Judgment :- 1. The question that arises in this second appeal is regarding the construction of S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 as amended by Kerala Act 26 of 1958. 2.The appellant had married the respondent on 9th November 1947 and he filed an original petition, in the court of the District Munsiff of Tellicherry, under S.7 of Madras Act 22 of 1933, asking for a dissolution of the marriage with the respondent. The court by its order dated 8th September 1958 ordered the dissolution of the marriage. On 15th September 1958 the respondent filed O.P. 70 of 1958, out of which this second appeal arises, under S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, for awarding maintenance to her at the rate of Rs. 75 per month. 3. The appellant raised two objections to the claim made by the respondent, namely, (a) that the application itself having been filed after a dissolution of the marriage has been granted by the court, is not maintainable under the provisions of S.10-B of the Act and (b) that the rate of maintenance claimed by the respondent is excessive and she is not entitled to the maintenance because she is able to maintain herself. 4. The learned District Munsiff, who considered this matter in the first instance, was of the view that the contention of the appellant that the application is not maintainable has to be accepted. According to the learned District Munsiff, the application O.P. No. 70 of 1958, having been filed after the marriage was dissolved by the court on 8th September 1958 and there being no relationship of husband and wife, the application is not maintainable. Another reason given by the learned District Munsiff is that the application not having been instituted at the time when the court was exercising the jurisdiction under Chapter II, is not also maintainable on that ground. 5. Another reason given by the learned District Munsiff is that the application not having been instituted at the time when the court was exercising the jurisdiction under Chapter II, is not also maintainable on that ground. 5. So far as the rate or quantum of maintenance claimed by the respondent was concerned, the learned District Munsiff, notwithstanding the fact that he was holding that the application is not maintainable in law nevertheless went into the evidence adduced by the parties in this case and came to the conclusion that the rate claimed by the respondent was quite reasonable and, therefore, the learned District Munsiff holds that if the respondent was held entitled to claim maintenance the court would have been willing to award the rate claimed by the party herself. 6. In view of the fact that the learned District Munsiff took the view on the legal aspect that the application was not maintainable, the original petition filed by the respondent, namely, O.P. No. 70 of 1958, was dismissed. 7. Against this order of the learned District Munsiff, the respondent carried the matter in appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge of Tellicherry. The learned Subordinate Judge is of the view that the reasoning of the learned District Munsiff that the application for maintenance is not maintainable cannot be sustained. It is the view of the learned judge that the expression "any court exercising jurisdiction under this Chapter" occurring in S.10-B of the Act, qualifies only the court and does not place any limitation regarding the period or time when the application is to be filed. The learned judge is also of the view that if the intention of the legislature was to fix or limit the period of time and if the intention of the legislature was further that the question of granting a permanent maintenance is to be considered even at the time when the order of dissolution is being made the appropriate words should have been "any court while exercising jurisdiction under this chapter". 8. The learned judge has sought some support from certain decisions based upon S.37 of the Indian Divorce Act, and basing his conclusions on those decisions, the learned judge is of the view that it is enough if a party comes to the court with a petition for maintenance within a reasonable time from the date of dissolution of the marriage. 9. 9. The learned Subordinate Judge is also of the view that the expressions 'wife' and 'husband' occurring in S.10-B of the Act will also take in, according to him, "ex-wife" or "ex-husband" and therefore there is no particular significance in the use of the expressions "wife" and "husband" in the said section. Ultimately, the learned judge winds up the discussion on this aspect by concluding that the petition filed by the respondent under S.10-B of the Act within a reasonable period of the date of the order of dissolution of marriage is legally maintainable inasmuch as it was filed "within a reasonable time after the formal dissolution of the marriage," 10. The learned judge then goes into the question of the quantum or rate of maintenance claimed by the respondent. On this question again, the learned judge differs from the conclusions arrived at by the learned District Munsiff. The learned judge again, after considering the evidence adduced in this case and the materials placed before him comes to the conclusion that the appellant must be held to have an income of about Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 1,500 per annum and making allowance for the fact that he has to maintain his two children and his old mother, etc., the learned judge is of the view that the rate of Rs. 75 per mensem claimed by the respondent is exhorbitantly high and ultimately he fixes the maintenance at Rs. 35 per mensem as being a reasonable rate, in the circumstances of the case. 11. Ultimately, the learned judge set aside the order of the trial court dismissing O.P. 70 of 1958 and grants a decree in favour of the respondent at the rate of Rs. 35 per mensem from the date of the filing of the said application, till her death or till her remarriage. 12. It is this judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, reversing those of the trial court that are attacked before me by Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant. 13. The contentions of the learned counsel are two-fold, namely, (1) the construction placed upon S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act by the learned Subordinate Judge and holding that the application filed by the respondent is quite valid and maintainable is erroneous; and (2) in any event the fixation of the rate of maintenance at Rs. 13. The contentions of the learned counsel are two-fold, namely, (1) the construction placed upon S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act by the learned Subordinate Judge and holding that the application filed by the respondent is quite valid and maintainable is erroneous; and (2) in any event the fixation of the rate of maintenance at Rs. 35 per month as against the appellant is also erroneous inasmuch as he has not taken into account the various matters mentioned in S.10-B of the Act. 14. On the other hand, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has supported practically the reasons given by the lower appellate court, for coming to the conclusion that O.P. 70 of 1958 is maintainable and he has also criticised the views of the trial court, that an application claiming maintenance after the dissolution of the marriage cannot be entertained by the court. 15. Before I consider in greater detail the various aspects presented before me by the learned counsel on both sides, I think it is desirable to have an idea of the scheme of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 as it stood originally and also after its amendment by Kerala Act 26 of 1958. 16. The relevant chapter that requires to be noted is Chapter II of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932, Madras Act XXII of 1933. Chapter II relates to "Marriage and its Dissolution". 17. S.4 deals with marriages which are valid under the Act. Again S.5 declares a marriage during the continuance of a prior marriage void. S.6 of the Act which deals with dissolution of marriage is as follows: "A marriage valid under S.4 may be dissolved on or after the date on which this Act comes into force (a) by a registered instrument of dissolution executed by the parties thereto; or (b) by an older of dissolution as hereinafter provided: Provided that if either or both the parties is or are minors, the marriage shall not be dissolved until the party has become a major or both the parties have become majors as the case may be. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any dissolution of the marriage, effected before the date on which this Act comes into force, in accordance with the custom prevailing in the community to which the parties belong or either of them belongs". Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any dissolution of the marriage, effected before the date on which this Act comes into force, in accordance with the custom prevailing in the community to which the parties belong or either of them belongs". S. 6-A is to the effect that the rights of children of the marriage are not affected by any dissolution of the marriage. 18. S.7 of the Act dealing with petition for dissolution is as follows: 7 (1) A husband or wife may present a petition for dissolution of the marriage - (i) if the place where the marriage was contracted or the respondent has a permanent dwelling or actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, at the time the petition is presented, is situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court of a District Munsiff, in such court; (ii) If such place is not situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court of any District, Munsiff, in the court of the Subordinate Judge or if there is no such court, in the Court of the District judge, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such place is situated; and (iii) if such place is situated within the local limits for the time being of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras, in the Madras City Civil Court. (2) The petition shall specify the place where and the date on which the marriage was contracted and if the respondent was a minor at the time of the marriage, the name and address of the guardian, if any, with whose consent the marriage was contracted." It will be seen that under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S.7, the application by a wife or a husband for dissolution of the marriage is to be filed in the Court of the District Munsiff mentioned therein if the place where the marriage was contracted or the respondent has a permanent dwelling or actually or voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain at the time the petition is presented is situated within the local limits of such a District Munsiff's Court. 19. 19. Again sub-clause (ii) of the said section says that if such a place is not situated within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Court of the District Munsiff, the application for dissolution is to be presented in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and it also provides that if there is no such court of a Subordinate judge the application is to be filed in the court of the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the various places mentioned in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S.7 are situate. 20. Again, sub-clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of S.7 deals with a special class of cases, namely, where the various places mentioned in sub-clause (i) are situate within the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. In this case, the proper forum, where an application is to be filed is the Madras City Civil Court. 21. Sub-section (2) of S.7 is to the effect that the application filed under S.7 (1) is to specify the place where and the date on which the marriage was contracted and it also provides that if the respondent was a minor at the time of the marriage the application should also give the name and address of the guardian, if any, with whose consent the marriage was contracted. 22. S.8 of the Act states that a copy of the petition shall be served at the expense of the petitioner on the respondent. 23. S.9 relates to an order of dissolution being passed by the court and it is as follows: "On the motion of the petitioner made not earlier than six months after the service of the copy as aforesaid, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall on being satisfied after such enquiry as it thinks fit that a marriage which is valid under S.4 was contracted between the parties, by order in writing declare the marriage dissolved. The dissolution shall take effect from the date of such Order." 24. S.10 states that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are to apply to petitions under this chapter. 25. S.11 prohibits the institution of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights in respect of a marriage valid under S.4 of the Act. 26. The dissolution shall take effect from the date of such Order." 24. S.10 states that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are to apply to petitions under this chapter. 25. S.11 prohibits the institution of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights in respect of a marriage valid under S.4 of the Act. 26. S.12 is to the effect that "Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to the marriage of any Nambudiri woman following the Marumakkathayam law of inheritance." 27. The above is the salient feature of Chapter II of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, as it stood prior to the incorporation of certain new sections by Kerala Act 26 of 1958. 28. It will be seen that originally there was absolutely no provision made for payment of any interim maintenance during the proceedings or for paying the expenses of the parties concerned therein in respect of the proceedings nor was there any provision regarding the payment of permanent alimony and maintenance. 29. By Kerala Act 26 of 1958, namely, the Madras Marumakkathayam (Amendment) Act, 1958, the sections with which we are now concerned, namely, S.10-A, 10-B and 10-C were incorporated in the main Act, by S.3 of the Amending Act. There were certain other amendments to the original Act which are not necessary to be considered now for the present purpose. 30. S.3 of the Amendment Act inserted, as I mentioned earlier, three new sections after S.10, namely, 10-A, 10-B and 10-C which are as follows: "10-A. Maintenance Pendente Lite and Expenses of Proceedings - Where in any proceeding under this chapter it appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her of his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable. 10-B. Permanent alimony and maintenance. 10-B. Permanent alimony and maintenance. - (1) Any Court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter may on application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, order that the respondent shall, while the applicant remains unmarried, pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance and support such gross sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the, life of the applicant, as having regard to the respondent's own income and other property, if any, the income and other property of the applicant and the conduct, of the parties it may seem to the Court to be just, and any such payment may be secured, if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property of the respondent. (2) If the Court is satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made an order under sub-S. (1), it may, at the instance of: either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may deem just. (3) If the Court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has remarried or has been leading a life of immorality it shall rescind the order. 10-C. Enforcement of and appeal from orders. - All orders made by the Court in any proceeding under S.10-A or S.10-B shall be enforced in like manner as a decree of the Court made in the exercise of the original civil jurisdiction is enforced, and may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force: Provided that there shall be no appeal on the Subject of costs only." 31. S.10 - A relates to maintenance pendente lite and also expenses of the proceedings and there can be no controversy that S.10 A can only relate to the period when the proceedings under this chapter are actually before the court and it will enure only till the termination of the proceedings. That is, the sub-section enables a court to make provision for the necessary expenses of the proceeding or to give suitable directions for payment of a monthly allowance during the pendency of the proceedings of such sum as the Court may after having due regard for the various matters mentioned therein consider to be reasonable. 32. That is, the sub-section enables a court to make provision for the necessary expenses of the proceeding or to give suitable directions for payment of a monthly allowance during the pendency of the proceedings of such sum as the Court may after having due regard for the various matters mentioned therein consider to be reasonable. 32. S.10-B, the construction of which is in very keen controversy in these proceedings, deals with permanent alimony and maintenance. I will revert to S.10-B a little later, after adverting to certain analogous provisions contained in other enactments also. 33. S.10-C deals with enforcement of the orders passed under S.10-A or S.10-B and it provides that they shall be enforced in the same manner as a decree of court made in the exercise of original jurisdiction and there is also a further provision that there may be appeal under any law for the time being in force. There is a proviso to S.10-C to the effect that no appeal shall lie on the subject of costs alone. 34. It is also necessary to consider the more or less analogous provisions contained in certain other enactments namely, certain Madras enactments, Central enactments and enactments obtaining in Travancore and also in the Cochin State. 35. The earliest Act, so far as I could see, is the Indian Divorce Act, namely Central Act 4 of 1869. The only material provision is S.37 on which, as I have mentioned earlier, the learned appellate judge has placed some reliance to come to the conclusion that an application for maintenance can be filed within a reasonable time after the disposal of the first application for dissolution of marriage. In my view the reliance placed by the learned judge on S.37 of the Indian Divorce Act is absolutely misplaced. The scheme of the Indian Divorce Act is totally different and S.37 clearly states that it is open to the District judge on the confirmation of any decree of his declaring a marriage to be dissolved or on any decree of judicial separation obtained by the wife, to make an order regarding the payment of maintenance. Therefore, the section clearly indicates that the section does contemplate a time lag between the original order made by the District Judge of dissolution of marriage and order of the District Judge fixing maintenance payable in the circumstances of a case. 36. Therefore, the section clearly indicates that the section does contemplate a time lag between the original order made by the District Judge of dissolution of marriage and order of the District Judge fixing maintenance payable in the circumstances of a case. 36. The next enactment to be noted is the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949. The relevant section is S.5, sub-section (8) of the Act. S.5, sub-section (8) omitting the later part of it is to the effect: "The Court when ordering the dissolution of a marriage under this section, may also make suitable provision...." It will be clearly seen that the expression used in sub-section (8) of S.5 is "when ordering dissolution of marriage under this section." That is, the order for maintenance of a woman until remarriage with another man in respect of the various matters mentioned in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S.5 have to be made when the court orders the dissolution of the marriage. 37. The next enactment is the Special Marriage Act, 1954, namely, Central Act, 43 of 1954. S.37 which is the relevant section deals with permanent alimony and maintenance and it is provided therein that "Any court exercising jurisdiction under Chapter V or Chapter VI may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent to the decree, on application made to it for the purpose, order that the husband shall secure to the wife for her maintenance and support, if necessary, by a charge on the husband's property such gross sum or such monthly or periodical payment of money for a term not exceeding her life, as, having regard to her own property, if any, her husband's property and ability and the conduct of the parties, it may seem to the court to be just." Here again, the expression used is "at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent to the decree". Therefore jurisdiction is given under S.37 of the Special Marriage Act to the Court exercising jurisdiction under Chapter V or Chapter VI of that enactment to consider the claim for maintenance either at the time of passing a decree therein or even at a stage subsequent to the passing of the decree. 38. The other enactment which requires to be noticed is the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Act XXV of 1955 (Central). 38. The other enactment which requires to be noticed is the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Act XXV of 1955 (Central). The particular section to be noted is S.25 which relates to permanent alimony and maintenance. Here again, the provision is to the effect "Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto," on an application made to it by the husband or the wife make provision for payment of maintenance. More or less the wording of S.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act is analogous to S.37 of the Special Marriage Act because here again power or jurisdiction is given to the court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to make an order regarding maintenance not only when it passes any decree but also at any time subsequent thereto. It will also be noted that both the enactments, namely, the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which give power to the appropriate court to consider the claim for maintenance even after a decree for dissolution of marriage is passed, use nevertheless the expressions 'husband' and 'wife' even when either of them makes an application for fixation of maintenance long after the dissolution of marriage has been effected by a decree of court. 39. It is also necessary to consider certain enactments obtaining in Travancore, namely the Travancore Nayar Regulation, II of 1100. I may straightaway say that the scheme is different in this enactment, i.e., there is no provision for awarding maintenance but it proceeds on a totally different basis, namely, the fixation and award of compensation. 40. S.7, sub-S. 3 of the Travancore Nayar Regulation II of 1100, which is the particular section to be noted says: "At the time of passing the order referred to in sub-S. (2)" Sub-S. 2 of S.7 is to the effect that "Three months after the service of the copy as aforesaid, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, (a) if the petition is not opposed with respect to any of the grounds mentioned in S.5" and after also stating certain matters, it is provided that the court shall declare in Writing the marriage dissolved. Therefore, sub S. (3) of S.7 again gave jurisdiction to the court for the purpose of fixing compensation thereunder only at the time of passing the order under sub-S. (2) of S.7. Therefore, sub S. (3) of S.7 again gave jurisdiction to the court for the purpose of fixing compensation thereunder only at the time of passing the order under sub-S. (2) of S.7. Again, sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-S. (3) of S.7 deals with the payment of compensation not exceeding Rs. 5,000 and clause (a) deals with the case where the applicant for dissolution is a husband and clause (b) deals with a case where the applicant for dissolution is the wife. 41. The other enactment that has to be noted is the Travancore Ezhava Regulation, 3 of 1100. Here again, the relevant sections to be noted are S.8, 9 and 11. S.8 deals with a petition for dissolution of marriage and after stating that a husband or wife may present a petition for dissolution of marriage under S.7 ultimately says that the petitioner shall, in all cases, offer in the petition itself reasonable compensation to the respondent except where such respondent has changed his or her religion. S.9 deals with the question as to what is reasonable compensation and it further provides that in case of dispute it is to be determined by the court after an enquiry into the matters mentioned therein. 42. S.11 is to the effect that six months after the service of the copy mentioned therein, if the petition for dissolution is not withdrawn the Court shall, after determining the amount of compensation, declare in writing the marriage dissolved and it also provides that the dissolution shall take effect from the date of the order declaring it. There is a further provision in S.11 to the effect that so far as it decrees payment of compensation such order shall be executable and appealable as a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure. 43. Therefore, it will be seen that the Travancore Ezhava Regulation, 3 of 1100 also provides that the question of payment of compensation has to be considered even at the time of passing the decree for dissolution of marriage. 44. The only other enactment that requires to be noted is the Cochin Nayar Act, 29 of 1113. The particular sections here again which have to be noted are S.15 and 17. 44. The only other enactment that requires to be noted is the Cochin Nayar Act, 29 of 1113. The particular sections here again which have to be noted are S.15 and 17. S.15 deals with petition for dissolution of marriage to be filed either by a husband or wife and it also says that where the petitioner is the husband, he shall be liable to pay reasonable compensation to the respondent. 45. S.17 deals with the order to be passed by the court on dissolution and it finally winds up by saying "The Court shall declare in writing the marriage dissolved and then proceed to determine and award the amount of compensation. There is a slight difference between the Travancore enactment and the Cochin enactment inasmuch as the Cochin enactment gives jurisdiction to the court to declare the marriage dissolved and then proceed to determine and award the compensation payable in the circumstances. 46. As I mentioned earlier the main contention of Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant is that the construction placed upon S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act by the lower appellate court is erroneous. The learned counsel urged that a reading: of the provisions newly incorporated in the original Madras Act by the Amending Act, 26 of 1958, especially S.10-A to 10-C will clearly indicate that the scheme of the enactment is that the claim for permanent alimony and maintenance must also be settled and finished even at the time when the dissolution of marriage is ordered by the court itself. Quite naturally, in this connection the learned counsel relied very strongly upon the wording to be found in the Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act to the effect that power is given to the courts to pass an order regarding permanent alimony and maintenance either at the time of passing any decree or even at any time subsequent to the decree. Mr. Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer rather strenuously urged that the Kerala Legislature, when it incorporated the provisions in question, especially S.10-B in the Madras Marumakkathayam Act must have been fully aware of the various expressions used in the other enactments and inasmuch as it has not chosen to use those identical expressions for giving jurisdiction or power to the court to entertain and investigate a claim for maintenance even "at any time subsequent to the decree" it should be considered that the Legislature wanted the entire matter arising as between the parties, including a claim for permanent alimony and maintenance, to be settled and concluded at or about the time of passing a decree for dissolution. 47. No doubt, this contention is met by Mr. V.K.K. Menon, learned counsel for the respondent, to the effect that the section does not show that there is any restriction sought to be placed on the powers of jurisdiction of court. For instance, the learned counsel urged that if the intention of the Legislature was that the powers regarding the award of maintenance must also be exercised simultaneously or concurrently with the passing of the order of dissolution of marriage, the Legislature would certainly have used the expression "at the time of passing the decree" as is found in earlier part of the Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act in the particular sections already adverted to. 48. Basing on this, the learned counsel proceeds further and states that at the time Kerala Act, 26 of 1958 was enacted by the State Legislature it must have been fully aware of the provisions contained in the Travancore Nayar Act, the Travancore Ezhava Act as well as the Cochin Nayar-Act and it has not certainly chosen to adopt the principles underlying this enactment, namely, the award of compensation. None of these enactments gives jurisdiction to the court to make provision for quantum maintenance or for expenses of the proceedings as such. The learned counsel also urged that the State Legislature had-also the more or less analogous provisions in the other enactments, namely, the Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, and it has not chosen to adopt those expressions in the particular section in question. The learned counsel also urged that the State Legislature had-also the more or less analogous provisions in the other enactments, namely, the Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, and it has not chosen to adopt those expressions in the particular section in question. Therefore, the learned counsel urged that the Legislature did not want to adopt either the analogous powers mentioned in the Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act nor was it concerned itself with the question of award of compensation as is found in the Travancore Nayar Act and the Travancore Ezhava Act, and the Cochin Nair Act. Therefore, the learned counsel further urged that the Legislature in enacting S.10-B was cutting a new path and it has not placed any restriction as to the period or time within which the question of award of maintenance is either to be gone into or decided by the court. 49. Mr. V.K.K. Menon, also urged that the expression "the court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" occurring in sub-S. (1) of S.10-B does not relate to the time factor or the period when the jurisdiction is to be exercised, but really it relates to the court which may be exercising jurisdiction under this chapter at the material time when an application under S.10-B is made by the party. 50. Mr. V.K.K. Menon also urged that the expressions 'wife' and 'husband' occurring in S.10-B will also take in a quondam wife or quondam husband as will be clear from the fact that even the other enactments, namely, the Special Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act when dealing with the case of maintenance even after the decree for dissolution has been passed, nevertheless chose to call those persons husband and wife, notwithstanding the fact that the marriage tie has been already put an end to. Therefore, the learned counsel urged that an application filed by the respondent on 15th September 1958, in spite of the fact that it was filed after an order was passed dissolving the marriage on 8th September 1958 is perfectly competent and maintainable in law. 51. The main contention of Mr. Therefore, the learned counsel urged that an application filed by the respondent on 15th September 1958, in spite of the fact that it was filed after an order was passed dissolving the marriage on 8th September 1958 is perfectly competent and maintainable in law. 51. The main contention of Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, as I have indicated earlier, is that the expression "any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" occurring in sub-S. (1) of S.10-B really deals with a time factor, namely, when the court is exercising powers or jurisdiction in respect of the grant of dissolution of marriage. 52. The question is which of the contentions urged before me by the learned counsel is to be accepted. 53. After giving due consideration to the various aspects placed before me by the learned counsel on both sides, in my view, the quite natural and reasonable interpretation to be placed on S.10-B is that advanced by Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, and I am in entire agreement with his contention that the application filed by the respondent, after the dissolution of the marriage, is not maintainable under S.10-B of the Act. 54. Even at the risk of repetition, I will have to again refer to one or two sections in the Madras Marumakkathayam Act because that will throw some light on the expression "any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" occurring in S.10-B. I shall now consider what is meant by the expression "court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" with reference to S.7 and 9 occurring before S.10-B. So far as I could see, and I may also state that learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to show me any other section under which it could be stated that the court is exercising any other jurisdiction under this Chapter. 55. S.6, as I mentioned earlier, deals with dissolution of marriage and it can be done in two ways, namely, (a) by a registered instrument of dissolution executed by the parties thereto or (b) by an order of dissolution as provided hereinafter and that is found in S.7, namely, when it gives a right to a husband or a wife to present a petition for dissolution of marriage. The court, where exactly such an application is to be filed is mentioned in sub-clauses, (1), (2) and (3) of sub-S. (1) of S.7. 56. The court, where exactly such an application is to be filed is mentioned in sub-clauses, (1), (2) and (3) of sub-S. (1) of S.7. 56. I have also referred to S.9 to the effect that if the application for dissolution of marriage is not withdrawn earlier than 6 months after the service of the copy of the notice under S.8, the court shall on being satisfied after such enquiry as it thinks fit that a marriage which is valid under S.4 was contracted between the parties shall order in writing declaring the marriage dissolved and it further provides that the dissolution shall take effect from the date of order. It will be noticed that no other enquiry is contemplated by court in an application filed either by the husband or wife under S.7. The only enquiry contemplated under S.9 is an enquiry by the court to find whether the marriage sought to be dissolved by the husband or wife on an application under S.7 is a valid marriage under S.4. Apart from this limited enquiry no other enquiry is contemplated. Therefore, S.10-B, occurring after S.6, 7 and 9 clearly indicates that the "court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" occurring in S.10-B must really relate to the court which exercises jurisdiction under this chapter by (a) receiving an application at the instance of the husband or wife under S.7 and (b) investigates the matter under S.9 and passes an order under the same section declaring the marriage dissolved. As I mentioned earlier, there is no other section earlier to S.10-A which will throw any light as to what other jurisdiction is being exercised by the court under Chapter II. 57. No doubt, S.10-A, 10-B and 10-C are incorporated after S.10, which really deals with the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to petitions filed under Chapter II. Therefore, the scheme of the sections occurring in Chapter II, after the incorporation of S.10-A, 10-B and 10-C will indicate that the court receives the application for dissolution under S.7, directs the copy of the petition to be served on the respondent, then investigates and satisfies itself under S.9 that the marriage, which is sought to be dissolved, is a valid marriage contracted under S.4 of the Act, and then finally declares the marriage dissolved under S.9. While there were no provisions in the original Act for grant of maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceeding and for grant of permanent alimony and maintenance, and for recovery of such amounts, those are now provided by S.10-A, 10-B and 10-C. No doubt, as pointed out by Sri. V.K.K. Menon the expression "at the time of passing the decree" does not occur in S.10-B. In my view it was not necessary to use such an expression because it is more or less implicit in the actual expressions used viz., "any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter." But the most important aspect to be noticed is that S.10-B does not contain words to the effect "at any time subsequent to the decree." To interpret S.10-B in the same manner as S.37 of the Special Marriage Act or S.25 of the Hindu Marriage Act as conferring a power to receive an application for permanent alimony or maintenance even after a decree for dissolution of marriage has been passed, will be ignoring the crucial fact that in the latter two enactments the Legislature has expressly conferred such a power by using appropriate expressions in the sections to that effect. 58. S.10-A gives jurisdiction to the court in proceeding under Chapter II to make provisions, if it is satisfied that either the wife or the husband has no independent income sufficient for his or her support and also to meet the necessary expenses of the proceeding, on an application being made by one of the persons, by ordering that the respondent in that application should pay the petitioner not only for the expenses of the proceedings but also a monthly allowance during the proceedings such sum as the court may consider reasonable. That admittedly relates to the duration of the proceedings for dissolution before the court. S.10-A specifically deals with maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceeding. 59. After having given to the court jurisdiction to make more or less an interim arrangement regarding the payment of maintenance during the pendency of the proceedings as well as of expenses of the proceeding, in my view, the Legislature also gave jurisdiction to the court by incorporating S.10-B to consider an application by a party concerned and make provision for permanent alimony and maintenance from the date of the decree for dissolotion.passed by the court. 60. 60. Though, no doubt, it is not really necessary for me to go into the question as to whether the expressions "wife" and "husband" occurring in S.10-B may also take in quondam husband and quondam wife, because it will ultimately depend upon the particular context in which they appear, in this case at any rate the expressions "wife" and "husband" occurring in S.10-B cannot be stated to be without any significance. 61. In my view this conclusion finds support from the scheme of the enactment, namely, that S.10-B (1) clearly refers to an application made to the court for the purpose of alimony and maintenance by "either the wife or the husband, as the case may be" and then finally states that an order may be made by that court directing the respondent to pay to the applicant for her or his maintenance for a period not exceeding the life of the applicant and also so long as the applicant remains unmarried. The use of the expressions 'wife' or 'husband' when it relates to an application filed to the court in the earlier part of S.10-B in quite contra-distinction to the other expression, namely, the applicant and the respondent, occurring 'in the later part of S.10-B (1) when the order for maintenance is passed is, in my view, not without significance. The use of the expressions 'wife' or 'husband' when an application is made is quite correct because they do remain as husband and wife in every sense of the term till an order for dissolution of marriage is passed by the court under S.9 of the Act. -It is stated in sub-section (1) of S.10-B that an application for the purpose of permanent alimony and maintenance may be made either by the husband or the wife, and that in my view, clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature was that the application for such purpose must have been made even during the pendency of the application for dissolution of marriage. Considering it from this point of view, the use of the expression'wife' or 'husband' is correct. But when the question of real award of maintenance is concerned, the Legislature very guardedly uses the expression the court may direct the respondent to pay the applicant for her or his maintenance the amount that may be fixed after taking into account the various matters mentioned therein. 62. But when the question of real award of maintenance is concerned, the Legislature very guardedly uses the expression the court may direct the respondent to pay the applicant for her or his maintenance the amount that may be fixed after taking into account the various matters mentioned therein. 62. Therefore, in my view, the natural and reasonable interpretation to be placed on S.10-B and especially on the words occurring in sub-section (1) of S.10-B "any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" must really be that it relates to the time when the court exercises jurisdiction by way of receiving an application for dissolution of marriage under S.7 and when it passes an order of dissolution of marriage under S.9 of the Act. 63. The provision to be made under S.10-B is for a period admittedly subsequent to the dissolution of the marriage. But the condition precedent for the exercise of that jurisdiction is that an application must have been made by the husband or wife concerned under S.10-B even when the application for dissolution of marriage was pending before the court. 64. Sub-section (2) of S.10-B gives no doubt power to the court to alter, vary, modify or rescind any order passed under sub-section (1) if it is brought to the notice of that court the change of circumstances of either party at any time after it has been made. Here, it is very significant because the court is dealing with the matter subsequent to the dissolution of marriage, and the Legislature quite guardedly uses the expression "a change in the circumstances of either party". 65. Sub-section (3) of S.10-B again provides that if the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made "under this section" has remarried or has been living a life of immorality it shall rescind the order. This clearly shows that an extended jurisdiction is given to the court to cancel an order passed hot only under sub-S. (1) of S.10-B but also under Sub-S. (2) of S.10-B, to cancel the order when matters mentioned in sub-S. (3) of S.10-B are brought to the notice of the court. Here again, the expression used is "if the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has been leading a life of immorality." 66. Here again, the expression used is "if the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under this section has been leading a life of immorality." 66. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. V.K.K. Menon that the expression "any court exercising jurisdiction under this chapter" occurring in S.10-B(1) of the Act really relates to the court which may be exercising jurisdiction under this chapter at the material time when an application for alimony or maintenance comes to be filed under S.10-B, that is, putting in my view a very unreasonable interpretation on the expression occurring in S.10-B. S.10-B cannot be isolated and it has to be read in the scheme and context in which the particular section appears. 67. It is not really necessary for me to consider the decisions that have been brought before me both by Mr. V.K.K. Menon, learned counsel for the respondent, to the effect that in certain circumstances the expression "wife or husband" may also be a quondam wife or quondam husband, nor is it necessary for me to refer to the decision relied upon by Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer in L. v. L. (1961) 3 W.L.R. 544, where the particular English statute came up for consideration. In the latter case, no doubt, the enactment was certainly amended by giving jurisdiction to the court to consider a claim for maintenance even after a decree for dissolution has been passed. I also make it clear that I am not resting my decision on S.10-B merely on the expressions used, namely "husband" and "wife" in the said section. 68. Before I wind up the discussion on this aspect it is necessary to refer to one decision of this Court, namely, of my learned brother Mr. Justice P.T. Raman Nayar, reported in Kunhikannan Nair v. Madhu 1961 KLJ. 812. Mr. V.K.K. Menon, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the views expressed by the learned judge in this decision clearly support his contention that an application is maintainable by either a husband or wife under S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act even after a decree for dissolution of marriage has been passed by a court. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel. I am not inclined to accept this contention of the learned counsel. If I may say so with great respect, the facts out of which the second appeal came before the learned judge are not contained in the judgment reported in the decision referred to above. I had to send for the original records available in this Court and I find that the application for maintenance in that case was admittedly filed by the wife during the pendency of the application for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent therein. Pending her application for dissolution of marriage the wife filed another application for award of permanent alimony and maintenance under S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act. 69. So far as I could see the only contention that was taken by the husband in that proceeding appears to be that the wife does not require any maintenance because she has got independent means of livelihood and that his means are too meagre to allow maintenance. No doubt, both the subordinate courts had negatived his plea and awarded maintenance at a particular rate. 70. In the second appeal which came before the learned Judge, S.A. No. 571 of 1961, I find that a point was raised in the grounds of appeal that the courts below went wrong in awarding maintenance to the respondent therein after she ceased to be the wife of the appellant from 20th June 1960, namely, the date of the dissolution of the marriage. That is, probably the contention must have been urged before the learned judge that when once a decree for dissolution of marriage was passed by the court on 20th June 1960 there was absolutely no jurisdiction under S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, in the court to fix permanent alimony or maintenance after that period. Such a contention if I may say so with respect, was quite rightly rejected by my learned brother Mr. Justice P.T. Raman Nayar. 71. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. V.K.K. Menon, that the learned judge had really an occasion to consider the point that now arises before me and had given the judgment holding that an application for maintenance is maintainable even after the order for dissolution has been made by the court. The particular part of the judgment which has been relied upon by Mr. V.K.K. Menon, that the learned judge had really an occasion to consider the point that now arises before me and had given the judgment holding that an application for maintenance is maintainable even after the order for dissolution has been made by the court. The particular part of the judgment which has been relied upon by Mr. V.K.K. Menon is to the effect " while the applicant remains unmarried" in S.10 "make it quite clear that the section applies to a wife or a husband who has obtained a divorce." 72. The only limited point that the learned judge had to consider in that case was whether the courts were justified in granting maintenance under S.10 - B of the Act for a period subsequent to the date of the decree for dissolution of marriage. In my view, the conclusions of the learned judge are amply supported by the clear provisions enacted in S.10-B because S.10-A, as I have already pointed out, deals with interim payment of maintenance or expenses of the proceedings during the stage when the proceedings are actually before the court and it stands to reason that when that provision has been made, S.10-B really relates to the fixation or award of maintenance for a period subsequent to the date of dissolution of the marriage. I have already indicated that the scheme of the enactment is also to deal with maintenance, one at an interim stage and then for a period subsequent to the date of the court passing a decree for dissolution of marriage. The learned judge had absolutely no occasion to consider the question that pointedly arises before me as to whether the application filed by the respondent, admittedly after the decree for dissolution has been made, is maintainable under S.10-B of the Act. 73. Therefore, disagreeing with the conclusions arrived at by the lower appellate court, I have to hold that the application filed by the respondent on 15th September 1958, namely, O.P. No. 70 of 1958, is not maintainable and it has to be dismissed. 74. The second contention that has been raised by Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer is regarding the manner in which the fixation of maintenance has been done by both the subordinate courts. In fact, as I am now holding that O.P. No. 70 of 1958 is riot maintainable, a decision on this question may probably become unnecessary. 74. The second contention that has been raised by Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer is regarding the manner in which the fixation of maintenance has been done by both the subordinate courts. In fact, as I am now holding that O.P. No. 70 of 1958 is riot maintainable, a decision on this question may probably become unnecessary. But I am also indicating my views because I am granting leave to appeal against this judgment as the decision may involve the rights of parties governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act. 75. As I mentioned earlier, the learned District Munsiff came to the conclusion that the rate claimed by the respondent, namely, Rs. 75 per month, is perfectly reasonable and that if he had come to the conclusion that the respondent is entitled to maintenance he would have awarded the same. On the other hand, the appellate judge has differed from the conclusions arrived at by the trial court even on this point and has fixed the maintenance payable at Rs. 35 per month. 76. The main attack on this part of the case by Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, is that in an application under S.10-B of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, the court has to fix maintenance only after having due regard to the income and the property of the applicant and also the income and the property of the respondent as also the conduct of the parties. The grievance of the petitioner is that in this case neither the trial court nor the appellate court has considered the means of the respondent before me, who was the applicant in O.P. No. 70 of 1958. Without having any regard to her means, it is pointed out that the fixation made by both the subordinate courts, having due regard only to the means of the appellant, is absolutely illegal and erroneous. 77. No doubt, this contention is sought to be met by Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon by saying that it is, a finding on a pure question of fact, after an appreciation of the materials on record and it does not require interference at the hands of this Court in second appeal. 78. If it is a finding arrived at on a consideration Of the matters which are obligatory under the statute, I would have been very reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact. 78. If it is a finding arrived at on a consideration Of the matters which are obligatory under the statute, I would have been very reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact. But I am not inclined to accept M. V.K.K. Menon's contention that in this case the finding, though one of fact, has been really arrived at either by the trial court or the appellate court after having due regard to the various matters referred to in S.10-B of the Act. Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer has taken me through the evidence of the appellant as well as of the respondent and the plea raised in the counter-affidavit filed in O.P. No. 70 of 1958 that the respondent is getting maintenance from her tavazhi and she is certainly not in need of maintenance to be provided by the appellant. It is not necessary for me to go into this aspect, because if I had not agreed with the legal contention of Mr. V.R. Krishna Iyer, I would have no hesitation to send back the case to the lower court for investigation of the question of the quantum of maintenance having due regard to the various matters mentioned in the statute or at any rate I would have called for a fresh finding from the lower appellate court. But that becomes unnecessary, because I am agreeing with the learned counsel for the appellant that O.P. No. 70 of 1958 is not maintainable and has to be dismissed. 79. In the result, the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court are set aside and the second appeal allowed and O.P. No. 70 of 1958 is dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs throughout. 80. In view of the importance of the question, a decision on which may govern the rights of parties governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, I grant leave to appeal against this judgment. Allowed.