JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 in O.S. No. 145 of 1125 M.E. on the file of the court of the District Munsiff of Trivandrum are the appellants in the second appeal. They, along with the 3rd plaintiff, who is now dead, filed the suit against the respondent defendant for damages for malicious prosecution. The 1st plaintiff is the son of the 2nd plaintiff, the 3rd plaintiff being the brother of the latter and the defendant being another brother. The plaintiffs were accused persons 6, 5 and 7 respectively in C.C. No. 321 of 1121, wherein the defendant was the complainant. The plaintiffs along with four others were prosecuted for offences under S.379, 427 and 104 of the Travancore Penal Code. The learned Magistrate discharged the accused persons; but the complainant filed a revision against that order in the High Court of Travancore. The High Court confirmed the order of discharge regarding the plaintiffs; but sent back the case for fresh disposal regarding the other accused persons. The suit, which has given rise to the second appeal, was filed, as indicated already, by accused persons 6, 5 and 7 as plaintiffs for damages for malicious prosecution against the complainant. The Trial Court held in favour of the plaintiffs and granted a decree for Rs. 180/-. On appeal by the defendant the lower appellate court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court held that the suit was barred by limitation and it also held on the merits that there were no grounds for granting a decree for malicious prosecution. In second appeal this decision of the lower appellate court is being challenged. 2. At the outset I would observe that the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the suit was barred by limitation is not sustainable. The decision relied on by the learned District Judge, namely Doddeta Subbayaa v. Muthalu Kesavulu (AIR 1945 Mad. 288), does not apply to this case. The facts of that case were that the 2nd accused was discharged under S.253(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a charge under S.379 of the Penal Code was framed against the 1st accused on 30th October 1941 and thereafter, on 24th January 1942 the 1st accused was committed to the Sessions Court. The facts of that case were that the 2nd accused was discharged under S.253(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a charge under S.379 of the Penal Code was framed against the 1st accused on 30th October 1941 and thereafter, on 24th January 1942 the 1st accused was committed to the Sessions Court. The 2nd accused having filed a suit for malicious prosecution against the complainant on 25th January 1943, it was held that the 2nd accused was discharged on 30th October 1941 and not on 24th January 1942 and therefore the suit was barred by limitation. 3. The learned advocate of the appellants invites my attention to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Soora Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingam Chetty ( AIR 1938 Mad. 349 ), which is a decision in point. In that case Leach C. J. who spoke for the Court, observed that where a person who was prosecuted was either discharged or acquitted and the revision petition filed by the complainant against the discharge or acquittal was dismissed, the prosecution proceeding terminated only when the revision petition was dismissed and not on the discharge or acquittal and therefore the limitation for a suit for malicious prosecution began to run only from the dismissal of the revision petition and not from the discharge or acquittal. The wording of Art.23 of the Limitation Act is "when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated", so that limitation starts to run from the termination of the prosecution. The acquittal or discharge of the plaintiff is a termination of the prosecution, if there is no appeal or revision against such acquittal or discharge; but if there is an appeal or revision, the prosecution terminates only with the disposal of such appeal or revision. 4. In the case before me the order of the learned Magistrate discharging the accused persons was passed on 10th Thulam 1123 and the revision petition before the High Court was disposed of on 4th Kanni 1124. The suit, out of which the second appeal has arisen, was filed on 3rd Kanni 1125, that is, within one year of the disposal of the revision petition by the High Court, but after one year from the order of discharge by the learned Magistrate. The suit, out of which the second appeal has arisen, was filed on 3rd Kanni 1125, that is, within one year of the disposal of the revision petition by the High Court, but after one year from the order of discharge by the learned Magistrate. Applying the principle of the Madras Full Bench decision, with which I respectfully agree, the suit was within time and therefore the decision of the learned District Judge on the question of limitation is not sustainable. 5. But on the merits I am inclined to think that the learned District Judge is right. From the evidence and circumstances of the case it cannot be held that the prosecution commenced by the respondent was devoid of reasonable and probable cause. The mere fact of filing a revision before the High Court against the discharge does not, ipso facto, show that the respondent was prompted by malice or ill will. It does not also show that the prosecution was without reasonable and probable cause. It appears from the order of the High Court in the revision petition that the evidence against the appellants was flimsy. That by itself does not mean that the prosecution itself was without reasonable and probable cause. The appellants and the respondent are near relations and they had several litigations pending between them. That may indicate that the respondent had some motive for bringing a prosecution against the appellants even without reasonable and probable cause, out of vindictiveness. It might also have prompted the appellants to abet or instigate the other accused persons in the criminal case to commit the offence. Therefore, the existence of litigations between the appellants on the one hand and the respondent on the other does not by itself conclusively indicate malice or lack of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. The right of the defendant to have resort to the criminal court for redress should not be made a dead letter by interpreting want of reasonable and probable cause so as to inculcate a constant fear in him of an action for malicious prosecution, because the prosecution lacks in bona fides and reasonable and probable cause. Equally so, the plaintiff should not unnecessarily and without reasonable and probable cause be dragged to a criminal court. Equally so, the plaintiff should not unnecessarily and without reasonable and probable cause be dragged to a criminal court. In finding out the presence or absence of reasonable and probable cause, care should be taken not to restrict either of these rights. In the circumstances of the case before me, I do not think that the prosecution was without such reasonable and probable cause as to merit a decree for damages. The second appeal therefore fails and the game is dismissed. Since the appellants have succeeded on the question of limitation, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs in the second appeal.