Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is by the plaintiff, a Co-operative Society, that has sued for recovery of money due under a chitty bond evidenced by Ext. A. The defendants are not members of the plaintiff Society but are members of another society which itself is a member of the plaintiff Society. The suit was originally instituted before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies; but, finding that the Registrar has no jurisdiction to try a suit of this kind, the plaint was returned for presentation in a Civil Court; and accordingly it was represented in the Munsiff's Court of Kottayam. The defendants pleaded bar of limitation. It is conceded, that unless the period of pendency of the suit before the Registrar and the arbitrator appointed by him to try it is excluded from computation, the suit would be beyond time. The Munsiff decreed the suit, giving the benefit of S.14 of the Limitation Act to the plaintiff. The District Judge, however, held an arbitrator under Co-operative Societies Act not a 'court' within the meaning of S.14 of the Limitation Act and therefore the plaintiff not entitled to exclusion of the period of pendency of the suit before such arbitrator in calculating limitation for the suit and dismissed the same as beyond time. Hence this Second Appeal. 2. The District Judge has obviously relied on Purushottamdas Hassaram Sabnani v. Impex (India) Ltd. (A.I.R.1954 Bombay 309; where in view of S.37(5) Arbitration Act" (of 1940), Chagla, C.J. (with the concurrence of Dixit, J.) held the plaintiff "not entitled to exclude any time taken up in arbitration proceedings". Incidentally an observation was also made by the learned judge that since S.14 of the Limitation Act referred to a 'court of first instance' and "a court of appeal" the Legislature must have meant by the word "court" only the "judicial courts, Courts established by the Law of the land, and not courts in the wider sense of domestic forums or tribunals." 3. The above observations cannot apply to arbiters under the Co-operative Societies Act. Clauses (2) and (5) of S.60 and S.61 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1952, read as follow: "60. (2). The above observations cannot apply to arbiters under the Co-operative Societies Act. Clauses (2) and (5) of S.60 and S.61 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1952, read as follow: "60. (2). "The Registrar may, on receipt of such reference, (a) decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by, the Government with powers in that behalf, or (c) subject to such rules as may be prescribed, refer it for disposal to an arbitrator or arbitrators: Provided that if any party to the dispute applies for action being taken under clause (c) the Registrar shall act accordingly. ................................................. (5) The Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of a party to a reference, revise any decision thereon by the person to whom such reference was transferred or by the arbitrator or arbitrators to whom it was referred". "61. (1) Any decision passed by the Registrar under clause (a) of sub section (2) of S.60 or under sub-section (5) of the same section or in case the said decision has been revised by Government under S.86, the order of Government as the case may be, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any civil court. (2) Any decision that may be passed by the person to whom a reference is transferred or by the arbitrator or arbitrators to whom it is referred under sub-section (2) of S.60 shall save as otherwise provided in sub-section (5) of the same section or in subsection (1) of this Section, be final and shall not be called in question in any civil court." It is clear therefore that the arbiters under the Co-operative Societies Act are not mere "domestic forums or tribunals". They are statutory authorities with exclusive jurisdiction in matters committed to their cognizance. They have all the plenary powers in the matter; their decisions are final; and so far as their jurisdiction extends, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. Such arbiters are Courts parallel to the civil courts and have therefore to be regarded as Courts within the meaning of the expression in S.14 of the Limitation Act. 4. They have all the plenary powers in the matter; their decisions are final; and so far as their jurisdiction extends, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. Such arbiters are Courts parallel to the civil courts and have therefore to be regarded as Courts within the meaning of the expression in S.14 of the Limitation Act. 4. No case was cited at the Bar, in which pendency of a proceeding before an arbitrator appointed by a statute was sought to be excluded under S.14 of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation for the institution of a suit on the same matter in a Civil Court. A.I.R. 1929 P.C.103, 1947 Allahabad 162, 1945 Patna 369 and 1948 Nagpur 334 all concerned proceedings before arbitrators appointed by parties and not by statutory authority. Even with regard to such arbitrators, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ramdutt Ramkissan Dass v. E.D. Sasoon & Co. (A.I.R.1929 P.C.103) observed referring particularly to S.14 of the Limitation Act, thus: "civil proceedings in a court must be held to cover civil proceedings before arbitrators whom the parties have substituted for the Courts of law to be the judges of the dispute between them. If arbitrators chosen by the parties can be'Court' within the meaning of S.14, it goes without saying that an arbitrator appointed by the Legislature by a specific provision, as in the Co-operative Societies Act, must necessarily be a Court within the meaning of the Section. That proceeding for recovery of money due is a civil proceeding does not require any authority. I would therefore hold that a proceeding originally instituted before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a civil proceeding in a Court within the meaning of S.14 of the Limitation Act, and that the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of that Section to exclude the period of pendency of his suit before such Court, which really had no jurisdiction on the matter, in reckoning the period of limitation for a subsequent institution of the suit in the civil court. That the present suit would be within time, if such period is excluded, is found by the Munsiff and is not disputed before me. I hold therefore that the suit under appeal is within time. 5. In the result, in reversal of the decree of the District Judge, I restore that of the Munsiff, with costs throughout. That the present suit would be within time, if such period is excluded, is found by the Munsiff and is not disputed before me. I hold therefore that the suit under appeal is within time. 5. In the result, in reversal of the decree of the District Judge, I restore that of the Munsiff, with costs throughout. Allowed.