Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is by the 1st defendant in a suit for damages for breach of covenant of title in the sale deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff. He was the owner of suit A and B schedule properties. He obtained the same by virtue of the decree in the partition suit, O.S. No. 500 of 1931, subject to a charge for Rs. 2000/- in favour of Mahomedunni. On October 31,1945, he sold A schedule property to the plaintiff as per Ext. A-2, and the B schedule to the 2nd defendant by another document. The sale deed Ext. A-2, made mention of a hypothecation for Rs. 1,500/- executed by the 1st defendant in favour of one Ayidruman but not of the charge declared by the decree in favour of Mahomedunni, and made an express covenant "assuring you hereby that there is no debt, other than the one for Rs. 1,500/- mentioned above, charged on the property scheduled hereunder and also that there are no other persons interested in this property." According to the plaintiff the charge in favour of Mahomedunni was suppressed by the vendor, the 1st defendant. Mahomedunni's rights devolved on Kunhali by successive assignments and the latter instituted a suit to enforce the charge, in O.S. No. 752 of 1945, and secured decree, Ext. A-4, against the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant for Rs. 2,970/-. Plaintiff had to pay Rs. 2,170/- and the 2nd defendant Rs. 800/- in discharge of the above-said liability in proportion to the values of their respective holdings. The present suit is for recovery of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 2,170, together with interest and costs, as damages for breach of the covenant of title in Ext. A-2. 2. The contention was that the plaintiff was well aware of the charge when he took Ext. A-2, and therefore the covenant in the deed was of no consequence, that the omission to mention the prior encumbrance in favour of Kunhali was at the request of the plaintiff who wanted to avoid payment to him, and that the plaintiff has not been defrauded by any suppression of defect in the title of the vendor and had therefore no cause of action for damages against the 1st defendant. (It is seen that in O.S. No. 752 of 1945 the present plaintiff had filed a written statement evidenced by Ext. (It is seen that in O.S. No. 752 of 1945 the present plaintiff had filed a written statement evidenced by Ext. B-3 raising several contentions like a bonafide purchase for value without notice of the charge, bar of limitation and bar of S.47, CPC. All these contentions were over-ruled and the decree was made as said above). 3. The Munsiff dismissed the suit, but the Subordinate Judge decreed the same. Hence this Second Appeal by the 1st defendant. 4. Counsel for the 1st defendant contends that the cause of action for the plaintiff being fraud in concealing information as to the existence of a charge in favour of Kunhali and it having been found concurrently by the courts below that the plaintiff was well aware of that charge when he took the conveyance, there could not be any fraud and therefore the suit has to fail. 5. Under Clause.2 of S.55 of the Transfer of Property Act the seller is deemed to contract with the buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsisted at the time of the sale; and clause (1) (g) provides that, except where the property is sold subject to encumbrances, the seller is bound to discharge all encumbrances on the property existing at the time of the sale. In the light of these provisions every sale executed in the jurisdiction where this Act is in force contains an implied covenant on freedom from encumbrances on the property sold. In the present case, a covenant for title free of encumbrances is expressly incorporated in the deed of sale, Ext. A-2, executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff was aware of a charge on the property, it was open to him to accept the assurance made to him by the vendor by a solemn covenant in document executed and registered by him. The assurance of freedom from encumbrances then amounts to an assurance that the encumbrance has been discharged. If the vendor has made the assurance at the time of the sale, as he has in the present case, it is not for him later on to resile from it & say that the encumbrance was really subsisting & the vendee who had blindly accepted his representation should bear the consequences of his mis-statement. 6. If the vendor has made the assurance at the time of the sale, as he has in the present case, it is not for him later on to resile from it & say that the encumbrance was really subsisting & the vendee who had blindly accepted his representation should bear the consequences of his mis-statement. 6. S.92 of the Evidence Act provides: "When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives-in-interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms." When there is an express covenant in the conveyance that the property that is conveyed is free of encumbrances, evidence that the parties contemplated and orally provided for a subsisting encumbrance can only be to contradict the express terms of the document. Even if the deed be silent on this aspect, it should be taken so in the light of the statutory provisions implying a covenant for title and imposing the obligation to discharge encumbrances on the vendor. Here, a covenant for freedom from encumbrances is express on the face of the deed. I would, therefore, hold that evidence of an agreement between the parties to Ext. A-2 that the vendee undertook to discharge the encumbrance in favour of Kunhali is inadmissible in this case in view of the express recital of freedom from encumbrances in the deed. 7. Reliance was placed by counsel on the ruling reported in Gondu Ramasubba Iyer v. Muthiah Kone (1925 Madras 968) where Devadoss, J. observed: "A declaration as to title or the absence of an encumbrance is not one of the terms of the contract of sale." With all respect, I am unable to follow the reason behind this observation. A recital as to the quantity and quality of the subject-matter of a conveyance is, in my view, an essential term of the conveyance. If a conveyance relates to a property, the right that is being conveyed must necessarily find express mention in the deed. A recital as to the quantity and quality of the subject-matter of a conveyance is, in my view, an essential term of the conveyance. If a conveyance relates to a property, the right that is being conveyed must necessarily find express mention in the deed. The provision in S.55 of the Transfer of Property Act to imply such a covenant in every sale of immovable property clearly indicates that, even in the absence of express mention such a covenant shall be assumed to be an essential term of the sale. The essential parts of a modern conveyance are parties, recitals, testatum, operative words, parcels, habendum and testimonium. The illustration of a recital given by Cheshire in his "Modern Real Property,' is thus: "Whereas the vendor is seized of the hereditaments intended to be hereby conveyed for an estate in fee simple absolute in possession free from encumbrances and has agreed to sell the same to the purchaser for the sum of I would therefore hold that a declaration as to title or freedom from encumbrances is one of the essential terms of a sale. I am happy to find support for the above view in the judgment of Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., in Thammineni Paparao v. Dhavala Polinaidu (AIR. 1945 Madras 205): "An express covenant for title or for freedom from encumbrances such as we find in this case cannot be regarded as a mere recital which can be contradicted by oral evidence. Such covenants are terms of the contract itself, and any oral evidence to contradict them falls within the mischief of S.92, Evidence Act. Even the statutory covenant for title which is implied in every contract of sale of immovable property must according to 52 All. 604 be deemed to be embodied in the deed of sale." 8. It then follows that the liability to discharge the encumbrance was on the vendor and he having not carried out his obligation under law and under covenant, has caused damages to the plaintiff and it was his duty to reimburse the plaintiff of the actual loss suffered on account of his own omission. The claim of the plaintiff is therefore right. The decree of the court below is affirmed and the Second Appeal dismissed with costs. No leave. Dismissed.