Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is one Nesamma whose claim for maintenance under S. 488, Criminal Procedure Code against her husband was disallowed by the learned Stationary First Class Magistrate of Neyyattinkkara. The petitioner alleged that while she was living with her husband, her husband developed an illicit intimacy with Sarada his brother's wife who was residing in the neighbourhood. When the petitioner protested, she was man-handled and sent away to her own house. The husband while denying these allegations alleged in his turn that as his wife was leading a loose life he had to sever his connections with her in 1956 and denied his liability to maintain such a wife. He further alleged that for some time she was living in adultery with one Evans who is now no more. 2. The petitioner denied the aspersions against her morals made by the husband and she and three witnesses gave evidence in support of her husband's misbehaviour with Sarada and the consequent ill-treatment and separation. Sarada was also examined as a witness for the petitioner. Though she denied having anything to do with the respondent, she did hot support respondent's case that the petitioner was leading a loose life. The respondent gave evidence that on one occasion when he returned home after work at 9 in the night fee saw Evans in his wife's company in his room and they quarrelled over it. When he left for Trivandrum a few days after that she began to live in the house of Joyce the aunt of Evans with whom Evans was staying. He produced Ext. P-1 letter alleged to have been written to him by the petitioner. Two witnesses who were cited by him supported his case that one night in 1956 Evans was found in the company of the petitioner in her husband's room and the husband and wife had a quarrel over that. They added that few days after that the petitioner was found living in the house of Evans's aunt for some days and then she left the place to live with her parents. 3. The learned Magistrate after disbelieving the petitioner and her witnesses found "that the petitioner lived with Evans till his death and was leading a loose life" and on that ground he rejected her claim for maintenance. 4. 3. The learned Magistrate after disbelieving the petitioner and her witnesses found "that the petitioner lived with Evans till his death and was leading a loose life" and on that ground he rejected her claim for maintenance. 4. It may be mentioned even at the outset that the finding that the petitioner was living with Evans and leading a loose life is based mainly on Ext. P-1 letter alleged to have been sent by the petitioner to the respondent on 28-4-1959 wherein she has, confessed her moral lapses. The petitioner denied the letter and repudiated its contents. Four money order coupons and the petitioner's vakalath' were filed for comparison of her signature and handwriting The learned Magistrate made a comparison and entered a finding that the letter was written and signed by the petitioner. Even apart from the fact that comparison of signature and hand-writing is no sure test I must say this finding of the learned Magistrate is unsustainable. In the first place the money order coupons and the vakalath do not contain any writing by the petitioner except her name in the Malayalam and her signature in English and offer little or no scope for a reliable comparison of hand-writing. As for her signature it is quite clear that the disputed signature bears no similarity to the admitted ones. The English letter 'N' in her name Nesamma in Ext. P-1 is a capital letter whereas in the money order coupons and vakalath the name begins with the small 'n'. The signature in Ext P-1 is also lacking in boldness and the smooth flow found in the admitted ones Moreover a reading of the contents of the letter would convince anyone that the letter is not genuine because the admissions in the letter far from furthering the purpose of the letter which was to effect a reconciliation seem to have been deliberately put in by way of defence to any possible action for maintenance on the part of the writer and her children if born. The failure to make mention of the letter in the written statement seems to indicate that the letter was not in existence on the date of the written statement. The learned Magistrate was clearly wrong in relying on the letter as a voluntary confession of the petitioner's intimacy with Evans. The failure to make mention of the letter in the written statement seems to indicate that the letter was not in existence on the date of the written statement. The learned Magistrate was clearly wrong in relying on the letter as a voluntary confession of the petitioner's intimacy with Evans. The oral evidence of the respondent's witnessess, even if accepted, only indicate that there was one solitary instance of suspicious conduct on the petitioner's part and that subsequently she spent a few days with the aunt of Evans before she went to her parents' house. I do not feel that these circumstances are sufficient to bar the petitioner from claiming maintenance under S.488. 5. S.488, Clause.4 provides: "No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery " (Rest of the clause is immaterial for the purpose of this case). The expression 'living in adultery' has been the subject of interpretation by almost all the High Courts in the country though no decision of the Kerala High Court was brought to my notice. The consensus of judicial opinion is that the phrase means more than occasional lapses from virtue. In Ma Mya Khin v. N.L. Godenho AIR. 1936 Rangoon 446 where the husband objected to the claim for maintenance and let in evidence that another man used to go to the place where his wife resided on many an occasion and that they had spent one or two nights together in his wife's house. Dunkley, J. observed: "The words 'living in adultery' denote a continuous course of conduct as distinguished from isolated acts of immorality and mean that the woman must be living in a state of quasi permanent union with the man with whom she is committing adultery; one or two lapses from virtue would be acts of adultery but would be quite insufficient to show that the woman was living in adultery. Words used are "living in adultery" and not "committed adultery." In Lakshmi Ambalam v. Andiammal AIR. Words used are "living in adultery" and not "committed adultery." In Lakshmi Ambalam v. Andiammal AIR. 1938 Madras 66 where the woman's claim for maintenance was opposed by the husband on the ground that she was living in adultery and evidence was offered to prove that she was expecting a baby which could not be his and also that she had more than one lover, Newsam, J. held: "Now I understand the phrase, 'living in adultery, to mean something quite different from living an unchaste life. The principle, it seems to me, is that a husband is absolved from the obligation to maintain his wife when his wife has a de facto protector with whom she lives and by whom she is being maintained as if she were his wife. The obligation of a husband to maintain his wife arises from the anxiety of the Legislature to protect deserted wives from the bitter necessity of earning a living by trading on their sex. That obligation however ceases when it has been voluntarily assumed by some man other than the woman's husband. No woman can fairly claim a right to be kept by two men". In Kista Pillai v. Amirthammal AIR 1938 Mad. 833 where a wife's claim for maintenance was disallowed by the Magistrate on the ground that she was having an illicit intimacy with another man it was held that:- "The clear implication from the words used by the Legislature in S.488 is that unless the wife is actually living in adultery at or about the time of the application she is not disentitled to obtain maintenance The words "living in adultery" are merely indicative of the principle that occasional lapses from virtue are not a sufficient reason for refusing maintenance." In Kallu v. Kaunsilia ILR. XXVI All. 326, Justice Aikman held: "That the fact that a woman who applied for an order of maintenance against her husband had given birth to an illegitimate child some two years before the date other application, was not a reason for refusing to make an order for maintenance, it being found that since that time she had been living with her parents and leading a chaste and respectable life." Almost all the earlier decisions were considered by the Mysore High Court in Subramaniyam v. Ponnakshiammal AIR. 1958 Mys. 1958 Mys. 41 where it was held that: "It is not a stray act or two of adultery that disentitles a wife from claiming maintenance from her husband but it is a course of continuous conduct on her part by which it can be called that she is living in adulterous life that takes away her right to claim the said maintenance." 6. The principle that emerges from the decisions discussed above is that an occasional lapse from virtue, or immoral conduct long before the time maintenance is applied for does not disentitle a wife for relief under S.488. I must say with respect that I find myself in complete agreement with the above principle. It is well recognised that the intention of the legislation is to prevent vagrancy which might result from throwing the estranged wife and her helpless children on their own. A husband might consider reprehensible the slightest lapse from moral rectitude on the part of his wife and he might justifiably shrink from maintaining conjugal relationship with such a woman or have her continue as the mistress of his house but if his resentment were to be carried to the extent of throwing his wife out on the streets to maintain herself by her own means and without any more help from him, it is more than probable that such a woman might turn to anti-social activities in her struggle to keep body and soul together; it is this evil that is sought to be prevented by the section. The provision that the wife is disentitled to maintenance if she is "living in adultery" means that the husband can withhold his aid only when her adulterous conduct has continued for some length of time suggesting thereby that she has found another albeit less honourable haven from the chill winds of penury. 7. Viewed in the light of these principles it is absolutely clear that the respondent has failed to establish that the petitioner was "living in adultery". All that is proved is that the petitioner was surprised by the husband in the company of Evans in his room once and for a few days after that she was living in the house of Joyce the aunt of Evans with whom Evans himself was put up. All this took place in the year 1956 and Evans himself died in the year 1958. All this took place in the year 1956 and Evans himself died in the year 1958. Thereafter the evidence is that the petitioner was living with her parents. There is absolutely no indication that she was misbehaving much less that she was living in adultery. Under these circumstances the refusal of her claim to maintenance by the Magistrate is clearly wrong. 8. It is not possible for me to make an order for maintenance as the Magistrate has not entered a finding as to the monthly rate of allowance. The Magistrate is therefore directed to dispose of the petition according to law. Allowed.