ORDER:- This is an application under section 24, C.P.C. by the respondents in Civil Appeal No.77 of 1960, pending before the District Judge, Manipur for the transfer of the said, appeal from the file of the District Judge -Shri Chandra Prakash to the file of another Court. As there is no other Judge in Manipur having jurisdiction to hear Civil Appeals, the prayer virtually amounts to a transfer of the appeal to this Court for hearing. 2. The appeal was posted for hearing before the District Judge on 29-4-61. The appellant in the said appeal who is the respondent herein had engaged a lawyer from Calcutta to argue the appeal on his behalf. The petitioners had also engaged a lawyer from Karijnganj in Cachar District to appear for them. The petitioners lawyer from Karimganj sent a telegram on 21-4-61 to their local lawyer stating that the date, namely, 29-4-61 was unsuitable to him. This telegram was delivered only on 22-4-61 at 1-00 p.m. As 23-4-61 was a Sunday, an application was taken out on 24-4-61 by the petitioners for adjournment of the hearing of the appeal to the end of May, 1961 to enable their lawyer to come or for some other lawyer from Calcutta being engaged for them. This petition was taken up on 25-4-61. It was opposed by the appellant in the appeal who filed an objection petition stating that he had engaged a lawyer from Calcutta at a cost of Rs.1,500/- to conduct the appeal on 29-4-61 and that the date of hearing should not therefore be changed. The learned District Judge thereupon passed an order on the petitioners application on 25-4-61 that the opposite party had already purchased the Air ticket for his counsel to come from Calcutta, that the application was too late and that the date cannot be changed. Thereupon the petitioners have come forward with the present application on 27-4-61 for transfer of the appeal from the file of the District Judge. They said that they entertained serious apprehension that they would not get fair and impartial justice at the hands of the District Judge as he was biased against them. 3. In order to show the bias of the District Judge, they have traced the history of this appeal ever since it was filed. They said that they entertained serious apprehension that they would not get fair and impartial justice at the hands of the District Judge as he was biased against them. 3. In order to show the bias of the District Judge, they have traced the history of this appeal ever since it was filed. The petitioners obtained a decree in the Munsifs Court against the appellant on 6-9-1960 for possession of a shop with a sum of Rs.1,455/- and odd by way of profits. They immediately took out execution. In the meantime, the appellant filed an appeal in the District Court. At that time, the District Judge - Shri Chandra Prakash was away at Simla and the Subordinate Judge -Shri M. Radhamohon Singh was in charge. The appellant moved for stay of execution. Thereupon, Shri Radhamohon Singh, sent a telegram to the District Judge - Shri Chandra Prakash for direction regarding the stay petition and Shri Chandra Prakash replied that urgent cases can be dealt with by Shri Radhamohon Singh himself. Thereupon an order was passed on 26-9-60 by Shri Radhamohon Singh, directing the Munsiff not to proceed with the execution till the disposal of the appeal. But if appears that the petitioners had obtained delivery of possession of the shop even on 24-9-60 and only the money portion of the decree remained to be executed. After the return of Shri Chandra Prakash to Imphal, he stayed the execution of the money portion of the decree on the appellants giving security. 4. It was pointed out for the petitioners that Shri Chandra Prakash was wrong in directing Shri Radhamohon Singh to deal with the emergent stay application under Sec.37 of the Manipur (Courts) Act, and further that he was wrong in staying the execution of the money portion of the decree. I am unable to understand this argument at all as showing any bias on the part of Shri Chandra Prakash. We are not concerned with the question whether the orders passed are right orders or wrong orders. A Judge has got to pass an order on an application filed before him and if he goes wrong he can be corrected by a higher Court. We are not concerned with the question whether the orders passed are right orders or wrong orders. A Judge has got to pass an order on an application filed before him and if he goes wrong he can be corrected by a higher Court. But the fact that he passed, the order against a particular party will not show that he had any bias against that party nor has the party against whom the order was passed any reasonable ground for fear that the Judge would be biassed against him in the appeal. 5. It would appear that the appellant filed an application under Sec.47, C.P.C. against the petitioners and the Bailiff of the Court making allegations regarding the manner in which delivery of possession of the shop was taken. A petition was also filed against the Bailiff before the Munsif for taking departmental action against him on the ground of collusion with the petitioners. Those matters came before Shri Chandra Prakash and he directed the Munsiff to hold an enquiry against the Bailiff and called for the explanation of the Bailiff. It was stated that this action of the District Judge showed that his mind was influenced against the petitioners. I cannot accept this argument. The District Judge had to direct an enquiry into the matter when an allegation is made against a member of his staff. I am unable to see how the fact off his directing an enquiry can be said to have influenced him against the petitioners. These are normal functions of a District Judge and if the Court does not take proper action, it will be abdicating its functions. If the Court directs an enquiry against the bailiff how could the Presiding Officer be charged with being influenced against a party? 6. The appellant applied for amendment of the memorandum of appeal and it was allowed only on payment of costs to the petitioners. Next, the appellant applied for amendment of the written statement in the suit and the petitioners objected to the said amendment and the matter was pending. The petitioners insisted that the application for amendment should be taken up before the appeal was heard. But the District Judge stated that it can be done only alter knowing of the merits of the case and that it will be decided after hearing arguments on the merits of the appeal. The petitioners insisted that the application for amendment should be taken up before the appeal was heard. But the District Judge stated that it can be done only alter knowing of the merits of the case and that it will be decided after hearing arguments on the merits of the appeal. The petitioners were not satisfied with the order and they took the matter in revision to this Court. But I dismissed the revision petition. 7. The appeal stood adjourned to 21-2-61 for hearing. On 17-1-61, the appellant moved the District Judge with a request that the appeal may be heard on 21-2-61 itself as he had engaged a lawyer from Calcutta at enormous expense and that he would suffer great loss if the case was adjourned on that date. On that, the District Judge passed an order that attempt will be made to take up the appeal on the date fixed. But neither party was ready on 21-2-61 and so the case was adjourned to 23-3-61. But on that date, a telegram was received by the Court direct from the Calcutta lawyer stating that the date was not suitable to him. The petitioners were also not ready on that date and they did not oppose any adjournment. The Court was also engaged in Sessions cases on that day. So the case was adjourned to 29-4-61 with the remark on the order sheet that a telegram was received from the Calcutta Advocate praying for adjournment and so the case was adjourned. 8. After this, the petitioners engaged the lawyer from Karimganj on their side. As already stated, the lawyer sent a telegram on 21-4-61 that the date 29-4-61 was not suitable to him and the application filed by the petitioner on 24-4-61 for adjourning the, case, was dismissed by the District Judge on the ground that the Calcutta lawyer had already purchased his plane ticket for 29-4-1961 and that therefore the application was too late and cannot be allowed. It is this last order of the District Judge which was the immediate cause for the filing of this application for transfer. 9. It is this last order of the District Judge which was the immediate cause for the filing of this application for transfer. 9. What was argued for the petitioners was that the cumulative effect of all that transpired before the District Judge even since the filing of this appeal on the mind of the petitioner may be taken into account by this Court in judging the question whether there was cause for reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioners that they would not get impartial justice from the District Judge. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, (S) AIR 1957 SC 425 , the tests not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment, but it is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. In that case, the matter had already been decided by the Bar Council Tribunal without any objection being taken by the Advocate at the enquiry that a member of the tribunal had a bias against him. The Supreme Court was dealing with that case when the matter ultimately came before that Court under special leave. 10. Thus, the test to be applied in our present case is whether a reasonable man would have found anything in the conduct of the District Judge which would make him apprehend that there was any bias on the part of the District Judge against the petitioners, and which would make it difficult for the District Judge to deal with the case impartially. For applying the test, this Court in dealing with the case has to put itself more or less in the shoes of the petitioners and to see if their apprehension was not only real, but reasonable. A party in a case will always be on tenterhooks about the result of his case before the Court and there will be a tendency on his part to exaggerate the implication of any order passed by the Court which may even in he slightest degree be against him in the course of interlocutory applications. The party would take seriously, any words which the Judge may use carelessly in the course of the hearing of interlocutory applications. The party would take seriously, any words which the Judge may use carelessly in the course of the hearing of interlocutory applications. A Judge has to be guarded against creating any such misapprehension in the minds of the parties, even unwittingly. He must not only create the impression that he will deal fairly and equally with all the parties, but he must also actually keep his mind open to conviction until he hears all the parties. 11. Thus, what we have to see in this case is whether any reasonable man and not the party himself had any reason for apprehension that impartial justice might not be done by the Judge. Applying that test, I am unable to see anything done by this District Judge which need have caused the petitioners to fear that he has any bias against them. 12. I have already pointed out that the granting of the stay by the District Judge to the appellant pending the appeal on security being given by him was what any Appellate Court under the circumstances would do. Again, the order for an enquiry against the Bailiff in the matter of the delivery of the shop was a routine matter and not something which need have caused any misgivings to the petitioners. That was what a District Judge was bound to do on receiving a signed petition against the Bailiff. Again, I fail, to understand how the order of the District Judge on 17-1-61 that an attempt will be made to take up the case on 21-2-61 was in any way improper or against the petitioners. The appellant had pointed out to the District Judge that they had engaged a Calcutta lawyer at enormous expenses for the hearing. Even then, the District Judge did not assure the party that the case will be definitely taken up on 21-2-61, but only that an attempt will be made. Even if the District Judge had agreed to take up the case definitely on 21-2-1961, the petitioners have no reason for any apprehension. 13. Next it was said that on 23-3-61, the Court should not have adjourned the case on receipt of a telegram from the Calcutta lawyer. I cannot understand this complaint. The petitioners themselves did not press that the case should be taken on 23-3-61 and the adjournment was not granted in spite of their opposition. 13. Next it was said that on 23-3-61, the Court should not have adjourned the case on receipt of a telegram from the Calcutta lawyer. I cannot understand this complaint. The petitioners themselves did not press that the case should be taken on 23-3-61 and the adjournment was not granted in spite of their opposition. It is evident that the petitioners also were not ready on 23-3-61, and that they were also anxious to engage a lawyer from outside and so did not mind the adjournment. 14. Thus, nothing which transpired before the District Judge in this case till 23-3-1961 could have caused any apprehension in the mind of any reasonable man that the District Judge will not deal fairly which both parties. Thus we are again left with what took place after 23-3-1961. 15. The petitioners wanted on 20-4-61 to have the appellants application for amendment of the written statement to be taken up before the final hearing of the appeal. It was rightly rejected by the District Judge and I have also dismissed the revision petition filed against the order. It is clear that the matter can be disposed of only after hearing the merits of the appeal and that it was a matter within the judicial discretion of the appellate Court. 16. Thus, we again come to the immediate cause of the filing of this application, namely, the dismissal by the District Judge on 25-4-61 of the application for adjournment made by the petitioners on the ground that the appellants Calcutta lawyer had already purchased his plane ticket to come to Imphal for the hearing on 29-4-61. I cannot, of course, congratulate the District Judge on his order refusing that reasonable request for adjournment. The fact that the appellants lawyer from Calcutta had purchased his plane ticket was no reason at all for refusing the adjournment to the petitioners to have a lawyer of their choice to appear for them. The learned District Judge evidently forgot that the Calcutta lawyer could get a refund of the plane ticket and book another ticket for the adjourned date of the appeal. When the appellant was getting a Calcutta lawyer, the petitioners, also should have been given an opportunity to bring a lawyer of their own liking to represent them. The learned District Judge evidently forgot that the Calcutta lawyer could get a refund of the plane ticket and book another ticket for the adjourned date of the appeal. When the appellant was getting a Calcutta lawyer, the petitioners, also should have been given an opportunity to bring a lawyer of their own liking to represent them. When the telegram from the lawyer whom they had engaged was produced before the District Judge 5 days before the hearing, it should, not have been rejected on the ground that the application for adjournment was too late. The application could not be filed earlier than on Monday (24-4-61), as the telegram was delivered only in the afternoon of Saturday (22-4-61). In a case where lawyers on both sides come from outside the Head quarters, the proper thing for the Court to do would be to fix a convenient date of hearing after consultation with the parties so that both lawyers could be present on the date of hearing. Thus, it has to be accepted that the order passed by the District Judge on 25-4-61 refusing the adjournment to the petitioners was far from happy. 17. But the question is whether the said order disclosed any bias against the petitioners. A wrong order or an unhappy order is not necessarily a biassed order. The appellant appears to have strenuously opposed the adjournment and naturally too, because he had made all arrangements to get his lawyer from Calcutta for that date including the purchase of the plane ticket. It is evident that the District Judge also appeared to have been impressed with that fact. He was so impressed with it that when the records were called for to this Court on the revision petition filed by the petitioners, the District Judge wroteto the Registrar to say on 26-4-61 that the hearing of the appeal was posted to 29-4-61 and a lawyer from Calcutta was coming to argue the case and that the records may be sent after 29-4-61.This letter was very much stressed for the petitioners as showing that the District Judge was bent on hearing the appeal on 29-4-61 itself without giving an opportunity to the petitioners to bring their lawyer from outside. When the records are called for to this Court in connection with a revision petition arising out of an interlocutory order in the appeal, it was certainly wrong on the part of the District Judge to have stated that the records would be sent after hearing the appeal itself, because the hearing of the appeal, will depend upon the result of the revision petition. It is evident that the learned District Judge placed much store on the lawyer from Calcutta coming to appear before him. But that will not again show that there was any bias against the petitioners. I cannot of course find fault with the petitioners for having filed this application for transfer as they were afraid that the appeal may be heard on 29-4-61 without their being represented by their lawyer from Karimaganj, but only by their local lawyer. But I am not satisfied that what transpired before the District Judge including the wrong order passed by him refusing the adjournment showed any bias against the petitioners, nor that there was sufficient cause for them to fear that they will not get justice. It is quite possible that the District Judge felt that the attempt on the part of the petitioners was to get an adjournment because the appellant had engaged a lawyer from Calcutta and he did not want that any delaying tactics should be allowed. Even if that was the reason for refusing the adjournment, it will not show any bias against the petitioner. 18. I am therefore satisfied that there are no good grounds for transfer of this appeal and the application is dismissed, but under the circumstances without any costs. But I must direct the District Judge that proper opportunity should be given for the petitioners being represented by a lawyer of their own choice. He must also see that the fact of the application for transfer being filed by the petitioners should not in any way influence him against the petitioners at the time of hearing the appeal. Application dismissed.