JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, Ag. C.J. 1. The Industrial Tribunal, Alleppey, held in Industrial Dispute No. 148 of 1956 that the men concerned -- represented by the Dakshina Bharatha Navika Thozhilali Union -- were not workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters referred to it by the Government under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act. It is that decision that is challenged before us by this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. According to the petitioners we should evaluate the evidence adduced in the case as we would in the ease of a first appeal, the controversy being not as regards ordinary facts but "jurisdictional facts" which go to the very root of the Tribunal's jurisdiction. We have been taken through the entire evidence adduced in the case and even assuming, without deciding, that the approach to the evidence should be the approach of a court of first appeal we see no reason to differ from the conclusion reached by the Tribunal. 3. The question that arose for decision before the Tribunal was whether the men concerned were independent contractors and their workmen as contended by the 1st respondent, the Pamba River Factory or the workmen of the respondent factory itself as contended by the petitioners before us. Ext. M7 is the application for registration which has to be filed before the company before a boat is registered. That clearly shows that the contract is really a contract for the hire of boats, not a contract for the employment of the owners of the boats or their workmen as the workmen of the factory. 4. Paragraph 5 of the application is significant. It indicates that the punishment for non-compliance is not disciplinary action against the men concerned but the cancellation of the registration of the boats: "In case I or any of my workmen violate any of the above terms and conditions or behave in any manner detrimental to the general interest of ryots, factory or other boatmen, I agree that the Company shall be at liberty to cancel the registration of my boat from the list". 5. 5. The evidence of W. W. 8 on which reliance is placed by the petitioners and of E. W. 1, the general manager of the factory, both establish that the petitioners are not the workmen of the company but independent contractors and their workmen. To the question "What is the nature of the agreement that you enter into with the applicant who applies for the registration of boat or boats? ", the answer of E. W. 1 is : "It is merely for the supply of boat or boats", and to the question "Do you expect any personal service from the applicant" ? the answer is "No". 6. In A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 264 the Supreme Court surveyed the authorities and said that: "The principle which emerges from these authorities is that the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship between master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work"; that "The nature or extent of control which is requisite to establish the relationship of employer and employee must necessarily vary from business to business and is by its very nature incapable of precise definition" ; and that "The correct method of approach, therefore, would be to consider whether having regard to the nature of the work there was due control and supervision by the employer". The respondent's supervision an d control of the manner in which the transport should be carried out is very small indeed, and applying the test, we have no hesitation in saying that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the men concerned were not workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 7. In paragraph 26 of the decision mentioned above the Supreme Court dealt with another distinction. It said : "The broad distinction between a workman and an independent contractor lies in this that while the former agrees himself to work, the latter agrees to get other persons to work. 7. In paragraph 26 of the decision mentioned above the Supreme Court dealt with another distinction. It said : "The broad distinction between a workman and an independent contractor lies in this that while the former agrees himself to work, the latter agrees to get other persons to work. Now a person who agrees himself to work and does so work and is therefore a workman docs not cease to be such by reason merely of the fact that he gets other persons to work along with him and that those persons are controlled and paid by him. What determines whether a person is a workman or an independent contractor is whether he has agreed to work personally or not. If he has, then he is a workman and the fact that he takes assistance from other persons would not affect his statuts" ; and quoted with approval the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England: "The workman must have consented to give his personal services and not merely to get the work done, but if he is bound under his contract to work personally, he is not excluded from the definition, simply because he has assistance from others, who work under him". In the case before us there is no agreement that the applicants will do any work by themselves. They only undertake to supply the boats. The factory has no concern with the manning of the boats, and the applicants seem to have the fullest liberty to get the entire work done through the employment of other persons. 8. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the men concerned were not workmen as defined in the Act and that as a result it had no jurisdiction to decide the matters referred for adjudication. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.