MEHROTRA, C. J. : This rule arises out of an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. (2) Neparpatty Ferry was put up for public auction on the 1st of January, 1961 for the year 1961-62. This ferry has been declared as a public fifty and the right to collect toll has to be auction­ed for different periods in accordance with the pro­visions of S. 8 of the Northern India Ferries Act, hereinafter called 'the Act'. The petitioner offered the highest bid. His offer was for Rs. 4,200/-. In the said auction, one Indradeo Singh also offered Rs. 4,050/- and the offer of Opposite Party No. 4, Phukan Chandra Gohain, was Rs. 3,000/-. The con­ducting officer under the provisions of S. 8, Para­graph (3) of the Act has got a right to reject the highest bid on recording sufficient reasons. The conducting officer by his order dated the 23rd Jan­uary 1961 directed the settlement of the right to collect toll with Phukan Chandra Gohain who had offered Rs. 3,000/- at the auction. He refused to settle the right of collection of toll with the pre­sent petitioner who was admittedly the highest bidder. The order runs as follows : "Sold to Sri Phukan Chandra Gohain, at Rs. 3000/- (Rupees three thousand) only, as the two other highest bidders fall in Special List." It does not appear from the order itself as to what that special list referred to in the order is and what does it contain. In the counter-affidavit which has been filed before us, an attempt has been made to explain the nature of the special list, on which, it is alleged, the name of the petitioner is placed. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Chief Engineer, Government of Assam, it is stated that a confiden­tial list is prepared by the Government in respect of persons who are suspected of being opium smug­glers. It is not disclosed in the counter-affidavit on what information such a list is prepared and from what source the Government gets the information for placing the names of the .persons on the list In the counter-affidavit it is further alleged that the Deputy Superintendent of Excise, Golaghat, furnished an affidavit to the effect that Shri Tulsi Singh is a suspected opium smuggler, a copy 01 which has been filed along with the counter affida­vit. It does not show that this affidavit was filed before the conducting officer. There is, therefore nothing to show on record or in the counter-affidavit filed by the State that the conducting officer himself considered the circums­tances and the materials placed before him and he himself came to the conclusion that the petitioner was suspected of being an opium smuggler. The only ground on which the conducting officer refused to accept his highest bid was that his name was placed on the special list prepared by the Government. It also does not disclose the source on which the Government acts while preparing such a special list. The question before us is whether such an order could be said to be an order in compliance with the provisions of Sec. 8 paragraph (3) and Rule 19 of the rules framed under S. 12 of the Act. (3) It is very strongly contended by Mr. Go­swami, appearing for the State, that this Court can. not examine the reasons given by the conducting officer and substitute its own discretion to that of the conducting officer. The powers of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution are limited and this Court cannot sit as a Court of Appeal and examine the reasons given by the conducting officer who has been given very wide discretion in the matter of settlement both under S. 8, Paragraph (3) and Rule 19 of the rules framed under the Act. Reliance has been placed on two cases of the Supreme Court in this connection - the case of Nagendra Natfy Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, reported in AIR 1958 SC 398 and the case of Radheshyam Khare v- State at Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1959 SC 107 . In our opinion, these cases are of no assistance to us in deciding the question which has arisen before us for consideration. In Nagendra Nath Bora's case, AIR 1958 SC 398 the only point which came up for considera­tion before the Supreme Court was whether the-Excise authorities when deciding the appeal under Sec. 9 of the Act were acting as quasi-judicial Tri­bunal and are amenable to a writ of certiorari by this Court. In Nagendra Nath Bora's case, AIR 1958 SC 398 the only point which came up for considera­tion before the Supreme Court was whether the-Excise authorities when deciding the appeal under Sec. 9 of the Act were acting as quasi-judicial Tri­bunal and are amenable to a writ of certiorari by this Court. It was held on a consideration of the provisions of the rule framed under the Act that there is a duty cast upon the appel­late authority to act judicially and thus any order passed by the appellate authority was amenable to a writ of certiorari by this Court. The next point which came up for consideration in that case was 'what are the circumstances' under which a writ of certiorari can be issued by this Court? It was contended that this Court has get jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari if there is an error ap­parent on the face of the record. The argument was that the import of the words 'error apparent on the face of the record' is similar to that used in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This contention was repelled. It was held that the 'error apparent on the face of the record' really means an error of law and not an error of fact. The next question which came up before their Lordships was what was the scope of the words 'error of law apparent on the face of the record.' In this view of the matter, this case is of no assis­tance in regard to the question which we are called upon to decide in this case. (4) The second case relied upon by Mr. Goswami also, in our opinion. Is not an authority for the proposition contended for by him. The only question which came up for consideration was whether the order passed by the Government under Section 53A of the C. P. and Berar Muni­cipalities Act, appointing an executive officer, was a judicial or a quasi-judicial order and amenable to a writ of certiorari or not. Various reasons were given for the contention that the order pass­ed by the Government was a quasi judicial order. Those were repelled. Various reasons were given for the contention that the order pass­ed by the Government was a quasi judicial order. Those were repelled. One of the reasons given was that the statute requires recording of reasons but that was not considered sufficient by the Su­preme Court to make the order as one of a quasi judicial body. It is not contended in the present case that the conducting officer while refusing to settle with the highest bidder acts in a quasi judi­cial capacity and the order passed by the conduct­ing officer is amenable to a writ of certiorari. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that ordinarily under Rule 19 and Section 8 paragraph (3) of the Act it is the high­est bidder who is entitled to the settlement of the right to collect tolls. If the conducting officer does not choose to settle it with the highest bidder, lie has got to record his reasons. The reasons are to be consistent with the spirit of the law and it should not mean that there should be no reasons at all. Section 8 paragraph 3 of the Act pro­vides as follows : ''When tile tolls are put up to public auction. the said officer or body, as the case may be, or the officer conducting the sale on his or its be­half, may, for reasons recorded in writing, refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidder, and may accept any other bid, or may withdraw the tolls from auction." Rule 19 of the rules framed under the Act provides as follows : ''The sale shall generally be by auction to the highest bidder. The Officer conducting the sale for sufficient reason recorded in writing under his hand may refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidder or any bid...." The conducting officer hag not only to record the reasons but the reasons must be sufficient in the eye of law. They should be reasons and not the whim and the arbitrary act of the conducting authorities. In our opinion, the reason which is specified by the conducting officer in the present order is no reason in the eye of law. The order passed by the conducting officer is arbitrary and capricious. (5) It is strenuously contended by Mr. They should be reasons and not the whim and the arbitrary act of the conducting authorities. In our opinion, the reason which is specified by the conducting officer in the present order is no reason in the eye of law. The order passed by the conducting officer is arbitrary and capricious. (5) It is strenuously contended by Mr. Go-swami that this Court cannot sit as a Court of Appeal and examine the reasons of the conducting officer. No objection can be taken to this broad proposition of law. The difficulty arises in apply­ing the law to the facts of each case. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that this Court is examining the reasons and is trying to substitute its own decision to that of the conduct­ing officer. The conducting officer has given no reasons consistent with the spirit of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. He has not at all exercised the discretion himself. Cases where the conducting officer himself, on the facts and mate­rials placed before him, conies to the conclusion that a person is guilty of an offence or otherwise is not qualified to get the settlement, may stand on a different footing from the cases where the con­ducting officer himself refuses to settle the right to collect the toll with the highest bidder simply because his name finds place in the special list prepared by the Government. It is contended in the counter-affidavit, to which we have already referred, that the docu­ment is a confidential one. It has, therefore, been rightly urged by the petitioner that this is no exercise of the discretion by the conducting officer at all. The matter has been considered by this Court in the case of Kailash Prosad Singh v. De­puty Commissioner, Darrang, reported in AIR 1959 Assam 107. This view has been reiterated by this Court in an unreported decision of a Special Bench in the case of Dharmeshwar Kalita v. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar (since reported in AIR 1961 Assam 158) (SB). In our opinion, the conducting officer has failed to give any reason as required under the law. He has not exercised his own discretion at all. In our opinion, the conducting officer has failed to give any reason as required under the law. He has not exercised his own discretion at all. He has not considered the matter himself and has acted upon the special list prepared by the Government, which cannot be said to be any exercise of discretion by him either under section 8 paragraph 3 of the Act or Rule 19 j made thereunder and in accordance with the spirit of die law. In this view of the matter, the petitioner, in our opinion, is entitled to a mandamus directing the opposite party not to give effect to the order dated the 23rd of January 1961. The opposite parties are further directed to give effect to the provisions of Rule 19, namely, to settle the ferry with the highest bidder, in the light of the obser­vations made by us earlier in our judgment. It should also be pointed out that this Court has clearly held that the fact that the name of the petitioner finds place in the special list is not rea­son in die eye of law and so far as the authorities are concerned, they have refused the settlement with the petitioner on this reason and this reason alone. The petitioner is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 100. (6) The rule is accordingly made absolute. (7) S. K. DUTTA, J.: I agree. IE/I, Rule made absolute.