JUDGMENT M. C. Desai, C. J. - This is an appeal from a decree passed by a District Judge dismissing on appeal the appellant's petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce from his wife. He himself valued the relief at Rs. 200 and filed the petition in the court of a Civil Judge. The Civil Judge allowed the petition, but on appeal the learned District Judge dismissed it. He comes up in second appeal to this Court on the only ground that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. This appeal came up for hearing before out brother Bishambhar Dayal, who has referred it to a larger Bench because he thought that the question of jurisdiction raised is an important one. 2. The right of appeal from a decree passed in any proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act is governed by Section 28 of it which lays down that a decree or order made in such a proceeding may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force. It is not in dispute that the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act is the law which governs the right of appeal and the forum of appeal. Under Section 21 an appeal from a decree or order of a Civil Judge lies to the District Judge where the value of the original suit, in which it was made, did not exceed Rs. 10,000 and to the High Court in any other case. Since the appeal filed by the respondents was from a decree made by a Civil Judge in a petition which was valued at less than Rs. 10,000, the appeal lay in the Court of the District Judge. 3. The main argument of the appellant before us was that the subject-matter of the petition was not capable of valuation and that consequently the appeal lay in the High Court in accordance with the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Paras Ram v. Janki Bai, 1961 ALJ 232 as if no valuation had been put down on the plaint. In other words he contended that though he himself had valued the relief at Rs. 200 the petition should be deemed to have not been valued at all. In other words he contended that though he himself had valued the relief at Rs. 200 the petition should be deemed to have not been valued at all. We are unable to accept this argument that the petition should be deemed to have been not valued simply because the relief sought under it was not capable of valuation. There are several reliefs in respect of which suits can be filed but which are not capable of valuation, for instance a suit for injunction or a suit for accounts or a suit for dissolution of a partnership. The Legislature has provided for the fixation of valuation of all such suits, vide the provision in Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, which lays down that when the subject-matter of any suit, barring certain suits, is such that in the opinion of the High Court it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, it will be valued in accordance with the rules to be made by the High Court. Thus, even when a suit is not capable of being valued it has to be valued. Under the C.P.C., Or. VII, R. 1, every plaint of a suit must contain a statement of the value of the subject-matter for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court-fees this provision applies in all suits regardless of whether they are capable of valuation or not. For the purposes of court-fees a plaintiff is given the freedom to value the relief claimed in certain suits at any amount of his choice. For example, he can value the relief sought in a suit for injunction or in a suit for accounts at any amount. Since the court-fee is payable ad valorem on these suits whatever valuation is fixed by the plaintiff is to be the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. Thus, even in suits which are not capable of valuation there has to be a valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and the law has provided for it. The contention of the appellant that the valuation fixed by him on the petition should be ignored and that the petition should be treated as one on which no valuation had been fixed, cannot, therefore, be accepted. The contention of the appellant that the valuation fixed by him on the petition should be ignored and that the petition should be treated as one on which no valuation had been fixed, cannot, therefore, be accepted. If he had not fixed any valuation on the petition the appeal from the decree or order of the court would have lain in this Court as held in the case of Paras Ram, 1961 ALJ 232 , but when he himself fixed the valuation at Rs. 200 he cannot plead that the petition was riot capable of valuation or that the valuation be ignored. 4. The appellant next contended that there is no provision for valuing petitions, as there is for valuing plaints, in the C. P, C. Under Section 21 of the Act all proceedings under it shall be regulated by the C.P.C. as far as may be; this means that a petition under Section 13 is to be treated as a plaint in a suit and the law is applicable to plaints will apply to petitions under Section 13 also. We do not agree with the appellant's contention that Section 21 of the Act comes into application only after a petition is filed and that the provisions of the C.P.C. do not govern petition. The filing of a plaint is as much a proceeding in a civil court as subsequent proceedings after the plaint is entertained and the court takes cognizance of the suit. The C.P.C. governs proceedings in civil courts. Sec 26 of it, which is a part of a Chapter under the heading `Institution of Suits', provides that every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. What should be contained in a plaint is provided in Or. VII, R. 1. Sec. 20 of the Act, which lays down that a petition under Section 13 must state distinctly the facts on which the claim to relief is founded and the fact of absence of collusion, is in addition to the provisions of Section 26 and Or. VII R. 1, C.P.C., and not in substitution of them. The particulars mentioned in Section 20 of the Act are in addition to the particulars required under Or. VII R. 1, C.P.C., and not in substitution of them. The particulars mentioned in Section 20 of the Act are in addition to the particulars required under Or. VII, R. 1, C.P.C. As was held in the case of Paras Rae a petition under the Act is deemed to be a plaint for the purpose of applying the provisions of the C.P.C. If the C.P.C. governs the valuation of a plaint it also governs the valuation of a petition under the Act and the argument that valuation is a matter to be considered before the filing of a plaint or petition is devoid of substance. The filing of a plaint or petition is itself a proceeding as we said earlier and the valuation has to be put down in the plaint or the petition. Though the proceeding commences with the filing of a plaint or petition the filing of a plaint or petition is a part of the proceeding governed by the C.P.C. The appellant was, therefore, bound to state the valuation of the relief in the petition and rightly did so. 5. It was then contended that the Civil Judge was a District Court and that an appeal from his order or decree lay in the High Court, where an appeal from a decree or order made by a District Judge lies under Section 20 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. Though the Civil Judge on account of his being included in a notification issued by the State Government was a "District Court" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act he did not thereby become a District Judge. The District Judge also is a District Court within the meaning of the Act, being the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, but the Civil Judge who becomes a District Court on account of the notification is not to be treated as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. An appeal from his decree or order is governed by Section 21 and not Sec. 20. Sec. 20 deals with an appeal from a decree or order made by a District Judge and not with an appeal from a decree or order made by a Civil Judge. 6. An appeal from his decree or order is governed by Section 21 and not Sec. 20. Sec. 20 deals with an appeal from a decree or order made by a District Judge and not with an appeal from a decree or order made by a Civil Judge. 6. There is no substance in the next contention of the appellant that 11 the forum of appeal depends on the sweet will of a petitioner, who is allowed to fix any valuation he likes on the petition, it may cause great prejudice and that the right of appeal cannot be left to the absolute discretion of the petitioner. In the first place this argument is not open to the petitioner himself; we fail to understand how he could claim that by his valuing the petition at Rs. 200 he has caused prejudice to himself. Secondly there arises no question of prejudice or deprivation of right unless there exists a right independently of the provision. The only right of appeal given to him is by that very provision which takes away his supposed right of appeal to the High Court. Independently by the provision which confers the right of appeal on him he never had any right of appeal to the High Court. His right of appeal is derived solely from the provision of Section 28 of the Act and if that provision confers upon him the right of appeal to the District Judge in certain circumstances, he cannot be heard to say that he is deprived of a right to appeal to the High Court. If he never had a right of appeal to the High Court he cannot be said to have been deprived of it. We also do not understand how a right of appeal given either to him or to the respondents to file an appeal from a decree or order of the Civil Judge to the District Judge can be said to have caused great prejudice to either of the parties. If the appeal is made to lie to the District Judge and not to the High Court it is not on account of the absolute discretion or sweet will of the petitioner but on account of the law that whatever valuation is put on the petition will govern the forum of appeal. If the appeal is made to lie to the District Judge and not to the High Court it is not on account of the absolute discretion or sweet will of the petitioner but on account of the law that whatever valuation is put on the petition will govern the forum of appeal. If the law also gives the petitioner a right to value the petition at any sum that he likes, it cannot be said that any prejudice is caused to the other party. In any case if there is any prejudice to the other party the remedy would be to take away the right from the petitioner to value the petition at any sum that he likes. 7. Our brother Bishambhar Dayal says in his referring order that a right of appeal can depend on the correct valuation according to law and not on any other valuation given by the petitioner. Even if this were correct there is nothing to show that the valuation fixed by the appellant on the petition was not correct. It is his own case, and it has been accepted by our learned brother, that the valuation is not governed by any law and if it is not governed by any law we do not think that the valuation fixed by the appellant can be said to be not correct. If the law allows a petitioner to fix any valuation, any valuation that he fixes must be held to be correct. 8. We also, with respect to our learned brother, do not agree that an appeal from every decree or order made by a Civil Judge in a proceeding under the Act will lie in this Court. Such a view would be directly contrary to the provisions of Section 28 of the Act read with Section 21 of the Bangal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. The forum of appeal does depend upon valuation and it cannot be laid down that the appeal will lie to the High Court in every case regardless of valuation. 9. In the result we answer the question referred to us by our learned brother in the affirmative. Let the record of the case be returned to our learned brother with this answer.