JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. This second appeal by the first defendant in O. S. 69 of 1944 arises out of restitution proceedings under S.144 of the Civil Procedure Code. 0. S. 69 of 1944 was a suit in ejectment by two plaintiffs, respondents 1 to 16 in this appeal being the legal representatives of the deceased first plaintiff, and respondent 17 being the second plaintiff, on the ground that the first defendant, a tenant, had committed default in the payment of rent. The latter's contention, that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of a notice to quit, was repelled. On the issue of default in the payment of rent, as furnishing the cause of action for eviction, the Trial Court relied upon the decree in O. S. 545 of 1942 for arrears of rent which had been obtained against the first defendant and which was still unsatisfied. In passing the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944 the Trial Court ordered as follows: "In the result in O. S. 69 of 1944 the first defendant is allowed two months' time from to-day to make a deposit of the correct amount due under the decree in O. S. 545 of 1942 to the credit of the first plaintiff and the balance future rent of 1119, 1120 and 1121 with interest at 12 per cent till date of deposit............ and also costs of suit........ in which case the suit will stand dismissed. If the amount as ordered is not deposited in time the suit will stand decreed for possession against defendants............" This was on April 22, 1946. O. S. 545 of 1942 had already been put in execution and was coming on for sale of the first defendant's properties on June 24, 1946. Two days earlier, the first defendant made a deposit of the full amount in terms of the decree, out of which, a sum of Rs. 1,416-10-8 was deposited in O. S. 545 of 1942 towards the credit of that decree, the balance being deposited in O. S. 69 of 1944. In an affidavit Ext. A. 2 which accompanied the deposit, the first defendant explained that the deposit in O. S. 545 of 1942 was being made as directed in the other decree and by petition Ext. B 2, prayed for satisfaction being entered. The sale did not take place. In an affidavit Ext. A. 2 which accompanied the deposit, the first defendant explained that the deposit in O. S. 545 of 1942 was being made as directed in the other decree and by petition Ext. B 2, prayed for satisfaction being entered. The sale did not take place. Later, when the first plaintiff in O. S. 69 of 1944 applied in O. S. 545 of 1942 for the withdrawal of the amount in deposit, the first defendant objected contending that he was intending to prefer an appeal against the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944, and that he was entitled to the benefits under the Madras Tenants and Ryots Protection Act, 1946 (Act XVII of 1946) which had come into force on October 4, 1946. The objections were overruled and the money was allowed to be withdrawn. In the appeal which was preferred against the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit for the want of a notice to quit. The first defendant then made the application now in question for the restitution of all amounts deposited by him. The two courts have allowed his claim, except to the extent of the amount deposited in O. S. 545 of 1942 and this appeal relates to this. 2. It may at once be stated, that when the first defendant made the deposit in O. S. 545 of 1942 and prayed for full satisfaction being entered, he acted beyond the scope of the direction in the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944. It no doubt served his immediate purpose, which was probably to avert the sale. The direction to him in the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944 was only to make the deposit of the amount to the credit of the first plaintiff, which seems to suggest that the deposit was to be in that very decree. However that be, the first defendant accepted a risk in praying for satisfaction of that decree being entered: furthermore, he took no steps to prefer an appeal against the order which overruled his objections and allowed disbursement of the amount to the first plaintiff, especially when, as he now thinks, his right under Act XVII of 1946 was impaired. This is sufficient to negative his present claim. 3. This is sufficient to negative his present claim. 3. On the question of restitution, I am inclined to take the view that the first defendant had suffered no prejudice by reason of the direction in the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944, for he was under a legal liability to discharge the decree in O. S. 545 of 1942. His present complaint is in effect that but for the direction in the decree, the deposit might not have been made immediately, and that he might have succeeded in averting the sale and delaying further execution till at last Act XVII of 1946 came in handy, under S.4 sub-section (3) of which, he would be entitled to stay execution by paying only a part of the decree amount which represented arrears of rent for two years, with the hope, not certainly unfulfilled, of ' similar legislations in the years to come. I do not think that chances such as these, constitute injury which S.144, C. P. C. is intended to remedy. The direction to the first defendant was only to pay off a subsisting liability under the decree in O. S. 545 of 1942. In T. S. Swaminatha Odayar v. Official Receiver of West Tanjore ( AIR 1957 SC 577 ) decided by the Supreme Court the facts were as follows. A final decree for partition provided for the payment of a sum of money to the appellant by the Official Receiver, in whom the interest of one of the sharers had vested on insolvency. The Official Receiver realised the assets partially and had a sum of over 6,000/- rupees in his hands. In the meantime, another creditor of the insolvent had taken out execution proceedings, and in a dispute between him and the appellant, the District Judge had decided, that under the terms of the decree the appellant was entitled to a charge on the estate of the insolvent and to a priority for payment. In accordance with this, the Official Receiver made payments to the appellant aggregating an amount of over 32, 000/- rupees. The defeated creditor appealed to the High Court, which decided against the appellant and remanded the case. In accordance with this, the Official Receiver made payments to the appellant aggregating an amount of over 32, 000/- rupees. The defeated creditor appealed to the High Court, which decided against the appellant and remanded the case. The District Judge then held, that the High Court had only ruled that the appellant had no charge on the assets of the insolvent, but had not denied his right to priority and rejecting an application which had been made by the Official Receiver for the restitution of the amount paid to the appellant in pursuance of the order which had been set aside, allowed the appellant also to withdraw a further sum which had been deposited by the Official Receiver. On appeal, the High Court allowed the application for restitution. The matter was then taken to the Supreme Court and in allowing the appeal Sarkar J. observed thus: "In making the payment the Official Receiver has carried out his obligations under the decree. The decree stands and he has, therefore, no right to recover the payments made. The official Receiver asked for the order for refund under S. 144, Civil P. C. But that section only applies where payments have been made under a decree which is varied or reversed. That is not the case here. Here the payments have been made in satisfaction of a decree which still stands and indeed is one which has never been attacked." In that case too, although the decree had declared the right of the appellant to be paid a certain amount, it was in pursuance of the order in execution, that the Official Receiver made payment and yet the claim for restitution was negatived. 4. In Lal Bhagwant Singh v. Sri Kishen Das (AIR 1953 S. C. 136) there were two decrees, one, which did not allow payment in instalments and the other, a decree which amended the earlier, and which allowed payments to be made in instalments. The latter having been set aside by the High Court, a sale was held in pursuance of the earlier decree. On further appeal, the Privy Council restored the amended decree, but by that time the right to make payment in instalments had been forfeited with the result, that the amount which became payable in a lump tallied with the amount of the earlier decree. The sale was sought to be set aside by way of restitution. On further appeal, the Privy Council restored the amended decree, but by that time the right to make payment in instalments had been forfeited with the result, that the amount which became payable in a lump tallied with the amount of the earlier decree. The sale was sought to be set aside by way of restitution. The principle was stated thus by the Supreme Court: "The decree holder in the present case has derived no advantage to which he was not entitled and the judgment debtor has lost nothing. In either event he had to discharge and satisfy the decretal debt due from him whether under the first decree or under the second and that debt could only be discharged by sale of the villages selected by the decree holder." 5. In this case too, the first plaintiff could not be deemed to have derived any advantage by the deposit made in O. S. 545 of 1942 to which he was not entitled and the appellant could not be deemed to have lost anything by making payment towards a subsisting liability on his part. I am therefore of the view, that in making deposit in O. S. 545 of 1942 the appellant did not act in accordance with the direction in the decree in O. S. 69 of 1944 and that in any case, he did not suffer any prejudice or injury by discharging his own decree debt. It was then stated, that the amount for restitution has not been correctly ascertained by the execution court. I hereby direct that before passing the final order, that court will verify as to the correctness of the amount. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.