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1961 DIGILAW 380 (SC)

Krishna Gopal Bhatwadekar v. State Bank of India at Bombays

1961-11-15

A.K.SARKAR, K.N.WANCHOO, P.B.GAJENDRAGADKAR

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JUDGMENT Per Gajendragadkar, J.:-By a notification issued on 5 January 1952, the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) constituted a tribunal consisting of three members under the chairmanship of Sri Panchapakesa Sastri for the adjudication of industrial disputes concerning the banking companies in India. One of the disputes referred to the said tribunal was between the Imperial Bank of India, which has now become the State Bank of India, and its employees in relation to the rules for compulsory contribution made by the State Bank under its pension scheme. It appears that In 1921 the Bank started a pension and guarantee fund. A trust In regard to this fund was created in the same year by a trust deed duly executed in that behalf. Until 1931 the employees were not required to contribute to the pension fund. In 1931, however, a five per cent contribution was made compulsory for the employees. The necessary change in the relevant rules of the pension fund was accordingly made and subsequent thereto the employees were contributing the said compulsory contribution to the pension fund. The Bank took this step owing to trade depression which was very strong in 1931. The contribution which was thus made compulsory for the employees and the employees. On behalf of the employees a demand was made before the tribunal that the monthly contributions from members towards the pension fund should be stopped forthwith and it was urged that all amounts recovered from the members by way of the said contribution in the past should be refunded to them with interest or credited to the provident fund account if the member so desired. This demand was Demand 4. The Sastri Tribunal considered this demand in dealing with the problem of the pension scheme in Chap. XX of the report. There were four constituent elements of this demand with two of which we are concerned in the present proceedings. The employees claimed that the future contribution should be stopped; that was the first constituent of the claim; and secondly, they asked that the amounts contributed by them should be refunded to them. XX of the report. There were four constituent elements of this demand with two of which we are concerned in the present proceedings. The employees claimed that the future contribution should be stopped; that was the first constituent of the claim; and secondly, they asked that the amounts contributed by them should be refunded to them. It appears that when the matter was argued before the tribunal Sri Niren De from Calcutta reserved to himself the right to question the validity of the trust deed and the constitution of the pension and guarantee fund and did not press for relief as regards refund of the contributions made in the past. He stated before the tribunal that he would take proper and adequate proceedings elsewhere with respect to that matter if so advised. In view of this concession the tribunal was called upon to consider primarily the first constituent of the demand, namely, that the future contri-buttons should be stopped. In that connexion the tribunal considered the objections raised by the Bank in support of its scheme of pension fund based on the contributions by the Bank as well as the employees and held that no case had been made out for compulsory contribution. The tribunal, therefore, came to the conclusion that the employees contributions should be stopped. It, however, realized that there were technical difficulties in the way of directing the abolition of the fund Itself. The trustees In whom the pension fund vested were not before the tribunal and It was not clear that the tribunal could legally and validly give any directions In regard to the said fund without Impleading the trustees and bearing them. Even so, the tribunal thought that In substance the compulsory contribution should be stopped In future by directing the Bank that If such contributions were required to be made by the employees the Bank should pay a special gratuity to the employees equal in amount to the contributions made by the workmen in question with Interest thereon as standing to their credit in the pension section of the fund. In other words, the tribunal first recorded its decision that compulsory contribution should be stopped and provided for the implementation of the said decision by directing the Bank to pay to Its employees a special gratuity as Just Indicated. In view of this latter direction the tribunal incorporated its final order in Para. In other words, the tribunal first recorded its decision that compulsory contribution should be stopped and provided for the implementation of the said decision by directing the Bank to pay to Its employees a special gratuity as Just Indicated. In view of this latter direction the tribunal incorporated its final order in Para. 403 of its award, this paragraph being a part of Chap. XIX which dealt with the question of gratuity. Against this portion of the award the Bank preferred an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. It appears that the Bank apprehended that the operative portion of the award made by the Sastri Tribunal may lead to a claim by Its employees for a refund of the contributions already made by them. The direction Issued by the Sastri Tribunal read thus: "We direct that so long as these rules (pension rules) remain unaltered and provided for compulsory contribution by employees, the Bank should pay a special gratuity to employees as provided for by us in our award in the chapter relating to gratuity." The Labour Appellate Tribunal observed that the direction Issued by the Sastrt Award were somewhat ambiguous and were capable of the Interpretation as apprehended by the Bank, and so it proceeded on the footing that the Sastri Award intended to confer upon the employees the right to claim a refund of the contributions already made by them towards the pension fund. It then examined the merits of the said direction and held that a claim for refund could not be awarded. In accordance with Its decision, the Labour Appellate Tribunal confirmed the Sastri Award in regard to the discontinuance of compulsory contribution In future and the direction to pay a special gratuity In case the said contribution was required to be made. In other words, as a result of the Labour Appellate Tribunal s decision future contributions bad either to be stopped by the Bank or payment of a special gratuity in lieu of the said contribution with interest had to be made by it to Its employees. The Bank was not liable under the appellate decision to refund the amount already received from its employees by way of contributions to the pension fund. The Bank was not liable under the appellate decision to refund the amount already received from its employees by way of contributions to the pension fund. The appellants Krishna Gopal Bhatwadekar and the Imperial Bank of India Staff Association, Kirkee, Poona, challenged the validity of the said direction In the Labour Appellate Tribunal s decision by their Special Civil Application No. 944 of 1955 filed by them in the Bombay High Court. To this application the appellants Impleaded the respondent, the Imperial Bank of India, now known as the State Bank of India and the members of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The principal ground on which the validity of the appellate decision was challenged was that the appeal preferred by the respondent against the Sastri Award was not competent under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (48 of 1950). It was urged by the appellants before the High Court that the Sastri Award had in substance directed the respondent to refund to Its employees (he amount compulsorily recovered by It from them by way of their individual contribution to the pension fund while issuing an order against the Bank for stopping such contribution in future. It was contended that the appeal preferred by the Bank in that behalf being incompetent, the modification made by the appellate decision was Invalid and not binding with the result that the original direction which, according to them, was contained in the Sastri Award would bind the parties. The respondent disputed the correctness of these contentions. The High Court has upheld the respondent s case. It has come to the conclusion that the appeal preferred by the respondent before the Labour Appellate Tribunal was competent and it has also found that the Sastri Award itself did not Justify the Appellants case that the employees of the Bank were entitled to the refund of the contributions made by them in the past. In the result, the writ petition filed by the appellants has been dismissed (vide 1956-II L.L. J. 229). It is against this order that the appellants have come to this Court with a certificate issued by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The principal question which calls for our decision in the present appeal is in regard to the competence of the appeal preferred by the respondent before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. It is against this order that the appellants have come to this Court with a certificate issued by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The principal question which calls for our decision in the present appeal is in regard to the competence of the appeal preferred by the respondent before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Section 7 of the Appellate Tribunal Act provides, inter alia, that subject to Its provisions an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award of an industrial tribunal if- (1) (a) the appeal Involves any substantial question of law; or (1) (b) (v) the award is in respect of gratuity payable on discharge. The High Court has held that the appeal was competent under S. 7 (1) (a) and may also prima facie be competent under S. 7 (1) (b) (v). In our opinion the decision of the High Court is obviously right. Under S. 7 (1) (a) the appeal would have been competent if it involved a substantial question of law. It is true that though a preliminary objection was presumably raised before the Labour Appellate Tribunal about the competence of the appeal, the Appellate Tribunal has not considered the point; but it is clear that the question as to whether an effective direction could be given for the discontinuance of the compulsory contribution of the employees towards the pension fund in the absence of the trustees of the fund before the tribunal was clearly a substantial question of law. In fact, both the Sastri Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal were conscious that there were technical and legal difficulties in the way of making direct and straightforward orders on the demand in question. If the rules framed required modification before appropriate relief could be granted to the employees the Sastri Tribunal thought, and we think rightly, that the trustees of the fund would have been necessary parties before the tribunal. That is why the Sastri Tribunal adopted a somewhat indirect course of giving effect to its decision without impleading the trustees and calling upon them to make appropriate changes in the rules. The direction about the special gratuity Issued by the Sastri Tribunal which has been confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Is obviously an indirect way of compelling the Bank not to demand compulsory contribution from its employees. The direction about the special gratuity Issued by the Sastri Tribunal which has been confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Is obviously an indirect way of compelling the Bank not to demand compulsory contribution from its employees. Whether or not such an indirect course could be adopted for achieving a result which could not be directly achieved without Impleading the trustees was itself a point of law of some Importance, and so it would not be right to contend that an appeal which raised this point of law did not satisfy the requirements of S. 7 (i) (a) of the Appellate Tribunal Act. Besides, the appeal would have been competent even under S. 7 (1) (6) (v). We have already noticed that the Sastri Award has deliberately inserted Para. 403 in the chapter dealing with gratuity because the effective portion of the award called upon the Bank to pay its employees special gratuity as therein directed. Therefore, the direction was one for the payment of gratuity, and it was ft direction for the payment of gratuity on discharge. In the context of the formula evolved by the Sastri Tribunal In that behalf the word " discharge," we think, must receive a broad and liberal interpretation so as to include even retirement. Therefore, we are satisfied that the High Court was right incoming to the conclusion that the respondent s appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal in regard to the present point In dispute between the parties was competent under B. 7 (1) (b) ("). If that be so, the validity of the directions Issued by the Labour Appellate Tribunal is beyond challenge In a writ proceeding like the one initiated by the appellants against the respondent. In that view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the Sastri Award did contain a direction on which a claim for refund of past contributions could be sustained. The result Is the appeal falls and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. For Citation : (1961) 2 Lab LJ 653