JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The Appellant was Defendant No. 3 in both Original suit Nos. 60 and 69 of 1932, instituted by the resent Respondents as Plaintiffs for recovery of Re. 6350/- and Rs. 17,215/- respectively. There were five other Defendants against some of whom no relief had been claimed in the said suits. Defendants 1 and 2 in both the suits were firms, and the Appellant had been alleged to be the managing director of those two firms on behalf of whom he was said to have taken the respective suit loans from the Plaintiffs. Both the suits were contested by Defendant No. 1 and were dismissed against Defendants 1 and 2: while decreed exparte against the Appellant on 213-2-1956. Execution cases were filed against the Appellant-judgment-debtor on 3-9-1956, and notice under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC was serves in the execution proceedings under Order 5, Rule 20 Code of Civil Procedure. Notice u/s 14 of the Money Lenders Act was also directed against the Appellant and was accepted as sufficient on 30-8-1957. Thereafter, on 20-9-1957, the Appellant filed two petitions under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the two exparte decrees. He alleged that he first came to know of those two exparte decrees on 10-9-1957, and that the Plaintiffs had got the two decrees against him by suspension of summons in collusion with the process-server. His further allegation in the petitions was "that no summons...were ever served on the Petitioner or any member of his family nor at his residence...That neither the Petitioner nor his family resided either at his native village or at his Cuttack residence where the summons are purported to have been served". No facts were pleaded as to the so called collusive or fraudulent suppression of summons, the manner of service of summons and where they purported to have been served and where the Appellant was at the relevant times. No facts were pleaded as to the so called collusive or fraudulent suppression of summons, the manner of service of summons and where they purported to have been served and where the Appellant was at the relevant times. The contention of the Respondents was that the petitions were barred by limitation; that there was no suppression of summons or any confusion with the process-server; that the allegation that no summons was served on the Petitioner or his family members at his residence, was false; that the Petitioner at the relevant period was staying at Cuttack and was going to his native village which is near Cuttack; thatthe Petitioner had knowledge of both the suits as well as the execution proceedings long before; and that it was untrue that he came to know of the decrees for the first time on 10-9-1957. Not pleaded in the counter, the Respondents sought to make out a case in the evidence stage that on several occasions, while the suits were pending, the Appellant had approached them for a compromise. 2. The trial court's finding in the case is as follows: ...I am unable to believe that the Petitioner had no knowledge of the suits during all these days for 4 years or more when the suits were pending and had also been executed after decree and that he learnt about the cases only from Mr. R.N. Das, P.W. 2 on 10-9-1957. No doubt, there has been some irregularity in the service and it has not been established in what circumstances then was justification for a service under Order 5, Rule 20, and it is open to the Defendant to show that the method employed by the Plaintiff was not calculated to effect the purpose of informing him of the institution of suits; but in the absence of proof of relevant papers, it is not possible for me to find out if the service under Order 5, Rule 20 was not justified. But all the same according to new amendment of Rule 13 of Order 9 any irregularity in service of process will be of no consequence if the Defendant was aware of the suits sufficiently before: the date of hearing. In the present case I have no reason to disbelieve the O.P.Ws that the Petitioner was aware of the suits and had been approaching the O.P. for settlement. In the present case I have no reason to disbelieve the O.P.Ws that the Petitioner was aware of the suits and had been approaching the O.P. for settlement. In the circumstances I hold that the petition is beyond time and must be rejected. 3. As it appears from the record of the trial court, under the orders of the court, summons was last served at the native place of the Appellant, a village near Cuttack town, in the manner laid down under Order 5 Rule 20 Code of Civil Procedure. Order 5, Rule 20, clause (2) lays down "Service substituted by order of the court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the Defendant personally". This provision does not preclude a Defendant, against whom an exparte decree has been passed, from showing that the circumstances justifying the order for substituted service did not in fact exist, or that the same was not properly served. If a Defendant can show in a proceeding under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC that the materials, on the allegation of which the Plaintiff had been able to procure an order from the court for substituted service, were non-existent the Defendant could make out a case that there was no due service of summons. Again, even if there were justifying circumstances for the court's order for substituted service, if a Defendant could show that the substituted service, was not effected in the manner directed by the court, then also he could urge that there was no due service of summons. But if none of these two things could be established by the Defendant, be cannot reasonably urge that there was no due service of summons. But if none of these two things could be established by the Defendant, he cannot reasonably urge that there was no due service of summons; when summons have been served in the manner provided by law. No doubt, though.Order 5, Rule 20 says that the summons served by substituted process shall be as effective as personal service there might be cases where a Defendant has no real knowledge of the suit irrespective of such service. For instance, a Defendant leaving his native place of residence goes away to a foreign place and his address is unknown. No doubt, though.Order 5, Rule 20 says that the summons served by substituted process shall be as effective as personal service there might be cases where a Defendant has no real knowledge of the suit irrespective of such service. For instance, a Defendant leaving his native place of residence goes away to a foreign place and his address is unknown. In such a case, on Plaintiff's move, a court may direct service of Summons by affixing a copy thereof at his native place and also making publications in newspapers. But irrespective of all these steps, a Defendant living away may not yet know about the institution of the suit. Even then it cannot be said, in a case under Order 9, Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, that there has been no due service of summons, though such service of summons might not have been really effective for the purpose for which it was intended. Order 9, Rule 13 does not rule out relief to the Defendant in such a contingency. Order 9, Rule 13 CPC (as amended for Orissa) provides, "In any case in which a decree is passed exparte against a Defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed, for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served or, that there was sufficient cause for his failure to appear when the suit was called in for bearing, the court shall make an order for setting aside the decree as against him". When summons has been served under Order 5, Rule 20, even if the Defendant is hot in a position to challenge the propriety of the order of the court for directing service of summons by substituted process, or even if he cannot show that the service by substituted process was not effected in the manner directed by the court, he is so entitled to show that there was sufficient cause for his failure to appear, if he can convince the court that he had really no knowledge of the institution of the suit. No doubt, Article 164 of the Limitation Act provider that limitation is 30 days from the date of the decree, or where summons was not duly served, from the date the Applicant has knowledge of the decree. No doubt, Article 164 of the Limitation Act provider that limitation is 30 days from the date of the decree, or where summons was not duly served, from the date the Applicant has knowledge of the decree. As Article 161 of the Limitation Act stands, if a summon has been duly served, then the Defendant cannot claim benefit of limitation from the date of his knowledge. If service under Order 5, Rule 20 be due service as contemplated by Order 9, Rule 13 and by Article 164 of the Limitation Act, then normally the Defendant has to come within 30 days of the decree for restoration, irrespective of the fact as to whether he has or has no knowledge of the decree that has been passed against him. To obviate any inconsistency arising on this score, the Orissa amendment of the CPC (Order 9, Rule 13, Clause (2) says down that the provision of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1928) shall apply to applications under Sub-rule (1) of the said rule. So, even though limitation has to be counted from the date of the decree, in a case, where summons has been served under Order 5, Rule 20 Code of Civil Procedure, the fact of want of knowledge of the decree will by itself the a sufficient ground for condonation of the delay. So, Article 164 works out no difficulty if service under Order 5, Rule 20 is held to be due service for the purpose of said Article. Some of the High Courts have been of opinion that substituted service will be due service for the purpose of this Article, vide Badar Rahim Vs. Badhshah Meah AIR 1924 639a (Lahore) and AIR 1950 Mad 282 . The last decision lays down: For the purposes of the Article (Article 164) a person on whom substituted service was affected, must be held to have been duly served and therefore time runs from the M date of the decree even though the Defendant had no,knowledge of the passing of the decree. On the other hand, some other High Courts are of the view that where substituted service has not achieved the object of bringing to the knowledge of the Defendants claim against him it is not due service as contemplated by Article 1&4 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, some other High Courts are of the view that where substituted service has not achieved the object of bringing to the knowledge of the Defendants claim against him it is not due service as contemplated by Article 1&4 of the Limitation Act. In this respect, the learned Counsel for the Appellant sought to rely on Raja Ram Vs. Gopi Nath and Others, and AIR 1957 AP 1 . The Allahabad case lays down: The rule that substituted service is to be taken as effectual as personal service only means that the Court hearing the case may proceed with the suit as if the summons had been personally served on the Defendant. But if for no fault of the Defendants Defendant was never put in a position to know that a suit had been instituted against him whatever steps might have been taken for serving the Summons on him, these steps can never be taken as amounting to due service. It is therefore open to the Defendant, when he appears to show that the method employed was not calculated to effect the purpose of informing the Defendant of the institution' of the suit, and in order to see whether there was due service or not, the court must consider all the circumstances of the case, for example, the place where the Defendant was when the summons was issued to him and where and how the summons was served. The Allahabad High Court was obviously considering a case where the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not available and so their Lordships sought to consider the import of due service, with a view to meet the hardships in applying the period of limitation. As I have already indicated, so far the Orissa amendment stands there is no room for any hardship arising against the Defendant who has an honest case. Even if the view taken by this authority be accepted, the Defendant has not sought to make out a case in the terms laid down by them. As I have already indicated, so far the Orissa amendment stands there is no room for any hardship arising against the Defendant who has an honest case. Even if the view taken by this authority be accepted, the Defendant has not sought to make out a case in the terms laid down by them. AIR 1957 AP 1 lays down: In the case of substituted service under Order 5, Rule 20 there are two conditions prescribed before it can be resorted to viz., that the court must be satisfied either (1) that there is reason to believe that the Defendant is keeping out of the way for the purpose of avoiding service, or (2) that for any other reason the summons cannot be served in the Ordinary way. Therefore when the question arises as to whether in a particular case, substituted service obtained from the court is or is not due service within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 13, it will have to be determined by ascertaining whether the representations made to the Court by the Plaintiff were or were not true, that is to say whether the Defendant could be presumed in the circumstances, to have bad or, had not actual knowledge. Hence, in cases where only substituted service has been effected on the Defendant in terms of Order 5, Rule 20, the substituted service mayor may not be due service required by Order 9, Rule 13, according to the circumstances of the case. It is open to the Defendant to establish that be never avoided service and that, in any case, notice of the claim had not been brought home o him. Here also their Lordships had been confronted with two alternative provisions of Order 9, Rule 13, one of which was regarding due service of summons and the other of which was that the Defendant had been prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing, and also the provision of Article 164 of the Limitation Act. For the original expression the Order 9, Rule 13 "he was prevailed by any sufficient cities from appearing", the Orissa amendment is there was sufficient cause for his failure to appear" which clearly covers cases where the Defendant has no knowledge of the suit irrespective of service of, summons by substituted process. For the original expression the Order 9, Rule 13 "he was prevailed by any sufficient cities from appearing", the Orissa amendment is there was sufficient cause for his failure to appear" which clearly covers cases where the Defendant has no knowledge of the suit irrespective of service of, summons by substituted process. When Order 5, Rule 20 clearly says that service by substituted process shall be as effective as personal service, and such a service is provided by law, there is no apparent justification to say that such service is not due service under Order 9, Rule 13 of the same Procedure Code, even though, the Defendant might have no actual knowledge of the suit or decree. Due service can mean nothing, but service in accordance with law, and though the purpose of all types of service is to bring the institution of the suit to the knowledge of the Defendant, his actual knowledge is not guaranteed by law. So, I humbly differ from the view taken in the aforesaid Andhra Pradesh decision. But even if the principle laid down in the said decision is applied to the present case, the Appellant would be entitled to no benefit. The Appellant does not ay either in his petition or in the evidence at any stage as to how toe order of the court was procured, and if that on wrong materials or false allegations and whether the substituted service was or was not actually effected in the manner prescribed by the Court and if so how he was circumstanced as not to know of the same. Thus, the Appellant neither pleaded nor sought to establish in the evidence a case to decide whether the substituted service was or was not due service, as laid down by their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In my finding, in the absence of anything pleaded or proved to the contrary, the service by substituted process was due service both for the purpose of Order 9, Rule 13, and also for the purpose of Order 9, Rule 13, and also for the purpose of Article 164 of the Limitation Act. Irrespective of such due service, a Defendant could still plead materials to indicate that he had no actual knowledge of the suit or the decree, and he could file a petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. Irrespective of such due service, a Defendant could still plead materials to indicate that he had no actual knowledge of the suit or the decree, and he could file a petition u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. There are no such petitions filed in the present case, and so the petitions under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC are barred by Article 164 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation being counted from the date of the decree, no matter even though the Appellant came to know of the decree for the first time on the date alleged by him. 4 In the aforesaid circumstances, I need not make any comment on the finding of the trial court that the Appellant had knowledge of the suit based on the fact sought to be made out by the Respondents in the evidence stage that the Appellant on several occasions had approached them for a settlement, when no such case had been specifically alleged in the counter of the Respondents. The trial court bas held that there was some irregularity in the service of summons, and that is based on the evidence of O.P.W. 4. Though the evidence of O.P.W. 4 is somewhat confused regarding different process served at different times relating to the suits and the execution proceedings, no irregularity is apparent from his evidence regarding the substituted service directed under Order 5, Rule 20, and the previous processes on the failure of which the order was procured under Order 5, Rule 20, Code of Civil Procedure. There is no other material, from which any irregularly in service of summons can be inferred, and so there is no room for application of the proviso clause under Order 9, Rule 13 to the effect that no decree shall be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in the service of summons, if the court is satisfied that the Defendant knew of the date of hearing in sufficient time to enable him to appear and answer the Plaintiff's claim. 5. There is another ground, on which the Appellant's appeals shall also fail. In the restoration proceedings, the Appellant had impleaded Defendants 1 and 2' amongst the other Defendants. But in the appeals, be impleaded none of those Defendants including Defendants 1 and 2, against whom the Plaintiffs' suits have already been dismissed. 5. There is another ground, on which the Appellant's appeals shall also fail. In the restoration proceedings, the Appellant had impleaded Defendants 1 and 2' amongst the other Defendants. But in the appeals, be impleaded none of those Defendants including Defendants 1 and 2, against whom the Plaintiffs' suits have already been dismissed. When Defendants 1 and 2 are not parties to the present appeals, the decrees passed in their favour cannot be set aside, though there would have been no difficulty in setting aside any decree that would have been passed against them. If the suits are restored as against the Appellant alone, the Appellant might contest that the loans were incurred by him on' behalf of Defendants 1 and 2, and that he was not personally liable, and if he succeeds in establishing such a case, then the Court shall have to dismiss the suits against him holding that Defendants 1 and 2 were liable in which case there will be two inconsistent findings in the same suits. 6. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Re. 50/-in each appeal. Final Result : Dismissed