JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. The appellant is the decree holder in a case for recovery of property on the basis of a superior lease in his favour. The 1st defendant is the lessee of the suit property. According to the plaintiff defendants 2 to 4 were residing in the property under the 1st defendant. During the pendency of the suit the 1st defendant died and his legal representatives were impleaded as defendants 10 to 15. The 3rd defendant also died during the course of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record as defendants 5 to 9. The contention of the 7th defendant was that the 3rd defendant was not holding the property under the 1st defendant, but only as prior lessee under the landlord himself, and that the 1st defendant himself was only a superior lessee who had not reduced the property to his possession. Before the matter could be tried between the parties the plaintiff and the 1st defendant struck a compromise between them by which they divided the suit properties between them and agreed between themselves that properties may be recovered as per that allotment from the other defendants in the case. The court without adverting to the terms of this compromise merely accepted it and decreed the suit in accordance with the compromise. It is this decree that the decree holder is now seeking to execute against defendants 7 and 9 in respect of the property in their possession. Defendants 7 and 9 contended that there is no executable decree against them. That contention was repelled by the executing court which allowed execution to proceed; but the Subordinate Judge, on appeal, held there was no executable decree against the objecting defendants and therefore disallowed execution against them. The decree holder has therefore come up in second appeal. 2. As the decree in the case was only one accepting a compromise and there is no decree by as court against the defendants who were not parties to the compromise, the decree has no operative force with regard to defendants 5 to 9 who were not parties to the compromise. As the court has not passed a decree except to the extent of accepting the compromise, there is no decree against them as such in this case. See the Commentary on Civil Procedure Code by Mulla, 12th Edition, page 986. As the court has not passed a decree except to the extent of accepting the compromise, there is no decree against them as such in this case. See the Commentary on Civil Procedure Code by Mulla, 12th Edition, page 986. "The contract to the parties is not the less a contract, and subject to the incidents of a contract, because there is superadded the command of the judge". Several authorities are cited in support thereof in the Commentary. The author further says: "The principle is that where a decree is passed on an agreement of compromise the court must be taken to adopt the agreement with all its incidents". (Vide Nagappa v. Venkata Rao (24 Madras 265, 266)). It is not for the plaintiff and the 1st defendant to agree that the property may be recovered by the plaintiff from defendants 5 to 9. As the compromise itself was not binding on the aforesaid defendants, it would not get any greater effect imply because it has been accepted and made the decree of the court. If the court had passed a decree independently against the defendants who were not parties to the compromise, and had accepted the compromise itself only as a ground for passing that decree as has been the case in Revur Venkata Subba Rao v. Gurijala Venkitaramanayya (AIR 1948 Madras 397) the decree would have been binding on all the defendants. What is there binding is the compromise between the parties. 1 would therefore hold that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is correct. The second appeal has no force, and is dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs.