ORDER :- On 29th November, 1961 this Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction took proceedings against Sri Sunderlal Srivastava, a clerk of an Advocate of this Court, for contempt of Court on the ground that on that date, while the Court was sitting and hearing a case, he was making noise in the corridor and disturbing the Court and defied the authority of the police official who, on the Court's orders, asked him to observe silence. After the Reader of the Court had failed to restore silence in the corridor, the Court sent a constable on duty to take action. He reported to the Court that three persons were talking loudly in the corridor, one of whom was the respondent Sunderlal Srivastava who on being requested by the constable to move and not disturb the Court, asked him to show by what authority he was acting. Thereupon the respondent was brought before this Court under its orders and questioned, but he denied that he had talked noisily or challenged the authority of the constable. The constable Samar Bahadur Singh was examined on oath and his statement recorded. The defendant's counsel (who is also the Advocate employing him) took an adjournment to enable him to cross-examine the constable and prepare the defence. On the 1st December, counsel wanted another adjournment on the ground that he had not been able to verify the facts or prepare the defence. He was asked by the Court to state whether he had been instructed to plead guilty or not guilty, and obtained a short adjournment to answer this question. Later in the day Mr. S.B.L. Gaur, a senior Advocate of this Court appeared for the defendant and stated that the defendant was sorry for what he had done and tendered his apology. The defendant who was present in Court repeated the apology. The Court reserved its orders. 2. This Court has an inherent power to punish any person who by his conduct disturbs its proceedings or otherwise interferes with the administration of justice. It is not necessary to trace the historical roots of the jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt of itself which is now derived from Article 215 of the Constitution. The extent of this power is co-extensive with that of the Court of the Queen's Bench in England. It is not necessary to trace the historical roots of the jurisdiction of this Court to punish for contempt of itself which is now derived from Article 215 of the Constitution. The extent of this power is co-extensive with that of the Court of the Queen's Bench in England. Under the English Common law the Court of the King's Bench derived its jurisdiction from the Sovereign and contempt of the King's Court was punishable as contempt of the Sovereign. But the nature of the contempt jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts today must necessarily be different, being derived from a republican Constitution under which political sovereignty resides in the people and legal sovereignty is distributed among the various organs of government. The Courts have advisedly refrained from defining too precisely or circumscribing this power, and any conduct which tends to interfere with the administration of justice is punishable as contempt of Court. But in a democratic republic the moral justification for the vast power of the High Court to punish in a summary manner any citizen for contempt must be justified on the ground of the public interest. 3. I think it can be so justified. The judiciary more than any other organ of the State depends for the successful discharge of its prestige. Unlike the executive it has no power to execute its commands, and unlike the legislature it has no mandate from the electorate. Unlike both it is not liable to any other authority to account for the wisdom of its decision; and yet its decisions are invariably obeyed by the ex-ecutive and respected by the legislature. The source of its authority can be stated in a single word, prestige. The prestige of the High Courts in India is not derived from any mystical or tribal cult or from the majesty of any sovereign as in England. It rests on concrete pillars - namely the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the Judges and upon the traditional atmosphere of dignified calm surrounding the law Courts. Even a losing litigant should leave the Court with a feeling that his case was decided by an impartial judge, that he had a fair hearing, and that the Court devoted its full attention to his grievance. It follows that any one who disturbs the Court or creates around it an atmosphere resembling that of the market place interferes with the administration of justice. It follows that any one who disturbs the Court or creates around it an atmosphere resembling that of the market place interferes with the administration of justice. He creates an impression that the Court is unable to maintain a proper atmosphere for its efficient functioning, and thereby lowers the prestige of the Court and shakes the confidence of the public in the judicial process. Such conduct amounts to contempt of Court, and it is in, the public interest that the disturber should be punished to restore the confidence of the citizens in the judicial process. 4. The case against the respondent is that he disturbed the Court by conversing with others in loud tones in the corridor and continued to do so even after he was warned. It must be emphasised that all the corridors skirting, the various court-rooms are parts of the Court where the. same degree of silence and decorum must be observed as in the court-room itself. A corridor leading to a Court room is meant to be passed and re-passed silently for gaining entry into the court-room, but not to be used as a place for gossip or conference with clients, the proper place for which are the premises of the Bar Association or counsel's chambers. In this case the testimony of the constable on duty has proved that the respondent was making a disturbance in the corridor outside the Court and disregarded his request to maintain silence. The constable was examined on oath and I am satisfied that he was telling the truth. He was not cross-examined and the respondent has now tendered an apology. 5. The Court has to decide whether it should accept the apology and discharge the defendant after giving him a warning, or reject it and proceed against him for contempt. At the outset, the defendant did not apologise but reserved his defence, and even on the adjourned date he did not appear to be in a mood to apologise. Later in the day wiser counsel must have prevailed and. he expressed regret for whatever he had done. In the circumstances the apology has lost some of its grace. At the outset, the defendant did not apologise but reserved his defence, and even on the adjourned date he did not appear to be in a mood to apologise. Later in the day wiser counsel must have prevailed and. he expressed regret for whatever he had done. In the circumstances the apology has lost some of its grace. On the other hand the Court must allow for the fact that the defendant is young and somewhat inexperienced, and it is possible that he may in the exuberance of youth have thought that the constable was imposing on him or that he wanted to put a police official in his proper place, so to speak. The respondent should have realised that any direction issued by this Court does not cease to be the Court's direction because it is conveyed through a police official, and that a constable acting under the direction of the Court to maintain order and quiet acts as an officer of the Court. The defendant was ill-advised to challenge the authority of the constable who was only doing his duty under the Court's orders. I am however inclined to accept Mr. Gaur's suggestion to accept the respondent's apology but warn him against similar conduct in the future. 6. I would, however, like to make a few comments. On several occasions during the last three years I have found the noise in the corridors outside the Court to be so loud that it interfered with the hearing of the case before the Court. The average litigant in this Country is illiterate and somewhat indisciplined. He expects this. Court to give his case a full and proper hearing but does not understand that the preservation of a calm and secure atmosphere in and around the Courts is in the interests of the litigant himself. It is for members of the bar - and I say this with the utmost respect for the fraternity to which I have the honour to belong - to guide the litigants and insist on the observation of a proper decorum in the Court premises. The law Courts have been described as temples of justice; and if I may extend the metaphor, the high priests of the temple of justice are advocates whose deity is the rule of the law. If the prestige of the temple suffers, the dignity of its priests must also decline. 7. The law Courts have been described as temples of justice; and if I may extend the metaphor, the high priests of the temple of justice are advocates whose deity is the rule of the law. If the prestige of the temple suffers, the dignity of its priests must also decline. 7. No Court can give its best to the litigant public without the co-operation of the bar. Guided by a strong and able bar, any judge can do his duty fairly well. Vrihatsahaya Karyantam Kshodiyannapi Gachchati. I would apply the famous verse of Magha to the judiciary in the sense that even a mediocre judge, assisted by the bar can achieve a modicum of success, as a small rivulet reaches the ocean when it becomes part of a mighty river. The efficiency of the judiciary depends largely on the bar which has been placed on a high pedestal in the Constitution, being the main source for the appointment of judges for the High Courts and for the Supreme Court. But the bar cannot discharge its duty as the guardian of the liberties of the citizens unless the Courts can function in a manner which will inspire confidence in the public. It would not be out of place to mention that in the Royal Courts of Justice in England complete silence is observed in the corridors during Court hours and an incident of this nature is unthinkable. The maintenance of a proper atmosphere for the efficient working of the Court and upholding the dignity and prestige of the Court are the privilege as well as the duty of the bar. The clerks of advocates to a certain extent share the privileges and obligations of the bar and are an integral part of the judicial administration. It is all the more unfortunate that this Court has had to initiate proceedings against one of them. I accept the resoondents apology but warn him against similar conduct in the future. Respondent warned.