JUDGMENT B. Mukerji, J. - This is an appeal against the decision of a learned single Judge disposing of a writ petition filed by the appellants by which a prayer for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari was prayed for to quash an order made by the second respondent on the 25th June, 1956. Further there was a prayer for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Land Reforms Commissioner, namely the first respondent, to withdraw his order dated the 8th of August 1955, No. 570 (2) CALB. 34-B (75) 55, whereby the Land Reforms Commissioner approved of the proposal to put for sale the movable and immovable properties of the petitioners as also for the withdrawal of his order dated the 2nd July, 1956, whereby the auction sale was confirmed. A writ of certiorari was prayed for quashing the auction proceedings and the sale in general, and a writ in the nature of mandamus was sought to direct the District Magistrate and Collector of Deoria to restore the petitioner-appellant to the possession of moveable and immoveable properties which had been made the subject of the sale proceedings. The other prayers need not be referred to for our purposes. 2. In order to appreciate the scope of the petition out of which this appeal has arisen and further to appreciate the scope of the prayers noticed above, it is necessary to state a few facts. The appellants carried on the business of manufacture and sale of sugar. The first appellant, namely the Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Limited got into some difficulties with the result that it became necessary for the Government under the powers it had under the law to appoint a Controller for the management and conduct of the business of the Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Limited. On the 14th July, 1954, the District Magistrate of Deoria was appointed the authorised Controller under the Essential Supplies (Temporary) Powers Act. On October 28, 1954, a change was made in the authorised Controller for the District Magistrate was relieved of the responsibility of being an authorised Controller and in his place the Cane Commissioner was appointed the authorised Controller. 3. On October 28, 1954, a change was made in the authorised Controller for the District Magistrate was relieved of the responsibility of being an authorised Controller and in his place the Cane Commissioner was appointed the authorised Controller. 3. One of the primary reasons why an authorised Controller was appointed was That the Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Limited to be hereafter referred to as the Sugar Company) had large liabilities in respect of cess and price of cane outstanding for the period 1954-55. The outstanding amount of the cess was about Rs. 5 lacs and the outstanding in regard to cane price was about 2 lacs. The Sugar Company had also arrears in respect of Income Tax to the extent of Rs. 81,821-2-0 to pay; this arrear of Income Tax related to a period prior to the appointment of the authorised Controller. The total amount realisable in respect of the outstandings of the Sugar Company came to Rs. 8,38,176-13-0. This amount, it may be mentioned here, was recoverable as arrears of land revenue. It may further be mentioned that there was no dispute in regard to either the total amount recoverable or the recoverability of that amount as arrears of land revenue. 4. The Income Tax Officer sent a `certificate' to the Collector as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Section 46 of the Indian Income Tax Act. That sub-sec. is in these words: - "The Income-tax Officer may forward to the Collector a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of arrears due from an assessee, and the Collector, on receipt of such certificate, shall proceed to recover from such assessee the amount specified therein as if it were an arrear of land revenue: Provided that without prejudice lo any other powers of the Collector in this behalf, he shall for the purpose of recovering the said amount have the powers which under the C.P.C., a Civil Court has for the purpose of the recovery of an amount due under a decree." Under sub-sec. (2) an obligation is cast on the Collector to recover the arrears certified by the Income Tax Officer as though they were arrears of land revenue. 5. The powers of the Collector to recover arrears of land revenue were, prior to the coming into force of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act contained in the Land Revenue Act (III of 1901). (2) an obligation is cast on the Collector to recover the arrears certified by the Income Tax Officer as though they were arrears of land revenue. 5. The powers of the Collector to recover arrears of land revenue were, prior to the coming into force of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act contained in the Land Revenue Act (III of 1901). Sec. 146 of the Land Revenue Act provided for the processes by which arrears of land Revenue could be recovered. The same provision is now contained in Section 279 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, 1950. It would, in my opinion, be conducive to better understanding of what is to follow hereafter to quote the provisions of this section, namely Section 279, in extenso:- Procedure for recovery of an arrear of land revenue. An arrear of land `revenue may be recovered by any one or more of the following processes: - (a) by serving a writ of demand or a `citation to appear on any defaulter, (b) by arrest and detention of his person, (c) by attachment and sale of his moveable property including produce, (d) by attachment of the holding in respect of which the arrear is due, (e) by sale of the holding in respect of which the arrear is due, (f) by attachment and sale of other immoveable property of the defaulter." 6. It must be noticed that the procedure quoted above is in regard to recovery of an arrear of land revenue. The section does not in term make a mention of recovery of such amounts which could be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Under Sec. 40(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act arrears of Income Tax could be recovered as land revenue. Sec. 288 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (which would hereafter be referred to as the Act) provides for such contingency, namely the contingency of having to recover some amount which was not really arrears of land revenue but which, under the authority of law, was to be for the purpose of its realisation and recovery, treated as such, for this section is in these words: "The provisions of this Act with regard to the recovery of arrears of revenue shall apply to all arrears of revenue and sums of money recover able as arrears if this due at the commencement of this Act." 7. The Collector had to realise as arrears of land revenue not only the arrears of Income Tax in respect of which he had a certificate from the Income-Tax Officer under Sec. 46(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, but he had also to realise the arrears in respect of cess and price of sugar-cane which also, as I pointed out earlier, could be recovered as arrears of land revenue. As I pointed out earlier, the total amount which was recoverable as arrears of land revenue was Rs. 8,38,176-13-0. The Collector, therefore, proceeded to make the realisation and he appears to have resorted to the process of putting the moveable and immoveable properties of the Sugar Company and the appellants to sale. The sale took place on the 8th of November, 1955. It was admitted before us that there were two sales, one which related to moveable property and another which related to immoveable property. At one stage there was a slight controversy in regard to whether there were two sales and as to which of the two sales took place first, but the controversy was resolved after a careful examination of the record. The examination of some of the original documents showed that there were two sale proclamations issued, one in respect of the moveable property which was dated the 17th October 1955, and the other in respect of immoveable property Of an earlier date, namely the 4th October 1955. The approximate assessed value of the movable property in the sale proclamation was shown as Rs. 7,64,817 while the value of the immoveable property was shown as Rs. 23,75,000. The sale of the immoveable property fetched Rs. 23,50,000; so that there was not much deficiency between the estimated price and the actual price fetched at the sale. In respect of the moveables, however, there was considerable disparity, for the moveables were actually sold for Rs. 2,75,000. 8. The sales, as I have said earlier, took place on the 8th of November 1955. The purchase was made by the 6th and the 7th respondents. The sequence of the sales has to be noticed now, since in effect the sequence of the sales has made for the major controversy in the case not factually but as a question of the effect in law if one type of property was sold first and if the other was sold first. The sequence of the sales has to be noticed now, since in effect the sequence of the sales has made for the major controversy in the case not factually but as a question of the effect in law if one type of property was sold first and if the other was sold first. The third appellant in his affidavit attached to the writ petition in respect of the sales said this: "29. That again on 8th November, 1955, the said Kunwar Surya Pratap Narain Singh, as General Manager of the Petitioner Company filed an application before the Collector of Deoria, when conducting the auction sale, submitting that the sugar in stock should be sold first and if the price realised found insufficient, then the molasses and store material should be sold, and thereafter machinery should be put to auction. Upon this application the Collector passed an order stating that according to the Rules immoveable and moveable property will be taken up separately. The sale of moveable property will be taken up first." "30. That it was thereafter that the Collector of Deoria put up the moveable properties set out in the proclamation to auction, but after a few bids the Collector decided to postpone the sale of moveable properties and directed that the immoveable properties should be put to auction immediately. It was after the immovable properties had been auctioned that the moveable properties were finally put up to auction." 9. The position which was set out on behalf of the petitioner appellants in regard to the sequence of the sales was more or less an admitted position. It is on this sequence of the sale of the moveable and immoveable properties that the questions which arose for determination in this appeal could be clinched. 10. Mr. Jagdish Swarup who appeared for the appellants contended that : 1. It was obligatory on the Collector under the law to sell the moveable property first, and that he could have no jurisdiction to sell the immoveable property unless and until the sale of the moveable did not make up for the arrears in respect of which the sale had taken place. 2. It was obligatory on the Collector under the law to sell the moveable property first, and that he could have no jurisdiction to sell the immoveable property unless and until the sale of the moveable did not make up for the arrears in respect of which the sale had taken place. 2. In respect of the arrears of Income Tax which had been certified by the Income Tax Officer under Sec. 46(2) earlier, there was an order of the Income Tax Officer staying realisation and keeping the certificate in abeyance, so to speak, and therefore, the Collector, had no jurisdiction to include this amount in the amount recoverable. 3. Cess was an illegal execution and therefore it could not be recovered at all as arrears of land revenue. 4. The arrears in respect of which, the sales had taken place, barring the arrears of income tax, were occasioned by the default of the officers of Government when Government had taken control of the Sugar Company. 11. Before proceeding further, I think it would be appropriate to dispose of the last two points, for they could be disposed of without much difficulty. Neither of the two points was raised before the learned single Judge, nor did they figure in the grounds set out either in the writ petition or in the appeal. Mr. Jagdish Swarup only stated his point in regard to the realisability of the cess, but did not put forward any reasons in support possibly, because he realised that cess could not be said to be an illegal exaction in view of an authoritative decision of this Court. Mr. Jagdish Swarup also put forward no arguments in support of his last contention and I for one see no adequate reason to think that there was any substance in that, possibly, attractive argument. Therefore, I have had no difficulty at all in rejecting the last two contentions, feebly put forward on behalf of the appellants. 12. Mr. Jagdish Swarup also put forward no arguments in support of his last contention and I for one see no adequate reason to think that there was any substance in that, possibly, attractive argument. Therefore, I have had no difficulty at all in rejecting the last two contentions, feebly put forward on behalf of the appellants. 12. The real point in the case - and a point of some difficulty - was whether under the law dealing with sales in respect of arrears of land revenue it was obligatory or mandatory for the Collector to follow any particular sequence that is to say, whether it was obligatory on the Collector to first sell moveables and if the sale of the moveables did not make up the demand in respect of which the sale was to take place, then alone could the Collector put the immoveable properties of a defaulter to sale. 13. As I noticed before, the procedure for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue was set out in section 279 of the Act. I have quoted this section earlier and, therefore, I need only say that the section does not say that the processes indicated in that section had to be resorted to in the sequence they were stated in the section. Indeed, the section says that the land revenue may be recovered by any one or more of the processes indicated. Prima facie, therefore, there was a choice in the person who had the authority to put the processes for the recovery in motion for purposes of the recovery. In my opinion, it would also not be correct to say that the various processes enumerated in Section 279 of the Act indicated any proper sequence having in view any notions of natural justice or fair play for it would be noticed that `arrest and detention' figures as the second process that could be resorted to even before the process of attachment and sale of the moveable property of the defaulter. Speaking for myself, I find it very hard to say that arresting a person was a less coercive process for the recovery of dues than selling moveable or even immoveable property. Secs. 280 to 284 of the Act elaborate the procedure in respect of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Sec. 279. Speaking for myself, I find it very hard to say that arresting a person was a less coercive process for the recovery of dues than selling moveable or even immoveable property. Secs. 280 to 284 of the Act elaborate the procedure in respect of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Sec. 279. It appears fairly obvious that the main concern in finding out the process of recovery of land revenue was for the recovery of land revenue as such. This is perfectly plain to me on the words of Section 279 itself. As I pointed out, other dues which could be recovered as land revenue became recoverable by having resort to the processes mentioned in Section 279 by virtue of the provisions of Section 288 of the Act - a section which I have already quoted. 14. Mr. Jagdish Swarup contended that it was obligatory on the Collector by virtue of Section 286 of the Act to first resort to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279, and after exhausting those processes and after those processes failed to yield the requisite amount of money the Collector had the power to resort to what was provided for in Cl. (f) of that section. In this context it is necessary to see the words of Section 286 of the Act rather carefully, and for that purpose I quote the section below: - "Power to proceed against interest of defaulter in other immovable property - (1) If any arrears of land revenue cannot be recovered by any of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279, the Collector may realise the same from the interest of defaulter in any other immoveable property of the defaulter as if the said arrears were arrears of land revenue assessed on and due in respect of such other property. (2) Sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue, but not due in respect of any specific land, may be recovered under this section from any immovable property of the defaulter." A great deal of stress was laid on the words `cannot be recovered.' It was contended that these words were mandatory to the extent to which they deprived the Collector of the jurisdiction to resort to the sale of "any other immoveable property of the defaulter. " 15. " 15. Do the words `cannot' indicate that it was obligatory on the Collector first to have taken actual resort to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 and then to fall back on the power conferred by Cl. (f), or was it open to the Collector to come to the conclusion on circumstances other than the actual sale that the arrears could not be recovered by taking resort to any of the processes mentioned, in Cls. (a) to (e)? The word `can' means `be able to.' It is undoubtedly sometimes used in the sense of mild imperative. It could be used in the sense of `may' or it could be used in the sense of `must'. Therefore, there was nothing inherent in the word `can' and with it the negative `not' which forced a court to come to the conclusion that it was an imperative provision and that that imperative provision could only be complied with by actual resort to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e). Funk and Wagnell's Dictionary says that the word `can' among other meanings, has the meaning of `be able under existing circumstances' or `to have capacity to.' The words, therefore, in my view, do not make it obligatory for the Collector to actually resort to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) but that it was open to the Collector on all the circumstances that he may have before him at the time to come to the conclusion that the land revenue could not be recovered by any of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Sec. 279. The Collector could come to conclusion subjectively. 16. In order to know the true import of sub-sec. (1) of Section 286 of the Act it may be of assistance to realise that the primary objection with which the coercive processes enumerated in Section 279 were enacted was to get the land revenue which was recoverable from a specified area: the recovery of other arrears as arrears of land revenue was a secondary object so far as the Act was concerned and, therefore, the enabling Section 288 appears to have been incorporated in the Act. Even sub-sec. Even sub-sec. (1) of Section 286 has certain words which, to my mind, lend support to this view, and these words are "in any other immovable property of the defaulter as if the said arrears were arrears of land revenue assessed on and due in respect of such other property." In the case of these sums which were not arrears of land revenue as such, but were treated as arrears of land revenue by fiction of law, it could not be said that such dues were to be treated as arrears of land revenue in respect of the immovable property of the defaulter which was being sold and which was not primarily responsible to discharge the arrears. It was conceded by Mr. Jagdish Swamp that the Legislature did treat land revenue as such and sums recoverable as land revenue differently, and in my view, if this was so, then there could be no difficulty in visualising that the Legislature permitted resort to different processes for the realisation of the two types of arrears. 17. Sub-Sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act lent support for the view that arrears which were not due in respect of any specific land could be recovered from any immovable property of the defaulter. It was contended that the words "under this section" indicated that sub-See. (2) was in some sense controlled by the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1). I am unable to see much force in this contention, for, in my view, if this contention was right then sub-sec. (2) would in a sense, at any rate, become otiose. There is good authority for the view that the scheme of legislation, the benefit which the legislature wished to confer on the public and the risks which were to be involved to the public interest if the interpretation was one way and also on the language used, all went to help in determining the true meaning of a legislative provision. It has been recognised over and over again by courts that there was no general rule for deciding whether a particular provision in a Statute was mandatory or merely directory; whether it was the one or the other had to be gathered from the things I have mentioned above. Each provision has to be considered on its own footing and in the context in which that provision occurs. 18. Each provision has to be considered on its own footing and in the context in which that provision occurs. 18. In The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills, Ltd., AIR 1948 Bombay 254 a Bench of the Bombay High Court said this : "In order to decide whether the word `may' is potential or imperative, discretionary or carries with it an element of compulsion, whether it is permissive and enabling or obligatory one must look at the object of the statute which vests this particular discretion and the intention of the Legislature to find out whether the discretion was coupled with a duty to be exercised in favour of a particular party. If the object for which the power is conferred is in order to give a right then there would be a duty cast on the person to whom the power is given to exercise it for the benefit of the party to whom the right is given when required on his behalf." Under Section 286 there was no power conferred in order to give a right to a defaulter. There was also no element of compulsion obviously discernible in the section. The object of Section 286 was merely to draw a pointed distinction between the way in which the coercive processes were to be put into effect for realising arrears of land revenues such and realising those sums which were realisable, so to speak, as land revenue. 19. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on the decision in Shiv Singh v. The Collector of Allahabad, 1957 ALJ 910. This case was authority for the proposition that in case where the arrears to be recovered were actually arrears of land revenue then under sub-sec. (1) of Section 286 before other property could be put up for sale the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 had to be resorted to. This case did not concern itself with the interpretation of sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act. Therefore this case could, in my opinion provide no adequate support to the appellant. 20. From what I have said above, I am of the opinion that when it is a question of recovery of some arrears as land revenue, then in the case of such recovery it was not obligatory on the Collector to actually resort to the steps mentioned in Cls. 20. From what I have said above, I am of the opinion that when it is a question of recovery of some arrears as land revenue, then in the case of such recovery it was not obligatory on the Collector to actually resort to the steps mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 before the Collector could sell any other immoveable property of the defaulter. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant next argued that when the sale of immovable property fetched more money than what was sufficient to pay up the entire arrears due in respect of which the sale had been ordered the Collector had no power to put the moveables to sale. As I pointed out it was admitted on all hands that the sale of immovable property brought Rs. 23,50,000 and the total dues realisable were Rs. 8,38,176-13-0. The sale of movable property could be said to be bad only if there was want of jurisdiction in the Collector to make that sale at the time when he did make it. Otherwise the impropriety or the improper exercise of jurisdiction could not make the sale without jurisdiction. There was nothing in the Act which prohibited the sale or property of greater value that was absolutely essential for meeting outstanding arrears. As I noticed earlier, the sale of both moveable and immoveable properties took place on the 8th November 1955. The sequence in which the properties were sold was that the immoveable property was sold first and soon after the moveables were sold. 22. Under R. 285(1) of the Rules framed under the Act a person had the right at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale to apply to the Commissioner to set aside any sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it. That rule made it clear that no sale could be set aside on the aforementioned ground unless the applicant proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or mistake. That rule made it clear that no sale could be set aside on the aforementioned ground unless the applicant proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or mistake. Proviso to R. 285-K indicated that a regular suit for setting aside the sale in the civil court was not barred, if the suit was filed on the allegation that there was fraud in making the sale, If the sale of moveable property was bad for some material irregularity and if the fact that movable property was sold when the sale of immoveable property had brought insufficient money to discharge the entire liability, then the proper remedy for the appellant was to attack the sale and have it set aside under the provisions of Rule 285-1 of the Rules framed under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. The mere fact that a sale in the retrospect appeared improper did not vest this Court with jurisdiction to set aside that sale under the extraordinary powers conferred on it under Article 226 of the Constitution. 23. An attempt was made by Mr. Jagdish Swarup to raise the question of the bona fide of the Collector conducting the sale, but then that question had not been raised any where in the proceedings and, therefore, could not for the first time be raised in the Special Appeal. If the sale was mala fide then the appellants had another equally efficacious remedy by way of a regular suit for damages and on that view of the matter also their remedy by way of a petition for a writ under Article 226 could not lie. 24. I would, for the reasons indicated above, dismiss this special appeal but in the circumstance of the case I would direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Jagdish Sahai, J. - 25. This special appeal is directed against the judgment of our brother Oak dated the 20th of March, 1958, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. 26. The petitioner-appellant No. 1 is the Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Limited (hereinafter referred to as the company). The petitioner-appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are the principal share-holders of the company. This special appeal is directed against the judgment of our brother Oak dated the 20th of March, 1958, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. 26. The petitioner-appellant No. 1 is the Padrauna Raj Krishna Sugar Works Limited (hereinafter referred to as the company). The petitioner-appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are the principal share-holders of the company. Due to some reasons, which are not relevant for the purposes of this case, on 14-7-54, the District Magistrate Deoria, was appointed the Authorised Controller of the company under the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. He was however, replaced by the Cane Commissioner, U.P. on 28-10-1954. The appellants' case is that a sum of Rs. 81,821-2-0 was due froth the company as arrears -of income tax for the year 1952-53. Proceedings for the recovery of the same were taken under Sec. 46(2) of the Income-tax Act. Sometime after sending the certificate under that section the Income-tax Officer, however, wrote to The Collector to keep in obeyance the proceedings for the recovery of the income tax. Apart from the Income-Tax demand, mentioned above, a sum of Rs. 5,64,301-149 as cess imposed under the Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchases) Act, 1953, and a sum of Rs. 1,92,053-12-3 as price of sugar-cane crushed by the company payable to the Cooperative Development Union Ltd. were outstanding against the company. The total demand realizable as land revenue against the company thus came to a sum of Rs. 8,38,176-13-0. According to the allegations of the appellants the company had sugar Stocks worth Rs. 9,00,000 and possessed other movable property worth about Rs. 12,00,000. The Collector of Deoria, proposed to sell immoveable property belonging to the company in connection with the demand mentioned above and obtained the approval of the Land Reforms Commissioner, U.P. for the same on 8-8-1955. Thereafter the 8th of Nov, 1955, was fixed for the auction sale. On the 7th Nov, 1955, a representation was made by the company that there was no need to sell the immoveable property and the entire demand could be met by the sale of the sugar stocks. The Collector of Deoria, however, put the moveable property for sale on 8th November, 1955, but after a few bids had been made postponed the sale thereof till the immoveable property was first sold. The Collector of Deoria, however, put the moveable property for sale on 8th November, 1955, but after a few bids had been made postponed the sale thereof till the immoveable property was first sold. He then first sold the immoveable property to be soon followed by the sale of moveable property also, to Shiv Chand Rai on behalf of M/s. Kanpur Sugar Works Ltd. Kanpur, respondent No. 5, for a sum of Rs. 26,00,000. The company filed an objection before the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, against the sales held on the 8th of November, 1955, but the same was dismissed on 25-6-1956, and later on the sales were confirmed by 'the Land Reforms Commissioner, U.P. on 2-7-1956. On these facts the appellants prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division dated the 25th of June, 1956, mentioned above. There was also a prayer for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Land Reforms Commissioner to withdraw his order dated 8-8-1955 by which he had approved the proposal of sale, and the order dated 2-7-1956, confirming the auction sales. There are also prayer to the effect that a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the proceedings regarding the sales mentioned above and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Collector of Deoria to restore the company to the possession of the properties sold on the 8th of November, 1955 and also the properties not sold but handed over to the Kanpur Sugar Works Ltd. In addition there is the usual prayer for the issue of writs, orders or directions as this Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition by his judgment dated the 20th of March, 1958, and it is against that order that the present special appeal has been filed. 27. We have heard Mr. Jagdish Swarup for the appellants and M/s. N. C. Chaterji, Ambika Prasad and Gurdayal Srivastava for the respondents. Mr. Jagdish Swarup has made the following submissions before us: - (1) The Collector had no jurisdiction to first sell immoveable property. He could do so only after he had failed to satisfy the demands against the company by the processes mentioned in Cls. Mr. Jagdish Swarup has made the following submissions before us: - (1) The Collector had no jurisdiction to first sell immoveable property. He could do so only after he had failed to satisfy the demands against the company by the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act; (2) Neither moveable nor immovable, property could have been sold in respect of the demands of arrears of income tax because the Income Tax Officer concerned had directed that proceedings for the realisation of the same be kept in abeyance. (3) The demand of cess itself was illegal and in any case the same could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue; (4) The arrears in respect of which the sales had taken place were occasioned by the default of the officers of the Government who were appointed authorised controllers of the company. With regard to the submission nos. 3 and 4 before us it would be sufficient to state that ground No. 3 was not pressed by Mr. Jagdish Swarup learned Counsel for the appellants, before the learned Single Judge as is apparent from his judgment and the fourth one never formed part of any of the grounds raised in the writ petition nor was it pressed before the learned Single Judge. It may also be mentioned that there is no material either in the petition or in the affidavit filed in support of it on the basis of which these contentions could be made. Mr. Jagdish Swarup has also not been able to seriously press these grounds and beyond stating the bars propositions has done nothing to develop them. Consequently, we have found no difficulty in rejecting these submissions. 28. The main submission is with regard to ground No 1 and it is based upon the language of Section 286 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which reads as follow: - "286(1) If any arrears of land revenue cannot be recovered by any of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279, the Collector may realise the same from the interest of defaulter in any other immoveable property of the defaulter as if the said arrears were arrears of land revenue assessed on and due in respect of such other property. (a) to (e) of Section 279, the Collector may realise the same from the interest of defaulter in any other immoveable property of the defaulter as if the said arrears were arrears of land revenue assessed on and due in respect of such other property. (2) Sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue, but not due in respect of any specific land, may be recovered under this Section from any immoveable property of the defaulter". Sec. 279 of the Act runs as follows :- The contention, in short, is that the provisions of Section 286 of the Act required that immoveable property of the petitioner could be sold only if the demand could not be met by having recourse to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act. The submission on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, is that sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Section 286 of the Act are independent of each other and that whereas sub-sec. (1) applies to the cases of recovery of land revenue as such, sub-sec. (2) applies not to the recovery of arrears of land revenue as such but only to the realisation of moneys which are not arrears of land revenue but are realisable as such by virtue of the legal provisions. The argument, in other words, is that there is nothing in the language of sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act which requires recourse first being had to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act and that for the recovery of sums which are not arrears of land revenue but recoverable as such (hereinafter referred to by me as miscellaneous dues) the immoveable property of the defaulter can be sold straightaway. 29. It is clear that the use of the words "An arrear of land revenue" with which the section opens clearly indicates that Section 279 of the Act in terms applies only to cases for the recovery of arrears of land revenue and not to the recovery of miscellaneous dues. The expression "land revenue" is a term of art and relates to the amount which are recoverable from bhumidhars and sirdars (see Section 242 of the Act). Sec. 241 of the Act makes the land revenue assessed on a village as the first charge on all the land situated in that village. The expression "land revenue" is a term of art and relates to the amount which are recoverable from bhumidhars and sirdars (see Section 242 of the Act). Sec. 241 of the Act makes the land revenue assessed on a village as the first charge on all the land situated in that village. Sec. 243 of the Act makes the bhumidhars and sirdars jointly and severally liable for the recovery of land revenue in a village and it also provides that except in cases where the Government issues a notification no bhumidhar or sirdar would be liable to pay land revenue assessed not in respect of his holding but that of another. Sec. 248 of the Act confers on the State Government the power to fix the dates on which and the instalments in which the land revenue is payable by a sirdar or a bhumidhar. Secs. 275, 276 and 277 of the Act deal with the arrangements for the recovery of land revenue. Sec. 278 provides that the amount certified to be arrears of land revenue by the Tahsildar shall be the conclusive evidence of the existence of the arrears of land revenue both in respect of the amount as also the person to be considered as a defaulter. It also provides that in a village in respect of which collection and realisation of land revenue has been left to the Land Management Committee a certificate issued by the Land Management Committee shall be such conclusive evidence. The various provisions occurring in Chapter X of the Act and dealing with land revenue clearly reveal that the word `land revenue' has been used only in connection with the sums realizable from the bhumidhars and sirdars and relates to amounts which are recoverable by virtue of the provisions of the Act and do not include miscellaneous dues, the liability for the payment of which does not arise under the Act but under other Acts. 30. In view of what I have said above and specially because of the language of Section 279 of the Act it is clear that the provisions of that section do not apply in terms to the cases of recovery of miscellaneous clues as arrears of land revenue. The liability for the recovery of these dues as arrears of land revenue is created by the special Acts under which those amounts are assessed or become due. The liability for the recovery of these dues as arrears of land revenue is created by the special Acts under which those amounts are assessed or become due. Thus in the case of Income Tax by virtue of the provisions of Section 46 of the Income Tax Act, the Income Tax Officer can have the arrears of income tax recovered as arrears of land revenue. Once a certificate has been sent to the Collector under Sec. 46(2) of the Act the same is realizable in the manner provided by the Land Revenue Laws prevailing in the State in which the recovery is to be made. It is well known that in different states there are different laws under which moneys can be recovered as arrears of land revenue. 31. Sec. 280 of the Act provides for the issue of a writ of demand by the Tahsildar calling upon the defaulter to pay the arrears of land revenue. This provision is made in connection with the enforcement of the process contemplated by Cl. (a) of Section 279 of the Act. Sec. 281 of the Act provides that a defaulter of land revenue may be arrested and detained in custody upto a period not exceeding 15 days unless the arrears with costs, if any, are sooner paid. This provision has been made in connection with the process provided for by Cl. (b) of Section 279 of the Act. Sec. 282 of the Act authorises the Collector to attach and sell moveable property of a defaulter of land revenue and is connected with Cl. (c) of Section 279 of the Act. Sec. 284 of the Act confers on the Collector the jurisdiction to sell the holdings of a defaulter, bhumidhar or sirdar, as the case may be, to recover the arrears of land revenue from him. This provision has been made to implement the provisions of Cls. (d) and (e) of Section 279 of the Act. It is quite clear from the language of these sections that in terms they apply to cases of recovery of arrears of land revenue and not to the recovery of miscellaneous dues. Sec. 286 of the Act has been framed in connection with the process provided for by Cl. (f) of Section 279 of the Act. 32. In order to correctly interpret sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act on which the entire argument of Mr. Sec. 286 of the Act has been framed in connection with the process provided for by Cl. (f) of Section 279 of the Act. 32. In order to correctly interpret sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act on which the entire argument of Mr. Chatterji has been built it is necessary to consider two expressions occurring in that sub-section. The first expression is "not due in respect of any specific land." Those words to my mind, only mean any arrears of land revenue as such. The word "land" has been defined in Sec. 3(14) of the Act which runs as follows: "3(14) `land,' except in Secs. 143 and 144 means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisiculture and poultry farming." It is obvious that the words "due in respect of any specific land" relate to the demand, the liability for the payment of which has arisen in connection with land and under the provisions of the Act. Therefore it appears to me that the words "but not due in respect of any specific land" have been used in order to contradistinguish the miscellaneous dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue from arrears of land revenue as such. The other expression which requires interpretation is "may be recovered under this section." It is worthy of notice that the words used are not `under this Act' or under this sub-section. To my mind the use of the words "under this section" points to the applicability of the whole section i.e. sub-sec. (1) also for the purpose of sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act. It appears to me that the two sub-sections have got to be read together and the effect of sub-sec. (2) is that even in connection with the recovery of miscellaneous dues as arrears of land revenue it is permissible to sell immoveable property of the defaulter but subject to what is provided for in sub-sec. (1). If the contention of Mr. Chatterji were correct the words "under this section" would be redundant and a mere surplusage and sub-sec. (2) is that even in connection with the recovery of miscellaneous dues as arrears of land revenue it is permissible to sell immoveable property of the defaulter but subject to what is provided for in sub-sec. (1). If the contention of Mr. Chatterji were correct the words "under this section" would be redundant and a mere surplusage and sub-sec. (2) should have read as follows: - "Sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue but not due to respect or any specific land may be recovered from any immoveable property of the defaulter." It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes not to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite or surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. See Aswani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, A.I.R. 1952 SC 369 at p. 377. I have already said above that Secs. 279, 280, 281, 282 and 284 which are machinery sections do not in terms apply to the recovery of arrears of miscellaneous dues as land revenue. If sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 is to be read in isolation there would be no provision either for serving a writ of demand or arrest or detention of a defaulter or the attachment or sale of his moveable property and these processes could not be availed of by the Collector in connection with the recovery of miscellaneous dues as arrears of land revenue with the result that except by the attachment and sale of the immoveable property the arrears of miscellaneous dues could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Such an interpretation to my mind militates both against the language of sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act as also against the scheme of Chapter X of the Act. There is no reason and none has been suggested to us as to why the legislature would have treated for the purposes of recovery, the miscellaneous dues as different from land revenue and why it would not provide for the utilisation of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act before selling immoveable property of the defaulter in the case of the recovery of miscellaneous dues as it has provided for in the case of recovery of arrears of land revenue. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act before selling immoveable property of the defaulter in the case of the recovery of miscellaneous dues as it has provided for in the case of recovery of arrears of land revenue. In fact the provision of Section 279 and other sections falling in chapter X of the Act have been made primarily and essentially for the realisation of land revenue and it is only incidentally that they apply to the recovery of miscellaneous dues. As already pointed out earlier Section 242 of the Act provides that the land revenue shall be the first charge on the holding. An anxiety on the part of the legislature for realising the land revenue at all costs even by the adoption of most stringent measures is apparent in the scheme of Chapter X of the Act. That being so it is inconceivable that the law would be more generous and less stringent in the case of realisation of land revenue than in the case of realisation of miscellaneous dues by insisting in the case of the former exhaustion of the processes contemplated by Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act before selling immoveable property of the defaulter while in the case of the later providing for the sale of the defaulter's immoveable property straightaway. It is also difficult to comprehend that having provided for the recovery of miscellaneous dues also as arrears of land revenue the legislature would not have made all the provisions relating to the recovery of the land revenue applicable to the recovery of miscellaneous dues also. It may also be mentioned that if sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act were to be read in isolation and detached from sub - Sec. (1) it would become impossible to administer the same. Sub-Sec. (2) only provides that the arrears of miscellaneous dues may be recovered from any immoveable property of the defaulter without specifying the manner in which they are to be recovered, that is to say, without indicating whether it would be recovered from the usufruct of the property or by its sale or by mortgage or lease. However, if that sub-section is read along with sub-sec. (1) and full meanings are given to the words `under this section' the mode of recovery becomes clear inasmuch as sub-sec. However, if that sub-section is read along with sub-sec. (1) and full meanings are given to the words `under this section' the mode of recovery becomes clear inasmuch as sub-sec. (1) makes a reference to all the clauses of Section 279 of the Act and provides for the realisation "from the interest of the defaulter" in any immoveable property. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 286 read with Section 279, Cl. (f) clearly discloses that the recovery is to be made by the sale of immoveable property. In the Land Revenue Act of 1873 there was no provision similar to sub-sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act. Such a provision came for the first time on the statute book in the form of sub-sec.(2) of Section 162 in the Land Revenue Act of 1901. The change was occasioned due to the fact that as time went on and British rule became more stabilised in India, the Governmental activities increased and its functions expanded and necessity arose for realisation of other dues also as arrears of land revenue. In the Land Revenue Act of 1873 the equivalent of Sec. 286(1) of the Act was Sec. 168. Sec. 162 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, is almost similar to Section 286 of the Act and reads as follows: - "162(1). If an arrear cannot be recovered by any of the above processes, and the "defaulter owns or is in possession of, any other mahal, or any share in any other mahal, or any other immoveable property the Collector may proceed against such mahal, or share, or other immoveable property as if it were the land on account of which the revenue is due, under the provisions of this Act: Provided that no interest save those of the defaulter alone shall be affected by such process, and when such property is sold, the provisions of Section 161 shall not apply to such sale. (2) Sums of money recoverable as arrears of revenue but not due in respect of any specific land, may be recovered by process under this section against any immovable property of the defaulter. 33. It would be noticed that the the words used in sub-sec. (2) of Section 162 of the Land Revenue Act are "may be recovered by process under this section." That sub-section does not mention the process and the same was mentioned in sub-sec. 33. It would be noticed that the the words used in sub-sec. (2) of Section 162 of the Land Revenue Act are "may be recovered by process under this section." That sub-section does not mention the process and the same was mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Section 162, the same being "the Collector may proceed against such mahal, or share, or other immovable property as if it were the land on account of which the revenue is due, under the provisions of this Act." Sec. 146 which was the the counterpart in the 1901 Act as Section 279 of the Act is almost the same as Section 279 of the Act and Cl. (h) there is the same as Cl. (1) of Section 279 of the Act. In other words sub-sec. (2) of Section 162 of the 1901 Act could not have been administered without reading it along with sub-sec. (1) as an integral part of the same. The position in Section 286 of the Act is the same and I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that even in the case of realisation of miscellaneous dues recourse must first be had to the processes provided for by Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act. I may, however, add that as the processes contemplated by Cls. (a) to (e) are concerned the law does not require that two or more than two of these processes may not be issued at the same time. I am unable to accept the argument of Mr. Jagdish Swarup that recourse must be had first to Cl. (a), then to Cl. (b) and thereafter to Cls. (c), (d) and (e), one after the other. There is nothing in the language of any of the sections which take away from the Collector the power to simultaneously proceed under more than one clauses of Section 279 of the Act. The bar created in respect of exercise of power under Cl. (f) of Section 279 of the Act does not extend to other clauses of that section. The view that I am taking finds support from a Division Bench case of this Court in King Emperor v. Gulab Singh, 7, ALJ 21 with which I find myself in respectful agreement. 34. I may also notice a submission which was made by Mr. The view that I am taking finds support from a Division Bench case of this Court in King Emperor v. Gulab Singh, 7, ALJ 21 with which I find myself in respectful agreement. 34. I may also notice a submission which was made by Mr. Chatterji to the effect that it is not Section 286 (2) but sec. 288 of the Act which makes the provisions of Section 279 and other sections dealing with the recovery of misscellaneous dues. Sec. 288 of the Act reads as follows:- "288. The provisions of this Act with regard to the recovery of arrears of revenue shall apply to all arrears of revenue due at the commencement of this Act." In my judgment the plain meanings of the words used therein would indicate that section was enacted to make recoveries of arrears of land revenue which had already become due before the commencement of the Act and the liability for the payment of which had not arisen under the Act, to be recovered by the machinery provided by the Act. Normally an Act is prospective in its application. The Legislature can make it retrospective also and that is precisely what it has done by enacting Section 288 of the Act in respect of the matters mentioned therein. 35. In order to support the sale of the immovable property before that of the movable property Mr. Chatterji contended that the words "if any arrears of land revenue can not, in the opinion or judgment of the Collector, be recovered.....The question to consider would be whether such a meaning can be given to these words when the words "in the opinion" or "in the judgment of the Collector" do not appear in the section. It is not open to add or subtract words from a provision if its meaning is clear. See British India General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh and others, A.I.R. 1959 SC 1331 and Sri Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1959 SC 459. 36. I am, therefore, unable to agree that the words mentioned above should be read so as to mean that it is not necessary for the Collector to actually exhaust the processes mentioned in Cls. 36. I am, therefore, unable to agree that the words mentioned above should be read so as to mean that it is not necessary for the Collector to actually exhaust the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act and he can sell the immoveable property of the defaulter straightway if in his judgment or opinion, the demand can not be satisfied by taking recourse to these processes. 37. The next submission of Mr. Chatterji was that the provisions of Section 286 of the Act are directory and not mandatory in their nature. His submission was that even though it be assumed that sub-sec. (1) of Section 286 of the Act applied to the cases of recovery of arrears of miscellaneous dues as land revenue the provisions not being mandatory their disregard would not justify the quashing of the proceedings of the sales. The submission was that the words are "may realise the same from the interest of the defaulter in any other immoveable property" and therefore, that provision was merely directory. The argument is based upon a misreading of that section. Whether or not the provision are mandatory would depend upon the correct interpretation of the words "if any arrears of land revenue can not be recovered by any of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Sec. 279. The question would be as to was it the intention of the legislature that first processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act should be exhausted and then only would the Collector have jurisdiction to proceed against the immoveable property of the defaulter. In my judgment Section 279 of the Act confers on the Collector the jurisdiction or the power to realise the arrears of land revenue by any of the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (f) of that section. The provision of sub Sec. (2) of Section 286 of the Act makes the provisions of Section 279 of the Act applicable to the cases of recovery as arrears of land revenue of miscellaneous dues. Consequently the Collector has the jurisdiction to sell the immoveable property of a defaulter from the very moment he receives the certificate for the realisation of the miscellaneous dues arrears of land revenue. Consequently the Collector has the jurisdiction to sell the immoveable property of a defaulter from the very moment he receives the certificate for the realisation of the miscellaneous dues arrears of land revenue. Sec. 286 of the Act only provides the procedure for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 279 of the Act. It is true that Section 286 of the Act provides that the proper procedure would be first to have recourses to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act, but it cannot be said that if that is not done or if immoveable property is sold first there is an infringement of an imperative provision and that there is either any illegality or defect of jurisdiction in the order of the Collector directing the sale of immoveable property before that of the moveable property. It is well established that a defect of procedure is a mere irregularity and is not fatal to the proceedings. See Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway v. Shivaji Company Mills Ltd. Baroda Ltd., AIR 1927 Allahabad page 514. 38. Having carefully considered the language of Section 286 of the Act it appears to me that the provision relating to the exhaustion of the processes contemplated by Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act is merely directory. In view of the provisions of the various Acts which make the realisation of sums becoming due under those acts as arrears of land revenue and in view of the provisions of the Act the Collector has got a duty and a statutory obligation to realise those sums. He has no discretion in the matter. Consequently I read the words "May realise the same from the interest of the defaulter in any immoveable property" in sub-sec. 1 or "may be recovered from any immoveable property of the defaulter" in sub-sec. (2) as meaning that if the Collector does not succeed in recovering the amount by having recourse to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act. He shall sell immoveable property of the defaulter. In my judgment the word `may' here has been used in the sense of `shall'. (2) as meaning that if the Collector does not succeed in recovering the amount by having recourse to the processes mentioned in Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act. He shall sell immoveable property of the defaulter. In my judgment the word `may' here has been used in the sense of `shall'. It is true, as was pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955 (1) SCR 104 and State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal, A.I.R. 1957 SC 912 that nothing depends upon the use of the words `may' or `shall' and that the statute as a whole has got to be looked into in order to determine what is provided for is imperative, that is, mandatory and not merely directory. In the case of Rani Drigraj Kunwar v. A.K. Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1960 SC 444 the Supreme Court was called upon the consider as to whether the provisions of Section 55 and 56 of the Court of Wards Act were mandatory or directory in their nature. In both these sections the words used was `shall'. The Supreme Court having considered the relevant provision of the Act came to the conclusion that those provisions were only directory and not mandatory. In Banwari Lal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 SC 849 their Lordships observed as follows:- "As has been recognised again and again by the Court, no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity, or only directory, i.e. a direction the non observance of which does not entail" the consequence of invalidity, whatever other section may occur, but in each case the Court has to decide the legislative intent. Did the legislature intend in making the statutory provision that non-observance of this would entail invalidity or did it not. To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same." 39. To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same." 39. I have already said above that it is the duty of the Collector and public interest requires it that when he gets a certificate either in respect of arrears of land revenue or in respect of arrears of miscellaneous dues he must recover the same by utilising the provisions for the recovery of arrears of land revenue. He has no option in the matter. He has got to recover the demand to the best of his capacity. Therefore, I read Section 286 of the Act to mean that if he is unable to recover the arrears by resorting to the processes contemplated by Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act he must sell the immoveable property of the defaulter and to that extent the provision is imperative or mandatory but the provision that he shall first have recourse to the processes contemplated by Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 279 of the Act is merely directory. There is good authority for the proposition that even though a directory provision is intended to be obeyed a failure to obey it does not render a thing duly done in disobedience of it, a nullity. See Drigraj Kuer v. A. K. Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1960 SC 444, Pratap Singh v. Sri Krishna Gupta, A.I.R. 1956 SC 140 and Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, A.I.R. 1940 PC 230. Therefore, even though moveable property of the company was not sold before selling its immoveable property the order of the Collector would not be amenable to a writ of certiorari or to being otherwise quashed or set aside. 40. For the reasons given above I have come to the conclusion that though the Collector of Deoria noted irregularly in selling the immoveable property before selling the moveable one the writ petition has still got to be dismissed. I may however state that in the present case the Collector of Deoria would have been better advised if he had first sold the moveable property of the company. I may however state that in the present case the Collector of Deoria would have been better advised if he had first sold the moveable property of the company. When the law confers vast powers on an authority it becomes all the more necessary for him to exercise them with care. Though I am unable to hold as was faintly suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Collector of Deoria acted malafide, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the orders that he passed did not show a high sense of responsibility, thought and care on his part. The approach of the Collector in such matter should be sympathetic to the defaulter. It should be realised that the defaulters are not criminals and coercive processes should be adopted only to the extent justified by the necessities of a case. Even the directory provisions are intended to be obeyed. Only if the Collector had cared to look into the provisions of Section 286 of the Act and R. 281 of the Rules framed thereunder he would have realised that the law expected him first to sell moveable property of the company. The Collector should have realised that he was discharging a public duty while exercising powers under Section 279 and 286 of the Act and R. 281 of the Rules and that he was not dealing with his private property and thus was free to do whatever he liked with it. The company might have escaped much of the loss which it seems to have suffered had the Collector sold the moveable property first but as the action of the Collector does not go to the extent of being mala fide it is difficult to give any relief to the appellant company. The mere fact that the Income Tax Officer had written to the Collector asking him to keep in abeyance the recovery of income tax dues would not make the sale held invalid because firstly the certificate issued under Section 46 of the Income Tax Act had not been withdrawn by the Income Tax Officer and secondly because even if the income tax dues were not to be recovered the Collector still had to recover about Rs. 7,50,000 in connection with the cess due from the company and the price of cane which it had received and crushed. 7,50,000 in connection with the cess due from the company and the price of cane which it had received and crushed. So long as the sales had got to be made in connection with the recovery of these amounts the sales were justified. Having carefully considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties I have come to the conclusion that the appeal can not succeed. I would consequently dismiss the appeal but direct the parties to bear their own costs. By the Court - For the reasons given in our separate opinions we dismiss this special Appeal but do not make any order as to the costs for in our opinion the costs should be borne by the parties.