ORDER : K.L. PANDEY, J. 1. The short question for consideration in this revision is whether a dispute about title to the land sought to be acquired between the State Government and any person laying claim to it can be referred to the Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. The question arises in this manner. Since land measuring 333.08 acres, including khasra Nos. 72, 73/1, 74, 75 and 80 of village khasadihin Durg Tahsil, was urgently required for the Bhilai Steel Project, proceedings were taken under the Land Acquisition Act. For brevity, that Act would hereinafter be called the Act, and, unless otherwise indicated, the sections mentioned would mean sections of that Act. As usual, there was a notification under Section 4, a direction under Section 17 (4) that Section 5-A would not apply and a notification under Section 6 for acquiring the land. General and special notices under Section 9 were also issued and served and, thereupon, under Section 17 (1), possession was taken. Subsequently, the Land Acquisition Officer, while awarding to the applicant Rs. 18,163-14 as compensation for khasra No. 72 and 80, held that, since khasra No. 73 (1) (embankment), 74 (Paithee) and 75 (tank) belonged to the State, there could be no question of payment of any compensation for those khasra Nos. to any one. Thereupon, at the instance of the applicant, who had not accepted the award, a reference was made to the Court under Section 18. The Additional District Judge, Durg, who dealt with the reference, held on a preliminary point raised before him that the question of title to khasra Nos. 73/1, 74 and 75 including the failure to award any compensation there for, was outside the purview of Section 18 and could not, therefore, be referred under that section. Against that decision, the applicant has come up in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Since the lower Court has not yet given an award as specified in Section 26, no appeal lies under Section 54. The point however is whether the lower Court, which functions under the provisions of the Act is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The reference under Section 18 is made to the Court, which, under Section 3 (d) in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The point however is whether the lower Court, which functions under the provisions of the Act is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The reference under Section 18 is made to the Court, which, under Section 3 (d) in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. By Section 53, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply, save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, to all proceedings under the Act. Under Section 26, every award made by the Court has to be deemed to be a decree and the statement of grounds of every such award has to be deemed to be a judgment within the meaning of clause (2) and clause (9) respectively of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 54, an appeal lies against an award of the Court to this Court and, against a decree of this Court, a further appeal lies to the Supreme Court. Having regard to these provisions, it would appear that the Court named in Section 3, namely the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, functions as a civil court and not merely as a persona designate with the consequence that its determination should not be treated merely as a judgment of a special tribunal created by the statute. 4. In Balkrishna Udayar vs. Vasudeva Aiyar 44 IA 261 the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction was empowered to act under Section 10 of the Religious Endowments Act XX of 1863. The High Court entertained under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure a revision against its order. The matter was taken to the Privy Council and it was contended that no revision lay to the High Court. Their Lordships observed;- "It appears to their Lordships to be clear that in all these matters the Civil Court exercises its powers as a Court of law, not merely as a persona designata whose determinations are not to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal". Their Lordships observed;- "It appears to their Lordships to be clear that in all these matters the Civil Court exercises its powers as a Court of law, not merely as a persona designata whose determinations are not to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal". [Pages 268-9] In Secretary of State for India vs. Chelikani Rama Rao 43 IA 192, the question was whether the decision of the District Court in appeal under Section 10 (ii) of the Madras Forest Act (V of 1882) against an order of the Forest Settlement Officer on questions relating to rights in or over land required for a reserved forest was subject to further proceedings by way of appeal. It was urged that such proceedings were incompetent. The Privy Council observed:- "In their Lordships' opinion, this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply". [Page 197] In the case before me, all these rules expressly apply. 5. In T. B. Ramchandra Rao vs. A. N. S Ramchandra Rao 49 I. A. 129 and Bhagwati vs. Ram Kali 66 I. A. 145 the Privy Council held that the District Court functioning under the Act was a Court and a decision of that Court on a question of title operated as res judicata. The two Privy Council decisions were accepted as conclusion on that question in Raj Lakshmi Dasi vs. Banamali Sen 1953 S. C. 33. It may be stated here that, in the first-mentioned Privy Council case, the earlier decision of the Board in Rangoon Botatoung Co. vs. The Collector, Rangoon 39 I. A. 197, was distinguished and it was pointed out that even under the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act XIX of 1921, which inter alia provided for a further appeal to the Privy Council, such an appeal lay if there was a dispute between the persons claiming compensation involving questions of title. 6. 6. In Chikkana vs. Perumal I. L. R. 1940 Mad 791 F. B. it was held that the Sub-ordinate Judge appointed by the Provincial Government under Section 3 (d) to decide a dispute referred by the Collector under Section 30 constituted a civil court and, even in the absence of an express provision, an appeal lay from his decision. In taking that view, the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench of the Madras High Court relied upon the two Privy Council cases mentioned in the beginning of the last paragraph and quoted the following observations in the earlier case:- "Such dispute forms no part of the award, and it would indeed be strange if a controversy between two people as to the nature of their respective interests in a piece of land should enjoy certain rights of appeal which would be wholly taken away when the place of land was represented by a sum of money paid into Court." [Page 137] 6A. The question in this case directly arose in Makhan Lal vs. Secretary of State for India in Council ILR 56 All. 656 F. B. The view taken in that case is that a District Judge, functioning under the Act, acts judicially as a Court, and not as a persona designate or as an executive officer and is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That decision was followed in Secretary of State vs. Allahabad Bank Ltd. Cawnpore AIR 1939 All 34 . and Rahimuddin Sheikh vs. Sarifun Nesa AIR 1954 Ass 92. Also, although the point did not arise in Laxmanrao Deshmukh vs. Collector of the Nagpur District ILR 1945 Nag 399, there are passing observations to the effect that where a dispute in regard to an award delivered by a Collector is referred to a Civil Court, an order passed by that Court is subject to revision by the High Court. In view of the authorities reviewed above, it must be held that the Court functioning under the Act is a Civil Court and is subordinate to this Court with the consequence that the present revision is competent. 7. In view of the authorities reviewed above, it must be held that the Court functioning under the Act is a Civil Court and is subordinate to this Court with the consequence that the present revision is competent. 7. In regard to the main question, it would appear that the Act does not contemplate or provide for acquisition of any interests which already belongs to Government in land which is being acquired under the Act but only for the acquisition of such interests in the land as do not already belong to Government. To this effect were the observations of Wallis J. (as he then was) in Deputy Collector Calicut vs. Aiyayu Pillay 9 Indian Cases 341. which were approved in The Collector of Bombay vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri (1955) 1 SCR 1311 . As pointed out in that case by the Supreme Court, there can be no question of Government acquiring what is its own. However, there may be cases when Government possesses an interest in land which is the subject matter of acquisition under the Act. In such cases, the interest of Government is outside such acquisition, which is restricted to the outstanding interests of other claimants. Even so, when there is a dispute between Government and any other person about the nature and extent of interest of each in the land, the question of title thus arising has to be decided by the Court to which a reference is made under Section 18. It was so decided in Secretary of State for India in Council vs. Satish Chandra Sen 57 I.A, 339. In Makhan Lal's case (sit-supra), a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, after an exhaustive review of the case law bearing on the point, took the same view. The Supreme Court also indicated in the above-mentioned case that an investigation into the nature and value of Government's interest in the land would be necessary for determining the compensation payable for the interests outstanding in the claimants. 8. The precise question here is somewhat different. While the State Government proceeded to acquire khasra Nos. The Supreme Court also indicated in the above-mentioned case that an investigation into the nature and value of Government's interest in the land would be necessary for determining the compensation payable for the interests outstanding in the claimants. 8. The precise question here is somewhat different. While the State Government proceeded to acquire khasra Nos. 73/1, 74 and 75 on the assumption that the land did not belong to it and used the machinery provided by the Act to take possession of the land from the applicant, it was claimed before the Land Acquisition Officer that the land belonged to the State Government and need not, for that reason, be acquired. Although that claim was contested by the applicant, it was accepted by the Collector. Also, as shown, the lower Court took the view that the contest raising a question of title of this nature between the State Government and the applicant could not be considered on a reference under Section 18. As I will show in a moment, the lower Court's view is clearly erroneous and amounts to a refusal to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. 9. In The Deputy Collector, Calicut vs. Aiyayu Pillay 9 Indian Cases 341, Government, claiming to be the owner of the land, sought to acquire the interests of other persons therein. One of them claimed that he, and not the Government, was the owner. Wallis J. (as he then was) observed:- "When Government claiming to be the owner of the land seeks to acquire under the Act the interests of other persons therein, and such persons deny the title of Government and set up that they themselves are the owners and claim compensation on that basis, it becomes necessary, for the purpose of fixing the compensation to be paid to them, for the Collector to determine what is the interest in the land to which they are entitled, and whether they are owners as they claim to be or only entitled to the limited interest admitted by Government.'' As indicated earlier, this case was cited before the Supreme Court, but the observations just quoted were not dis-approved. It will be seen that, in the Madras case as in this case, it was claimed that Government was not the owner of the land. It will be seen that, in the Madras case as in this case, it was claimed that Government was not the owner of the land. The only difference between the two cases is that, while, in the Madras case, it was all along accepted that the claimant had some inferior interest in the land, in the instant case the State Government belatedly denied that the applicant had any interest in the land. In either case, the initial jurisdiction was there and, in the present case, that jurisdiction could not be taken away merely because it was subsequently claimed that the State Government was the full owner of the land. Having regard to the provisions of the Act, the position appears to be this. Where land is not owned by the State Government or where not all interests, which go to make up ownership of the land, vest in it, the procedure laid down in the Act must be followed for its acquisition. Where land is fully owned by the State Government, there can be no question of acquiring what is its own. If by mistake or otherwise, proceedings under the Act have been initiated for acquiring such land, the State Government can, under Section 48 (1) of the Act, withdraw from its acquisition at any time before possession has been taken. Where, however, possession of any land has been taken under the provisions of the Act from another person, who claims title to it, there can neither be any withdrawal nor can the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under the Act to deal with the matter be challenged on the ground that the land belonged to the State Government and was for that reason, outside the purview of the Act. In other words, it is not open to the State Government to use the machinery provided by the Act to deprive any person, who claims title to the land in his possession, or his possession over such land and then to urge, as above indicated, that the provisions of the Act do not apply to it. In such a case, the Collector has to determine the compensation payable for the land and the dispute about title to the land between the State Government and the claimant must also be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act to determine if the compensation is payable to the claimant. 10. In such a case, the Collector has to determine the compensation payable for the land and the dispute about title to the land between the State Government and the claimant must also be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act to determine if the compensation is payable to the claimant. 10. The result is that the revision succeeds and is allowed. The lower Court's order dated 3 August 1959 is set aside. The lower Court shall now decide the case with advertence to the observations in the last paragraph. The applicant shall have his costs from the non-applicant. Counsel's fee Rs. 50.