JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. A. S. No. 482 of 1957 is by the plaintiffs 3 and 4, and A. S. No. 30 of 1958 by the 2nd defendant in O. S. No. 31 of 1956 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Mavelikara. The suit was to set aside a gift executed by the trustee, 1st defendant, in favour of the 2nd in respect of certain trust properties, for removal of the 1st defendant from trusteeship and for framing a scheme for the future management of the religious trust. 2. The plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 73 were members of a Nayar tarwad. There was a partition in the tarwad, evidenced by Ext. A dated Mithunam 21, 1076 M. E. The three branches in the tarwad divided most of their tarwad properties among them, leaving some properties in common for certain religious and charitable purposes to be managed by the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant mismanaged the trust, and appropriated all profits for his selfish ends. On January 30, 1950, the 1st defendant executed a gift of some of the suit properties by Ext. C in favour of the 2nd defendant, his nephew and son-in-law, as if they belonged to himself absolutely. He had no authority to make the gift; the same has therefore to be set aside, the 1st defendant removed from trusteeship and a proper scheme for the future management of the trust framed by the court. The contesting defendants claimed several of the suit items as their own, not subject to the trust. The 2nd defendant questioned further the competency of the plaintiffs to institute the present suit and contended that no trust was created by Ext. A. The Subordinate Judge found that a valid trust for religious and charitable purposes has been created by Ext. A, that the plaintiffs being members of the beneficiary tarwad were competent to institute the suit, that the suit properties have been dedicated to the trust, except items 46, 48 to 52, and 54 to 56 which belonged to defendants 2, 85, 95 and the tavazhi of defendant 24 and that the 1st defendant having died during the pendency of the suit no question of his removal from trusteeship arose but there being no provision for the continued management of the trust in Ext. A a scheme for its management was called for in this suit. A a scheme for its management was called for in this suit. A preliminary decree was therefore passed in respect of the suit properties (except the aforesaid items) declaring them to be trust properties and adjourned the case for passing a final decree incorporating a scheme for its management, It is from this judgment that the present appeals have been preferred by plaintiffs 3 and 4 and the 2nd defendant. 3. Plaintiffs 3 and 4 challenge the suit items 46, 48 to 52, 54 to 56 being excluded from the trust. The court below has found the 85th defendant to be the absolute owner of suit items 49 to 51. He was made the 72nd respondent in A. S. No. 482 of 1957 and the 5th respondent in A. S. No. 30 of 1958. He died in July 1960 and none has been so far impleaded as his legal representative in these appeals which have therefore abated in regard to him. The finding of the court below with regard to suit items 49 to 51 has therefore become final. 4. The suit trust is created by the provisions of Ext. A. It is admitted that items 46, 48, 52, 54, 55 and 56 do not find express mention among the properties set apart for the trust in Ext. A. The contention is that the aforesaid items belong to the tarwad and not having been allotted to any of its branches in the partition under Ext. A came within the purview of the residuary clause in that deed which provided that any properties discovered subsequently as belonging to the tarwad and not divided under it should go along with the properties set apart for the trust. The contention that the aforesaid items belonged to the tarwad is challenged by counsel for the contesting defendants. It is averred in the plaint that the suit properties were made the subject of a claim for partition by the present 73rd defendant in O. S. No. 55 of 1107 on the file of the District Court, Quilon, which claim, though allowed by the Trial Court, was dismissed by the High Court on appeal finding that they belonged to an impartible trust. The judgment of the Trial Court in that case is Ext. E, and of the High Court Ext. B in this case. Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on Ext. The judgment of the Trial Court in that case is Ext. E, and of the High Court Ext. B in this case. Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on Ext. B where it has been observed referring to Ext. A: "some properties were given for charity and a separate scheme was agreed on for the management of this charity". This is too vague an observation to found a decision on. What the properties set apart for the charity or the trust are not indicated in Ext. B or E. Those observations cannot therefore be of any assistance in deciding whether the disputed items were among the properties found to have ben set apart for the religious and charitable purposes in Ext. A. Reliance was placed by counsel for the plaintiffs in the pleadings in the aforesaid suit, O. S. No. 55 of 1107, to show that the present contesting defendants have admitted there that the suit properties belonged to the tarwad. Ext. E, the judgment of the Trial Court, shows that these properties were claimed by the plaintiff in that suit as properties of the tarwad liable to be partitioned among the members of its three branches. The present 2nd defendant, as the 23rd defendant therein, supported that claim in full and therefore it is contended that he has admitted the suit items to belong to the tarwad. It is further contended that the 24th defendant, who was the 19th defendant in the prior suit, was a minor and her guardian ad litem had not entered contest in the suit nor filed a written statement therein ; and that conduct of the guardian amounted to an admission binding on the minor that the suit properties belonged to the tarward. Apart from the above, no other evidence has been adduced in this case to show that these disputed items belong to the tarwad. The judgments Exts. E and B, found the properties not to belong to the tarwad and therefore dismissed that suit. The admissions if any made by the defendants 2 and 24 in that suit were therefore held not correct by the court. It is clear law that a party can show that an admission made by him on a former occasion was not, in fact, correct. An admission by a party in his pleading in one suit is seldom taken as binding on him in other suits. It is clear law that a party can show that an admission made by him on a former occasion was not, in fact, correct. An admission by a party in his pleading in one suit is seldom taken as binding on him in other suits. (See Ramabai Shrinivas v. Government of Bombay -- AIR 1941 Bombay 144). In the case of the 24th defendant who claims suit items Nos. 46 and 48 as the separate properties of her tavazhi, the basis of the contention is a conduct imputed on her through the inaction of her guardian ad litem. Failure to deny the allegations in a plaint may be taken as an admission of the claim therein for the purposes of that suit, but not for purposes of subsequent litigations. See Mt. Diali v. Lachhman Singh (AIR 1946 Lahore 256). It is too much to say that, even after a claim advanced in a plaint has been repelled by the judgment in the case, the support a defendant had offered to that claim would still bind him and disallow him from relying on the findings in that case. I hold that the plaintiffs have not made out that the aforesaid suit items belonged to the tarwad. If only the properties are shown to have belonged to the tarwad, there is any scope for the application of the residuary clause in Ext. A. It then follows that the finding entered by the Subordinate Judge that the aforesaid items do not belong to the suit trust is correct and has to be affirmed. 5. Counsel for the 2nd defendant contends that no trust has been created by the provisions of Ext. A. The argument is that "no dedication" of the properties has been made for the suit trust and therefore there was no valid creation of a trust. Reliance was placed on Kunjunni Panicker v. Rama Panicker (ILR 1954 T-C. 1138). Certain properties were set apart for specific religious services and entrusted to two branches for management and utilisation of the income therefor. It was held that the mention in the document of the properties being left as common properties of the tarwad for religious purposes indicated that the ownership of the properties continued to vest in the tarwad and that therefore there was no dedication of properties for religious purposes and did not therefore constitute them properties of the trust. It was held that the mention in the document of the properties being left as common properties of the tarwad for religious purposes indicated that the ownership of the properties continued to vest in the tarwad and that therefore there was no dedication of properties for religious purposes and did not therefore constitute them properties of the trust. "There is nothing in document to show that there has been a dedication of the properties in favour of any particular idol or temple. In the absence of a dedication it cannot be said that original owners have divested themselves of their ownership of the properties ............. We are clearly of opinion that under the partition deed, Ext. A, the ownership of the plaint schedule properties continues to vest in the tarwad of the plaintiff and the defendants. It follows from this that the properties are partible and that the suit for partition is maintainable," Obviously this ruling assumes that a trust cannot be created by an owner while the ownership of the property rests with him. Even for the creation of a private trust no transfer of ownership is required if the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee. See Bai Mahakore v. Bai Mangla (35 Bombay 403). It is not necessary for the creation of a trust that there should be a transfer of ownership to a different person by the founder of the trust, its former owner. It is open to the proprietor of the property which is being dedicated to a religious or charitable purpose to constitute himself the trustee thereof. The learned author B. K. Mukherjea, in his treatise "The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust" (1952 Edn.) at pages 102, 103, observes: "........... it is quite open to him to create an endowment merely by renouncing his rights in specific property and indicating the particular religious or charitable purpose for which the property is to be used. No deed is necessary, and no trustee need be appointed, and the law will impose the duties of trustee upon the founder or his heir, or such other persons, as might have control over or possession of the endowed property. No deed is necessary, and no trustee need be appointed, and the law will impose the duties of trustee upon the founder or his heir, or such other persons, as might have control over or possession of the endowed property. Thus essential formalities for the creation of a religious or a charitable endowment according to Hindu Law are: firstly the property in respect of which the endowment is made must be designated with precision; secondly the object or purpose of dedication should be clearly indicated, and thirdly the founder must effectively divest himself of all beneficial interests in the endowed property." As observed by Sale J. in Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonna Sen (ILR 25 Calcutta 112), no express words of gift, either directly or indirectly in the shape of a trust, are required to create a valid dedication for a religious or charitable purpose. All that is necessary is that the purpose or object of the endowment should be clearly specified and that the property intended for the endowment should be set apart and dedicated to those purposes. It is not therefore necessary that the founder of a religious trust should transfer a property to someone else in trust. It is enough if he divests himself of the beneficial interest in the property and assign the same for purposes of the trust. The legal ownership may continue with the founder or the author of the trust even after the creation of the trust. Thus if a tarwad sets apart certain properties for the performance of certain religious services, and dedicates all the future income thereof for such religious purposes, a valid trust is created thereby, even though the right of management of the property be retained with the tarwad itself. And that is exactly what we find in Ext. A in this case. The objects of the trust are enumerated in Ext. A as the worship of the family deity on the Uthradom day in the month of Chingam, feeding pilgrims to Sabarimala, the conduct of five monthly ceremonies in the family chapel, Shanthi, Bhagavathi Seva, Easwara Seva, Ganapathi Homam etc., etc. Properties set apart for purposes of the aforesaid objects are also specified; and the entire income thereof is directed to be utilised for those purposes without reservation of any beneficial interest in any member of the tarwad. Properties set apart for purposes of the aforesaid objects are also specified; and the entire income thereof is directed to be utilised for those purposes without reservation of any beneficial interest in any member of the tarwad. It then follows that the essential requirements of the creation of a religious and charitable trust are complied with in the provisions in Ext. A. Ext. A has therefore created a trust for the religious and charitable objects enumerated therein in regard to the properties specified as item 1 in the schedule appended to the document. 6. Contention was also urged on behalf of the 2nd defendant that by non observance of the service, the trust has failed and therefore the suit properties have now become the properties of the tarwad. The 2nd defendant, as D. W. 5 in this case, has sworn that the services mentioned in Ext. A are still continued by him, even after the gift in his favour. The contention that after the institution of the suit the services have ceased to be performed cannot be of any relevance for the adjudication in this suit. Mere non performance of the services will not terminate the trust. It is for the perpetuation of the services for which the trust has been constituted that the plaintiff has instituted this suit and prayed for a scheme to be framed by the court. Even if the 2nd defendant has stopped performance of the services, he cannot be allowed by his own wrong to create a right in his favour to defeat a valid object of law. 7. Counsel for the 2nd defendant contended that as per the provisions of Ext. A, the power to question mismanagement of the trust by the 1st defendant was conferred on members of the other two branches of the tarwad than that of the 1st defendant. The present plaintiffs 1 and 2 are members of the 1st defendant's branch and plaintiffs 3 and 4 are members of another branch but there is no member of the third branch among plaintiffs in the suit, and therefore the suit is incompetent. I do not find any force in this contention. The trust created by the tarwad is for the performance of certain religious and charitable services, obviously for the common benefit of the entire tarwad. I do not find any force in this contention. The trust created by the tarwad is for the performance of certain religious and charitable services, obviously for the common benefit of the entire tarwad. Under the general law it is open to any beneficiary to question mismanagement of the trust by a trustee. Nothing in Ext. A takes away, restricts or limits that right of a member of the tarwad as a beneficiary of the trust. Since the properties set apart for the trust is put in the possession of the 1st defendant belonging to one branch, it should not be assumed that the other two branches have no voice in the management of the trust. The members of the tarwad wanted to make this express in the deed of partition by which they created the trust. It cannot be interpreted as the conferment of a power which they did not otherwise have or the negation of the power of the members of the 1st defendant's branch to question mismanagement of the trust. Nor does it indicate that in every action concerning the suit trust the members of the two branches should act in conjunction. I would therefore hold that the plaintiffs are competent to institute the present suit if otherwise a cause of action is made out therein. 8. In the result, the finding of the court below that a valid trust has been created in regard to the properties found dedicated for the religious and charitable purposes mentioned in Ext. A is held correct. The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs.