JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. The 2nd plaintiff, whose suit to redeem a kanom has been concurrently dismissed by the courts below, has preferred this second appeal. The 1st defendant, upon whom the tenancy has devolved, admits the kanom, but contends that the 2nd plaintiff is not a landlord entitled to resume the property from him. The courts below have found that the plaintiff needs the land bona fide for cultivation for his maintenance; but dismissed the suit because S.25 of the Malabar Tenancy Act permitted only the landlord to resume property from a tenant and the landlord in regard to the suit kanom is the tarwad, and not the 2nd plaintiff who is only a member thereof. Hence this appeal. 2. The question therefore is of the capacity of a member of the tarwad to resume tarwad property outstanding with strangers on a lease or a kanom. The courts below have assumed that the proprietary right in the suit property is vested in the legal entity known as 'the tarwad' and therefore the plaintiff, who was not the karnavan, cannot claim to recover the same. The appellant challenges in this appeal the correctness of that proposition. 3. As observed by Sankarasubba Iyer J., in 1944 TLR 847 at 856, "Several eminent Judges .............. have attempted at a definition but have been constrained to admit that it is not possible to devise a definition which will cover all that is meant by the word 'tarwad'." In ancient days the theory of Marumakkathayam law was that landed property however acquired by a member of a Marumakkathayam family merged in the family possessions (vide, Madras Decisions, December 1859, page 226) and that the tarwad was, in the words of Justice Holloway, "an indissoluble unit, a mere aggregate with no separate rights". The karnavan of the tarwad was held to be the head, the representative and the mouthpiece of the tarwad. The junior members were then considered to have no proprietary rights in the landed property of the tarwad, their rights being only of maintenance out of its income and of residence in the tarwad house. 4. Muthuswami Ayyar J., in Moidin Kutty v. Krishnan (ILR 10 Madras 322, 329) had to strain much to find out rights in the junior members in a tarwad. 4. Muthuswami Ayyar J., in Moidin Kutty v. Krishnan (ILR 10 Madras 322, 329) had to strain much to find out rights in the junior members in a tarwad. "The substantial question then is whether the right which the respondents sought to enforce is an individual right or a right which vests in their family only in its collective capacity. Having regard to the family system that obtains in Malabar, I do not consider that a tarvrad is a corporate body in the sense that no single member of it has an individual right to enforce. Each member of a tarwad has a right to be maintained in the tarwrd house, and this is a personal right. He has also a right, if a male and not incompetent, to succeed to management in the order of seniority, and this is also a personal right. The tarwad property is not partible at the pleasure of any one member, and he cannot maintain a suit to enforce partition because no separate right to demand partition exists. The tarwad property is, however, a common fund for subsistence, and each member is entitled to see that the karnavan to whose management it is entrusted does not exceed his lawful authority and waste it, and this is an individual right vesting in every anandravan by reason of his position as such. If the anandravan is a female, there is the further right to see that the tarwad property is not wasted by the karnavan, and thereby divested from descent to her children. The conception of a tarwad is that of a joint family under the management ordinarily of the senior male, in which the anandravans have each a group of individual rights which they are entitled to enforce individualy or collectively either as against the karnavan or his alienee or both." 5. At one time it was thought that if a junior member were allowed to recover tarwad property outstanding on mortgage or lease with a stranger and to hold the same as an assignee of the encumbrance it would cause disruption in the family unity and therefore could not be allowed. At one time it was thought that if a junior member were allowed to recover tarwad property outstanding on mortgage or lease with a stranger and to hold the same as an assignee of the encumbrance it would cause disruption in the family unity and therefore could not be allowed. Kunhiraman Nair J., delivering the judgment of a Full Bench of four Judges in Padmanabhan Raman v. Raman Narayanan (18 TLR 31) observed : "To empower an Anandravan to redeem such mortgages and to appropriate to himself the Michavarom and other usufruct of the property, would, we are afraid be a fruitful source of dissensions and disturbance of peace of the Tarwad. A law suit by a karnavan against a junior member in possession of Tarwad land redeemed by him from a previous mortgage means the creation of ill feeling between the Karnavan and the junior member, and it goes without saying that the courts, when administering the Marumakkathayam Law, are bound to preserve the position and authority of the Karnavan unimpaired without driving him to the necessity of incurring the displeasure of the junior members whose cooperation is essential for the proper administration of the affairs of the Tarwad." 6. Changes in the concept of family unity occasioned by ideas of progressive development in social life, brought about many changes from time to time in the concept of a tarwad as well. Self acquisitions of a member came to be regarded as disposable by him during his life; right of succession to self acquisitions came to be confined in the nearer relations rather than in the entire tarwad; right to make devises by will in regard to one's own acquisitions came to be recognised; and ultimately "impartibility which is the fundamental characteristic of a Malabar tarwad has been put an end to" and right of compulsory partition conceded to every member of a tarwad. In these altered and advanced conditions, great care has to be taken in adhering to ancient precedents which, by the eminence of their authors, may tempt close following. 7. For may purposes 'the tarwad' is recognised as a legal entity. It is capable of owning properties and owing debts. Decrees can be obtained against a tarwad, executable against its properties only. But, the tarwad is not recognised as 'a corporation' in the legal sense. 7. For may purposes 'the tarwad' is recognised as a legal entity. It is capable of owning properties and owing debts. Decrees can be obtained against a tarwad, executable against its properties only. But, the tarwad is not recognised as 'a corporation' in the legal sense. Srinivasa Ayyangar J. observed in ILR 39 Madras 317(FB) at 335 : "In India it is not uncommon for groups of persons though not incorporated to hold properties as if they were corporate entities. Castes and sub-castes hold property as such, so also village communities. But the more common and familiar instances of such groups in Southern India are the joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the Nambudiri Illom governed by the Makkathayam law, the Nayar tarwad governed by the Marumakkathayam law, and the Aliasanthana family of South Kanara." Govinda Menon J. when he used the expression "the juristic person styled the tarwad" in Chekku v. Puliasseri Parvathi (AIR 1956 Madras 634) does not appear to have adverted to the strict connotation of a 'juristic person' in jurisprudence. Legislative definition of a tarwad has always been : "Tarwad means the group of persons forming a joint family with community of property governed by the Marumakkathayam law of inheritance (See S.3(i) of Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1933)". 8. In Kavalappara Moopil Nayar v. States of Madras and Kerala (1960 KLJ 1077), Subba Rao J. delivering the majority judgment of the Supreme Court, considered the incidents of a tarwad under the Marumakkathayam law to be so well settled that it was not necessary to refer beyond the relevant passage in the book "Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law" by Sundara Aiyar, which reads thus: "The joint family in a Marumakkathayam Nayar tarwad consists of a mother and her made and female children, and the children of those female children, and so on ...... The property belonging to the tarwad is the property of all the males and females that compose it. Its affairs are administered by one of those persons, usually the eldest male, called the karanavan: The individual members arc not entitled to partition ........ Otherwise everyone is a proprietor and has equal rights". The property belonging to the tarwad is the property of all the males and females that compose it. Its affairs are administered by one of those persons, usually the eldest male, called the karanavan: The individual members arc not entitled to partition ........ Otherwise everyone is a proprietor and has equal rights". Sarkar J. who delivered the minority judgment in that case also agreed with the above observation when his Lordship held : "The property of the tarwad is owned by all its members but is managed ordinarily by the eldest male member, such manager being called the karnavan". 9. Thus the tarwad has always been understood as a group of persons, and not as a juristic person different from the group. The rights of the tarwad are the rights of the members collectively; in other words, the rights of the tarwad inhere in every member of the tarwad in part. The karnavan being the accredited representative of the entire group -- the tarwad, his competency to exercise the rights of the tarwad is full. But it does not mean that a member of the tarwad has no proprietary right in the tarwad property; as a part owner he is entitled to exercise the rights of the tarwad in relation to tarwad properties demised to strangers, when the karnavan is not a competitor with him in the field. It is now beyond doubt that a junior member of a tarwad is entitled to redeem tarwad property outstanding on mortgage with a stranger. This right can be explained only by holding that a right of the tarwad to redeem its properties inheres in every member of the tarwad in part. Every member of a tarwad is recognised to be a part owner of its equity of redemption. Likewise must be the case of resumption of property outstanding on a demise of lease or kanom with a stranger. Every member of a tarwad is a part owner of its right of resumption; and a tenant cannot be heard to say that the landlord is only the "tarwad" and that therefore a member of the tarwad cannot resume the property from him. Every member of a tarwad is, in respect of its property outstanding on a demise, a bit of the landlord, and as such entitled to claim its resumption from the tenant. 10. Every member of a tarwad is, in respect of its property outstanding on a demise, a bit of the landlord, and as such entitled to claim its resumption from the tenant. 10. The view taken by the court below that the right of resumption, under S.25 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, is vested only in the "tarwad" and therefore cannot be exercised by a member thereof is unsustainable. That finding is reversed and the plaintiff is held entitled to claim resumption of the properties of this tarwad from it tenants. 11. As the claim in this suit is to resume a kanom holding, it can now be decided only in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, IV of 1961. The grounds for resumption allowed under that Act are far different from those provided in the Malabar Tenancy Act. The claim of the plaintiff in this suit has therefore to be tried afresh. The suit is therefore remitted to the court of first instance for that purpose. 12. The decree of the courts below is reversed and the suit is remitted for a fresh disposal in the manner indicated above. The court fee paid on the memorandum of second appeal will be refunded to counsel for the appellant. The appellant will have the rest of his costs in this second appeal from the respondents 35 to 40 and the estate of the deceased 3rd respondent.