JUDGMENT A. P. Srivastava, J. - This case has come to us on a reference made by Mr. Justice Sahai. It is an execution first appeal on behalf of a judgment-debtor. The facts, which have led to it, can be briefly stated. Smt. Panna Devi obtained a decree against Mool Chand, the appellant, from a court in the State of Bengal. The decree was transferred for execution to the Court of the Civil Judge of Banaras and two houses of the Judgment-debtor were attached. They were directed to be sold and the Amin sold the houses by public auction. The highest bid offered in respect of the first house No. 37/152 was Rs. 3,600 and that for the other house No. 37/153 was Rs. 3,500. These highest bids had been offered by the appellant. The Amin accepted these bids subject to the final acceptance of the Court and required the appellant to deposit one-fourth of the purchase money on the spot. That was done. The court impliedly accepted the bids when it approved of the report of the Amin and then the balance of the purchase money was deposited in due course within time. The appellant thus became the auction-purchaser of the two houses. By that time, however, the, judgment-debtor had applied for the setting aside of the decree itself and had obtained an order for the stay of the confirmation of the sale. The sale could not, therefore, be confirmed though as it had been held on the 15th October 1951 it was due for confirmation on the 15th November 1951. On account of the stay order the confirmation remained stayed for about a year. Then the application for setting aside the decree having been dismissed for default the stay order was withdrawn. The Court then fixed the 9th September 1952 for confirmation of the sale. On that date the judgment-debtor appeared and made an application praying that he be allowed to deposit the decretal amount along with the five per cent. of the purchase price for the auction purchaser. Though the application did not say that it was being filed under Or. XXI, R. 89 of the C.P.C. it appears to have been intended to be filed under that provision and in his memorandum of appeal the appellant has referred to it as such. of the purchase price for the auction purchaser. Though the application did not say that it was being filed under Or. XXI, R. 89 of the C.P.C. it appears to have been intended to be filed under that provision and in his memorandum of appeal the appellant has referred to it as such. The Court directed the judgment-debtor to deposit the amount at his own risk and the amount was deposited. The deposit was, however, not unconditional and was made after the time for making an application under Or. XXI, R. 89, C.P.C. had expired. It was prayed in the application that the money should he given, if at all, to the decree-holder only after taking security. The judgment-debtor, who had filed this application, was directed to pay the process fee and file notices so that notices could be issued to the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser. The date fixed for the hearing of the application of the judgment-debtor was the 4th October 1952. When the case was taken up the judgment-debtor as well as the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser were absent. The executing Court, therefore, passed an order saying: "None for the parties. The execution application is dismissed in default. Cost on decree-holder." Subsequently on the 27th November 1952 the auction-purchaser made an application to the Court praying that the sale be confirmed in his favour and a sale certificate be issued. Notice in respect of this application was issued and the judgment-debtor showed cause. By the order dated the 11th July 1953 the executing Court directed that the sale be confirmed and that a sale certificate be issued. It is against that order that this execution first appeal has been filed on behalf of the judgment-debtor and the contention raised in support of the appeal is that the execution application having been dismissed for default the whole matter came to an end and it was not open to the executing Court to confirm the sale. 2. When the appeal came up for consideration before Mr. Justice Sahai he found that three important questions were involved which deserved consideration by a Division Bench. He, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench. The three questions which he thought arose in the case were: - (1). 2. When the appeal came up for consideration before Mr. Justice Sahai he found that three important questions were involved which deserved consideration by a Division Bench. He, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench. The three questions which he thought arose in the case were: - (1). Whether the executing Court has jurisdiction to dismiss an application for execution for default of the decree-holder, if the sale has been held and waiting confirmation and the decree-holder has nothing more to do for the furtherance of the execution? (2). Whether a sale can be confirmed without notice to the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder? (3). Whether the executing Court has jurisdiction to confirm the sale after dismissing an application for execution for default of prosecution? 3. It will be noticed that on the 4th October 1952 two entirely separate proceedings were pending before the learned Civil Judge. One was the execution case itself. The other was the application which the judgment-debtor had made for setting aside the sale, presumably under Or. XXI, R. 39, C. P.C. The latter application had been registered and notices had been ordered to be issued to the decree-holder and the auction purchaser in respect of it. The judgment-debtor, who had made the application, had been directed to take the necessary steps. On the 4th October 1952 the learned Civil Judge dismissed the execution application in default though the decree-holder was not required to do anything for that date and was not, in fact in default in any manner. The order was thus obviously wrong. Both the decree-holder and the Judgment-debtor have allowed that wrong order to become final as they did not challenge it by appeal or revision. If an order is allowed to become final it is binding on the parties whether it is right or wrong. It cannot, in our opinion be said that because the sale had been held and was awaiting confirmation the executing Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the execution application. The Court was seized of the execution case and could deal with it rightly as well as wrongly. A wrong order is not necessarily an order without jurisdiction. 4. In the circumstances of the case the proper order which should have been passed on the 4th October 1952 was to dismiss the appellant's application to set aside the sale. The Court was seized of the execution case and could deal with it rightly as well as wrongly. A wrong order is not necessarily an order without jurisdiction. 4. In the circumstances of the case the proper order which should have been passed on the 4th October 1952 was to dismiss the appellant's application to set aside the sale. The appellant had committed default in not paying the process fee and was himself not present when the case was called on the date fixed. The wrong dismissal of the execution application could not, however, have the effect of disposing of the application for setting aside the sale which was also pending before the learned Civil Judge at that time. Besides the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder the auction-purchases was also interested in that application. Proceedings for setting aside a sale though they stem out of the execution. case are strictly speaking independent proceedings which do not necessarily stand or fall with the execution proceedings. This is so specially if the auction-purchaser is a third person and not the decree-holder himself. The application for setting aside the sale did not, therefore, get automatically dismissed with the dismissal of the application for execution. It remained pending and should have been disposed of by a separate order. 5. Even after the dismissal of the execution application, therefore, the Court was still seized with the application for setting aside the sale and could while dealing with the application either set aside the sale or confirm it. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Court lost its jurisdiction to deal with the question of confirming the sale simply because the execution application was dismissed. By that dismissal all the earlier proceedings did not get completely wiped off and the sale already held did not get automatically set aside. It may be said that under Or. XXI, R. 57 of the Code on the application for execution being dismissed for default the attachment ceased. Even if it did, that could not have any practical effect. The sale already held remained unaffected and it was necessary by a separate order either to confirm it or to set it aside. The Court, therefore, continued to have jurisdiction to do that in spite of the dismissal of the execution application. Even if it did, that could not have any practical effect. The sale already held remained unaffected and it was necessary by a separate order either to confirm it or to set it aside. The Court, therefore, continued to have jurisdiction to do that in spite of the dismissal of the execution application. We find no provision in the Code under which notice to the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder was necessary before confirming the sale. In the present case, however, when the auction-purchaser applied for the confirmation of the sale notice was given to the appellant and he even showed cause. The decree-holder had not objected to the confirmation. 6. It may be said that under R. 92 of Or. XXI of the Code if an application for setting aside the sale under Or. XXI, R. 89 of the Code had been filed the executing Court had no jurisdiction to confirm the sale till the application was disposed of. Two things are noticeable in this connection. In the present case that application filed for setting aside the sale was not headed as an application under Or. XXI, R. 89. If it was treated as such an application it was bound to fail in any case because it had been filed long after the expiry of the period of limitation provided for an application of that kind and was also defective inasmuch as the deposit made was not unconditional. Learned counsel for the appellant conceded this. Secondly the application must be deemed to have been rejected when the sale was ordered to be confirmed on the 11th July 1953. 7. The appeal must, therefore, fail and is dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders to costs.