JUDGMENT S.D. Singh, J. - This appeal has been filed against the judgment of Nigam, J. dismissing the writ Petition No. 154, of 1958, of the petitioner for a writ of mandamus for quashing an order of the District Supply Officer dated 10th April, 1958, and directing him not to modify or cancel the previous allotment order dated 24th January, 1956. A prayer was also made for an interim order directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2, namely, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, not to dispossess the applicant from the accommodation in dispute till the decision of this petition. 2. The dispute in this appeal relates to an accommodation owned by Nawab Wazir Begam in mohalla Goldarwaza at Lucknow, which accommodation along with other properties of Nawab Wazir Begam are being managed by what is known as Husainabad Trust. The District Magistrate, Lucknow, is it may be mentioned at this very place, acting as an Advisor to this Trust. One Sarjoo Prasad was a tenant in the accommodation in question and a part of this accommodation was sublet by him during the period of his tenancy to one Sri Satish Chandra, son of Sri Chhail Behari, who is respondent No. 3 in this appeal. 3. On 21st February, 1957, the landlord obtained a decree for arrears of rent and ejectment against Sarjoo Prasad. Sri Satish Chandra vacated the premises before the decree could be executed and even Sarjoo Prasad was ejected on 22nd November, 1957. 4. Chhail Behari respondent No. 3, who was father of Satish Chandra, then applied on 2nd December, 1957, for allotment of this accommodation to him and the order directing the landlord to let out the house to him was passed on 9th December, 1957. Krishna Chandra Sharma the present appellant, either with or without the knowledge of this order, applied that very day for this accommodation being allotted to him. It may be mentioned that the arrears of rent due against Sarjoo Prasad were to the extent of a little over Rs. Krishna Chandra Sharma the present appellant, either with or without the knowledge of this order, applied that very day for this accommodation being allotted to him. It may be mentioned that the arrears of rent due against Sarjoo Prasad were to the extent of a little over Rs. 4000/- and the Husainabad Trust appears to have been anxious to realise this amount from the new tenant as a condition precedent to his securing possession over this accommodation, and there is material to indicate that even the District Magistrate was supporting this attempt on the part of Husainabad Trust, even though Section 4 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act prohibits a landlord from charging any premium or any additional payment of any sort from a tenant; Krishna Chandra Sharma, when he applied for this accommodation being allotted to him, agreed (Sic) to pay arrears of rent due against Sarjoo Prasad, and the allegation is that the District Magistrate even obtained the consent of Husainabad Trust for an allotment being made in favour of Krishna Chandra Sharma. Chhail Behari made an attempt in the course of the day to obtain possession over the accommodation, but could not succeed and the next day, i.e., on 10th December, 1957, he applied for proceedings under Sec. 7-A (1) being taken against it, and the Rent Control and .Eviction Officer even directed issue of notice against the landlord. On 13th December, 1957 however, the District Magistrate ordered stay of these proceedings. Realising that an attempt was being made to cancel the order which had been issued in his favour on 9th December, and that probably the accommodation was being allowed to be let out to Krishna Chandra Sharma, Chhail Behari submitted a representation to the Hon'ble Minister for Housing and Civil Supplies on 1st January, 1958, with the following prayer: "Wherefore it is most respectfully prayed that the record of the case may please be called for and after perusal of the same, the order of the District Magistrate Lucknow, staying the issue of notice under Sec. 7-A (1) and further proceedings in this case, be set aside and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, be kindly. directed to proceed under Sec. 7-A (1) and 7-A (2) as and if necessary to put the petitioner allottee in possession of allotted premises." The same day another application, copy of which is annexure "C" to the counter affidavit of Chhail Behari, was moved for stay of proceedings before the District Magistrate. The application contains the following prayer: Wherefore, it is most respectfully prayed that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Lucknow, be restrained from cancelling or superseding the above petition; and also directed to see that the possession of the premises is not passed on by the landlord to any one other than the allottee till the disposal of this petition." 5. On 4th January, 1958, the Government directed that no fresh allotment order be made, and the contention on behalf of respondent No. 2 is that without this stay order being brought to the notice of the District Magistrate, he, on 6th January, 1958, directed the cancellation of the order in favour of Chhail Behari passed on 9th December, and also that the premises be allotted jointly to Krishna Chandra Sharma appellant and Chhail Behari respondent No. 3. This order was actually issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 11th January 1958, and is annexure I to the affidavit filed by the appellant. The same day on 6th January, 1958, Krishna Chandra Sharma is said to have obtained possession over the premises, as has been stated on oath by Sri T. V. David, Senior Inspector of Rent Control and Eviction Office in his affidavit dated 29th October, 1959. 6. On 14th January, 1958, Chhail Behari protested against this so called joint allotment order, and requested that the portions to be allotted to the two allottees, Krishna Chandra Sharma and Chhail Behari, be specified. The order dated 11th January, 1958 (which is alleged to have been actually passed on 6th January) was modified on 24th January, and while on one room towards north facing the road was allotted to Sri Chhail Behari, the rest of the house was allowed to be occupied by Sri Krishna Chandra Sharma. The order says that the allotment order dated 11th January, 1958, was modified to that extent. 7. The appellant Sri Krishna Chandra Sharma contends that he entered into a contract of tenancy with Husainabad Trust in the 1st week of January, 1958, agreeing to pay Rs. The order says that the allotment order dated 11th January, 1958, was modified to that extent. 7. The appellant Sri Krishna Chandra Sharma contends that he entered into a contract of tenancy with Husainabad Trust in the 1st week of January, 1958, agreeing to pay Rs. 85 as rent per month. 8. Almost 21 month's later, the Government, purporting to exercise jurisdiction under Sec. 7-F of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereafter to be referred as the Act), cancelled the allotment order passed by the District Magistrate on 11th January, 1958 and directed that "the above house is hereby allotted to the applicant." When this order of the Government was received by the District Magistrate (or the District Supply Officer exercising the jurisdiction on his behalf) the order dated 11th January, 1958 and subsequent order dated 24th January, 1958 were cancelled by him. It is this later order dated 17th June, 1958 against which the petitioner wants a mandamus, quashing the said order and directing that the allotment order already made in favour of the petitioner be not cancelled. 9. This petition came up for hearing before our brother Nigam, J. who was of opinion that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. He held that the order of the State Government dated 10th April, 1958, was within the scope of the authority conferred on the State Government and that this order could be passed even after the petitioner had taken possession over the accommodation on 6th January, 1958. It is against this order of the learned single Judge that the petitioner has filed this special appeal, which was argued before us at considerable length. 10. Having heard the arguments on behalf of the appellant and the different sets of the respondents we are of opinion that the order of our brother Nigam, J. cannot be sustained and that this appeal will have to be allowed and the relief granted to the petitioner in the form prayed for by him. 11. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 to the counter-affidavit dated 30th August, 1958, filed by the petitioner in which the following allegation has been made by him. "It is wrong that the deponent was encouraged by the District Magistrate, Lucknow, to unlawfully occupy the premises known as Kanya Kubj Hotel on 6-1-1958. 11. Our attention was invited by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 to the counter-affidavit dated 30th August, 1958, filed by the petitioner in which the following allegation has been made by him. "It is wrong that the deponent was encouraged by the District Magistrate, Lucknow, to unlawfully occupy the premises known as Kanya Kubj Hotel on 6-1-1958. The deponent got possession of the house lawfully on 28-1-1958 as a consequence of the allotment order dated 24-1-1958 in his favour." 12. It was urged on the basis of this allegation made by the petitioner that he did not obtain possession over the accommodation on 6th January, 1958 but later on 28th January, 1958, that is, long after proceedings had been stayed by the State Government. It is difficult, however, to read this meaning in this allegation in the affidavit of the petitioner. The affidavit dated 29th October, 1959 sworn by Sri T.V. David, Senior Inspector of Rent Control and Eviction Office clearly stated that on 6th January, 1958, the allottee, i.e., the petitioner took possession of the allotted premises. It appears that the District Magistrate passed orders for allotment of the premises in the joint names of the petitioner and Chhail Behari in supersession of the previous order made on 9th December, 1957, in favour of Chhail Behari alone, and it was in pursuance of this order dated on 6th January, 1958, that the petitioner obtained possession the same day even though the formal order under Sec. 7(2) of the Act was issued on 11th January, 1958. When he stated in his affidavit dated 30th August, 1958, that he got possession on 28th January, 1958, what he probably meant was that he obtained exclusive possession under the revised order dated 24th January. 13. Regarding the cancellation of the previous order dated 9th December, 1957, the District Magistrate had authority to do so, as the allottee Sri Chhail Behari had not even obtained possession over the premises till then. It may be that in cancelling the previous order, the District Magistrate was acting arbitrarily or capriciously, but the fact remains that he did cancel the previous allotment order and directed on 6th January, 1958, that the premises be let out jointly to the petitioner and Chhail Behari. It may be that in cancelling the previous order, the District Magistrate was acting arbitrarily or capriciously, but the fact remains that he did cancel the previous allotment order and directed on 6th January, 1958, that the premises be let out jointly to the petitioner and Chhail Behari. While it may be a question open to some discussion as to whether an order under Sec. 7(2) of the Act may be cancelled by a District Magistrate after the tenant has already obtained possession, there is nothing in law to curtail the powers of the District Magistrate to cancel the order before the accommodation is let out to him, or before he actually occupies the same, and since it is admitted even by Chhail Behari that he had not obtained possession over the accommodation till then, the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to cancel the previous order. In doing so he was acting purely in his administrative capacity. The order passed by him was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, and the justification for the passing of that order is consequently not open to be looked into by us in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. The position, therefore, is that there was an order under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 of the Act in favour of the petitioner Sri Krishna Chandra Sharma, and it was in pursuance of this order that the landlord, that is, the Husainabad Trust let out the premises to him on 6th January, 1958. The order of allotment was undoubtedly passed by the District Magistrate in favour of two persons, Sri Krishna Chandra Sharma and Chhail Behari jointly as a result of which Sri Chhail Behari lodged a protest before the District Magistrate on 14th January. Realising that joint letting out of an accommodation to two rival claimants was almost impossible, the District Magistrate modified his order on 14th January, 1958, and while one room was allotted to Sri Chhail Behari, the rest of the accommodation was allotted to the petitioner Sri Krishna Chandra Sharma. In filing this petition the petitioner does not challenge the correctness of this modified allotment, which consequently means that he is satisfied with the order for the letting out of this part accommodation only to him. In filing this petition the petitioner does not challenge the correctness of this modified allotment, which consequently means that he is satisfied with the order for the letting out of this part accommodation only to him. It may have been open to the Husainabad Trust to question the breaking up the accommodation into two units by the District Magistrate, but there is no objection on its behalf, which consequently means that the Husainabad Trust is agreeable to the accommodation being broken up into two parts and let out separately to the two tenants. The petitioner is thus in occupation of this accommodation in compliance with the order which was actually passed on 6th January, but issued on 11th January, 1958, as modified of course on 24th January, 1958. 15. The petitioner has now been served with a notice under Sec. 7-A (1) as being a person in occupation of the accommodation in contravention of an order passed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 of the Act. The first question, therefore, for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant petitioner can be said to be a person in occupation of the accommodation in contravention of an order passed under Sec. 7(2). He is on the contrary a person in occupation of the accommodation under an order passed under Sec. 7(2). It may be that this order is said to have been subsequently set aside by the State Government under Sec. 7-F, but all the same he is not in occupation of the premises in contravention of any such order. All what can be said against the petitioner-appellant is that he is in occupation of the premises under an order passed under Sec. 7(2), which order has subsequently been set aside by the State Government under Sec. 7-F. 16. The second question which arises for consideration is whether notice under Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 7-A may be issued against a person, who is found to be in occupation of an accommodation in contravention of an order passed by the State Government under Sec. 7-F. Assuming for purpose of the present discussion, that the State Government directed under its order dated 10th April, 1958 that the accommodation be allotted to Chhail Behari, can it be said that that is an order for the contravention of which notice may be issued under sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 7-A? (I) of Sec. 7-A? In answering this question, it will be the plain language of the statute as it stands, which will have to be considered and not the language in which the statute might have been drafted. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 7-A contemplates that there an order requiring an accommodation to be let or not to be let has been duly passed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7, and the District Magistrate believes or has reason to believe that any person has in contravention of the said order, occupied the accommodation or any part thereof, he may be called upon to show cause why he may not be evicted. There must, therefore, be an order under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 requiring an accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person, and an order under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 can be passed only by a District Magistrate. It may be that the order passed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 is liable to be revised by the State Govt. under Sec. 7-F, but Sec. (1) of Sec. 7-A contemplates action being taken only in respect of the contravention of an order passed under Sec. 7(2) and not an order passed under Sec. 7-F. The language of the section is plain and can admit of no two interpretations. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu, A.I.R. 1957 SC 907 that the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used' are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any hypothetical construction on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy, or object of the Act can legitimately arise. 17. It may be that the intention was to make it possible for the District Magistrate to take action under sub-sec. 17. It may be that the intention was to make it possible for the District Magistrate to take action under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 7-A against any person who may be in occupation of an accommodation in contravention of an order passed either by the Distt. Magistrate under Section 7 (2) or the State Govt. under Sec. 7-F. But if that were so, the Legislature should have expressed its intention in so many words in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 7-A. It may also be that what the Legislature intended was that the State Govt. would not itself pass an order under Sec. 7-F directing a landlord to let or not to let an accommodation to a certain person, but would only issue necessary directions to the District Magistrate to pass his order under Section 7 (2) in such manner as may be specified by the State Govt.; and if that were so, it was for the State Govt. to couch its orders in such words as may satisfy the requirements of the law, and not word it in a manner which may make it possible for a person to escape the consequences thereof. It appears to us, therefore, that the order allotting the accommodation to Chhail Behari having been passed by the State Govt. and not the District Magistrate, and the order having been passed under Sec. 7-F and not under sub-sec. (2)- of Section 7, contravention of the same cannot be a ground for issue of notice under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 7-A and the notice that has been issued against the petitioner-appellant is, therefore, liable to be set aside even on that ground. 18. There is also an additional ground for the order passed by the State Govt. being set aside. In passing its order dated 10th April, 1958, the Government has adopted a terminology which is not borne out by the provisions of the Act. Sub-Sec. (2) of Section 7 authorises a Distt. Magistrate to pass an order requiring a landlord to let or not to let any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant, and assuming that the same order could be passed by the State Govt. under Sec. 7-F., all what the State Govt. Sub-Sec. (2) of Section 7 authorises a Distt. Magistrate to pass an order requiring a landlord to let or not to let any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant, and assuming that the same order could be passed by the State Govt. under Sec. 7-F., all what the State Govt. could do was to direct the landlord to let out the accommodation to Chhail Behari or not to let out the accommodation to the petitioner-appellant. What the State Govt. on the other hand did was to say : "The above house is hereby allotted to the applicant." The question of allotment by the Govt. could arise only if the accommodation were the property of the Govt. The State Govt. could allot an accommodation to a person, if by virtue of allotment order itself, the allottee could become entitled to occupy the accommodation. That is not so in the case of an order which may be issued under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7. All what the District Magistrate, and, may be, even the State Govt. under Sec. 7-F, could direct was that the landlord shall let out the accommodation to a particular person or not to let out an accommodation to him. If what was intended was that the accommodation be let out to Chhail Behari, Chhail Behari would still have to approach the landlord and obtain a lease of the premises from him. Chhail Behari would not be entitled to occupy the house merely by virtue of being an allottee of the accommodation by the State Govt., or may be even by the District Magistrate. It is use of such inaccurate language, not borne out by the provisions of law, which tends, in many cases, to encourage the tenants to take the law in their own hands and to make an attempt to occupy the accommodation even without making an approach to the landlord. There is nothing on record to indicate that the landlord has, in so many words, been so far asked not to let out the accommodation to the present petitioner appellant or to let out the accommodation to Chhail Behari. The order issued by the Distt. Supply Officer (probably exercising jurisdiction of the Distt. Magistrate) on 17th June, 1958, after the receipt of the Govt. The order issued by the Distt. Supply Officer (probably exercising jurisdiction of the Distt. Magistrate) on 17th June, 1958, after the receipt of the Govt. order dated 10th April, 1958, only says that the previous allotment order dated 11th January, 1958, and the subsequent dated 24th January, 1958 "are hereby cancelled." The landlord has thus neither been called upon not to let out the accommodation to the petitioner appellant, nor to let out the accommodation to Chhail Behari. 19. It appears to us that having once let out the accommodation to the petitioner-appellant under an order validly passed by the District Magistrate under Sec. 7(2) of the Act, it was impossible for the landlord to terminate the tenancy in his favour. It may be that this view may, in some cases, result in the filing of a revision before the Govt. or the passing of an order by the State Govt. under Sec. 7-F. infructuous. But there is the other side of the question as well. We may for instance consider the question of this very accommodation falling vacant in December, 1957. It was allotted to the petitioner appellant by the Distt. Magistrate on 6th January, 1958. The Govt. passed its orders on 10th April, 1958. There was no order in the intervening period, requiring the landlord not to let out the accommodation to the petitioner-appellant; and even if there were such an order, who were to be responsible for making good the loss of rent to the landlord for this intervening time. If the intention of the Legislature were that pending the disposal of an application under Sec. 7-F., the order of the Distt. Magistrate passed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7 should not be enforced, there should have been a clear provision to that effect somewhere in the Act itself. When there was no provision for the payment of the rent to the landlord during the time the State Government may take to pass final orders under Sec. 7-F., the landlord could not justifiably be expected not to let out an accommodation, more so when there is an order already passed under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7, and even served on him for compliance. 20. In our view, therefore, the appeal succeeds. The order of the learned single Judge, dated 4th November, 1959 is set aside. Writ Petition No. 154 of 1958 is allowed. (2) of Section 7, and even served on him for compliance. 20. In our view, therefore, the appeal succeeds. The order of the learned single Judge, dated 4th November, 1959 is set aside. Writ Petition No. 154 of 1958 is allowed. Writ of mandamus will be issued as prayed by the petitioner appellant quashing the order of the State Govt. dated 10th April, 1958 and the order of the Distt. Supply Officer (Exercising the powers of the Distt. Magistrate) dated 17th June, 1958 and directing respondent Nos. 1 and 2 not to modify or cancel the order dated 24th January, 1958 in favour of the petitioner-appellant. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs.