Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against the judgment of Vaidialingam, J., dismissing O. P. No. 662 of 1960. By that petition under Art.226 of the Constitution the appellant sought the cancellation of two orders, one dated 11-2-1960 and another dated 26-4-1960. 2. The order of 11-2-1960 was an order of assessment under S.23 (4) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, for the assessment year 1959-60 in respect of the appellant's income for the accounting period 1958-59. The order of 26-4-1960 was an order rejecting the appellant's request to deal with the matter afresh in view of a return filed by him on 15 21960. 3. The assessment under S.23 (4) was made on 11-2-1960. It is common ground that the appellant did not comply with the notices under subsections (2) and (4) of S.22 of the Act and that his non-compliance was the basis for the best judgment assessment under sub-section (4) of S.23. 4. Sub-section (3) of S.22 of the Act provides: " If any person has not furnished a return within the time allowed by or under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), or having furnished a return under either of those sub-sections, discovers any omission or wrong statement therein, he may furnish a return or a revised return, as the case may be, at any time before the assessment is made". The assessment in this case, as already stated, was on 11-2-1960. The order of assessment was served upon the appellant only on 23-2-1960. Before that date, on 15-2-1960, the appellant filed a return, and his contention is that that return should have been considered and an assessment made on its basis. It was this contention that was negatived by the second of the two orders challenged, namely, the order dated 26-4-1960. 5. The answer to the controversy depends on the meaning to be assigned to the words "before the assessment is made" occurring in sub-section (3) of S.22. If the assessment has to be considered as made on 11-2-1960, the return filed on 15-2-1960 was out of time and will not enter into the picture. If, on the other hand, it has to be considered as made only on 23-2-1960, the return filed on 15-2-1960 was in time and will arise for consideration. 6. If the assessment has to be considered as made on 11-2-1960, the return filed on 15-2-1960 was out of time and will not enter into the picture. If, on the other hand, it has to be considered as made only on 23-2-1960, the return filed on 15-2-1960 was in time and will arise for consideration. 6. In (1951) 19 I.T.R. 402 Rajamannar, C.J., said: "If a person is given a right to resort to a remedy to get rid of an adverse order within a prescribed time, limitation should not be computed from a date earlier than that on which the party aggrieved actually knew of the order or had an opportunity of knowing the order and therefore must be presumed to have had knowledge of the order". This statement of the law has been approved by the Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 25 and 26 of 1958. In that case the Supreme Court discussed the case-law on the subject and said: "Where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned". 7. What we are concerned with, however, is not the starting point of a period of limitation but the expiry of a period of grace granted to the assessee in spite of his default and terminating - automatically - on an assessment being made. We see no reason to hold, in such a case, that the making of the assessment is not when the officer does so; but when the order is communicated to the assessee. 8. It follows that the appeal should fail and has to be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed with costs, advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.