Judgment :- 1. The Civil Revision Petition, arising out of a small cause suit, raises a short question of law, whether the transaction covered by the suit comes within the mischief of S.6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. On the merits no serious objection to the decree of the lower court has been raised by the learned Advocate of the defendant-petitioner. 2. The 1st plaintiff sold some copper, bronze and brass vessels to the defendant for Rs. 738-6-0 in April, 1957. Subsequently, the defendant paid Rs. 367-9-6 in several instalments to the 1st plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant demanding payment of the balance and since the amount was not paid the 1st plaintiff instituted the suit, which has given rise to the Civil Revision Petition. Pending suit the 1st plaintiff died and a few days prior to his death he executed a deed of assignment, Ext. A 28, in favour of the 2nd plaintiff. By that document the amount inclusive of principal, interest and costs covered by the suit, was assigned to the 2nd plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff was also authorised to get himself impleaded in the suit and prosecute the same. The 2nd plaintiff consequently came on record as a supplemental plaintiff and continued the suit and obtained a decree. The contention now raised is that what was transferred under Ext. A 28 was only a mere right to sue which could not have been transferred, because S.6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act prohibited such transfer. 3. Mr. C. Unnikanda Menon, the petitioner's learned advocate, has contended that in every case, where there is a suit, otherwise than on a charge or in any way based on immovable property, pending and if a transfer of the rights in the suit takes place pending suit, such transfer comes within the mischief of S.6(e), Transfer of Property Act. Putting, the contention differently, it means that only in cases where there are no suits pending at the time of the transfer, the question can arise whether the transfer is a mere right to sue or not: in eases where suits are pending, suits not based on any charge or any debt or liability attached to immovable property, that is, suits for personal reliefs, transfers of the rights involved in the suits are always transfers of mere rights to sue. I am afraid that the proposition so formulated is too wide for acceptance. In my opinion it is not the pendency of the suit that decides whether the subject-matter of the transfer is a mere right to sue or not. It is really the nature or character of the subject-matter that decides the question. If the subject-matter is a debt or property or at least a chose in action, then the transfer of such debt, property or chose in action is not a mere right to sue. Nothing turns on the presence or absence of a pending suit. If, on the other hand, what is transferred is only a mere right to sue, the absence of a pending suit thereon does not make the transfer any the less a mere right to sue. Two or three authorities may be referred to in order to make this position clear. In Manmath Nath Mullick v. Sheikh Hedait Ali (A.I.R.1932 P.C. 32) the Privy Council held that S.6(e) applied only to a mere right to sue, but not to a claim for a definite sum of money, which the defendant was bound by his contract to pay. Such a claim, the Privy Council made clear, would be an actionable claim to which S.130 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply. In that case a mortgagor leased the mortgaged property to a lessee who agreed to pay the Government revenue and also contracted to be responsible to the lessor in damages if he failed to pay such dues. The lessee defaulted and the mortgagee who purchased the property in court auction under a previous mortgagee's decree paid the Government dues,, The mortgagor had also assigned his right against the lessee to the mortgagee-purchaser. The mortgagee subsequently filed a suit for the amount of Government dues paid by him, when the objection was taken that S.6 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act was fatal to the suit. The objection was overruled by the Privy Council and their Lordships held that what was transferred by the mortgagor to the mortgagee-purchaser was an actionable claim and not a mere right to sue. 4. Another case which indicates the; principle underlying this provision is the English case in Glegg v. Bromley (1912 (3) K.B. 474). The objection was overruled by the Privy Council and their Lordships held that what was transferred by the mortgagor to the mortgagee-purchaser was an actionable claim and not a mere right to sue. 4. Another case which indicates the; principle underlying this provision is the English case in Glegg v. Bromley (1912 (3) K.B. 474). At page 490 Parker, J. observed: "It is to be observed that an equitable assignee of a chose in action, whether it is legal or equitable, could institute proceedings and maintain proceedings for its recovery. The question was whether the subject-matter of the assignment was, in the view of the court, property with an incidental remedy for its recovery, or was a bare right to bring an action either at law or in equity." That appears to be the real test. The test is whether the subject-matter of the assignment is property and the suit only the incidental remedy for its recovery or whether the subject-matter is only a mere right to bring an action. In New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Rivers Steam Navigation Ltd. (A.I.R.1959 Cal. 352) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that it was necessary to remember and stress the word "mere"; that the transfer of a bare right to sue alone and nothing else was prohibited; that property with an incidental right to sue for damages might also be transferred; and that in the last category of cases a right to sue for damages for breach of contract appertaining to such property was intimately connected with the enjoyment of the same and therefore, the right to sue for damages in such cases was not a transfer of a mere right to sue, which would fall under S.6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the assignment before me is an assignment of a debt which is property and therefore, S.6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act is not a bar to the assignment or the maintainability of the suit. This contention therefore has necessarily to fail. No other contention has been pressed before me and therefore, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.