JUDGMENT A. P. Srivastava, J. - These are two connected execution first appeals and may be conveniently disposed of by the same judgment. 2. One Bidhi Chand filed a suit for recovery of money against Bedi Lal and others. After filing the suit he applied for the attachment before judgment of certain properties belonging to Bedi Lal defendant. The properties included a share in a grove and certain machinery installed in that grove. Attachment before judgment was ordered, and a Vakil Commissioner was appointed to make the attachment. He went to the spot, attached the properties, and put them in the supurdigi of one Mohammad Gulsher Khan. The latter executed a supurdnama in respect of the property. The suit was ultimately decreed, and an execution application. bearing execution case no. 39 of 1955 was filed to execute the decree. The decree was satisfied in part and by an order dated the 9th of October 1953 the execution application was struck off in part satisfaction. In course of the execution case it was alleged by the judgment-debtor Bedi Lal that some parts of the attached machinery which had been put in the custody of Mohammad Gulsher Khan had been removed and misappropriated by the latter. On the 22nd of February 1956, therefore, the judgment-debtor Bedi Lal made an application that Mohammad Gulsher Khan be made liable for the sum of Rs. 11,000 on account of the missing machinery parts. The application was filed under Section 145, C.P.C. 3. Mohammad Gulsher Khan objected to the application. He pleaded that the application was not maintainable under Section 145, C.P.C. and said that at the time when it had been attached the machinery was not in working order. As regards the flour mill and the weights etc., he said that they had been sold by the Amin on the 9th of Feb. 1956. He also denied having removed any parts as alleged. The learned Civil Judge held, in view of the decision reported in Mathura Das v. Hari Shanker, AIR 1949 Allahabad 306, that the application was maintainable under Section 145, C.P.C. He further held on facts that Mohammad Gulsher Khan was responsible for the loss illeged. He determined the amount of the loss for which Mohammad Gulsher Khan was liable as Rs. 979, and allowed the application to that extent. He also awarded to the judgment-debtor. He determined the amount of the loss for which Mohammad Gulsher Khan was liable as Rs. 979, and allowed the application to that extent. He also awarded to the judgment-debtor. Bedi Lal one-fourth of his costs in the proceedings. Against this order Mohammad Gulsher Khan has filed Ex. F.A. No. 84 of 1958. 4. Subsequently, Bedi Lal, the judgment-debtor, made a Second application, again under Section 145, C.P.C. This application was made on the 5th Feb. 1958, and it was alleged in it that after the 28th of June 1956 Mohammad Gulsher Khan had removed almost the entire remaining portions of the attached Machinery. It was said that the whole machinery was worth Rs. 11,587. Out of it parts worth Rs. 1,010 had been sold in execution case No. 54 of 1957, and for parts removed earlier Mohammad Gulsher Khan had already been held liable for Rs. 979. He was, therefore liable for the balance of Rs. 9,598. 5. This application was also opposed by Mohammad Gulsher Khan, who pleaded that it was not legally maintainable and denied having removed any machinery as was alleged. In this case it was also pleaded that the original attachment was invalid. After hearing the parties and considering the evidence that was produced the learned Civil Judge came to the conclusion that Mohammad Gulsher Khan could be held liable for Rs. 1,821 only. He, therefore, allowed this application also in part and directed that a decree for Rs. 1,821 be prepared in favour of Bedi Lal against Mohammad Gulsher Khan. He also allowed proportionate costs, and 3% future interest. Mohammad Gulsher Khan has submitted to the order, but Bedi Lal, the judgment debtor, has come up in appeal against the order. His appeal is Ex. F. A. No. 579 of 1958. 6. Besides contending that the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge in the two cases were not justified on the materials on the record, learned counsel for Mohammad Gulsher Khan, the appellant in appeal No. 84 of 1958, has urged two more points. His appeal is Ex. F. A. No. 579 of 1958. 6. Besides contending that the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge in the two cases were not justified on the materials on the record, learned counsel for Mohammad Gulsher Khan, the appellant in appeal No. 84 of 1958, has urged two more points. They are: (1) that Section 145, C.P.C. was not applicable to the case, and the two applications made by the judgment-debtor Bedi Lal could not be maintained under that provision; and (2) that the supurdnarna which Mohammad Gulsher Khan had executed on the 9th of October 1953 was really not an enforceable document, and, in any case, could not be enforced in the execution department. 7. In support of the appeal of Bedi Lal, his learned counsel has urged that the application should have been allowed in full. He also tried to controvert the two points urged on behalf of Mohammad Gulsher Khan. 8. The bond which Mohammad Gulsher Khan executed on the 9th of October 1953 when the attached property was given to him reads thus :- "Today, on the 9th of October 1953, grove No. 140, as pointed out by the plaintiff, situated in village Mirpur on the east of which is grove and field of Shahzad Barhai, on the west there is the grove of Bishan Sarup, on the north is the Grand Trunk Road, on the south is the field of Ramalla and Piare of which 6/16th share having an area of 4 bighas 4 biswas pukhta on the east side with the goods mentioned below which was attached by Sri Satyendra Narain Vaish Commissioner was put in my custody (Supurdigi) in the presence of witnesses. The price of all the property including the grove attached is about Rs. 6,000. I, the supurdar, agree that during the continuance of my supurdigi I shall keep the grove and the machines aforementioned described below with care and in my custody. Nothing will be removed by me from the grove with out the permission of the court. I shall also carry out in full any orders of the court on getting the same." 9. The document is signed by Mohammad Gulsher Khan and is attested by two witnesses, Debi Prasad and Hira Lal. No details or description of the machinery attached is mentioned at the foot of the document. 10. I shall also carry out in full any orders of the court on getting the same." 9. The document is signed by Mohammad Gulsher Khan and is attested by two witnesses, Debi Prasad and Hira Lal. No details or description of the machinery attached is mentioned at the foot of the document. 10. Three features of this document were pointed out on behalf of Mohammad Gulsher Khan. The first was that it did not create any obligation in favour of any particular person. There was thus no obligee in the document. The document was neither in favour of the court nor in favour of Bedi Lal nor in favour of the decree holder. The second thing pointed out is that in it Mohammad Gulsher Khan did not undertake any liability, personal or otherwise, He did not undertake to return the property at any stage or to be liable for any amount. He did not describe himself as surety nor did he say that he would perform the decree or any part of it in any manner. He also did not undertake liability for the payment of any money or for the fulfilment of any condition imposed on any person under the orders of the court. The only thing he undertook was that he wilt preserve the property with care, will not remove any portion of it from the grove and will carry out the orders of the court that were conveyed to him. The contention is that the bond was not one contemplated by Section 145, C.P.C. The third feature to which our attention is drawn is the absence of the details of the moveable property in the document. At two places in the document there is a mention of the properties detailed below or aforesaid, but the properties were not described anywhere. It is urged that on account of these defects the bond was wholly unenforceable, and, in any case, it could not be enforced under Section 145, C.P.C. 12. That the defects pointed out are there in the bond cannot be disputed. The question is what is the effect of those defects. We are not called upon in the present case to consider the question whether the bond was enforceable in a suit. That the defects pointed out are there in the bond cannot be disputed. The question is what is the effect of those defects. We are not called upon in the present case to consider the question whether the bond was enforceable in a suit. It is also unnecessary for us to consider whether Mohammad Gulsher Khan could in the circumstances of the case be held to be a trustee in respect of the goods given to him and the trust could be enforced in law. Our consideration must be confined to the provisions of Section 145, C.P.C. as the two applications out of which the present appeals have arisen were filed under that provision and the question is whether a bond of the kind executed by Mohammad Gulsher Khan could be enforced at the instance of the judgment-debtor in proceedings under Section 145, C.P.C. 13. Apart from the question whether a judgment-debtor can take advantage of Section 145, which we shall consider presently, it appears to us that on its terms Section 145 could not be applicable to the bond in question. That section, as it stood in the year 1953 when the bond was executed, read like this: - "Where any person has become liable as surety - (a) for the performance of any decree or any part thereof, or (b) for the restitution of any property taken in execution of a decree, or (c) for the payment of any money, or for the fulfilment of any condition imposed on any person, under an order of the Court in any suit or in any proceeding consequent thereon, the decree or order may be executed against him, to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable in the manner herein provided for the execution of decrees and such person shall, for the purposes of appeal, be deemed a party within the meaning of Sec. 47: Provided that such notice as the Court in each case thinks sufficient has been given to the surety." 14. The first part of the section requires that before anyone can be held liable under its provisions he must have made himself liable as surety for the performance of a decree or part thereof, for the restitution of any property taken in his possession or for the payment of any money, or for the fulfilment of any condition imposed on any person, under an order of the Court. In the present case Mohammad Gulsher Khan by executing the bond in question did not make himself a surety, at all. He never guaranteed the performance of any decree or part thereof. At the time when he executed the bond there was no decree in existence. He also never undertook to restitute any property that had been taken in execution of a decree. Nor did he make himself liable for the payment of any money or for the fulfilment of any condition imposed on any person under an order of the court in that suit or proceeding. Such a bond could not, therefore, be enforced in execution proceedings under the provisions of Sec. 145. 15. It is pointed out that in the bond Mohammad Gulsher Khan had undertaken to comply with the orders of the court. That undertaking was certainly there, but it was a wholly unnecessary. undertaking. He would have been bound to carry out the orders of the court even if there had been no undertaking to that. effect. Moreover, in the present case learned counsel has not been able to draw our attention to any orders of the court which were served upon him and with which he had not complied. For instance, it appears that no order was ever passed requiring him to produce the property. Then arises the question whether the judgment-debtor, Bedi Lal, could under Section 145, C.P.C. proceed against Mohammad Gulsher Khan in the manner in which he has tried to proceed. 16. Under Section 145 if a certain person has made himself liable as surety in the manner indicated in the section, the decree or order may be executed against him to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable in the manner provided for the execution of a decree. 16. Under Section 145 if a certain person has made himself liable as surety in the manner indicated in the section, the decree or order may be executed against him to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable in the manner provided for the execution of a decree. Thus the surety becomes the judgment-debtor for certain purposes in view of the provisions of -the section, and the decree can be executed against him in the same manner in which it could be executed against the judgment-debtor himself. In the present case the decree was not being executed against Mohammad Gulsher Khan. The decree had in fact been satisfied in part and it was not the decree-holder who was trying to proceed against Mohammad Gulsher Khan as judgment-debtor or as surety in execution of his decree. In the present case it was the judgment-debtor Bedi Lal who was trying to recover from Mohammad Gulsher Khan damages for property which he alleged had been misappropriated by the latter. On the terms of section 145 this does not appear to be permissible. 17. Dealing with the scope of Section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code Richards, C.J. (Banerji, J. concurring) in Amir and others v. Madho Prasad, 15 ALJ 76 observed: - "All that the section says is that the decree or order may be executed against the surety to the extent to which he has rendered himself personally liable. The "decree" mentioned here is clearly the same decree against the judgment-debtor for the due performance of which the surety has rendered himself liable. In other words, (applying the section to the facts of this particular case) the simple money decree which had been obtained against Suraj Din could be executed against Jagannath just as it could be executed against Suraj Din himself neither more nor less." 18. On this view of Section 145 the learned Judges refused to permit the decree-holder to proceed against a property of the surety which had been transferred to another person. 19. Banerji, J., who was a party to the decision in Amir's case, 15 A.L.J. 76 subsequently held in Kallu Khan v. Abdullah Khan, 18 ALJ 357 that it was not open to a judgment-debtor under Section 145, C.P.C. to make a supurdar, to whom crops had been entrusted after attachment, liable for the crops. 19. Banerji, J., who was a party to the decision in Amir's case, 15 A.L.J. 76 subsequently held in Kallu Khan v. Abdullah Khan, 18 ALJ 357 that it was not open to a judgment-debtor under Section 145, C.P.C. to make a supurdar, to whom crops had been entrusted after attachment, liable for the crops. To recover the crops or their value he could have his remedy only in a suit for damages against the supurdar. 20. The question whether a judgment-debtor could enforce any liability of a surety under Section 145 arose again in Mathura Das v. Hari Shanker, AIR 1949 Allahabad 306 and was disposed of at the end of the judgment where it was observed: - "If any person becomes liable as surety under a decree, as if the decree had been made against him, we see no reason why the person in whose favour the liability had arisen cannot enforce that liability. The property of the judgment-debtor was attached and was released by the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor was entitled to obtain it back and the surety was bound to deliver it back to him. The decree-holder was no longer interested in the property; nor could he obtain it back. So the person entitled to enforce the liability was the judgment debtor. That liability could be enforced by an application under Section 145 of the Code or by a regular suit. If the judgment-debtor chose the former remedy, there was no legal bar to his doing so." 21. The only ground on which the case of Kallu Khan v. Abdullah Khan, 18 ALJ 357 was distinguished was that the provisions of Section 145 of the Code were not considered in it at all. The decision had, however, been given with reference to the section, and in all probability Banerji, J. who decided the case did not deal with the scope of Section 145 more elaborately as he had earlier expressed his views in the Division Bench case of Amir and others v. Madho Prasad, 15 ALJ 76. With all respects to the learned Judges who decided Mathura Das's case, AIR 1949 Allahabad 306 we find it difficult to see how the scope of Section 145, C.P.C. could be enlarged and in spite of its restricted terms the judgment-debtor could be allowed under its provisions to enforce his claim against a supurdar. With all respects to the learned Judges who decided Mathura Das's case, AIR 1949 Allahabad 306 we find it difficult to see how the scope of Section 145, C.P.C. could be enlarged and in spite of its restricted terms the judgment-debtor could be allowed under its provisions to enforce his claim against a supurdar. That section, as we have observed, only permits the execution of a decree or order against the surety in the same manner as it could have been executed against the judgment-debtor himself. When there is no question of executing the decree against anyone, Sec. 145, in our opinion, becomes inapplicable. It cannot by implication be held to entitle the judgment-debtor to execute a decree against himself or against another party. The surety under the section can be proceeded against only in execution, and if the judgment-debtor has no right to execute the decree he cannot proceed under Sec. 145. 22. As the view expressed in Mathura Das's case has not commended itself to us, in the usual course we would have referred the matter to a larger Bench. This, however, does not appear to be necessary in the present case for two reasons. In the first place, in Mathura Das's case', as has been noted at page 871 of the judgment, the executing court had, presumably under Section 47, C.P.C., treated the application started by the judgment-debtor as a suit, and had directed court-fee to be paid. It can, therefore, be said that the judgment-debtor in that case was enforcing the liability against the supurdar not under Section 145 but in a regular suit. If the case is considered in that light, the observations made by the Division Bench about the judgment-debtor's right to enforce his claim under Section 145 become obiter. Secondly, in the present case it is not necessary to rest our decision on the ground that the judgment-debtor has no right to enforce the liability of the supurdar under Section 145, because, as we have said above, the bond of the supurdar in the present case was not enforceable at all. It could not be enforced either by the decree-holder or by the judgment-debtor. 23. In the above view of the case, the contention of Mohammad Gulsher Khan in the two appeals that the application made by Bedi Lal under Section 145 of the C.P.C. was not maintainable against him must be upheld. It could not be enforced either by the decree-holder or by the judgment-debtor. 23. In the above view of the case, the contention of Mohammad Gulsher Khan in the two appeals that the application made by Bedi Lal under Section 145 of the C.P.C. was not maintainable against him must be upheld. The result is that his appeal No. 84 of 1958 must be allowed. So far as Bedi Lal's appeal, No. 579 of 1958 is concerned, it must fail but as Mohammad Gulsher Khan has submitted to the order directing him to pay Rs. 1,820 and has not either appealed against that order or filed any cross-objection, that order must remain and cannot be touched. 24. In this view of the case it is not necessary to consider whether the extent of Mohammad Gulsher Khan's liability and the amount for which he has been made liable have been correctly determined. 25. Appeal No. 84 of 1958 is in the result allowed with costs and the appeal No. 579 of 1958 is dismissed with costs.