Ramachandra Iyer, J.- This appeal which is filed by the decree-holder (fourth defendant) raises a question of limitation, namely, whether E.P. No. 291 of 1956 in O.S. No. 121 of 1926 is barred by the provisions of section 48, Civil Procedure Code. The suit was one for accounts on the basis of a dissolved partnership. The decree in the suit was passed on 20th February, 1928, under which the second defendant along with two others were directed to pay a large sum of money to the fourth defendant. By a subsequent agreement between the parties which was duly recorded in Court the liability of the defendants was split up. Under the terms of the compromise, the second defendant was to give security for the decree against him and also pay a sum of Rs. 2,000 per year, the balance of the decree amount to be paid on 13th April, 1943, on which date the decree-holder would attain the age of majority. For the due performance of the decree (under the terms of the compromise) the second defendant was to give security of certain immoveable properties. This he did. Both the compromise as well as the security bond were duly registered. The execution petition out of which this appeal arises was filed on 5th April, 1956, more than 12 years from the date when the money under the decree became payable. The appellant claimed that he was entitled to exclude the period from 5th Decemb3r, 1953 to 27th February, 1955, by virtue of section 5 of the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, V of 1954 (to be referred to also as the Act) as the judgment-debtor was an agriculturist entitled to the benefit of the moratorium declared by that Act and by the Ordinance V of 1953, which preceded it. Before the lower Court it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the debtor owned certain agricultural lands in the villages of Kothamangalam and Nappalkudi in the Ramnad District within the State of Madras. The lower Court found-and that finding has not been challenged before us-that the judgment-debtor did not own any agricultural lands in this State. Before the lower Court it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the debtor owned certain agricultural lands in the villages of Kothamangalam and Nappalkudi in the Ramnad District within the State of Madras. The lower Court found-and that finding has not been challenged before us-that the judgment-debtor did not own any agricultural lands in this State. But the appellant now relies on the circumstance of the judgment-debtor owning agricultural lands in Pegu (which fact is not denied) and contends that possession of those lands on the material dates would entitle the debtor to the protection afforded by Act V of 1954 and the Ordinance preceding it and that the decree-holder being thereby prevented by filing the execution petition during the time when they were in force that is for a period of one year and twenty-six days, he would be entitled to the exclusion of that period in the computation of limitation. The appellant does not claim any benefit of the four months period given under Act I of 1955 as it has been found that the judgmentdebtor was not an agriculturist within the meaning of that enactment. The only question to be decided in this case is whether a person who owns agricultural lands not within the State of Madras but outside it would be entitled to claim the benefit of the Ordinance V of 1953 and the Madras Act V of 1954. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative the decree-holder would be entitled to exclude the period during which the Ordinance and the Act were in force by virtue of section 5 of Act V of 1954. It will be sufficient to consider the provisions of the Act as the provisions of the preceding Ordinance are almost identical with it. The Act purports to provide for a temporary relief to indebted agriculturists. The Preamble to it refers to the draught in the preceding years which led to greater indebtedness of the agriculturists and of the coming in of adequate rains during the year enabling the agriculturists to devote their energies to cultivation with assiduity and the necessity for relieving them from the pressure of creditors for a short time in order that the maximum possible advantage might result to the State in the matter of food production. The Preamble would appear to show that the object of the legislation was to benefit agriculturists possessing lands in this State as the failure of monsoon and increasing the food production referred to could only relate to this State. Section 3 of the Act provides that no suit for recovery of debt or application for execution of the decree against an agriculturist could be, instituted for a period of one year from the commencement of the Act. A similar provision was contained in the Ordinance which was in force from 5th December, 1953, till the commencement of the Act. The term ‘agriculturist’ is defined under section 2 (a) of the Act thus: “‘agriculturist’ means a person who owns an interest in land, and who, by reason of such interest, is in possession of such land or is in receipt of the rents or profits thereof and shall include a lessee” (the rest of the section is omitted as unnecessary). Neither the terms of section 3 nor the definition of the term ‘agriculturist’ impose any express qualification on the person claiming the benefit of the Act, that he should own agricultural lands in the State of Madras. It is argued for the appellant that whatever might have been the reason which influenced the Legislature to enact the legislation the operative part of the statute is clear and unambiguous and that read in the light of the definition would show that the benefit of the moratorium should be given to all persons who own agricultural lands whether it be within the State or outside it. It was further argued that the words in the enacting part of the statute should be held to have been designedly used so as to comprehend a larger category of persons, as the Legislature whenever it wanted to restrict to agriculturists within the State of Madras, had used specific words to that effect. Reference was made in this connection to the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, IV of 1938, which defined the term of ‘agriculturist’ as a person owning or possessing agricultural lands within the State of Madras, to the Madras Agriculturists Income-tax Act and the Wealth Tax Act, etc. One of the well settled and cardinal rules of construction of a statute is that its provisions should be considered in such a way as to accord with the intention of the Legislature that enacted it. One of the well settled and cardinal rules of construction of a statute is that its provisions should be considered in such a way as to accord with the intention of the Legislature that enacted it. How is that intention to be ascertained? One rule is that if the enacting part is clear, prima facie, that should be taken as declaring the intention of the Legislature and that no other aid should be resorted for the purpose of ascertaining it. But where it is not so clear resort may be had to other matters for arriving at the true construction. The question whether a statute applied to a particular subject-matter or only to a limited part of it cannot strictly or always be called one of construction of the statute. A statute may expressly provide in regard to its scope and applicability. But sometimes it may not be possible to ascertain the scope of the enactment by a mere reference to its provisions. The question then arises whether in regard to these cases resort can be had to other matters for the construction of the statute. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that where there is no ambiguity in the enacting part of the statute, it is not the duty of the Court to restrict the scope of the Act by trying to understand the words used in it in any limited sense. We do not consider that this is the correct way of approaching the question. In Thomson v. Advocate-General1, a question arose whether the words of a statute which levied an estate duty on every legacy given by a person by his will, would apply to the case of a legacy under a will executed by a person who was domiciled and died abroad. In Thomson v. Advocate-General1, a question arose whether the words of a statute which levied an estate duty on every legacy given by a person by his will, would apply to the case of a legacy under a will executed by a person who was domiciled and died abroad. Answering the question in the negative Tindal, C.J., observed: “The very general words of the statutes must of necessity receive some limitation of their application for they cannot in reason extend to every person everywhere whether subjects of their kingdom or foreigners or at the time of their death domiciled within the realm or abroad.” In Fefferys v. Boosey2, the English Copy Right Act of 1710 which gave protection to an author by giving him the exclusive right of printing for 14 years was held to apply only to British authors though there was no such qualification in the enacting part of the statute. It is therefore clear that a Court would be competent to ascertain what the meaning of the general words employed in the statute is, in the context of the enactment and with due regard to the subject-matter dealt with by the statute. In Maxwell’s “Interpretation of Statutes” 10th Edition, it is stated at page 19 as follows: “The literal construction then, has, in general, but prima facie preference. To arrive at the real meaning it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope, and object of the whole Act; to consider according to Lord Coke: (1) What was the law before the Act was passed; (a) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) what remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) The reason of the remedy.” Act V of 1954 is not the first of those statutes which aimed at giving relief to agriculturists-debtors. In 1938 the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act was enacted providing for the scaling down of debts due by agriculturists. The operation of that Act was restricted to agriculturists who owned lands in the province of Madras. No doubt that was achieved as a result of the definition containing a qualification that the agriculturists who own or possess lands in the province. We shall presently consider whether the absence of any such qualification would at all make a difference. The operation of that Act was restricted to agriculturists who owned lands in the province of Madras. No doubt that was achieved as a result of the definition containing a qualification that the agriculturists who own or possess lands in the province. We shall presently consider whether the absence of any such qualification would at all make a difference. It is sufficient for the present purpose to state that historically speaking the State Legislature gave relief to agriculturists-debtors only in cases where they owned or possessed lands within the State of Madras. It is necessary next to consider the mischief which the present enactment sought to remedy. The Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938, did not prevent creditors from suing on their debts. Having regard to the unprecedented drought conditions in the State which had the effect of increasing the indebtedness of the agriculturists, temporary relief was deemed necessary to enable them to devote their energies exclusively to agricultural operations: and it was also found necessary that a more comprehensive legislation should be enacted to enable them to liquidate the accumulated liability. The first part of the object was achieved by Ordinance V of 1953 and Act V of 1954 which granted a moratorium to the debtors for a short time. The second part was achieved by Act I of 1955 which followed the Act V of 1954 providing for payment of debts incurred by agriculturists in annual instalments. It is therefore clear that the Act was intended to meet a situation peculiar to the agriculturists in the Madras State. In our opinion, there is an indication in the provisions of the Act itself to show that a wider operation was not intended. A moratorium of the kind granted by the Act might be misused by unscrupulous debtors. For example a debtor while taking advantage of the moratorium might put all his properties outside the reach of creditors by effecting alienations, etc. Section 6 provides for raising a statutory presumption that wherever a debtor entitled to the benefits of sections 3 and 4 of the Act transfers immoveable property, such transfer shall be presumed to have been made with intent to defeat and delay the creditors. The property referred to in section 6 can only relate to those situate within the State as the State Legislature cannot legislate in regard to immoveable property outside it. The property referred to in section 6 can only relate to those situate within the State as the State Legislature cannot legislate in regard to immoveable property outside it. This section which provides against alienations by debtors during the time when they are having the benefit of the Act or Ordinance cannot therefore apply to persons holding property outside the State. It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature would not have intended to give the benefit of the Act to persons owning lands or other properties outside the State, as it will be possible for them with impunity to defeat the claims of creditors. It follows that the benefit given by the Act should also be confined to those persons to whom the sanction provided by section 6 would apply. A person having no property in the State cannot therefore come within the ambit of sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Mr. Natesan, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that there being no qualification in the definition of the term ‘agriculturist’ in the Act it would not be competent for this Court to restrict it-? meaning. It may be accepted as a general rule that words occurring in an Act should be interpreted in terms of the definition contained therein. At the same time if the scope of the enactment itself is limited the terms of definition cannot enlarge it. The definition like any other word in the statute has to be read in the context, having regard to the scheme of the Act and the intention of the Legislature. That all statutory definitions should be read in the light of the context is clear from the section containing the definition itself which states that the definition given by the Act would apply only “if the context does not otherwise require”. Therefore if the scope of the enactment and the context in which the defined term is used to provide only for limited operation, i.e., to the agriculturist within the State, the term itself can have only that limited meaning. The Preamble to that Act clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature is to limit the operation of it to agriculturists owning lands in the State. The question then arises whether the Preamble can be looked into for the purpose of ascer- taining the scope of the Act. The Preamble to that Act clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature is to limit the operation of it to agriculturists owning lands in the State. The question then arises whether the Preamble can be looked into for the purpose of ascer- taining the scope of the Act. In Kochuni v. State of Madras and Kerala1, the Supreme Court observed that “the Preamble of statute was a key to the understanding of it and that it might legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words which might have more than one or to keep the effect of the statute within its scope (italics supplied) whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt.” In Kannammal v. Kanakasabai Mudaliar2, Curgenven, J., observed: “It is , I think, indisputable that before restricting the scope of an Act by the terms of its Preamble the Court must be satisfied that there was an intention on the part of the Legislature that its scope should be so restricted and, in fact, that the Legislature would have agreed, had the point been so put, that the passage relied upon in the Preamble should form part of the text of the Act. It is not open to the Court to speculate regarding the intentions of the Legislature or to frame its decisions in conformity with what it would itself have done had it been legislating. Now in the present instance, if the Preamble had declared it necessary to protect a certain clearly defined class of tenants, it might be reasonable to hold that, although the text is silent, there was an intention so to restrict it; though even then the meaning of the Act would not be so clear as if the restriction had appeared in the body of it.” In our opinion, it can be said in the instant case that the Preamble has defined a class of agriculturists, (that is those in the Madras State) who are entitled to the benefits given under the Act. Perhaps if the attention of the Legislature had been directed to it, they would have incorporated the substance of the term of the Preamble in the definition of the term ‘agriculturist’ itself as they did in the case of Act IV of 1938. Perhaps if the attention of the Legislature had been directed to it, they would have incorporated the substance of the term of the Preamble in the definition of the term ‘agriculturist’ itself as they did in the case of Act IV of 1938. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the decision in H.R.H. Prince Augustus v. A.G.3, for the proposition that the effect of the clear enacting words of a statute could not be restricted by the Preamble which gave only doubtful indication of the intention of the Parliament. We do not find in that decision any rule that a Preamble cannot be looked into for ascertaining the scope of the statute. Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R., decided the case on the assumption that the words in a statute prima facie of general import can be cut down so as to make the effect of the Act to correspond with its purpose by reference to other relevant statutes or other admissible matters of context or by reference to its Preamble. Romer, L.J., observed that while the function of the Court was to ascertain the intention of the Parliament from the language used to express it, due regard must be had to all relevant circumstances which existed at the time the Act was passed. The learned Lord Justice was not prepared to lay down as a rigid rule that a Preamble could not be looked into where the enacting part would go beyond the purpose of the statute (see page 662). In Popatlal Shah v. State of Madras4, the Supreme Court had to consider the meaning of the term sale in the Madras General Sales Tax Act of 1939 which according to the definition covered every transfer of property in goods not necessarily made within the State of Madras. Mukerjee, J., observed at page 742: “It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. Mukerjee, J., observed at page 742: “It is a settled rule of construction that to ascertain the legislative intent all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself. The Title of the Madras Sales Tax Act described it to be an Act the object of which is to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the Province of Madras and the very same words are repeated in the Preamble which follows. The Title and Preamble, whatever their value might be as aids to the construction of a statute undoubtedly throw light on the intent and design of the Legislature and indicate the scope and purpose of the legislation itself. The Title and Preamble of the Madras Sales Tax Act clearly show that its object is to impose taxes on sales that take place within the province though these words do not necessarily mean that the property in the goods sold must pass within the province.” The learned Judge went on to observe that in defining the word sale, “...........the Legislature had in mind a sale in the province of Madras and as these words occur in the Title and Preamble to the Act it was not deemed necessary to repeat them in the definition or the charging section.” There is nothing in the enacting part of Act V of 1954 to indicate to which class of agriculturists the Act were to apply. It will therefore be permissible to refer to the Preamble to ascertain the scope of the statute. As we have stated already the Preamble indicates that the moratorium was intended only to apply to agriculturists owning lands within this State. The operation of the statute, in our opinion, should be restricted accordingly. It was next contended that for the application of section 5 it would be sufficient if the creditor in good faith thought that the debtor was an agriculturist and it was further not necessary that the latter should actually be one. The learned counsel argued that the appellant was acting in good faith because (1) he believed that the debtor owned lands at Kothamangalam and Neppalpatti. The learned counsel argued that the appellant was acting in good faith because (1) he believed that the debtor owned lands at Kothamangalam and Neppalpatti. (2) He equally bona fide believed that having lands in Pegu would entitle the debtor to take advantage of the moratorium. The question whether the appellant was bona fide of opinion that the respondent was an agriculturist is a question of fact depending on the evidence. That plea in regard to that question was not taken in the lower Court. The case of the appellant was that the debtor did own agricultural lands and not that he thought he owned them. It is unnecessary to consider whether a mere mistake of law as to the applicability of the Act in the absence of evidence as to taking advice from competent persons could be said to be a mistake made in good faith. We are of opinion that this belated plea should not be allowed to be raised in the circumstances of the present case. It follows that the appellant cannot claim the benefit of section 5 of Act V of 1954 and exclude the time during which that Act and the Ordinance preceding it were in force in the computation of the period of limitation for the purpose of section 48, Civil Procedure Code. We therefore agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the execution application is barred by the provisions of section 48, Civil Procedure Code and dismiss this appeal. There will be no order as to costs. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed