (1) of section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section (2) of section 20 of the 1950 Act read: " Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit under an award or decision of an industrial tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to the rules made under this Act, be deter-mined by that Industrial Tribunal and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1)." The point made with reference to this sub-section is that the omission in sub-section (2) of section 33-C of the words "under an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal " is significant and points to the fact that the Legislature intended to make the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-G wider than what it was under sub-section (2) of section 20 of the 1950 Act. The point thus urged is one of some importance and requires a careful scrutiny. The object of section 33-C patently is to provide a cheap and speedy remedy for the workman to have the benefit of a settlement on an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A realised through the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act. The benefit may be expressed in terms of money in which case it will directly fall under sub-section (1). The benefit may be expressed in terms of money in which case it will directly fall under sub-section (1). Where it is not so, the benefit, provided it is capable of being computed in terms of money, and when so computed, the machinery provided for execution under sub-section (1) will apply. A combined reading of the two subsections of section 33-C prima facie leave the impression that " any benefit" mentioned in sub-section (2) in the context of sub-section (1) means any benefit due to a workman under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The primary object, as I said of the entire section being to provide a machinery for speedy execution, there appears to be no special reason why sub-section (2) should be read de hors that purpose and as comprehending any benefit whatever awarded outside the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Having provided for execution of a settlement or an award under which money is due, any benefit computed under sub-section (2) in terms of money, is also made realisable through the machinery provided for by sub-section (1). No more, in my opinion, is the scope of sub-section (2). It is no doubt true that in the 1950 Act aforesaid the words " under a settlement or an award " occurred in sub-section (2) of section 20, and those words have been omitted in sub-section (2) of section 33-C. But this omission, in my opinion, is apparently due to the fact that the Legislature wanted to avoid redundancy. I am unable to read into the omission of those words an intention on the part of the Legislature to give a wider amplitude to the words " any benefit." If that were the intention, the Legislature could have expressed it in more clear terms. In Railway Employees’ Co-operative Bank Ltd., Madras v. Labour Court, Madras1which arose out of an application under section 33-C (2) for computing in terms of money a benefit due to the applicant under the provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., had to consider the scope of that sub-section. In Railway Employees’ Co-operative Bank Ltd., Madras v. Labour Court, Madras1which arose out of an application under section 33-C (2) for computing in terms of money a benefit due to the applicant under the provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., had to consider the scope of that sub-section. The learned Judge, mainly basing his reasoning on the omission In sub-section (2) of section 33-C of the words " under an award or a decision of an Industrial Tribunal," was of the opinion that the scope of sub-section (2) was wider and that the application, therefore, was maintainable. On appeal from this judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in Railway Employees’ Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras2 , to which I was a party, observed: " There is considerable force in the contention of Mr. Vasantha Pai for the bank (Appellant ‘that section 33-C (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act would have no application to the facts of this case and it was not intended to provide for a claim such as we have in this case........................We should not however be understood as accepting the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., on the point." Though the point was not finally decided by us in that case, we, prima facie, recognised the force of the argument against the view of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. as to the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-C. On further examination, I adhere to the view we were inclined to take in that case. In my opinion, " any benefit" under sub-section (2) means only that which flows from a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. There are certain other considerations which seem to lend support to the above view of mine. Sri K. Rajah Ayyar appearing for the management contended that to interpret sub-section (2) in any other manner may lead to an anomaly. There are certain other considerations which seem to lend support to the above view of mine. Sri K. Rajah Ayyar appearing for the management contended that to interpret sub-section (2) in any other manner may lead to an anomaly. He pointed out, supposing an award was passed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act partly in terms of money and partly in terms of a certain benefit computable in terms of money value, could it be said that so far as the money portion of the award was concerned, the remedy was to invoke the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and in respect of the rest of the award not in terms of money but convertible into money it could after such conversion be executed through the machinery of sub-section (2) read with sub-section (1) of section 33-C. The learned counsel states that such an intention could not be attributed to the Legislature in enacting the first two sub-sections of section 33-C. The contention is not without force. The point is when a particular remedy, is provided by sub-section (1) with reference to the money portion of the award, there is no reason, without specific words which compel a different view, to interpret sub-section (2) as of a wider scope merely because the words “ any benefit” occur in that sub-section. Those words will have to be understood in the light of the object of the whole section and in the context of sub-section (2) read along with sub-section (1) and not read disjunctively. Otherwise, in respect of the same award, as pointed out by Sri K. Rajah Ayyar, it would mean that different remedies through different means are contemplated by the Legislature which, to my mind, does not appear to be the case. One other consideration according to Sri K. Rajah Ayyar, is the use of the word ‘the‘ in the words ‘the employer‘ in sub-section (2) as contrasted with an employer in sub-section (1) is significant. The suggestion is that sub-section (2) is therefore really related to and goes with or takes colour from sub-section 1). But 1 do not think that the interepreation of the scope of sub-section (2) need be rested on this ground. The suggestion is that sub-section (2) is therefore really related to and goes with or takes colour from sub-section 1). But 1 do not think that the interepreation of the scope of sub-section (2) need be rested on this ground. On behalf of the petitioner Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam, invited my attention to the decision in Shree Amarsinghji Mills Ltd. v. Nagrashna and others1 That was a case of lay off compensation and the only question that was decided there was whether the words “any benefit” in sub-section (2) would comprehend or include a claim for monetary benefit also. The precise question that falls to be decided in this case was not raised or decided in that case and it, therefore does not afford any assistance to the petitioner. My attention was also invited to the decision in Madan Lal v. State of Bihar2, but this too, in my opinion, is not helpful in deciding the ambit of the words “ any benefit” in sub-section (2) of section 33-C. I hold, therefore, agreeing with the labour Court, that the good attendance benefit awarded under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, is not within the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition is dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. K.L.B ----------- Petition dismissed.