JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, Mr. M. M. Abdulkhader, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the order of the second respondent namely, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Ernakulam, Ext. P-2. Ext. P-2 purports to be a prohibitory order issued by the second respondent under order XXI, rule 46, C.P.C. It is addressed to the writ petitioner and also to the tenant of a premises which the petitioner purchased from one Sri V. K. Abdul Majeed under Ext. P-1, dated 10th October 1957. 2. According to the Department, Sri Abdul Majeed the transferor was an assessee to sales-tax and that he has defaulted in payment of the tax due to the Department. While so, the said assessee transferred the property in question which is a building under Ext P-1 in favour of the writ petitioner. 3. The order Ext P-2 from the 2nd respondent directed the writ petitioner until further orders not to receive rent of the said building from the tenant and there is a further order as against the tenant himself prohibiting him from paying the rent or portion of the rent to any person except in accordance with the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer. 4. This order practically amounts to placing an embargo by the Tahsildar acting under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, read with order XXI, rule 46, C.P.C. upon the right of the writ petitioner, who is admittedly a purchaser of the property in question from Sri V. K. Abdul Majeed under Ext. P-1. 5. It is the contention of Mr. M. M. Abdulkhader, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the State has no charge or priority in the payment of sales-tax over the properties of the defaulter and the only right that is given to the State to proceed against third parties is that provided under rule 37-A of the General Sales Tax Rules which provides for a contingency of the ownership of a business carried on by a dealer and liable to pay the tax being entirely transferred in favour of a third person. That rule provides that in such cases, the transferor and the transferee will be both liable for payment of the tax as if they were dealers with a proviso to the effect that so far as the transferee is concerned, the recovery of arrears of tax due prior to the date of transfer shall be only to the extent of the value of the business he obtained by transfer. The other part of the rule which clearly indicates, in my view, that such a right is given to the Department to proceed against the third party only in the case of a transfer of the entire business by the original dealer is again emphasised when it says that the transferee is also liable to pay tax on the sales of goods effected by him with effect from the date of the transfer and there is also an obligation on the part of such transferee to apply for registration or issue of licence as the case may be. 6. No doubt, the learned Government Pleader did not attempt to place any support on the provisions of rule 37-A of the General Sales Tax Rules. According to the learned Government Pleader, this order can be supported on the basis that the assignment in favour of the petitioner by the assessee namely, Sri. V. K. Abdul Majeed can be ignored by the Department under the provisions of section 32 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act. He also pursued this contention by urging that section 32 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act read with section 54 of the said Act and order XXI, rule 46 C.P.C., give ample jurisdiction to the authorities functioning under the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act to pass the order in question. 7. I have absolutely no hesitation in rejecting this contention advanced on behalf of the State based upon the particular provisions referred to above. 8. Admittedly, the Sales Tax Act does not give any such right to the State for recovery of arrears of tax. No doubt, section 13 of the Sales Tax Act provides that in default of payment of the arrears of tax the whole of the amount then remaining due may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Admittedly, the Sales Tax Act does not give any such right to the State for recovery of arrears of tax. No doubt, section 13 of the Sales Tax Act provides that in default of payment of the arrears of tax the whole of the amount then remaining due may be recovered as if it were an arrear of land revenue. It will be clearly seen that the provision is only limited to this extent namely, that the amount due from the person liable to pay tax, can be recovered by adopting the procedure indicated for recovery of arrears of land revenue. Section 32 relied upon by the learned Government Pleader, in my view, cannot certainly be invoked when the revenue authorities act under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for purpose of collecting the arrears of sales-tax; and its scope is very limited. 9. It is also clear that the legislature did not intend to give any such right to either the Revenue or the Sales Tax Department to proceed against the transferee, because as I mentioned earlier, the only limited right of proceeding against the transferee under such circumstances, has been given to the Department under rule 37-A of the Sales Tax Rules. 10. Again section 54 of the Revenue Recovery Act will not also assist the learned Government Pleader. That refers to two particular classes of items that may be attached namely, (a) salaries; and (b) debts and the essential condition is that those, items must be due to a defaulter at the time of attachment. In this case, rightly or wrongly, the suspicion of the Department may be well-founded or unfounded in the matter of transfer effected by the assessee in favour of the writ petitioner. The question is, are they entitled to ignore the transaction evidenced by Ext. P-1 made in favour of the writ petitioner and proceed to treat the original owner as still the owner of the property, notwithstanding the transfer, dated 6th July 1960. 11. If the Department is prepared to take the risk of establishing that this transaction is absolutely mala fide and benami to cheat the State out of non-payment of revenue, it is open to take other appropriate proceedings. Such summary relief cannot be granted either under the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act or the General Sales Tax Act. 12. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the order Ext. Such summary relief cannot be granted either under the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act or the General Sales Tax Act. 12. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the order Ext. P-2 must be understood to mean that an embargo is placed upon the tenant of the building, prohibiting him from paying any arrears of rent that may be due on that property and payable to the assignor of the writ petitioner namely, Sri V. K. Abdul Majeed. I may straight away say that the order Ext. P-2 does not give any such intention. On the other hand, Ext. P-2 is clearly unambiguous when it attempts to place a complete prohibition as against the petitioner in the matter of collecting the amount due from the tenant as and by way of rent. 13. Therefore, the order under attack Ext. P-2 is set aside, but it is open to the State to recover the arrears of sales-tax due by Sri V. K. Abdul Majeed in any other manner permissible under law. Parties will bear their own costs.