JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. The suit that has led to this civil miscellaneous appeal, was by a jenmi, to enforce payment of renewal fees which became payable on Edavom 2, 1128 M. E., and was instituted in the year 1954, when the Cochin Tenancy Act, Act XV of 1113, was in force. That Act was repealed by the Kanam Tenancy Act, 1955 Act XXIV of 1955 which came into force on March I, 1956. Though the first Court held otherwise, the appellate Court decided, that the suit is maintainable under both these enactments, but remanded it, for ascertaining the michavaram payable, as under Section 16(6) and (8) of Act XXIV of 1955, renewal fee payable is the equivalent, of one year's michavaram or of the renewal fee payable under Act XV of 1113, whichever is less, and for passing a decree for renewal fees accordingly. The plaintiff has preferred this C. M. Appeal against the order of remand, as according to her learned counsel, the provisions of Act XXIV of 1955 are not applicable and the renewal fee as sued for, is recoverable. 2. It was first contended, that the suit having been instituted before Act XXIV of 1955 is not governed by that Act. Act XV of 1113 and others were repealed by Section 51 (1) of Act XXIV of 1955 and Section 51 (2) has provided that, the suits stayed under the provisions of the enactments so repealed shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The present suit was not stayed under the provisions of any enactment whatever, and so Section51(2) does not in terms apply. But Sections 16(6) and 16(8) of Act XXIV of 1955 have provided as follows:- Sec. 16(6): Where according to the terms of contract of kanam, renewal fees are commencement of this Act, and no renewal fees have been paid, the aggregate amount of the renewal fees payable under the contract of kanam in respect of such periods or periods shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (8) be payable by the kanam-tenant to the jenmi within a period of three years from the commencement of this Act or with interest at six per cent per annum thereafter within a further period of three years. (8): For the purpose of this Section the renewal fees shall be deemed to be one year's michavaram or the renewal fee payable under the Cochin Tenancy Act, XV of 1113,whichever is less. The meaning is clear, that is, in a case which falls within the scope of these provisions, he renewal fee which the tenant can be called upon to pay, is only what is prescribed by sub-section (8): in other words, whenever the suit was instituted, after the Act came into force, no decree could be passed for renewal fee in excess of that prescribed by sub-section (8). The question therefore does not really turn so much upon the application of Section 51(2), as upon, whether in passing the decree, what the statue ordains, should not be given effect to. We see no reason why it should not be. 3. The second question is whether section 16(6) applies to the present case. In order that it may apply, three conditions have to be fulfilled, two of which have, according to the plaintiff's learned counsel, been satisfied, that is, that renewal fees are payable under the terms of the contract of kanam on the expiry of a specified period, and that two periods have expired at the commencement of Act XXIV of 1995, but maintained, that the third condition, that no renewal fees have been paid, that is, that the tenant should have defaulted for all the periods which have expired at the commencement of that Act, has not been fulfilled. The document of kanam was of the year 1104 M. E., the first period of renewal expired in the year 1116 M. E. and the second in the year 1128 M. E., but the renewal fee for 1128. The point of the argument was, that unless the tenant was in default in the payment of renewal fees for all the periods, and not merely for the last period, sub-section (6) can have no application. We cannot agree, that on a reasonable interpretation, sub-section (6) of Section 16 is susceptible to this view. It is true, that provision has been made in it for dealing with defaults for more than one period, but this is not to say, that if there is default for one or more of several periods which have expired but not for all, the provision would cease to apply. It is true, that provision has been made in it for dealing with defaults for more than one period, but this is not to say, that if there is default for one or more of several periods which have expired but not for all, the provision would cease to apply. We do not think, that the legislature has insisted upon continuous default from the very beginning of the tenancy as a qualification for the tenant to entitle him to the concession. We therefore hold that the tenant, though a defaulter in the payment of the renewal fees for the year 1128 M. E. only, is entitled to rely on Section 16(6) an (8) of Act 24 of 1955, as to the amount of the renewal fee which may be decreed against him. 4. The third contention is, that Section 16(6) and (8) of Act 24 of 1955 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned counsel argued, that sub-section (6) of Section 16, discriminates in favour of cases where the original contract of kanam has stipulated for the payment of renewal fee, as against those where it has not, for granting to the tenant, the concession of paying a reduced renewal fee in terms of sub-section (8) of section 16. In our opinion, the argument lacks the foundation on which it is based. Under Act 24 of 1955, the jenmi ceases to be, and the tenant becomes instead, the owner of the property, subject only to the payment of jenmikaram; but this is only from the date of the commencement of the Act. The renewal fee though payable on the expiry of a period, is nevertheless related to that period. It may be, that when the Act commenced one or more such periods and also a part of the next period have expired without payment of renewal fee having been made. Some provision had necessarily to be made for part of the period which had expired, and this was achieved by enacting sub-section (7) of Section 16. But the legislature also though it fit to make a provision for the completed periods which have expired without payment, by making a concession in the amount and this was achieved by sub-sections (6) and (8) of Section 16. But the legislature also though it fit to make a provision for the completed periods which have expired without payment, by making a concession in the amount and this was achieved by sub-sections (6) and (8) of Section 16. Kanam as defined in Section 2(4) of Act 24 of 1955 means a demise in which the tenant has the right to occupy the property demised for 12 years or for any other longer period which is specified and in respect of a demise created prior to the commencement of this Act he has the liability to pay a renewal fee on renewal of the demise. The principle underlying sub-sections (6) and (8) of section 16 and the definition of a kanam in Section 2(4), are sufficient to take in both cases envisaged by the learned counsel. He was unable to point out any other provision in Act 24 of 1955 which might apply to kanams, in which there is no stipulation to pay renewal fee; there is none at all, apart from Section 16(7), which applies to renewal fee, for part only of a period which had expired on the date of that Act and yet that sub-section too uses the words terms of any contract of kanam. We do not think these words are sufficient to introduce a classification, of tenants, in whose case the original deed makes a stipulation for payment of renewal fee and of those with respect to whom, there is no such stipulation, and yet are bound to pay such fee. We venture to think, that the words terms of any contract of kanam must be liberally interpreted and not narrowly, so as to mean the original document. We consider that there is no basis for the apprehension of the learned counsel that sub-sections (6) and (8) of section 16, we hold, that they apply to all kanam-tenants who are subject to the liability to pay renewal fee. In this view, there is no basis for the argument under Article 14. 5. We therefore come to the conclusion, that the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge is proper. The learned counsel for the defendant has preferred an objection memorandum contending that the suit as laid is premature. We cannot accept this contention, for the suit was instituted before Act 24 of 1955 came into force. 5. We therefore come to the conclusion, that the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge is proper. The learned counsel for the defendant has preferred an objection memorandum contending that the suit as laid is premature. We cannot accept this contention, for the suit was instituted before Act 24 of 1955 came into force. Sub-section 6 of Section 16 of that Act, gives only an extended time within which the tenant may make payment, but does not make the suit premature. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The cross-objection also is dismissed, but without costs. The being of the year 1954, we hereby direct, that the trial Court will dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.