Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by defendants 1 and 2, the judgment-debtors, in a decree for money charged on immovable property. 2. The suit was instituted on 27-1-1951, and decreed on 26-9-1951. On the date the suit was instituted, as per the law of Travancore, the plaintiff could remit the fee in court for having the decree, when passed, registered at the instance of the court. 3. S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act (II of 1087) provided: "When any civil court shall, by a decree or order, create, declare, transfer, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of any person to or in any immovable property situate in any part of Travancore, such court shall cause a memorandum of such decree ore order to be sent to the Sub Registrar or to every sub Registrar within whose Sub-District the whole or any portion of the property is situate and such memorandum shall, so far as may be practicable, describe the property in the manner required, by S.14;. and the memorandum so received shall be filed in book I." Under this provision the registration was to be effected only when the court had made a decree or order affecting immovable property; but, as a matter of procedure, the fee for such registration was directed to be remitted in court even at the institution of the suit. It is stated by counsel for the plaintiff-decreeholder that in this case registration fee had been paid at .the time of the institution of the suit.. But the decree came to be passed only subsequent to the repeal of the Travancore Registration Act and the introduction of the Indian Registration Act by Part B States Laws Act (Central Act III of 1951). Under the latter Act, no decree can be registered on the basis of a memorandum from the court; and therefore the decree was not registered in this case. The courts below held that the registration fee having been paid by the party it was the duty of the court to have the decree registered and therefore the decree shall be deemed to have been registered on the principle that 'no act of court shall prejudice the rights of a party'. This Second Appeal is against the same. 4. S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act provided for registration of a decree only after it has been passed. This Second Appeal is against the same. 4. S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act provided for registration of a decree only after it has been passed. In other words, the right to register a decree arises only when it has been made, and not before. A payment of the registration fee earlier during the pendency of the suit did not give an immutable right to the plaintiff to have his decree registered. Counsel for the plaintiff-decreeholder contends that on payment of the registration fee, the plaintiff got a vested right to have the decree registered. I see little force in this contention. 5. Under the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act 14 of 1947, orders passed under S.5-B of the Act were final and conclusive. By the: amending Act 12 of 1949 such orders were made subject to a revision by the High Court. It was urged before the Supreme Court in. Indira Sihanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Properly (AIR. 1956 S.C. 77) that as the proceedings have been initiated before the promulgation of the Amending Act the provision for finality of the order became a vested right in the party and therefore the subsequent; enactment making such orders revisable by the High Court would not apply to the case. In repelling this contention, the Supreme Court observed: "it appears to be clear that while a right of appeal in respect of a pending action may conceivably be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the action No such vested right to obtain a determination with the attribute of finality can be predicated in favour of a litigant on the institution of the action. By the very terms of S.5-B of East Punjab Act 14 of 1947, finality attaches to it on the making of the order. Even if there be, in law, any right at all as the right to a determination with attribute of finality, it can in no sense be a vested or accrued right. It does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as in A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 242. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the principle of [1905) AC. It does not accrue until the determination is in fact made, when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as in A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 242. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the principle of [1905) AC. 369, cannot be invoked in support of a case of the kind we are dealing with." As the right to have the decree registered even as per the provisions; of S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act arose only when the decree was passed, the contention that a right to that effect became a vested right in the plaintiff even before the decree was passed cannot be correct. 6. Registration is a matter of procedure and therefore can be effected only according to the law current at the time registration is to be made. When the right to have the decree registered accrued to the plaintiff, that is, on the day the decree was passed, the law of registration was admittedly as laid down in the Indian Registration Act. It is not disputed that, under the provision of the latter Act, a decree could not he registered through court; such registration could only he on presentation of an attested copy of .the decree before the Sub-Registrar by the party interested. It therefore follows that no blame should be fastened on the court for not getting the decree registered as the court can be expected to act only in accordance with, the law in force at the material time. 7. Counsel for the decreeholder placed reliance en the ruling in Mathevan v. Mathevan Pillai (1958 K.L.T. 441) and Joseph v. Jessaya (1955 K.L.T. 602). The contention in those two cases was that a decree, not having been registered under the Indian Registration Act, would not be a registered decree within the meaning of the Indian Limitation Act. The Court, relying on the last proviso to S.6 of Part B States Laws Act, 1951, held that what has been registered duly under the previous law in force before the introduction of the Indian Registration Act has to be deemed to be registered under the corresponding provisions of the Indian Registration Act, though the procedure prescribed therefor in the two Acts bore no parallel. The facts being far different from those of the present case, the dicta in those rulings are of little assistance in the disposal of the question before me. 8. The facts being far different from those of the present case, the dicta in those rulings are of little assistance in the disposal of the question before me. 8. In Parameswara Bharathikal v. Padmanabhan (1958 K.L.T. 271) a decree passed after the introduction of the Indian Registration Act in a suit instituted before such introduction came up for consideration; and it was held therein that registration not having been effected, the decree-holder was not entitled to the benefit of the extended period of limitation under Art.182 of the Limitation Act. Following that precedent, I hold that the decreeholder in this case is not entitled to the benefit of the six years' period of limitation for the- execution of the decree in this case. 9. The decreeholder has also urged that the decree is saved by acknowledgments under S.19 of the Limitation Act. That question has not been considered by the courts below as they held the decree to be a registered one and therefore not barred. The matter is therefore remitted to the executing court for a fresh disposal of the question of limitation, in the light of the observations made above. The appellant will have his costs of this Second Appeal. Allowed.