MEHROTRA, C. J. : This is a second appeal on behalf of defen­dant No. 2 arising out of a suit for specific per­formance. (2) The facts are that the plaintiff filed a suit as minor represented by his natural guardian-his father-for specific performance of a contract for sale of the suit land on the allegation that Poraram Saloi borrowed Rs. 1,500 from him on the 16th February 1950 by executing a mortgage bond in respect of the suit land. The possession was delivered to the plaintiff's father who was the mortgagee. Thereafter he again borrowed Rs. 570 from the plaintiff and on the 16th May 1951 exe­cuted a deed of agreement in favour of the plaintiff contracting to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for Rs. 2,120 within six months. The sale deed was never executed by Poraram and he sold the land in favour of defendant No. 2 Lachu-ram Nath on the 18th June 1951. Defendant No. 2 according to the plaintiff had knowledge of the contract between Poraram and the plaintiff for sale of the suit land. After filing of the writ­ten statement, Poraram Saloi who was impleaded as defendant No. 1, died. His heirs were implea­ded as parties to the suit. Poraram's case was that he borrowed Rs. 570 from the plaintiff by executing a pronote and thereafter borrowed ano­ther sum of Rs. 930 and for the total amount of Rs. 1,500 he executed a mortgage in favour of the plaintiff's father on the 26th February 1950, and thereafter sold the land to defendant No. 2 on the 13th June 1951 and paid off the mortgage dues to the plaintiff's father. He denied the exe­cution of any 'bainapatra' in favour of the plain­tiff. Defendant No. 2 contested the suit on vari­ous grounds, on law and fact. (3) The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate court came to the con­clusion that the plaintiff failed to prove the pay­ment of Rs. 570 to the vendor. He also held that the case set up by the defendant No. 1 that the mortgage was redeemed by paying Rs. 1,500 to the plaintiff mortgagee was not established. He however held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance with a direction that he was to deposit Rs. 570 to the vendor. He also held that the case set up by the defendant No. 1 that the mortgage was redeemed by paying Rs. 1,500 to the plaintiff mortgagee was not established. He however held that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance with a direction that he was to deposit Rs. 570 towards the balance of the consideration money in the lower court within three months of the date of the receipt of the lower court's record. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been filed by the de­fendant No. 2. (4) Mr. Ghose for the appellant has canvassed three points before us. Firstly his contention is that the agreement to sell being in favour of the plaintiff minor, cannot be specifically enforced by him. His contention is that the deed was exe­cuted in the name of the minor through the guar­dian-his father. By assuming that the deed was executed in favour of the father as the guardian of the minor, the minor had no right to bring a suit for specific performance of the contract. Se­condly he has contended that the defendant No. 2 being a bona fide purchaser for value, no decree for specific performance can be given in favour of the plaintiff against the said transferee. His con­tention is that the court below has wrongly held that the defendant failed to make the necessary inquiries. The defendant having no knowledge of the contract of the plaintiff and being a bona fide purchaser, no decree for specific performance could be passed against him. Lastly he contends that the plaintiff came with a specific case that he had paid up the entire consideration money. The court below having found that his case was not true, as regards the payment of Rs. 570, he should have held that the plaintiff failed to discharge his part of the contract and thus in equity no decree could be passed in his favour for specific perform­ance of the contract. The relief of specific per­formance is an equitable relief and the plaintiff having come with a false case, is not entitled to any decree for specific performance. The relief of specific per­formance is an equitable relief and the plaintiff having come with a false case, is not entitled to any decree for specific performance. (5) The case was referred to a Division Bench by a single Judge mainly on the ground that an authoritative decision was required on the ques­tion as to whether the minor could bring a suit for specific performance of the contract in his fav­our. (6) In support of his contention that the minor cannot bring a suit for specific performance of a contract reliance is placed by the counsel for the appellant on the case of 'Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri, 39 Ind App 1 (PC). The case arose out of a suit for specific performance of a contract entered into by the guardian on behalf of the minor. Their Lordships held that it was not within the competence of a manager of a minor's estate or within the compe­tence of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the pur­chase of immovable property, and they were fur­ther of opinion that as the minor in that case was not build by the contract there wag no mutuality, and that the minor who had now reached his majority could not obtain specific performance of the contract. In the case of Hari Mohan v. Sew Narayan; AIR 1949 Assam 57, it was held by a Bench of this court that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor is not competent to bind the minor Or his estate by a contract for sale even though it may be for necessity Or for the benefit of the minor. The contract was not specifically enforceable against the minor after attaining majority. The ratification of the contract by the minor in such a case must be with full knowledge of his rights after attaining majority. Reliance was placed in this case on the case of 39 Ind App 1 (PC), referred to above. The Privy Council case was sought to be distinguished on the ground that in that case it was a contract for purchase of a land on behalf of the minor while in the Assam case the contract was for sale of the property of the minor by the guardian. This distinction however was not accepted. The Privy Council case was sought to be distinguished on the ground that in that case it was a contract for purchase of a land on behalf of the minor while in the Assam case the contract was for sale of the property of the minor by the guardian. This distinction however was not accepted. In the present case however there is a contract in favour of the minor and not a contract for sale of the minor's property by the guardian. (7) In the Full Bench case of Venkatachalam Pillai v. Sethuram Rao, AIR 1933 Mad 322 (FB), there was a covenant in the sale executed by the minor's guardian that in case the vendee sold the property, he should resell it to the minor or his heirs. It was held that the agreement for resale in the sale deed being an executory contract with­out mutuality was unenforceable by either party in a suit for specific performance irrespective of the question whether the contract was for the bene­fit of the minor or not. The Full Bench relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of 39 Ind App 1 (PC) (ibid). Reference in this case has been made to the ear­lier decision of the same court, in the case of Raghavachariar v. Srinivasa Raghavachariar, ILR 1 40 Mad 308 : (AIR 1917 Mad 630) (FB), and It was observed in respect of that case that it was an authority for the proposition that the mere fact that the sale or a mortgage is in favour of a minor is not enough to hold that it is valid and enforceable.. Where a mortgage or sale has been effected as a completed transaction in favour of the minor and it does not involve the performance of any onerous act by the minor by reason of any contrac­tual obligation in respect of the sale or mortgage, such a sale or mortgage would not be invalid. (8) The next case referred to is Zeebunnissa Begum v. Mrs. H. B. Danagher, AIR 1936 Mad 564. The case arose out of a suit brought by the minor against defendant No. 1 for rent due by Her as a lessee upon her covenant and against defen­dant No. 2 as guarantor of the due performance of her covenants by defendant No. 1. H. B. Danagher, AIR 1936 Mad 564. The case arose out of a suit brought by the minor against defendant No. 1 for rent due by Her as a lessee upon her covenant and against defen­dant No. 2 as guarantor of the due performance of her covenants by defendant No. 1. The lease was given by the plaintiff acting by her father and guardian. The plea was taken by the defendants that the lease was void, as the lease was given by the plaintiff who was a minor. The trial court had held that as the lease contained covenants which were not enforceable against a minor, the suit must fail. It was held by Cornish, J. that- "I therefore think, that there can be no doubt that the failure of the lessor's covenants because they are not enforceable will not enable the lessee to avoid the lease. On the other hand it is quite intelligible that a lessor who finds that he has been subjected to covenants in a lease which are not binding on him should have the right to avoid it-But he must elect to avoid the lease as a whole or to adopt it. He cannot approbate and reprobate it." The case was remanded to the court below. Varada­chariar, J, observed at p. 567 as follows: "The learned Judge is, of course, right in say­ing that 'no decree for specific performance could be made against the plaintiff'. But as he himself recognises elsewhere, the non-availability of the remedy by way of specific performance does not necessarily show that a contract is void. Several instances are well known to the law where a Court may feel obliged to refuse specific performance and yet may award damages- This clearly shows that there' may be a valid contract though the remedy by way of specific performance may not be avail­able. Several instances are well known to the law where a Court may feel obliged to refuse specific performance and yet may award damages- This clearly shows that there' may be a valid contract though the remedy by way of specific performance may not be avail­able. Dealing particularly with the refusal of specific performance on the ground of want of mutuality, I may point out that though it is the rule under the English law that on this ground an infant cannot sustain a suit for the specific perfor­mance of a contract, it is not the rule there that there is no valid contract in such a case or that the lessee can avoid the lease on the ground of the lessor's infancy." Dealing with the case of ILR 56 Mad 433 : AIR 1933 Mad 322 (FB), Varadachariar, J. remarked that: "The answer to this, it seems to me, is that as pointed out in para 460 of Fry on Specific Per­formance, a contract to be specifically enforced must be such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them.'* The view taken by Varadachariar, J. was that a contract to be specifically enforced must be such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them. He was further of the view that the non-availability of the remedy by way of speci­fic performance does not necessarily show .that a contract is void. (9) Reliance is placed by the counsel for the respondents on the case of Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao, AIR 1948 PC 95. In this case the res­pondent Kurra Subba Rao and his father constitut­ed a Hindu joint family. The father died on the 4th October 1935 leaving him surviving his widow and the respondent, who was a minor. The res­pondent's father incurred certain debts including a debt of Rs. 16,000 owing to the appellants and a debt owing to one Ramayya. By an agreement dated the 29th November, 1935 executed by the guardian of the minor and his mother, he agreed to sell the land in suit with the appellants for Rs, 17,200. The contract provid­ed that a sale deed was to be executed, registered and delivered to the appellants, at their expense and upon their request. By an agreement dated the 29th November, 1935 executed by the guardian of the minor and his mother, he agreed to sell the land in suit with the appellants for Rs, 17,200. The contract provid­ed that a sale deed was to be executed, registered and delivered to the appellants, at their expense and upon their request. The earlier mortgages were paid off by the vendees and they obtained possession. No sale deed was however, executed. The minor then brought a suit for possession of the property on the ground that the agreement was void. The defendants vendees took the plea that they were protected under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The main question argued before their Lord­ships was whether the minor plaintiff was a trans­feror within the meaning of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and thus the vendees were entitl­ed to get the benefit of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that though the deed of agreement was executed by the guardian, the minor was a right party to the agreement and the vendees could thus get benefit of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The following passage however, in Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, Edn. 7, page 70 was approved by their Lord­ships: "A minor's agreement being now decided to be void, it is clear that there is no agreement to be specifically enforced; and it is unnecessary to refer to former decisions and distinctions, following English authorities which were applicable only on the view now overruled by the Privy Council. It is, however, different with regard to contracts enter­ed into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or by a manager of his estate. In such a case it has been held by the High Courts of India, in cases which arose subsequent to the governing decision of the Privy Council that the contract can be speci­fically enforced by Or against the minor, if the con­tract is one which it is within the competence of the guardian to enter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it, and, further, if it is for the bene­fit of the minor. But if either of these two condi­tions is wanting, the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all.1' (10) In the case of Ramalingam Reddi v. Baba-nambal Ammal, AIR 1951 Mad 431 , it has been held by Viswanatha Sastri, J. that- "A Hindu minor is bound by a contract enter­ed into by his mother guardian on his behalf for sale of his property for purposes considered under Hindu law as necessary; such a contract can be en­forced against him." Dealing with the case of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee he observed at page 433 as follows: "The doctrine of mutuality as developed by English decisions with its deceptive appearance of symmetry and simplicity but having no foundation in reason or logic, was imported in India by the decision of the Judicial Committee in ILR 39 Gal 232 : 39 Ind App 1 (PC), delivered by Lord Mac-naghten. Though his Lordship's opinion must com­mand the respect due to that great master of the law, I may be forgiven for remembering that oc­casionally ''dermitat Homerus" ILR 39 Cal 232 : 39 Ind App 1 (PC), is "mutuality" run riot, if I may be permitted to say so. ............ Yet their Lordships in ILR (1949) Mad 141 : AIR 1948 PC 95, upheld the contention that a guardian's contract for sale of the immovable property of the ward was specifically enforceable, if the contract was beneficial to the minor. Principles laid down for the protection or benefit of minors had been ap­plied in this country to their prejudice by invoking this artificial doctrine of mutuality. If the guardian has made an advantageous contract for the sale or lease of the property of the ward there is no rea­son why the ward should be disabled from enforc­ing it against the other party to the contract. If the guardian has made an advantageous contract for the sale or lease of the property of the ward there is no rea­son why the ward should be disabled from enforc­ing it against the other party to the contract. I -submit that the doctrine of 'mutuality', illogical in form and in substance unjust, has now been dis­carded by the very tribunal which was responsible for its introduction in India and it need no longer cast its spell on Indian Courts and sterilise con­tracts of sale entered into by a guardian on behalf or his ward for the letter's interest or benefit." He has also distinguished the Privy Council case on the ground that that was a case of a contract for purchase of immovable property on behalf of a minor by his guardian and on the assumption that this decision survived even today in full force, he held that there was no necessity to extend the principle of that decision to contracts for gale of a ward's property by his guardian. As pointer out by him the question which is vital to sales by a guardian, namely, necessity cannot arise in a contract for the purchase, not for the sale of immovable property. (11) In the case of "Gujoba Tulsiram v. Nil-kanth, AIR 1958 Bom 202 where a minor had received benefit from a contract of sale enter­ed into on his behalf by his father in respect of property solely belonging to them, it was held by Mudholkar, J. that the vendee was en­titled to specific performance of the contract. The case of AIR 1948 PC 95 was relied upon by his Lordship. Reference was made to the decision of Viswanatha Sastri J. in the case referred to by me earlier. This was however also a case of sale by the guardian of minor's property. (12) In the case of 'Amir Ahmad v. Meei Nizam Ali, AIR 1952 Hyd 120, the majority view was that a suit can be brought by a minor for the specific performance of the contract of the purchase of the property entered into by the guardian on his behalf. Deshpande J. however dissented from the view taken by the majority and held that the contract for sale of the minor's property on behalf of the minor jean be specifically enforced by the vendee. Deshpande J. however dissented from the view taken by the majority and held that the contract for sale of the minor's property on behalf of the minor jean be specifically enforced by the vendee. But a contract for purchase on behalf of the minor cannot be enforced by a suit for speci­fic performance by the minor. (13) In Modern Equity, Fourth Edition by Harold G. Hanbury regarding the rule of mutuality it has been observed at page 575 as follows: "Specific performance will not be granted, of a contract which is not obligatory on both parties, in the sense that, at the time at which it was executed, both had the right to come to equity to have it specifically enforced. Here we are on very debatable ground, for the exceptions are so numerous and so weighty that it has been argued, not merely that they eat up the rule, but that the rule never was on their plates. On the other hand, it is un­doubtedly a convenient formula under which a certain line of decisions can find common shelter. Fry lays down that 'a contract to be specifically enforced by the Court must, as a general rule, be mutual - that is to say, such that it might, at the time it was entered into, have been enforced by either of the parties against the other of them.' But this position is attacked by Professor Ash burner, who re­fuse, to 'want of mutuality' a place among the defences to a suit for specific performance. On this matter Maitland, for once, is not so clear as he might be. He tells us that 'Chan­cery came to the doctrine that 'remedies should be mutual but yet follows Ash burner in his condemnation of want of mutuality as a defence. He seems to think that equity laid down in a general way that remedies should be mutual, without being willing to commit itself to saying that remedies must be mutual. In fairness to Fry it must be pointed out that Maitland argues from one particular case, which Fry admits to be an exception. He seems to think that equity laid down in a general way that remedies should be mutual, without being willing to commit itself to saying that remedies must be mutual. In fairness to Fry it must be pointed out that Maitland argues from one particular case, which Fry admits to be an exception. But the most vigorous objector to the rule was Ames." (14) So far as this court is concerned, it has been held by a Bench of this court that the doctrine of mutuality as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 39 Ind App 1 (PC) (ibid) holds good in India also and the minor has no right to specifically enforce such a contract. For the purposes of this case it is however not necessary to examine the effect! on the earlier decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council of the case of AIR 1948 PC 95 and to examine the position today in the English law. It is sufficient for the purposes of the present case to point out that so far as the contract of purchase by die guardian on behalf of the minor is concerned, no specific performance can be granted. As pointed out by Viswanatha Sastri J. in the case of AIR 1951 Mad 431 the question of benefit to the minor cannot from its very nature arise in the case of the contract for purchase. (15) The result of the two cases of the Privy Council mentioned above has been summaris­ed in the following passage In 'Indian Contract Act,' Eighth Edition, by Pollock and Mulla at page 81: "A minor's agreement being now decided to be void, it is clear that there is no agree­ment to be specifically enforced; and it is un-necessary to refer to former decisions and dis­tinctions following English authorities! which were applicable only on the view now overruled by the Privy Council. The guardian of a minor unless competent to do so has no power t0 bind the minor by a contract for the pur­chase or sale °f immoveable property, and the minor therefore is not entitled to specific per­formance of the contract: so held by the Privy Council in 39 Ind App 1 (PC). The guardian of a minor unless competent to do so has no power t0 bind the minor by a contract for the pur­chase or sale °f immoveable property, and the minor therefore is not entitled to specific per­formance of the contract: so held by the Privy Council in 39 Ind App 1 (PC). In the course of the judgment their Lordships said; They are however, of opinion that it is not within the competence of a manager of a minor's estate or within the competence of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property, and they are further of opinion that as the minor in the present case was not bound by the contract, there was no mutuality and that the minor who has now reached his majority cannot obtain specific performance of the contract.' It is, however, different with regard to contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or by a manager of his estate, where the guardian or manager, as under Hindu Law, is competent to alienate property. In such a case it has been held by the Privy Council that the con­tract can be specifically enforced by or against the minor, if the contract is one which it is within the competence of the guardian to en­ter into on his behalf so as to bind him by it, and further, if it is for the benefit of the minor. But if either of these two conditions is wanting, the contract cannot be specifically enforced at all." Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act lays down the contracts in which specific performance can be enforced. Sec. 21 enumerates the con­tracts which cannot be specifically enforced. A contract by the guardian is not included in S. 21 of the Specific Relief Act. In "Pollock on Contracts,' 12th Edition by Professor P. H. Winfield at page 46 the law as developed in English Courts of equity with regard to the doctrine of mutuality is summarised thus: "An infant is not absolutely incapable of binding himself, but is, generally speaking, in­capable of absolutely binding himself by con­tract. His acts and contracts are voidable at his option subject to certain statutory and other ex­ceptions. His acts and contracts are voidable at his option subject to certain statutory and other ex­ceptions. By the common law a contract made by an infant is generally voidable at the infant's op­tion, such option to be exercised either before his attaining his majority or within a reason­able time afterwards. Where the obligation is incident to an interest (or at all events to a beneficial interest) in property, it cannot be avoided while that interest is retain­ed.'' In Mulla's 'Principles of Hindu Law,' Tenth Edition, page 594 the power of the natural guardian to enter into contracts on behalf of the minor is thus summarised: "The natural guardian has power to enter into contracts and to do all other acts which are reasonable and proper for the protection or benefit of the minor's property and for the advantage of the minor. A decree can be passed against a minor's estate on a deed of maintenance executed by the guardian in fa­vour of the minor's paternal grand-mother.. . . It is not within the competence of the manager of a minor's estate or within the competence of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the pur­chase of immovable property for the minor." The result of all these discussions is that a contract entered into by a minor is void under Section 11 of the Contract Act as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas Ghose, 30 Ind App 114 (PC) and thus the ques­tion of granting specific performance for such a contract does not arise, at all. If however the contract has been entered into on behalf of the minor by the guardian which is with­in the competence of the guardian to enter, there can be no objection to grant specific per­formance of such a contract at the instance of the minor. The guardian can bind the minor by a contract only if he has derived benefit out of the contract and the contract as such is for the benefit of the minor. In such a case the contract entered into by the guardian is within the competence of the guardian and as such there can be no bar to the minor who has derived benefit from such a contract to specifically enforce it. In such a case the contract entered into by the guardian is within the competence of the guardian and as such there can be no bar to the minor who has derived benefit from such a contract to specifically enforce it. In cases however where the guardian has entered into a con­tract for the purchase of any land on behalf of the minor, such a contract by its very na­ture cannot be for the benefit of the minor and it may as well be said that the guardian has no power to enter into such a contract and thus it will not be enforceable by the minor on attaining majority. (16) In the present case Mr. Ghose for the appellant contends that the contract was by the minor himself and thus it is void and can-aot be enforced. He has further contended that even assuming that the contract was en­tered into by a guardian on behalf of the minor, there being no mutuality, the contract} was not enforceable by the minor. He has further urged that even assuming that a de­cree for specific performance of a contract en­tered int0 by the guardian on behalf of the minor may be passed at the instance of the minor, if the contract is for the benefit of the minor, in the present case the contract being for purchase of an immovable property such a contract cannot be for the benefit of the minor and thus not within the competence of the guar­dian. No decree for specific performance can be granted. In our opinion even accepting the argu­ment of the respondents that the contract was by the guardian and not by the minor, the contract being one for purchase of the immoveable property, there was no benefit to the minor and the case is not covered by the dic­tum of their Lordships in the case of AIR 1948 PC 95. The suit in our opinion thus was not maintainable. In this view of the matter it is hot necessary to go into the other points rais­ed by the appellant. (17) It is however, pointed out that on the finding that the defendant No. 2 had no know­ledge of the contract made by defendant No. 1 With the plaintiff, no decree for specific per­formance could be passed against the said de­fendant. (17) It is however, pointed out that on the finding that the defendant No. 2 had no know­ledge of the contract made by defendant No. 1 With the plaintiff, no decree for specific per­formance could be passed against the said de­fendant. The question .of the defendant No. 2 not making the proper inquiries does not arise in the cases where a decree for specific performance is sought against the transferee. It is also difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Ghose that because the case of the plain­tiff that the entire consideration has been paid off has been found to be incorrect, no decree for specific performance should have been granted in his favour. It cannot be said that the plaintiff was not willing to perform his part of the contract. In view of our judg­ment that the suit for specific performance is not maintainable, We allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and dis­miss the suit. But in the circumstances we make no orders as to costs as the point does not appear to have been taken before the court) below. (18) DUTTA, J.: I agree. IE/RGB Appeal allowed.