JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by which the petitioners have challenged the decrees passed by the trial court, the first appellate court and the second appellate court for ejectment of the petitioners under Section 202 (b) (i) read with Section 21 (i) (c) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Board of Revenue, which was the second court of appeal, in its judgment held that there was no dispute as to facts between the parties. 2. Opposite parties 4 to 9 represented persons who were originally the tenants of the disputed land, but they were ejected by their land-holders sometime prior to the Ist of Sept. 1946. Thereafter the land-holders let out this land to petitioner No. 2 and opposite parties Nos. 10 to 14 and they in their turn sublet the land to petitioner No. 1. Subsequently the U.P. Tenancy (Amendment) Act (10 of 1947) came into force and under Section 27 of that Act a right accrued to opposite parties Nos. 4 to 9 to claim reinstatement. Consequently, opposite parties nos. 4 to 9 presented an application under Section 27 of that Act. That application was allowed. When allowing that application, the court held that the Proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Section 27 of that Act applied to this case. The result was that the petitioner No. 2 and opposite parties nos, 10 to 14 were declared as sub-tenants, not liable to ejectment for a period of three years. Petitioner no. 1 who was their sub-tenant until this order, thus, became their sub-sub-tenant. This order of reinstatement under Section 27 in favour of opposite parties nos. 4 to 9 was made on the 8th of March 1950. Then, on the 21st of May, 1953, this suit was instituted by opposite parties nos. 4 to 9 for ejectment of the two petitioners and opposite parties nos. 10 to 14. That suit was decreed by the trial court and that decree has been upheld by the first appellate court as well as by the Board of Revenue which was the second appellate court. 3. The only point which is raised in this petition, in view of the facts mentioned above, is that opposite parties nos. 10 to 14. That suit was decreed by the trial court and that decree has been upheld by the first appellate court as well as by the Board of Revenue which was the second appellate court. 3. The only point which is raised in this petition, in view of the facts mentioned above, is that opposite parties nos. 4 to 9, after having obtained an order of reinstatement under Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 did not execute that order, and since the execution of that order had to be sought within a period of three years from the date of the order, their right to execute it became time-barred. It was urged that the Board of Revenue, in these circumstances, should have held that opposite parties nos. 4 to 9 lost all rights which they could have acquired under that order of reinstatement if they had gat it executed, and having failed to do so, it must be held that the order of reinstatement became ineffective and the opposite parties acquired no fresh rights by virtue of it, so that the two petitioners and opposite parties nos. 10 to 14 continued to possess the rights which had been conferred on them by the land-holders when the land was let out to them before the 1st of Sept. 1946. 4. On behalf of opposite parties nos. 4 to 9, it was contended that, in view of the fact that the Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 was applicable to this case, there was no need for opposite parties nos. 4 to 9 to apply for execution of the order of reinstatement and that by virtue of that order of reinstatement their old rights were revived which later matured into rights as sirdars under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and they became land-holders of petitioner no. 2 and opposite parties nos. 10 to 14, and on their suit they and also Ganga Saran Petitioner no. 1 holding under them became liable to ejectment under Section 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 5. It will thus be seen that the sole controversy in this case is on the question as to whether an order of reinstatement covered by the Proviso to sub-sec (3) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 does or does not require execution. 6. 5. It will thus be seen that the sole controversy in this case is on the question as to whether an order of reinstatement covered by the Proviso to sub-sec (3) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 does or does not require execution. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has drawn our attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Roorey v. Board of Revenue and others, 1956 ALJ 417. He also drew our attention to the fact that that decision of the learned single Judge was upset by a Division Bench in appeal whose decision is reported in Roorey v. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad, 1960 ALJ 26. He, however, relied on the reasoning which was adopted by the learned single Judge in his decision on the ground that, when the appeal was allowed, that reasoning was not dissented from, and in fact the appeal was allowed by the Division Bench on an entirely different point. In view of the fact that the judgment of the learned single Judge was set aside by the Division Bench, the decision given by the learned single Judge on this point becomes obiter dictum. However, since the reasoning given by the learned single Judge was not dissented from and in fact was not even considered by the Division Bench, we have considered it advisable to take that reasoning into account in giving our decision to see how far that reasoning appeals to us and is correct. 7. The learned single Judge in his decision held that an order of reinstatement even covered by the Proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 had to be executed at least against the land-holder, because, in his opinion, the reinstatement would not be complete until and unless, by execution of the order in some form or other, the rights granted by the order were brought into effect. The learned Judge noticed the fact that there was no provision in the U.P. Tenancy Act or its amendment Acts or in the C.P.C. which specifically provided for execution of such an order. He was, however, of the view that such an order could be executed by a court on the analogy of the provisions of Or. 21, R. 36, C.P.C. and the provisions of Secs. 181 and 186 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. He was, however, of the view that such an order could be executed by a court on the analogy of the provisions of Or. 21, R. 36, C.P.C. and the provisions of Secs. 181 and 186 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. With all respect, we find ourselves unable to agree with this view. There is first the general position to be kept in view that the C.P.C. in Or. 21 makes provision for execution of decrees only and not for execution of orders, so that the provisions of Or. 21, C.P.C. cannot be held to be applicable to orders of court; they can only be applied to decrees or orders which have the force of decrees. In the case of the U.P. Tenancy Act, the Legislature felt the need to provide for execution of one type of order, and that was an order of ejectment passed by the revenue courts. Under Section 181 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, therefore, a provision was made that an order of ejectment under the U.P. Tenancy Act shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the C.P.C., 1908, relating to the execution of decrees for delivery of immovable property. These orders of ejectment were specifically made executable by Section 181 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, and the further provision was made that, in executing such an order, though it would not be an order for delivery of immovable property as being an order for ejectment, it is to be executed in the same manner as a decree for delivery of immoveable property. An order of reinstatement passed under Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 has not been made executable by any provision contained in that Amendment Act or in any provision of the principal Act, viz., the U.P. Tenancy Act. On the face of it, therefore, it appears that the provisions made by the legislature do not require an order or reinstatement to be executed. If the Legislature had intended that orders of reinstatement should be executed, there was no reason why the legislature could not have made a specific provision for that purpose. A very simple provision could have been made by stating that the provisions of Section 181 of the U.P. Tenancy Act shall apply to an order of reinstatement passed under Sec. 27(3) of Act 10 of 1957. A very simple provision could have been made by stating that the provisions of Section 181 of the U.P. Tenancy Act shall apply to an order of reinstatement passed under Sec. 27(3) of Act 10 of 1957. The absence of such a provision indicates that the legislature never intended to equate an order of reinstatement with an order of ejectment or delivery of possession and consequently made no provision for execution of such an order. 8. There are then intrinsic circumstances to be found in the provisions of Sec. 27(3) of Act 10 of 1947 itself which go to support our view. The principal clause of sub-section (3) to Section 27 is the general provision under which an order of reinstatement is to be made by a court under the circumstances mentioned in sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec. (2) of that section. In this principal clause of sub-sec. (3), the legislature has proceeded, after directing the court to pass an order for reinstatement, to lay down that the court shall also order that any other person in possession of the land be ejected there from. If the order of reinstatement could have been executed by itself, this further direction by the legislature to the court to order ejectment of the person in possession would have been unnecessary. If the order for reinstatement could be and had to be executed, the applicant who obtained that order would be entitled to be restored to the position in which he was, before he was ejected. On restoration in that position, he would naturally be put in possession, and for that purpose the landlord or any other person in possession would have had to be dispossessed. Consequently, if the order of reinstatement were held to be an executable order, this further provision for an order of ejectment of any other person in possession would be redundant; and it seems to us that we should not attribute to the order of reinstatement qualities which would render part of this provision redundant. Under the principal clause the legislature made this provision for an order for ejectment of the person in possession for the purpose of providing an executable order by which effect could be given to the order of reinstatement which would have been a non-executable order. In cases covered by the proviso, the position is different. Under the principal clause the legislature made this provision for an order for ejectment of the person in possession for the purpose of providing an executable order by which effect could be given to the order of reinstatement which would have been a non-executable order. In cases covered by the proviso, the position is different. Under the Proviso, the person in actual possession has to be declared a sub-tenant of the applicant who may have obtained the order of reinstatement. Since the person in actual possession has to be declared a sub-tenant, there remains no necessity for providing for execution of the order of reinstatement by any means to be adopted for delivery of possession. In fact, the result of the Proviso is that the land-holder becomes the land-holder of the person reinstated. The person reinstated becomes the chief tenant and the person who had been admitted as a tenant by the landholders after the ejectment of the original tenant becomes the sub-tenant of the chief tenant. Actual physical possession has to remain with the subtenant. Neither the land-holder nor the chief tenant can claim actual possession over the land. The right of cultivating the land vests in the sub-tenant. In these circumstances, it is clear that there was no need to make provision for any order being made for delivery of possession to the chief tenant from anyone. The moment an order of reinstatement is passed, the chief tenant would become liable to pay rent to the land-holder, the sub-tenant to the chief tenant, and the rights as land-holder and chief tenant would be exercised by those two persons by realising rent from their tenant and subtenant in the manner provided by the U.P. Tenancy Act. Those rights could be exercised without resorting to any procedure of the nature laid down by Or. 21, R. 36, C.P.C. This interpretation of the principal clause as well as the Proviso of sub-sec. (3) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 thus shows that our view that an order of reinstatement does not require execution follows even from the language used in this provision of law. 9. Lastly, we may consider the provision contained in sub-sec. (3) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 thus shows that our view that an order of reinstatement does not require execution follows even from the language used in this provision of law. 9. Lastly, we may consider the provision contained in sub-sec. (4) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947, where the legislature directs that the applicant under Section 27 shall not be reinstated in such holding or in any part thereof unless within such time, as may be allowed by the court, he pays to the land-holder (i) any amount . . . (ii) in a case in which and (iii) in a case falling under clause (a) of sub Sec. (1) It was urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that this sub-sec. (4) of Section 27 should be interpreted as requiring the execution court not to execute the order of reinstatement until the applicant pays to the land-holder the amount mentioned in this provision of law. It seems to us that this interpretation will be incorrect in view of the fact that the court mentioned in sub-sec. (4) is not the execution court but the court before which the applicant may have moved the application for reinstatement and this is the court that has to pass the order of reinstatement. The mention of this court indicates that the limitation placed on the applicant being reinstated is a limitation which would have to be taken into account by the court making the order of reinstatement, and that court can only take it into account at some stage prior to making that order of reinstatement. Once the order of reinstatement is made by the court and it is held that that order of reinstatement is an in-executable order, that court would become functus officio, and subsequent powers would only be exercised by the court executing that order. It is a fundamental principle that an executing court is bound by the decree or order it is required to execute, and cannot go behind that order. Nor can it attach conditions to that decree or order which are not already found in it. The execution court may apply limitations or conditions provided the law gives the power to the execution court to impose limitations or conditions. Nor can it attach conditions to that decree or order which are not already found in it. The execution court may apply limitations or conditions provided the law gives the power to the execution court to impose limitations or conditions. Where, in the law, the mention with regard to imposition of a condition is with reference to the court passing the decree or orders and not the executing court, the executing court must execute the decree or order in the form in which it exists. In these circumstances we consider that sub-sec. (4) of Section 27 of Act 10 of 1947 should be interpreted as a substantive provision of law creating a bar to the right of the applicant to be reinstated, and such a bar or condition will have to be given effect to by the court dealing with the application at a stage of passing the order of reinstatement. In sub-sec. (4), therefore, the mere use of the expression "shall not be reinstated" cannot be interpreted as indicating that the condition laid down in that provision of law is to be imposed at the stage of execution of the order of reinstatement. On the other hand, that is a condition which will have to be kept in view by the court passing the order of reinstatement and cannot be left to the execution court. Clearly it could not be left to the execution court because an order of reinstatement is not to be executed at all, there being no provision made anywhere for execution of such an order. Therefore, the provisions contained in sub-sec. (4) also support the view taken by us. 10. For the reasons given above, we hold that the order passed by the Board of Revenue was correct and that this petition has no force and is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss it with costs.