MEHROTRA, J. : These are two first appeals on behalf of two sets of defendants which can be disposed of by one common judgment. (2) The appeals arise cut of a suit brought by the Gauhati Bank Ltd. for recovery of Rs. 1,15,341-0-9 pies against defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3-jointly and severally subject to a deduction of Rs. 11.400/- in case the suit is decreed against defendant NO. 4. A further prayer has been made for grant of a decree of Rs- 9.000/- plus Rs. 2,400/- as interest from the 28th February 1945, to the 30th June 1948, against defendant No. 4 together with proportionate costs and future interest at Rs. 6 per cent per annum. (3) The plaintiff's case is that it is a bank carrying on banking business at various places. The bank has a branch at Golaghat. From 31st October 1942 to 14th November 1945, the defen­dant No- 3, whose heirs are the appellants in First Appeal No. 22 of 1956, was the Managing Director of the Plaintiff-Bank at Golaghat branch, and the defendant No. 4, who is the appellant in First Appeal No. 27 of 1956, was one of the Directors of the plaintiff-Bank. During this period, defen­dant No. 5 stood surety for defendant NO. 2 to the extent of Rs. 2,000/-. Defendant No. 1 was carrying on business at Golaghat, and, on the 2nd December 1943, he made an application for an over-draft arrangement of Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 35.000/- a month. On 15th December 1943, defendant No. 2 on behalf of the Bank entered into an agreement with defendant No. 1 by which the former agreed on behalf of the Bank to make advances to defendant No. 1 from time to time to extent of Rs. 35,000/- The defendant No. 1 offered a security for the due repayment of the advance to be made (sic) all his contract works under Military, Forest, P. W. D. etc. The defendant No. 1 further agreed to execute a pro-note for the said amount There Were other terms of agreement between the Bank and the defendant No. 1. In pur­suance of the aforesaid agreement, the defendant No. .1 executed the pro-note. The defendant No. 1 was allowed to take advances through a Cash-Credit account opened in his name from the 4th December 1943. An advance of Rs. 8,000/- was allowed to him on that account. In pur­suance of the aforesaid agreement, the defendant No. .1 executed the pro-note. The defendant No. 1 was allowed to take advances through a Cash-Credit account opened in his name from the 4th December 1943. An advance of Rs. 8,000/- was allowed to him on that account. From time to time the defendant No. 1 took advances from the Bank and .deposited some amount in payment of the over-draft account. (The defendant No. 1 acknowledged his liability and on the basis of the over-l draft account the present suit has been filed against the various defendants. (4) The case against the defendants Nos. 2 and; 3 is that defendant No. 2 in excess of the authority; conferred on him went on advancing money to the defendant No. 1 and thus he is liable for the amount advanced to the defendant No. 1. As against defendant No. 3 the allegation is that is acquiesc­ed and approved the action of defendant No. 2 when he without any authority and sanction of the Board of Directors advanced a large sum of money to the defendant No. 1. He is thus guilty of negligence and breach of the clear direction con­tained in the memorandum of association and is liable to reimburse the Bank the amount payable by defendant No. 1 to the Bank. (5) As against defendant No. 4, the case is that on the 28th February 1945, he wrote a letter to the Agent of the Bank to the effect that the defendant; No. 1 had deposited a cheque for Rs. 9,260/-and as he, as against that amount, had issued a cheque for Rs. 9,000/- in favour of the defendant No. 4, the said cheque should be cashed and he held himself responsible if the Head Office objected to such a payment. It is contended that the defen­dant No. 4 is liable to pay this sum of Rs. 9,000/- which was advanced to defendant No. 1 on the 28th February 1945 in order to meet the cheque issued in favour of defendant No. 4. (6) The defendants Nos. 3 and 4 filed a written statement challenging the claim of the plaintiff both on facts and various questions of law. (7) The trial court has decreed the suit ex parte against the defendant No. 1 and against the other defendants en the following terms: "The defendants Nos. (6) The defendants Nos. 3 and 4 filed a written statement challenging the claim of the plaintiff both on facts and various questions of law. (7) The trial court has decreed the suit ex parte against the defendant No. 1 and against the other defendants en the following terms: "The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 will be jointly, liable for the decree against the defendant No. 1 as follows: (a) the defendant No. 2 will not be liable for Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 9.000/- cut of the amount of the claim with interest and proportionate costs thereon end for future interest in respect of those amounts and for the rest of the amount he will her Juicily liable along with the defendants Nos. 1 and 3; (b) the defendant No. 3 will not be liable for the decree for Rs. 9,000/- of the claimed amount with interest and proportionate costs and future interest thereon, for die rest, he will be jointly liable with the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 subject to the limitation in respect of the defendant No. 2 as pointed out above. The defendant No. 4 will he jointly liable for Rs. 9000/- with interest along with the defendant No. 1 in respect Of the decree in suit. The decree will be executed against the defen­dant No. 1 at the first instance, and then the under-covered amount, if any, may be realized from the other defendants to the extent as indicated above." (8) During the pendency of the suit, defendant No. 3 died and his heirs were brought on the re­cord as defendants Nos. 3(a), (b) and (c). Defen­dant No. 1 has filed no appeal. Defendant No. 2 also has not come up in appeal against the deci­sion of the lower court but he has been impleaded as a respondent in these appeals and we will con­sider his case later. (9) It is contended by Mr. Lahiri, who appears for the heirs of defendant No. 3, the Managing Director, that there was no cause of action against him- It is not alleged that any of the advances were made by him to the defendant No. 1- The only allegation against him is that he was negli­gent and acquiesced in the act of the defendant No- 2 in making advances to the defendant No. 1 beyond the powers conferred on him under the memorandum of association. He is thus guilty of negligence. With regard to a sum of Rs. 10,000/- it is contended that if was advanced to the defen­dant on his approval and thus it cannot be regarded, directly as an advance made by him. In our opinion, the suit is wholly misconceived, so far as the defendant No. 3 is concerned. The suit had been brought primarily against defen­dant No. 1 as a debtor for the advances made to him. If on account of any negligence of the defen­dant who may be regarded as the Agent of the Bank, the Bank has suffered any loss, the Bank may have been entitled to bring a suit against him for recovery of the damages in a properly framed suit. In that case, the negligence of defendant! No. 3 had to be established and the damage had to be proved. But having brought this suit against defendant No. 1 treating him as the debtor, it is not open to the plaintiff in the same suit to assume that the advances made to defendant No. 1 were no advances in the eye of Haw, as it was done in excess of the power given to the Agent or the Managing Director and that the Managing Direc­tor was thus liable for his negligence or for acting beyond the scope of his authority. The plaintiff if at all had a distinct and separate cause of action against defendant No. 3 even assuming the allega­tions to be correct; but, such a cause of action could not be joined in suit against the debtor for 'recovery of the loan advanced to him. The cause of action as against defendant No. 3 is distinct front the one against the defendant No. 1, and, in our opinion, they could not be joined together; nor on the allegations made in the plaint the plaintiff has any cause of action against the defen­dant No. 3- It is nowhere alleged that the advance was actually made by the defendant No. 3. The mere fact that from time to time the position of the over-draft account of the defendant No. 1 was brought to the notice of defendant No. 3 in a routine manner, no inference can be drawn that he acquiesced in or approved the conduct of defen­dant No. 2 in making advances to defendant No. 1 and that he can be said to be negligent in the dis­charge of his dutjes or that he acted beyond the 'scope of his authority. (10) As regard the sum of Rs. 10,000/-, the Agent of the Bank wrote to the Managing "Director a letter placing the entire circumstances under which the defendant No. 1 had asked for a further advance of Rs. 10.000/-. A telegram referring to the said letter was again sent on the 29th December 1944, by the Agent to the Managing Director. Thereupon the Managing Director repli­ed on the 30th December, 1944 by telegram, which are Exts. 15 and 15(1), and reads as follows.: "If these requirements as per our letter dated 13th December 1944, are complied with the questions of allowing Rs. 10,000/- to draw may be considered." Thereafter a letter by the defendant No. 1 was sent to the Managing Director in which he had stated his requirements and the mode of paying up the loan. On that the Agent advanced the sum of Rs. 10.000/- to defendant No. 1- Therefore, Rs. 10,000/- cannot be said to have been advanced on the approval of defendant No. 3. All the mat­ters were placed before him by the Agent and after consideration of those representations he in the normal course directed the Agent, the defen­dant No. 2, to exercise his power and advance the loan to the defendant No. 1. It cannot be said that this sum was advanced by defendant No. 3 himself so as to make himself liable for the repay­ment of the said amount- There is, in our opin­ion, no case against the defendant No. 3. (11) The suit against defendant No. 4, who is the appellant in the other appeal, also should be dismissed. The entire case against defendant No. 4 is based on the letter (Ext. 41), which reads as follows: ".....In this connection I beg to say that Mr. (11) The suit against defendant No. 4, who is the appellant in the other appeal, also should be dismissed. The entire case against defendant No. 4 is based on the letter (Ext. 41), which reads as follows: ".....In this connection I beg to say that Mr. Marwa has deposited his C/C a/c today by a cheque for Ra- 9,260/- only- As he owed me a good amount he has to draw Rs- 9,000/- out of the above amount. As he issued a cheque for Rs. 9,000/- in my favour, I shall be glad if you would please allow the amount to be drawn and credit the same in my C/D a/c. I shall be res­ponsible for this, if your H. O. objects to it." By this letter no undertaking was given by defen­dant No. 4 to repay the entire liability of the defendant No. I in case he failed, to pay up the amount; nor any liability is taken under this letter to pay the Bank the sum of Rs. 9,000/- in case the Bank failed to realise the amount due in the Cash-Credit account of the defendant No. 1 from him. On the 28th February 1945 the defendant No. 1 had deposited a cheque for Rs. 9,2607- in the Bank in his account. It was open to the defen­dant No. 4 to have realised his sum of Rs. 9,000/-out of the proceeds of that cheque and not allow the defendant No- 1 to deposit the said cheque in his account. If that had been done by the defen­dant No. 4, he could have realised his money without taking the risk of discharging the liability of defendant to the extent of Rs. 9,000/- to the Bank against his Cash-Credit account. What defen­dant. No- 4 did by this letter was only to ask the Agent to cash his cheque as against the deposit of a cheque by defendant No. 1 and in case the Head Office objected to this procedure, he wag prepared to pay back Rs. 9,000/- which he had withdrawn as against that cheque. But there is no undertak­ing to pay up the liability of the defendant No. 1' even with regard to the sum of Rs. 9.000A. 9,000/- which he had withdrawn as against that cheque. But there is no undertak­ing to pay up the liability of the defendant No. 1' even with regard to the sum of Rs. 9.000A. Moreover, this sum was paid to defendant No. 4 on the 28th February 1945 and the suit was brought on the 26th January 1949, beyond the period of limitation- It cannot be said by the plaintiff that the Bank had no knowledge of this transaction earlier. According to the statement of Kabindra Ram Das (P- W- 1), who was the Managing Direc­tor of the Bank when he made the statement, the statement showing a credit of Rs. 9,260/- and debit of Rs. 9,000/- on the same day 26th February 1945, appear., in the daily statement of account in the name of Marwa and the Head Office received it on 5th March 1945. The suit could only have been brought within three years of the date of the knowledge. The suit so far as this sum of Rs. 9,000/- is concerned, on the face of it, is beyond time. Any acknowledgment given by defendant No. 1 with regard to his liability cannot save limitation against defendant No. 4. In any view of the matter, the suit against defendant No. 4 also is liable to be dismissed- (12) It is further contended by Mr. Lahiri that by filing the present suit and acknowledging The defendant No. 1 as the debtor, the Bank has ratified the act of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in advancing loan to the defendant No. 1 even though such advances may be beyond the powers con­ferred on them under the memorandum of associa­tion. It is not open to the plaintiff to accept the act of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 by recognising the defendant No. I as the debtor and then hold that the act is illegal as it is beyond, the powers of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 under the memorandum of association. Reliance is placed on the case of Re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines, Limited, reported in (1890) 45 Ch D. 16. 2 and 3 by recognising the defendant No. I as the debtor and then hold that the act is illegal as it is beyond, the powers of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 under the memorandum of association. Reliance is placed on the case of Re Portuguese Consolidated Copper Mines, Limited, reported in (1890) 45 Ch D. 16. In this case it was held that although the Original allotment of shares was invalid, it had been ratified by the com­pany and was binding on die allottees; with regard to one of the properties, such ratification was com­pleted on the 24th of December 1888, when the action against him was commenced. Further reli­ance is placed on the case of Firth v. Stain, re­ported in 1897-2 QB 70. Reference is made to the following observations at page 75: "To constitute a valid ratification three con­ditions must tie satisfied; first, the agent whose act is sought to be ratified must have purported to act; for the principal; secondly, at the time the act was done the agent must have had a competent princi­pal; and, thirdly, at the time of the ratification the principal must be legal capable of doing the act himself. I think that all those conditions were satisfied here. Therefore, upon the approval of the vestry being given, the acts of the committee be­came valid as from the time when they were done." The question whether the act of defendant No. 3 was ratified Ly the Bank by filing a suit against defendant No. 1 does not arise for consideration in the view which we have taken. (13) It is also contended by the defendant' No- 2, who is arrayed as pro forma respondent, that although he has filed no appeal, and his appli­cation for leave to appeal in forma pauperis was rejected, he is entitled to a relief in his favour under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the findings arrived at by this Court. It is contended that the decree was a joint decree in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and any appeal by defendant No- 3 will enure for his benefit also. We do not think that defendant No. 2 can get the benefit of the appeal filed by defendant No. 3, particularly when his application for leave to ap­peal in forma pauperis has been rejected. 2 and 3 and any appeal by defendant No- 3 will enure for his benefit also. We do not think that defendant No. 2 can get the benefit of the appeal filed by defendant No. 3, particularly when his application for leave to ap­peal in forma pauperis has been rejected. More­over, his appeal is time barred and a right has accrued to the plaintiff and this Court will not grant any relief to defendant No. 2 under Order 41» Rule 33 when it affects; a right acquired by the plaintiff as against this defendant, no appeal having been filed by him in time- Defendant No. 2 is thus not entitled, to any relief in this appeal. (14) In the result, therefore, we allow the appeals, set aside the decree of the court below is so far as these defendants-appellants are concern­ed. But, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs in these appeals. (15) H. DEKA C. J. : I agree. BF/D.R.R. Appeals allowed,