JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The plaintiff, an ooralan of a devaswom, sued defendants 1 to 4 the other ooralars, to enforce payment of a sum of Rs. 850-11-0, being the annuity payable to him for the years 1123 to 1125 M. E., under a karar for management Ext. A1, dated Thulam 1, 1035 M. E. Defendants 2 to 4 died pending the suit, and those who succeeded them as ooralars were impleaded in their place. The relevant provision in Ext. A1 is clause 7, which declared that an annuity of 720 edangazhies of paddy would be paid by the devaswom to the plaintiff's illom as in the past, in consideration of a prior karanavan of the illom having spent large sums of money, which were not to be refunded, to discharge the debts of the devaswom. The two courts have decreed the suit. Defendants 1 and 5, the latter being the successor of the third defendant, have preferred this second appeal and their only contention was, that by reason of the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951, Act XIX of 1951, the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 2. The provisions of the Act aforesaid which bear on this controversy are, Section 57 clause (e) and Section 93. Section 57, clause (e) reads, "Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matters : * * * * * (e) whether any person is entitled, by custom or otherwise, to any honour, emolument or perquisite in any religious institution; and what the established usage of a religious institution is in regard to any other matter;" and Section 93 provides that: "No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration, or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act." The suit was instituted in the year 1949 when the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, Act II of 1927, was in force. At first the Munsiff dismissed the suit, holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain it by reason of Section 79 of that Act, but on appeal, the Subordinate Judge set aside the decree and remanded the case for fresh disposal by his judgment dated September 22,1953. It may be mentioned that Act XIX of 1951 came into force, on September 30, 1951. In the appeal before the Subordinate Judge it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff who was the appellant, that the provision in Section 57(e) of Act XIX of 1951, differed materially from the corresponding provision in Section 79 of Act II of 1927, and that the former is an enabling provision which does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. The Subordinate Judge was inclined to think that the argument had "good deal of force," but striking a different note, observed as follows : "Anyway the present Act has been made retrospectively applicable by Section 103 thereof. Even otherwise any procesual law would be retrospective in its application and the provisions contained therein as on the date of the institution of a particular proceeding would be applicable. On the date, when this appeal was filed the new Act had come into force and it will certainly enable the appellant to take advantage of the provisions of the new Act and request the court to adjudicate more fully and elaborately on all matters in controversy between him and his opposite parties. In this view therefore the entire matter will have to be investigated and adjudicated upon by the learned District Munsiff." After the case went back, the trial court held that the claim of the plaintiff was not for any emolument or perquisite within the meaning of Section 57(e), and that therefore the bar under Section 93 of Act XIX of 1951 was not attracted. This was also the view of the Subordinate Judge to whom the matter went up in appeal a second time. 3. It is unnecessary for the disposal of this appeal to canvass the soundness of the reasoning on which the Subordinate Judge passed the order of remand, for it was not appealed against and under Section 105 sub-section (2) C. P. C. both parties are now precluded from disputing its correctness. 3. It is unnecessary for the disposal of this appeal to canvass the soundness of the reasoning on which the Subordinate Judge passed the order of remand, for it was not appealed against and under Section 105 sub-section (2) C. P. C. both parties are now precluded from disputing its correctness. While remanding the case, the Judge did not decide the issue of jurisdiction and had he done so, there would have been an end of the matter. He decided merely, and the counsel, seemed to agree upon this construction of the remand order, that the suit has to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Act XIX of 1951 and not of Act II of 1927. This was how the two courts also understood the scope of the remand. If this be so, there is no point in the argument of counsel for the plaintiff, supported no doubt by authority, that the law in force on the date of the commencement of the action would continue to apply till its termination, notwithstanding any change in the law in the interval having no retroactive operation. The question which now arises is simply whether the suit is maintainable under Act XIX of 1951. 4. This will depend on whether the claim in the suit falls under section 57 clause (e) or not, that is, whether it can be deemed to be for emolument. It is not for perquisite because it is not for "anything acquired by the holder of a place or office over and above wages or salaries thereof", which is the definition of the term perquisite in Jowitt's Law Dictionary, Vol. II page 1334. The term 'emolument' according to the dictionaries has a slightly wider connotation, but on a consideration of the various meanings and definitions set out in them I find it difficult to dissociate the idea underlying the term, from office or employment or service. Encyclopaedia dictionary, Vol. III, published by Cassell & Co. II page 1334. The term 'emolument' according to the dictionaries has a slightly wider connotation, but on a consideration of the various meanings and definitions set out in them I find it difficult to dissociate the idea underlying the term, from office or employment or service. Encyclopaedia dictionary, Vol. III, published by Cassell & Co. Ltd., gives the root meanings of the word emlument as follows : "From latin, "emolamentum" "that which is gained by labour; emolir=:work out; e=out and molior=to exert oneself," and hence two meanings are given, "(1) profit or gain arising from any office or employment; that which is received in return for services done, as salary, fees, etc.; remuneration and (2) an advantage gain or profit in general." In the same dictionary under the word "Gain", the distinction between 'gain' and 'emolument' is set out thus : "Emolument is a species of gain for labour or a collateral gain." Webster's New International Dictionary gives the following meanings : "Profit from office, employment or labour ; compensation ; perquisites, fees or salary ; advantage; benefit." Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the meanings "advantage ; profit arising from employment as salary or fees" and Murray's Dictionary gives "profit or gain arising from station, office or employment; dues, reward, remuneration, salary." Black's Law Dictionary defines the term, as "profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for service or which is annexed to the possession of office as salary, fees and perquisites ; advantages, gain, public or private" and Stroud's Law Dictionary says, that it means "a profit or advantage -- anything by which a person is benefitted, e. g. a person dispossessed of an office, or employment, who is entitled to compensation calculated according to his "annual emolument" derived therefrom, is entitled to have taken into consideration the profit he has made on the allowance made to him for travelling expenses". These are sufficient to indicate, that in its primary sense, the term "emolument" is associated with office or employment or service, and that only in a secondary sense it means gain or advantage. These are sufficient to indicate, that in its primary sense, the term "emolument" is associated with office or employment or service, and that only in a secondary sense it means gain or advantage. It seems to me, that in Section 57(e), the term is used in its primary sense, as related to office or employment or service in the religious institution, and not in its secondary sense, so as perhaps to include any and every claim, monetary or otherwise and whatever its foundation, which may be deemed to spell some advantage or profit or gain ; otherwise, even the claim of a mere creditor of the institution for example, might fall within the scope of Section 57(e) for enquiry by the Deputy Commissioner and might thus attract Section 93, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. I do not think that the term "emolument" in the context of Section 57(e) can be given such extended meaning as any advantage, profit or gain. I do not set much store by the words "custom or otherwise" in Section 57(e), but feel persuaded to accept, differing from the courts below, that they might take in a contract or agreement but that does not affect the present question. As an annuity a certain regularity is attached to it, but this ought not to confound the real character of the claim. I therefore agree with the two courts, though for different reasons in thinking that the annuity sued for is not emolument within the meaning of Section 57(e). 5. It follows that Section 57 clause (e) of Act XIX, has no application and that Section 93 does not come into play. The civil court has jurisdiction to try this suit. No other point was argued in the second appeal, which fails and is dismissed with costs.