JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has sought the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Pratapgarh, dated 4-5-1955 refusing to implead petitioner No. 1 as a legal representative of one Bahadur Singh plaintiff deceased, and the order of the Board of Revenue dated 6-7-1956 upholding that order. The suit, which had been filed by Bahadur Singh together with petitioner No. 2, was one under Section 180 U.P. Tenancy Act which, even after the enforcement of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, had to be decided in accordance with the provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act. Bahadur Singh, plaintiff died on 1-10-1954 after the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act had come into force. Earlier, before the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act came into force, Bahadur Singh had obtained a declaration under Section 6 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 in respect of the land in suit. That declaration was obtained on 31-1-1950. After having obtained that declaration, Bahadur Singh, on 20-4-1950, executed a registered will, and devised his properties including the land in suit in favour of petitioner No. 1 Smt. Raghuraji. In the land in suit he had tenancy rights. In these circumstances, the Assistant Collector held that by the will Bhumidhari rights in the land could pass to the petitioner no. 1 on the death of Bahadur Singh, but the tenancy rights did not and could not pass to her as tenancy rights were not transferable. Following this conclusion he proceeded to hold that Bahadur Singh in fact did not transfer his tenancy rights by virtue of the will but only the Bhumidhari rights. Since the proceedings in the suit had to be continued under the U.P. Tenancy Act and the tenancy rights had not passed to petitioner No. 1 her prayer for being substituted as legal representative of Bahadur Singh was refused. The petitioner No. 1 filed an application for revision before the Additional Commissioner seeking a reference to the Board of Revenue. The Additional Commissioner was of the view that the application of Smt. Raghuraji should be allowed and petitioner No. 1 should be substituted for the deceased plaintiff Bahadur Singh. The reference came up before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue disagreed with the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner and rejected the revision. The Additional Commissioner was of the view that the application of Smt. Raghuraji should be allowed and petitioner No. 1 should be substituted for the deceased plaintiff Bahadur Singh. The reference came up before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue disagreed with the recommendation of the Additional Commissioner and rejected the revision. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners have moved this Court. 2. It is to be noticed that the Board of Revenue itself came to the view that the will executed by Bahadur Singh in favour of Smt. Raghuraji was a valid will and that the trial court was wrong in rejecting the application for substitution. It was held by the Board of Revenue that "Smt. Raghuraji was clearly the legal representative of the deceased as the deceased had executed a will in her favour, the will being valid." In spite of this finding arrived at by the Board of Revenue, the Board of Revenue proceeded to examine the question whether Smt. Raghuraji having acquired Bhumidhari rights on the basis of the will could maintain the suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The Board of Revenue was of the view that the suit by a Bhumidhar for ejectment of trespasser did not lie under the U.P. Tenancy Act or in the revenue court; it lay under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Consequently, it was of the view that the trial court was not wrong in holding that Smt. Raghuraji could not maintain the suit. On this ground the Board refused to interfere with the order of the trial court. 3. It has appeared to us to be rather curious that the order of the Board of Revenue contains contradictory findings. There is first the finding that the will by Bahadur Singh was valid and that the trial court was wrong in rejecting the application filed by Smt. Raghuraji to be substituted as legal representative of the deceased. The will was executed, as we have mentioned earlier, on 20-4-1950. If it was a valid will the rights which it could convey to the legatee were the rights which Bahadur Singh possessed on 20-4-1950. In this land those rights were the rights of a tenant. The will was executed, as we have mentioned earlier, on 20-4-1950. If it was a valid will the rights which it could convey to the legatee were the rights which Bahadur Singh possessed on 20-4-1950. In this land those rights were the rights of a tenant. If a valid will in respect of those tenancy rights was executed, as held by the Board of Revenue, it is clear that the petitioner No. 1 was entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased and to continue the suit. The second aspect mentioned in the order of the Board of Revenue that, under the will, only the rights of Bhumidhar passed to Smt. Raghuraji, appears to have no justification or basis. The will would transfer all rights in respect of this land purported to do in the will. On the face of it, therefore, the decision of the Board of Revenue is incorrect. The Board of Revenue has thus committed an error of law in holding that the will merely devised to petitioner No. 1 the rights of a Bhumidhar and not the rights as a tenant. 4. In this petition learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 5 has urged before us that the Board of Revenue was wrong in holding that the will was valid, because, at the time when the will was executed, tenancy rights in the land in suit were not transferable by a will under the provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act and consequently those tenancy rights could not pass to Smt. Raghuraji petitioner No. 1 by virtue of that will. We have already mentioned earlier that, before the will was executed, Bahadur Singh had, on 31-1-1950, obtained a declaration under Section 6 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949. That Act as it stood at the time when this declaration was granted did not entitle the person who obtained the declaration to transfer by will or gift his tenancy rights. However, that Act was subsequently amended by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, 1951 which amendment became effective on 1-7-1952 when all the provisions of that Act came into force as a result of the vesting order. The amendment introduced in the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act are contained in schedule IV to the latter Act. The amendment introduced in the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act are contained in schedule IV to the latter Act. One of the amendments introduced in Section 7 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act was the introduction of a new Cl. (c) in that section to the following effect :- "(c) The applicant shall, except as hereinafter excepted, be entitled, notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, or any contract to bequeath by will or transfer by way of sale, simple mortgage or gift his interest in the holding or his share therein." 5. The exception mentioned in this amendment need not be cited as it is not at all necessary for the purpose of deciding this petition. Ordinarily of course, if this amendment had been introduced with effect from 1-7-1952 without any provision being made about retrospective effect, the result would have been that the rights acquired by the applicants who may have obtained a declaration under Section 6 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 would have been available only to persons whose applications might be granted after this amendment was introduced. In the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, however, there was included Section 340 to the following effect :- "Where any orders have been made, proceedings taken, declarations granted, or jurisdiction exercised under the provisions of U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions of the said Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained therein, be so read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in Schedule IV had been made therein and were in force on the commencement of the said Act. (2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that all orders made, proceedings taken, declarations granted, and jurisdiction exercised, under and at any time during the continuance of the said Act, shall be good and valid in law as if the said Act, as amended by sub-sec. (1) had been in force at all material dates." 6. (2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that all orders made, proceedings taken, declarations granted, and jurisdiction exercised, under and at any time during the continuance of the said Act, shall be good and valid in law as if the said Act, as amended by sub-sec. (1) had been in force at all material dates." 6. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 340 thus contains, amongst other provisions, a clear provision that if any declaration had been granted under the provisions of U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 prior to this Section 340 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act coining into force that declaration is to be read and construed as if the amendments mentioned in schedule IV existed from the commencement of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949. That Act commenced in 1949. The effect of this provision made in Section 340 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will be that the declaration which was granted to Bahadur Singh on 31-1-1950 will have to be read and construed as if this new amendment already existed on that date when the declaration was granted in his favour. The nature of the declaration that is granted under Section 6 of the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 is to be found in Section 3 of that Act. The declaration has to be to the effect that the applicant "has become entitled to the privileges provided by or under this Act". It is such a declaration that is to be construed in accordance with the provision contained in Section 340 U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act under which it is laid down that for the purpose of reading or construing such a declaration the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act must be deemed to have been amended retrospectively from the date of its commencement. The consequence clearly is that the declaration to the effect that Bahadur Singh became entitled to the privilege provided by the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act will have to be constructed on the basis that Cl. (c) introduced by this amendment in sub-sec. (1) of Section 7 already existed in that law on the date when the declaration was granted. (c) introduced by this amendment in sub-sec. (1) of Section 7 already existed in that law on the date when the declaration was granted. The declaration being to the effect tint Bahadur Singh had become entitled to all the privileges under that Act, it must be held that on the grant of that declaration he became entitled to the privilege mentioned in this Cl. (c) which was introduced in Sec. 7(1) of that Act by the amendment brought about by the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. It is to be noticed that we have come to the conclusion that Bahadur Singh acquired this right of bequeathing by will or transfer by way of sale simple mortgage or gift his interest in the tenancy holding not on the basis that it accrued upon the grant of the declaration, but on the basis that the declaration itself was to the effect that he was to become entitled to all the privileges under that Act, and these were sonic of the additional privileges which had to be deemed to exist at the time of declaration for the purpose of construing that declaration. 7. On 20-4-1950, therefore, when Bahadur Singh actually executed the will, the law as it must be deemed to exist, recognised in him the right to bequeath this tenancy land by a will, and the will to the extent that it purported to bequeath his rights in the tenancy land in favour of petitioner No. 1 must be deemed to be valid. Learned counsel also urged that though, by the retrospective provision made in Section 340 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, such right to bequeath tenancy lands by a will may have been retrospectively conferred, the will executed by Bahadur Singh must still be deemed to be ineffective, because to take effect it must first be shown that he in fact intended to bequeath by will his tenancy rights knowing that he had a right to bequeath them. We do not think that the validity of the bequest depends on the question as to whether Bahadur Singh was or was not conscious of the legal position whether the rights which he was bequeathing could or could not validly be the subject-matter of a will. We do not think that the validity of the bequest depends on the question as to whether Bahadur Singh was or was not conscious of the legal position whether the rights which he was bequeathing could or could not validly be the subject-matter of a will. That he intended to bequeath these rights is clear from the terms of the will itself, and as long as he intended to do so, the bequest will be a valid bequest as a result of retrospective legislation. It is also to be kept in view that though the will was executed on 20-4-1950 before the U.P. Agricultural Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949 was retrospectively amended, the question of the will taking effect only arose on the death of Bahadur Singh which took place on 1-10-1954, long after the amendment had already come into effect, so that at least by the time the question of enforcing the rights under the will arose the law already stood amended, and the amended law is therefore being applied. Consequently, the submission of learned counsel that the Board of Revenue was incorrect in holding that the will was invalid has no force. As a result of the will, the tenancy rights also passed to the petitioner No. 1 on the death of Bahadur Singh plaintiff and consequently petitioner No. 1 was entitled to be substituted as his legal representative. 8. It was also urged by learned counsel that we should not interfere in this case on the ground that the Board of Revenue was moved to exercise its revisional jurisdiction, and the point on which the decision of the trial court is being held to be incorrect is only a question of fact or law and not a question of jurisdiction. First, it appears to us that this submission ignores the actual effect of the order of the trial court. The trial court refused to permit petitioner No. 1 to continue the suit by refusing her application to be substituted as a legal representative, and the result of it was that the trial it court thus refused to exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the suit or the connuance of the suit at the instance of petitioner No. 1 when petitioner No. 1 had the right to continue the suit. That such a question is a question of jurisdiction follows from the decision of the Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal Baba v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, A.I.R. 1949 PC 239 : 1949 ALJ 278. Consequently, the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to interfere in revision and should, therefore, have passed the appropriate order on the basis of the correct view indicated by us. Secondly, in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, a prayer has been made not only for quashing the Order of the Board of Revenue but also the order of the trial court, and even if it be held that the Board of Revenue would have had no jurisdiction to correct the error committed by the trial court, it appears to us that there is no bar to our correcting that error by issue of a writ of certiorari on the ground that the trial court committed an error which was manifest and apparent on the face of the record. When we indicated this view of ours, learned counsel for the opposite parties urged that, in case this petition is treated as a petition directed against the order of the trial court, it should be held to be a very belated one, inasmuch as the order of the trial court was passed several years before this Court was moved under Article 226 of the Constitution. Our view is that, even if we were to hold that the Board of Revenue was not competent to interfere in revision, the petitioners cannot be held to be guilty of laches and delay in moving this Court if they at least bona fide tried to seek relief from the Board of Revenue before coming to this Court. In the circumstances, this submission made by the learned counsel also does not stand in the way of relief being granted to the petitioners. 9. As a result we quash the order of the Board of Revenue and the trial court dated 6-7-1956 and 4-5-1955 respectively. The result is that the case will now go back to the trial court which will proceed to decide the applications and the suit before it in accordance with law following our view expressed above on the points decided by us. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs from opposite party No. 5.