ORDER:- This is a reference by the Additional Sessions Judge (II) Manipur, made at the instance of 5 petitioners who were convicted under Secs.143 and 447, I.P.C. and sentenced to fine of Rs.50/- each under each of the counts by the S.D.M. Thoubal. 2. The case against the petitioners was that on 13-9-59 they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of criminal trespass into the lands of the respondent, namely, patta Nos.127/50 and 127/201 and that they actually committed criminal trespass. In support of the prosecution, 6 P.Ws. were examined. The defence of the petitioners was a denial of the trespass. According to petitioners 1 to 3, the lands in dispute were their ancestral properties and had been in their possession for 12 years, while according to petitioners 4 and 5, they never entered on the lands. They all said that the complainant had no possession of the said lands. It may be mentioned here that there were proceedings under Sec.145 Cr.P.C. against the petitioners at the instance of the complainant and that an order confirming the possession of the respondent-complainant was passed by Shri M.C. Roy, First Class Magistrate, Manipur, on 19-8-1959. Thus, we have to take it that the complainant was in possession as late as 19-8-1959. We may also fairly take it therefore that on 13-9-1959, the date of the occurrence also, the respondent was in possession of the disputed lands. The petitioners admitted that the order under Sec.145, Cri.P.C. was passed against them on 19-8-1959. But they would say that even before that order was passed they had harvested the crops from the lands. One is unable to know what exactly is the import of that statement. The time for harvest had not yet come when that order was passed as harvest usually took place in the month of Poinu (November-December). Actually, according to the respondent, he was making arrangements for transplantation of seedlings when the trespass took place. 3. Anyway, both the lower Courts have dealt with the evidence in the case and were satisfied that the petitioners had formed themselves info an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing criminal trespass and that they actually committed criminal trespass on the lands. 3. Anyway, both the lower Courts have dealt with the evidence in the case and were satisfied that the petitioners had formed themselves info an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing criminal trespass and that they actually committed criminal trespass on the lands. I may also say that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not referred the matter to this Court on the merits of the case and that he agreed with the findings of the Magistrate. His reference was on the question that the petitioners having been convicted and sentenced under sec.143 I.P.C they should not have been further convicted and sentenced under Sec.447 I.P.C. His argument was that since the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit criminal trespass and since the petitioners were convicted for that offence, they should not have been convicted again for the actual criminal trespass which they committed in furtherance of their common object. He has relied on sec.71 I.P.C. for this. 4. I am unable to see how Sec.71 I.P.C. would enter into the picture at all. Section 71 states as follows : "Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided. Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which the offences are defined or punished, or Where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one such offences". Perhaps, the Additional Sessions Judge has relied on the first paragraph of the section to say that punishment should have been given only for one offence. But that paragraph deals with a case where there are several parts to an offence, of which any of the parts may itself amount to an offence. In such a case, the offender cannot be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences. But the offences under Secs.143 and 447 I.P.C. are not of that category. But that paragraph deals with a case where there are several parts to an offence, of which any of the parts may itself amount to an offence. In such a case, the offender cannot be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences. But the offences under Secs.143 and 447 I.P.C. are not of that category. For an offence under Sec.143, what is required is the membership of an unlawful assembly as defined under Sec.141 I.P.C. An assembly is designated an unlawful assembly, if the persons composing the assembly had one or more of the common objects mentioned in that section. In our present case, the common object was to commit criminal trespass into the field of the respondent. Section 447 has no reference to any unlawful assembly. The offence under Sec.447 is criminal trespass as defined in Sec.441, i.e. entry into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult, or annoy any person in possession of such property. Thus the criminal trespass in this case, cannot be said to be a part of the offence of being a member of the unlawful assembly. Criminal trespass need not have been committed actually to constitute an offence under Sec.143, even though the common object of the assembly may have been to commit criminal trespass. 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has relied on the decision Bhup Singh v. Emperor, 8 Cal WN 305. In that decision, it was held that an accused could not be convicted and sentenced for criminal trespass under Sec.447 I.P.C. in addition to a conviction and sentence under Sec.147 I.P.C., the common object of the riot and the intention in the criminal trespass being substantially the same in the case. That decision was based on certain illustrations given under Sec.35 Cr.P.C., before the amendment of that section in 1923. Those illustrations have now been repealed. Thus the view taken in that decision will not apply at present. Further in the present case, there is no conviction under Sec.147, but only under Sec.143. That decision was based on certain illustrations given under Sec.35 Cr.P.C., before the amendment of that section in 1923. Those illustrations have now been repealed. Thus the view taken in that decision will not apply at present. Further in the present case, there is no conviction under Sec.147, but only under Sec.143. Under section 147, there must have been rioting which meant that the criminal trespass must also have been committed in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or with the intention mentioned in S.441, I.P.C. But under S.143 I.P.C., the punishment is for the fact of being a member of an unlawful assembly. It is not necessary that the common object of the unlawful assembly, namely, criminal trespass must have been carried into effect. Thus, no actual criminal trespass was at all necessary for a conviction under S.143 I.P.C. Hence, that decision cannot apply it our present case. 6. I may here refer to the later decisions of the Calcutta High Court after the amendment of Sec.35 Cr.P.C. in 1923, namely, the decision Kanchan Molla v. Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 101 and Aftan Fakir v. Israfil Khan, 54 Cal WN (2 DR) 311, and also to the Sind decision Baijnathsin Attarsing v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 76 which have taken a different view from that in 8 C WN 305. Thus, there is nothing wrong in convicting and sentencing a person separately under Secs.143 and 447 I.P.C. The reference cannot be accepted. 7. It was however argued for the petitioner that on the evidence adduced for the prosecution the petitioners should not have been convicted under either section. I am not prepared to go into the details of the oral evidence as both the lower Courts which have gone into the matter have found that the petitioners formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing criminal trespass and that they actually committing criminal trespass. My attention was drawn to certain discrepancies in the evidence the P.Ws. But those discrepancies were dealt with by the Magistrate and he did not consider them as in any way detracting from the truth their evidence. 8. My attention was drawn to certain discrepancies in the evidence the P.Ws. But those discrepancies were dealt with by the Magistrate and he did not consider them as in any way detracting from the truth their evidence. 8. It was next pointed out that the two lands, namely, patta Nos.127/50 and 127/201 were not contiguous lands as seen from the attachment list, that there could not have been criminal trespass in two such separate lands and that the prosecution witnesses did not make it quite clear which of the two lands there was criminal trespass. This matter was not brought to the notice of the lower Courts. The case of the respondent was that the two lands were contiguous lands, P.W.6 had, in fact, stated that the patta lies in a compact area. P.W.1 also had said that the dispute lands consisted of 3 plots lying touching each other. Even the petitioners in their statements before the Court did not say that the two lands were not contiguous. Hence, in revision, I cannot accept the new point raised for the first time regarding which there has been no reference to this Court by the Additional Sessions Judge. 9. I see no merits at all in this revision petition and reference. It is dismissed. Revision and reference dismissed.