Judgment :- On the application of respondent 2 under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the labour court, Coimbatore, found that he was a fitter from January 1956, among the staff of the petitioner, and that, as such, he was entitled to salary on the scales Rs. 44-11-0 to Rs. 64-11-0 and to his first increment on 1 October 1958, and computed his total benefit upto 30 September 1959 at Rs. 316-8-0. This petition by the management under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash that order. The main contention of the petitioner, which appears to be one of its objections before the labour court but the not particularly decided by that Court, is that the question, whether respondent 2 was a fitter, as claimed by him or only a fitter-helper, as the management would have it, was not within the purview of the application under S. 33C(2) of the Act. Apparently, the labour court proceeded on the view it had jurisdiction to decide the issue The respondent 2 was entertained by the petitioner, which is a textile mill at Coimbatore, as a temporary worker on 17 January 1954, and was made permanent from 1 January 1956 in the mechanical shop department. Before that time he was in the lowest category of workers classified as unskilled workers and was drawing a basic wage of Rs. 26 per month. In about January 1956, he was directed to work in the reeling section, where the conversion of hand reels into power reels was going on, was designated as a power reel fitter. After the process of conversion was completed, he was transferred on 1 April 1957 back to the mechanical shop department. His basic wage was enhanced to Rs. 32-8-0 with effect from 1 February, 1957, and he continued to receive wages on that scale until 3 October 1959, when he made the present claim as a fitter under S. 33C(2) claiming wages at Rs. 50-11-0 per month on basis of an award in Industrial Dispute No. 65 of 1958. Prior to that award, some of the textile mills of which the petitioner was one, and their workmen had, in relation to certain disputes, reached a settlement on 25 September 1956, the terms of which appear in a memorandum signed by the parties. 50-11-0 per month on basis of an award in Industrial Dispute No. 65 of 1958. Prior to that award, some of the textile mills of which the petitioner was one, and their workmen had, in relation to certain disputes, reached a settlement on 25 September 1956, the terms of which appear in a memorandum signed by the parties. Clause 15 of this memorandum stated that the wages and work-loads with regard to workers in the electrical and mechanical shop determents and automatic loom sections of the relative mills would be discussed between parties and the determination would be added to from part of the settlement. Failing to reach an agreement, this question was referred to for adjudication which ended in the said award published in the gazette, dated 18 February 1959. This award fixed the scale of pay for a fitter at Rs. 44-11-0 with effect from 1 October 1957. There is no dispute that if respondent 2 were a fitter, he would be entitled to wages at that rate. But according to the management, respondent 2 was never a fitter but only a fitter-helper ever during the time of the conversion of the hand reels into power reels, and notwithstanding his designation as a power reel fitter, the nature of work he did, continued to be the same and his designation was altered into a fitter-helper even from 1 April 1957. The management further stated that the mere fact that respondent 2 was called a power reel fitter during the short period between 1 January 1956 and 1 April, 1957, did not in itself entitle him to claim to be a fitter and that his status, in relation to the scale of salary he was entitled to draw, should be determined not merely with reference to the designation but the nature of the work he did. It was in such Court, the petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the labour court under S. 33C(2) to decide whether respondent 2 was a fitter or a fitter-helperThe petitioner contends that what was decided by the industrial tribunal in Industrial Disputes No. 65 of 1958 was the fixation of the scale of wages for a fitter and not whether respondent 2 belonged to that category or not. The question according to the petitioner, not being covered by the award, respondent 2 could have it independently raised as an industrial dispute and decided, and could not apply under S. 33C(2) as if he was fitter which was disputed. There is no controversy that the award never went into the question and decided whether respondent 2 was a fitter. But what is urged on behalf of respondent 2 is that whenever he is entitled to a benefit under the terms and conditions of his employment, he could invoke S. 33C(2) to have that benefit computed in terms of money value and that, in any case, the case, the scale of wages applicable to a fitter having been fixed in the award, the question whether he is a fitter or not is incidental to his claim to the benefit of that scale In Writ Petition No. 195 of 1960 (since reported in I considered the scope of S. 33C(2) and held "In my opinion, 'any benefit' under Sub-sec. (2) means only that which flown from the settlement or an award under the provisions of Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act." That, of course, was a case where, in an application under that section, the labour court wads called upon to compute the benefit namely, the good attendance bonus embodied in an award, made not under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act but the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, and the labour court dismissed the application as not maintainable on the view which I have upheld. The principle of this decision, namely, that a benefit not comprehended by or included in any settlement or award under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, or not within the purview of the provisions of Chap. VA of the same Act, does not fall within the ambit of Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C is equally applicable to the instant case. In support of this view of the sub-section, the learned Advocate-General who in the course of the hearing of the petition, intervened to assist the Court, submits, I think, very rightly, that having regard to the entire purpose of S. 33C, in the context of the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, Sub-sec. (2) cannot be read as of a wider scope than that of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 33C. (2) cannot be read as of a wider scope than that of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 33C. The purpose of the section, which in 1956 replaced S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, is to provide for a speedy, effective and inexpensive remedy for a workman to recover, in a summary proceeding, from his employer any money which by an adjudication under an award or an agreement under a settlement, or by virtue of the provisions of Chap. VA, he is entitled to. But if what he is entitled to is not expressed in terms of money, as for instance, Deepavali bonus, or good attendance bonus, sick leave allowance and the like, it becomes necessary to have the benefit translated into terms of money for the purpose of enabling a workman to realized the same by levying execution. It is to give effect to this purpose that Sub-sec. (2) has been enacted. While Sub-sec. (1) comprehends and includes a present claim for money embodies in an award or settlement of an order under Chap. VA which is readily executable, Sub-sec. (2) contemplates cases of claims which are embodied in an award or a settlement or becomes due under Chap. VA but which for the purpose of recovery under the machinery provided by Sub-sec. (1), require to be first computed in terms of a definite sum of money. In respect of claims of money or benefit computable in terms of money which fall outside the purview of an award, settlement or the provisions of Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, there are remedies provided for the workmen under the provisions of the appropriate and related enactments, lime the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. So far as the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, the scope of the remedies provided thereunder to the workmen should, in my view, be read and understood in the context of and as limited by its provisions themselves, and in such a way and not to lead to the overlapping or trenching upon the special jurisdictions under the particular related legislations. For example, a claim, arising out of deduction from wages or delay in payment of wages, which is not the subject-matter of a settlement or an award under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, will not fall within the purview of S. 33C(2) of that Act but within S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and such a claim will have to be considered by the authority specially constituted therefor. What is, therefore, enforceable under S. 33C, be it under Sub-sec. (1) or Sub-sec. (2), is what is covered by a settlement or award or a claim under Ch. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act. While this is one mode of enforcement, S. 36A empowers the Government to interpret an award or a settlement for the purpose of removing any difficulty or doubt therein, and S. 29 provides for another mode of enforcement by prescribing a penalty for breach of a settlement or an award. The word "benefit" in Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33C, therefore, is of no wider amplitude that a benefit which is due under a settlement or an award or under Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes ActAs to the next contention, that the question whether respondent 2 was a fitter or a fitter-helper is incidental to his claim in his application under S. 33C(2) and the Labour Court was, therefore, competent to decide the question, the fallacy underlining it is the assumption that the question, is ancillary or incidental to anything embodied in the award. It may be conceded that if any benefit is due under a settlement or award or under the provisions of Chap. VA, any matter incidental or ancillary to its computation in terms of money may be enquiry into as within the competence of the labour court. But in this case, though the award fixed the scale of pay applicable to a fitter, it stated nothing on the question whether respondent 2 was a fitter or a fitter-helper. That question was never raised as a dispute and did not form part of the award. That is the only question which has to be determined before respondent 2 can claim wages applicable to a fitter and cannot, therefor, be regarded as an incidental or ancillary question. In Sri Ambica Mills Co. That question was never raised as a dispute and did not form part of the award. That is the only question which has to be determined before respondent 2 can claim wages applicable to a fitter and cannot, therefor, be regarded as an incidental or ancillary question. In Sri Ambica Mills Co. v. S. B. Bhatt which arose out of an application under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the problem was of a quite different nature. There, the nature of the work done by the claimant workman, not being in dispute, the only question was whether, on a proper interpretation of the relevant clauses in an agreement, and an earlier award, he was entitled to the scale of wages applicable to certain category of employees within the purview of one of the clauses in the agreement. The question of interpretation of the relevant clauses with reference to the particular work done by the claimant was held to be incidental to the claim of delayed wages under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The question in this case is different, namely, what was the work done by the second respondent during the relevant period so as to entitle him to be called as a fitter ? Apart from that, the decision of the Supreme Court proceeded in relation to the particular definition of "wages" in the Payment of Wages Act, the object and scheme of its provisions, especially S. 15. Kasturi & Sons (Pte.) Ltd. v. Salvateswaran arose under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. It was held in that case that S. 17 of that Act was confined to an investigation of the narrow point as to what amount was actually due to be paid to an employee under at decree or award or other valid order obtained by him after establishing his claim in that behalf, and that an enquiry into the disputed liability under the claim was not within its purview. Though there is a reference in this decision to S. 33C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was only in the context of elucidating the scope of S. 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. Though there is a reference in this decision to S. 33C(1) and (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was only in the context of elucidating the scope of S. 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955. I can find nothing in this case that he was entitled to have the question 2's case that he was entitled to have the question whether he was a fitter or a fitter-helper adjudicated under S. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. I hold that the application in the instant case under S. 33C(2) of that Act was not maintainable and the order of the labour court under that section is without jurisdiction. It is, therefore, hereby quashedTwo further points on behalf of the petitioner were urged, which, in the view I have expressed above, it will be unnecessary to decide. Nevertheless, I may briefly record my opinion on these points as well. The first of them is that in view of Cl. 15 in the memorandum of settlement, dated 25 September 1956, respondent 2's remedy was, as provided by Cl. 20 therein, to ask for arbitration. But it is obvious that as no agreement was reached and there was no settlement in regard to the scale of wages for workers in electrical and mechanical shop departments and automatic loom sections of the mills, neither of the two clauses will have application. The other point urged for the petitioner is that there was no evidence before the labour court to justify its finding that respondent 2 was a fitter from 1 January 1956. Assuming that it is within the purview of certiorari to impugn a finding of fact on the ground of there being no evidence as such to support it, it cannot be said in this case that the labour court entirely acted without material. The sufficiency of the material this Court will not assess in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution The petition is allowed and the rule nisi is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs.