JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Second Appeal No. 247 relates to Money Suit No. 150 of 1955 in which Rs. 350/- was claimed as damages. Second Appeal No. 248 relates to Money Suit No. 188 of 1956 in which Rs. 242-10-0 was claimed as damages. The first suit was against 1 and 2, and the second against Defendant No. 1 alone. Both the suits were tried analogously, and the trial court dismissed both the suits. The two corresponding first appeals preferred by the Plaintiff were allowed and damages claimed in both the suits were decreed, and the present appeals are against the said decrees of the appellate court. 2. In both the suit, the Plaintiff is a deity represented by its marfatdar p.W. 1. Defendants 1 and 2 are brothers. Plot No. 143 in Khata No. 12 of village Behari comprising an area of 2.45 acres and plot No. 351 in Khata No. 483 of village Sundihi comprising an area of 3.64 acres admittedly belong to the Plaintiff-deity. There was a suit in 1939 by the Plaintiff to dispossess the Defendants or their predecessors-in-interest, who were working as sebayats of the deity, from those plots amongst others, and P.W.J, the marfatdar of the deity, recovered possession of those plots in execution in 1940. It is the common case of both sides that since 1940 the Defendants have nothing to do with the possession of the said plots, and that the Plaintiff is in possession. The Plaintiff's case in Money Suit No, 150 of 1955 is that on 21-12-1954, both the Defendants, with the help of 30 to 40 labourers, forcibly cut and removed the paddy crops from plot No. 143, and about 4 months thereafter, that is on 20-4-1955, Defendant No. 1 got the mung crops standing on plot No. 351 received with the help of several labourers, which is the subject matter of the other suit. The case of the Defendants was that they did not remove the paddy crops, as alleged, and that P. w. 1 himself got the crops removed from the said plot, and that as to the mung crop, no such crop had been raised on the other plot, far from Defendant No. 1 removing any such crop. 3. The trial court believed that mung crop had also been raised on plot No. 351. 3. The trial court believed that mung crop had also been raised on plot No. 351. On appreciation of oral evidence adduced on both sides regarding removal or non-removal of the paddy and mung crops by the Defendants, the trial court's finding was, "I have no other alternative but to hold that the Plaintiff has signally failed to prove removal of the paddy and mung crops from the disputed plots by the Defendants." The appellate court, however, believed in the evidence adduced on the Plaintiff's side regarding removal of paddy and mung crops by the Defendants. 4. The sole point for determination in the present appeal is whether the appellate court failed to appreciate the oral evidence from the proper perspective. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Das on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondent that the decision of the first appellate court was a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence, and so there is no room for interference therewith in a second appeal u/s 100, Code of Civil Procedure. Appreciation and determination of a point of fact is a duty imposed by law upon the court, and the question whether there is failure in that duty is a question of law.- Vide AIR 1943 P.C. 203, (1). 5. The law regarding correct perspective for the first court of appeal in matter of appreciation of oral evidence bas been laid down in Sarju Pershad Vs. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Others, as follows: Where the question for consideration for the appellate court is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case, the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it bas not the advantage with the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of parties on any matter in issue and the decision binges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which bas escaped the trial Judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. The appellate Court is wrong in thinking that it would detract from the value to be attached to a trial Judge's finding of fact if the Judge does not expressly base, his conclusion upon the impressions be gathers from the demeanour of witnesses. The duty of the appellate Court in such cases is to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial Court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which, in the opinion of the Court, outweighs such fin ding. On the same subject, their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down as follows in Radha Prasad Singh Vs. Gajadhar Singh and Others, : Where an appeal lies on facts, it is the right and the duty of the Appeal Court to consider what its decision on the question of The acts should be; but in coming to its own decision it should bear in mind that it is Looking at the printed record and has not the opportunity of seeing the witnesses and that it should not lightly reject the trial Judge's conclusion that the evidence of a particular witness should be believed or should not be believed particularly when such conclusion is based on the observation of the demeanour of the witness in Court. But, this does not mean that merely because an Appeal Court bas not heard or seen the witness, it will in no case reverse the findings of the trial Judge on the question of credibility, if such question depends On a fair consideration of matters on record. But, this does not mean that merely because an Appeal Court bas not heard or seen the witness, it will in no case reverse the findings of the trial Judge on the question of credibility, if such question depends On a fair consideration of matters on record. When it appears to the Appeal Court that important to considerations bearing on the question of credibility have not been taken into account or properly weighed by the trial Judge and such considerations including the question of probability of the story given by the witnesses clearly indicate that the view taken by the trial Judge is wrong, the Appeal Court should have no hesitation in reversing the findings of the trial Judge on such questions. A Bench of this High Court in a case reported in Mahammad Khan v. Dukulal Das and Anr. 21 C.L.T. 99 observed as follows: Where the issue for determination depends solely on the appreciation of' the oral evidence, very great weight is to be attached to the assessment made of the value of the oral evidence by the trial court who had the advantage of seeing and hearing,the demeanour of the witness at the box; The first appellate Court can disturb such a finding on such issue arrived at by the trial court only for grave and compelling reasons, or if the trial court has committed serious errors in overlooking or mis finding some very salient and material features of he evidence of which he was to attach value. 6. It is to be seen whether the: first court of appeal has departed from the principles laid down above in coming to a finding different from that of the trial court. 6 witnesses were examined on the Plaintiff's side and 4 witnesses were examined on the side of the Defendants including Defendants 1 and 2. All the P.Ws except P.W. 5 sought to prove the removal of the paddy crops by the Defendants. P.W. 2 was disbelieved by the trial court; since he happened to be a chance witness, he had no land in the vicinity, his house was two miles away from the field concerned, and he had never previously seen the disputed land. All the P.Ws except P.W. 5 sought to prove the removal of the paddy crops by the Defendants. P.W. 2 was disbelieved by the trial court; since he happened to be a chance witness, he had no land in the vicinity, his house was two miles away from the field concerned, and he had never previously seen the disputed land. Defendant No. 1 (as D.W. 1) did not claim to have any enmity with this witness and the appellate court observes, "So there is no reason why P.W. 2 would perjure ill favour of the Plaintiff." Witnesses sometimes perjure themselves for reasons other than enmity, and such reasons may not sometimes be known to the persons against whom they perjure. P.W. 3 is another witness, whom the trial court discredited exactly on the same ground as P.W. 2, and the appellate Court has sought to believe in P.W. 3 on the ground that Defendant No. 1 did not say that he had any enmity with P.W. 3. P.W. 6 is a neighbouring tenant. The trial court discredited the evidence of P.W. 6, since P.W. 1 himself admitted that no local cultivators were present at the time of the occurrence. The appellate court observes, "It has not been suggested to P.W. 1 if P.W. 6 was not present at the time of occurrence of paddy cutting. No suggestion has been put to P.W. 6 that he was not present at the time of occurrence though he definitely says that he cutting paddy from his field." P.W. 6 had not been named in the witness list, on the day P.W. 1 was examined, nor he had been summoned to appear as a witness for the Plaintiff, and as such there could be no occasion for the Defendants to ask P.W. 1 if p.W. 6 was not present at the time of the occurrence of paddy cutting. P.W. 6 has been subject to cross-examination on the Appellants' side. In the circumstances, there is no importance in the observation that "no suggestion has been put to P.W. 6 that he was not present at the time of the occurrence." As to P.W. 4, the trial court discredited him on the ground that he was inimical to the Defendants, and on the further ground that he was not prepared to admit certain facts though they were matters of record. The appellate court observes, "P.W. 4 is, DO doubt, inimical to the Defendants inasmuch as he filed a criminal case u/s 12 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act against the Defendant No. 2 in 1953 P.W. 1 also deposed against him (P.W. 4) in the suit filed by one Sambari Jena. He (P.W. 1) also filed a damage suit against-him (P.W. 4) which was ultimately compromised. So, it can be said that he is not based in favour of P.W. 1 at the time of his examination". The appellate court appears to mean that P.W. 4 is as much inimical to the Defendants as to the Plaintiff, and so he could be reliable The trial court sought to discredit P.W. 1 himself on the ground that there was previous enmity between the parties, that there was no motive proved for the alleged high-handed action of the Defendants, that the information which was claimed by P.W. 1 to have been lodged with the police immediately after the paddy cutting had not been sought to be proved to corroborate P.W. 1, that though P.W. 1 categorically said that he showed the removal of the paddy to the Chowkidar soon after the incident, the choukidar as D.W. 4 denied the alleged incident, and that P.W. 1 examined none of the labourers who were either cutting paddy in his own field (according to P.W. l, at the time of removal of paddy by the Defendants from the contested field, P.W. 1 was gathering crops from a neighbouring field with the help of some labourers, or any of the labourers engaged by the Plaintiff. Regarding the motive part of the occurrence, the appellate court observes, "As a matter of fact, motive does not play an important role in a civil suit." Regarding non production of the first information report, the appellate court observes, "I do not think it was very essential to produce the copy of the first information report. The case of the Plaintiff must stand or fall on the evidence adduced in this suit, and if the evidence is found to be sufficient to prove its case, the non production of the F.I.R. cannot afford any ground for drawing adverse inference against the Plaintiff". The case of the Plaintiff must stand or fall on the evidence adduced in this suit, and if the evidence is found to be sufficient to prove its case, the non production of the F.I.R. cannot afford any ground for drawing adverse inference against the Plaintiff". Regarding the evidence of D.W. 4, the choukidar whom the trial court believed, the appellate court observes, "He was a witness for Defendant No. 1 in a criminal case which was started against one Padan Malik (a third person) and secondly because P.W. 1 has filed a suit against him (the choukidar) alleging removal of mango tree from Thakur's land. No doubt, he says that this suit was filed after he received Summons in the suit, but all the same, a suit was pending against him when he deposed in court." The appellate court makes not comment on the trial court's observation about non-examination of the labourer witnesses. While Defendants 1 and 2 (D.Ws. 1 and 3) denied having removed the paddy crops, D.W. 2, a neighbour of the parties, deposed to the effect that it is P.W. 1 who removed the paddy crops from plot No. 143 in the relevant year. Thee appellate court observes, "It is fantastic to believe that the Plaintiff would have taken to his head to institute false suit against the Defendants, if as a matter of fact, he removed the paddy crops raised by him D.W. 2 is a distant agnate of the Defendants who deposes to the effect that P.W. 1 had grown and remove paddy crops from the suit plot No. 143, but admittedly he was serving at Bholong School in 1954, and it was at a distance of about a mile from his house and the school was being held from 11 A.M. to 4 P.M. at the time of the alleged occurrence, and so it was not possible for him to have witnessed the removal of paddy crop by P.W. 1. So his evidence practically serves no purpose." The only flaw against D.W. 2 is that he is a distantagnate of the Defendants. The other part of the appellate Court's observation stands to no worth since it has not been established if the date of the occurrence was a school day and D. W. 2 was asked no question as to bow be could be able to see the occurrence. The other part of the appellate Court's observation stands to no worth since it has not been established if the date of the occurrence was a school day and D. W. 2 was asked no question as to bow be could be able to see the occurrence. As to the removal of mung crops, the only witnesses on the Plaintiff's side are P.We. 1 and 5. The trial court discredited P.W. 5 on the ground that though he claimed to have seen the removal of mung crops by Defendant No. 1, he did not see P.W. at the field, whereas P.W. 1 claimed that he was present at the field when Defendant No. 1 was removing crops with the help of hi labourers. The appellate court, in seeking to believe P.W. 6, 5, did not attempt to offer any reason against the view taken by the trial court. It may be incidentally observed that none of the two court took into consideration the unmmal conduct of P.W. 1 in taking no immediate steps to call for villagers or neighbours to protest against the conduct of the Defendants when he saw them removing paddy crops with the help of labourers while he was with equanimity harvesting' crops in a neighbouring field of his own None of' the two courts has also taken notice of the fact that the disputed drilling field lies ill between the mouth of P.W. l on one side: and the Harijan Basti on the other side, and that though the Plaintiff's case is that the Defendants were inimical to him, because they suspected the Plaintiff to be supporting the harijans of the Basti in matter of their bhag tenancy, none of the Harijans of the Basti was sought to be examined as a witness over removal of the mung crop. The appellate court committed an error of record in mentioning that P.W. 6's field was 2 kiaries removed from the disputed paddy field, whereas in fact he had admitted in cross-examination that it was 20 kiaris removed. 7. I have referred to in Some details the reasons given by the trial court for disbelieving the P.Ws. and the reasons by the appellate court for taking those witnesses into reliance. 7. I have referred to in Some details the reasons given by the trial court for disbelieving the P.Ws. and the reasons by the appellate court for taking those witnesses into reliance. The reasons offered by the appellate court are flimsy and superficial, and they do not stand the test laid down by the Supreme Court or this Court, above referred to, for taking a view deferent from the trial court. There was no important consideration bearing on the 'question of credibility that has not been taken' into account or properly weighed by the trial Judge, and there was nothing in the circumstance and probability of the case to indicate that the view taken by the trial court was wrong. 8. In the result, therefore the appeals are allowed with costs throughout, the decrees passed by the appellate court are set aside and the suits are dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed