Judgment :- 1. In a chitty of which the first defendant was the foreman, the first plaintiff was the subscriber. He prized his ticket but was paid only a part of the prize amount and for the balance was satisfied with taking a promissory note from the first defendant. The latter having failed to make payment, the first plaintiff and his assignee the second plaintiff, have sued the first defendant for the amount due after setting off the subscriptions payable to him for the last two instalments. They prayed for a decree charging the properties secured by the first defendant for the conduct of the chitty and in respect of which, the second defendant was impleaded as a subsequent encumbrancer. The two Courts have concurred in giving the plaintiffs a personal decree against the 1st defendant and in declining to give a charge on the properties. The only question which arises in this Second Appeal is, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a charge. The two Courts have held that by the acceptance of the promissory note the first plaintiff has lost his rights to enforce the security. 2. It may at once be stated, that the suit as framed, is not solely upon the promissory note. It may well be construed to be a suit for the realisation of the amount of the prize itself. The security was offered by the first defendant in pursuance of S.17 (1) of the Travancore Chitties Act, 1120, which reads as follows: "Every foreman shall, before the first drawing of the chitty execute a bond in favour of or in trust for the other subscribers for the proper conduct of the chitty, charging property sufficient to the satisfaction of the Registrar or any officer empowered by Our Government in that behalf for the realisation of twice the chitty amount or depositing cash in any approved bank of not less than chitty amount." The security was in favour of or in -trust for the subscribers for the proper conduct of the chitty. S.42 of the Act which reads: "Where there are debts due from the foreman of a chitty in relation thereto and also other debts due from such foreman, the chitty assets shall be a first charge for payment of the chitty debts due to the subscribers." lays down a rule of preferential payment to the subscribers of the chitty and is useful as indicating, that the security is primarily intended to meet the claims of the chitty creditors. In order to establish that the first plaintiff has lost his right to enforce the security, it is not enough to point to the acceptance of the promissory note by him, but it must be made out that he also renounced the security. Otherwise, the promissory note might well be regarded as a collateral security. In a very similar case, in Easwara Iyen Vaikuntam Iyen v. Retnaswami Iyer (16 T.L.R. 193) a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court observed thus at page 197: it ......care must be taken to distinguish cases in which a new contract is substituted for the old one from those in which, the old contract still subsisting, an additional security is given for its performance, and bills and promissory notes given under such circumstances as merely to form a collateral security for the due performance of an existing contract cannot be regarded as a novation destroying the original contract." It was therefore ruled, that the promissory note taken from the chitty foreman was only a collateral security and did not destroy the original contract. In cases arising under the Travancore Debt Relief Act, 1116, especially in the Full Bench decision in Ramalekshmi v. Pananasakam Pillai (31 T.L.J. 978) it has been held that it is a question of fact in each case, whether the taking of a document was by way of additional security or was in supersession of the original contract. It was also held that the acceptance of a document did not extinguish the lien of a vendor for unpaid consideration. A similar view has been taken in Syed Abdul Hue Sahib v. Raj Muhammad Kabuli (A.I.R.1943 Mad. 28) and Somu Achari v. Singara Achari (A.I.R.1945 Madras 407). There is nothing in the present case to establish that the first plaintiff gave up his rights to enforce the security. A similar view has been taken in Syed Abdul Hue Sahib v. Raj Muhammad Kabuli (A.I.R.1943 Mad. 28) and Somu Achari v. Singara Achari (A.I.R.1945 Madras 407). There is nothing in the present case to establish that the first plaintiff gave up his rights to enforce the security. The refusal of the two Courts to allow a charge for the amount decreed cannot be justified. It was not contended that in the frame of the suit, no charge could be given. 3. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is allowed by declaring a charge on the properties in the schedule, for the amount decreed. The first plaintiff is allowed his costs in this Court and in the lower appellate Court to be realised from the contesting respondent in each court. Allowed.