MEHROTRA, C. J.:-This is an appeal against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Lower Assam Districts at Gauhati setting aside an award given by the Umpire Mr. P. C. Chaudhury, retired Accoun­tant General, Bengal. The case of the plaintiff Domi­nion of India was that under a contract dated the 28th January 1943 the old Bengal and Assam Railway gave orders to one Kumbha Mawji father of the present appellant to manufacture and supply stone boulders and ballast from the Chutupaia Quarry. Under the agreement the appellant had to manufac­ture and supply six lakhs cubic feet of stone boulders and three lakhs cubic feet of ballast. Subsequently it is contended by the appellant that the contractor manufactured additional four lakhs cubic feet of boulders and one lakh cubic feet of ballast against the said agreement. The dispute arose between the parties. It is not disputed that the contractor has been paid at the rate given in the contract for the manufacture and supply of the original quantity of ballast and boulders under the agreement. The dis­pute was with regard to the enhanced rate claimed by the contractor and with regard to the manufac­ture of additional boulders and ballast which the contractor said that he had manufactured arid had supplied to the Railway. The Railway said that the additional supply forms no part of the agreement. (2) There was some difference between the two arbitrators, and the Umpire then gave an, award under which he granted a sum of Rs, 3,67,000/- to the contractor as the price of the boulders and bal­last supplied at the enhanced rate. By another award he awarded a sum of Rs. 83,000/- as the price of the additional supply o£ four lakhs cubic feet of boulders and one lakh cubic feet of ballast at enhanced rate. The Railway was not satisfied with this award and an application was filed on the 10th August 1949 for direction to the Umpire to file the award with a view to enable the Railway to file an objection to the award. After the notice an objection was filed on the 28th October 1949 wherein the validity of the award was challenged. The court below has accepted the contention of the Railway and set aside the award. After the notice an objection was filed on the 28th October 1949 wherein the validity of the award was challenged. The court below has accepted the contention of the Railway and set aside the award. (3) The main ground raised in the appeal is that the court below was not justified in holding that S, 5 of the Limitation Act applied to the proceedings before the court under the Arbitration Act and thus the court could not extend time. According to Article 158 of the Limitation Act an objection fur setting aside an award has to be filed within thirty days from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. According to the court below the objection was filed beyond the period allowed by the Article but the court below has condoned the delay in exercise of its power under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, which ac­ceding to the contention of the appellant before us the court could not do. (4) The next point is that even assuming that the court had jurisdiction to enter into the question of the validity of the award suo motu, in the present case, it cannot be said that the award was without jurisdiction. It cannot be doubted that if the award is assailed on the ground that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to give an award inasmuch as the dis­pute decided by him did not form part of the agree­ment itself, the court has got power to set aside such an award suo inotu. No objection need be filed by any of the parties to the arbitration. Section 14 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') pro-vides for the filing of the award. Section 16 of the Act provides that the court may from time to time remit the award on any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for consideration upon such terms as it thinks fit. Section 14 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') pro-vides for the filing of the award. Section 16 of the Act provides that the court may from time to time remit the award on any matter referred to arbitration to the arbitrators or umpire for consideration upon such terms as it thinks fit. Section 17 of the Act pro­vides that where the court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set aside the award, has expired, or such applica­tion having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree ex­cept on the ground that it is in excess of, or not other­wise in accordance with, the award. It is the duty of the court under S. 17 to pro­nounce a judgment in accordance with the award and if there is an application made by any of the parties to the arbitration for setting aside an award,, the ap­plication under Article 158 of the Limitation Act is to be made within thirty days of the service of notice. But S. 17 gives ample power to the court to go income the question of the validity of the award without any objection being tiled by any of the parties to the ar­bitration and thereafter pronounce judgment in ac­cordance with the award. In the present case the contention of the respondent is that on the face of it the award is without jurisdiction and such a matter is examinable by this court even in an appeal. In our opinion this submission is correct. In view of this, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the objection is barred by limitation or not and whe­ther S. 5 of the Limitation Act is attracted to such cases or not. In our opinion this submission is correct. In view of this, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the objection is barred by limitation or not and whe­ther S. 5 of the Limitation Act is attracted to such cases or not. The contention of the respondent, however, is that it: is not an objection filed for setting aside of the award but it is an application under b. 33 of the Act and thus Article 181 of the Limitation Act is attract­ed and further the contention is that the objection which was filed on the 28th October 1949 was in effect continuation of the application tiled on the 10th August 1949. It is further urged that S. 5 of the Limi­tation Act is attracted to these proceedings. As we have already pointed out, the question being one of the want of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator and the court below having jurisdiction to decide the matter suo motu, it is not necessary to decide these questions. (5) The main paint urged by Mr. Goswami for the appellant is that the additional supply formed part of the original contract which provided for a reference to the arbitrator it any dispute arose. It cannot be doubted that so far as the enhanced rate claimed by the contractor is concerned, it does not form part of any agreement. The contention of the appellant is that from the correspondence entered in­to between the railway and the contractor, it will be clear that the Railway had agreed to give enhanced rate on account of the price having gone up. We do not find anything on the record to show that there was any contract between the Railway and the con­tractor for payment of additional rate in conformity with S. 175 of the Government of India Act or with the provisions of the Constitution. The contractor had thus no right to claim the price of the material manufactured and supplied at the enhanced rate. (8) The heading of the award dated 20th July, 1949, which is marked Ex. 3 runs as follows:- "Claim of Contractor Kumbha Mawji for in­crease of rates in connection with manufacture and supply of ballast, boulders etc. The contractor had thus no right to claim the price of the material manufactured and supplied at the enhanced rate. (8) The heading of the award dated 20th July, 1949, which is marked Ex. 3 runs as follows:- "Claim of Contractor Kumbha Mawji for in­crease of rates in connection with manufacture and supply of ballast, boulders etc. from Chutiapara quarry in the years 1942-43 against Agreement No. M/A/3/MG/CE of 1942-43." There is no mention of any enhanced rate in the, agreement of 1942-43 and thus any claim for en­hanced rate cannot be regarded as any dispute arising out of or connected with the agreement. From the very nature of the agreement, it could only have been the subject matter of a separate contract which neither has been proved in this case, nor has it been established that any such contract was entered into in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and thus so tar as the award of a sum of Rs.3,67,000/-i« concerned, the award K on the face of it, in excess of jurisdiction of the arbitrator. (7) Regarding the award of Rs. 83.000/-, for the, additional supply, the sum of Rs. 83,000/- is the price, of the additional materials manufactured and supplied at enhanced rate and if the contractor is not entitled to any enhanced rate even with regard to the manufacture of additional ballast and boulders, for the supply of the same he cannot get an enhanced rate. Mr. Goswami's contention is that the award is severable and so far as the price of the additional ballast and boulders supplied by the contractor is concerned, he is entitled at the contractual rate. The main question to be considered is whether at all it can be said that he had manufactured this additional quantity under the agreement which provided for reference to an arbitrator. The main question to be considered is whether at all it can be said that he had manufactured this additional quantity under the agreement which provided for reference to an arbitrator. Clause 15 of the contract which provides for reference to the arbitration is as follows : "Arbitration (see separate page attached)-If any dispute, difference, or controversy (save and except such disputes, differences or controversies as are to be settled and decided in accordance with the provi­sions and in the manner provided for in any of the preceding clauses) shall at any time arise between the Contractor on the one hand and Governor General in Council or the said Railway Administration or the Chief Engineer of the said Railway 011 the other hand relating to the contract for the work, or as to the true construction, meaning and intent of any part, or condition of the same, or as to the manner of executing the works, or as to the quality, or descrip­tion of, or payment for the same, or as to the true intent, meaning, interpretations) construction, or effect of any of the clauses of the contract, specifica­tion or drawings or any of them or the incidents or consequences of the contract, or specifications, or drawings or any of them, or as to anything 10 be done, omitted or suffered to pursuance of the con­tract, or specifications, or as to the mode of carrying the contract into effect, or as to any breach, or alleged breach of the contract, or as to any claim, or' claims on account of such breach or alleged breach, or as to obviating for the compensating for the com. mission of any such breach, or as to any other matter, or thing connected with, or arising out of the con­tract, and whether before, or during the progress, or after the completion of the work, such question, difference or dispute shall be referred to in writing for decision to two arbitrators, one to be nominated by the Hail way and the other to be nominated by the contractor, or in case of the said arbitrators not agreeing, to an Umpire (to be appointed by the arbi­trators in writing before proceeding with the refe­rence) and the decision of the arbitrators, or in the event of their not agreeing of the Umpire appointed by them shall be final and conclusive and binding on all parties and this condition shall be deemed to be a submission to arbitration within the meaning of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 or any statutory re-enactment or modification thereof for the time being in force." The parties could refer to an arbitration any matter if any dispute arises relating to the terms of the contract or any payment to be made under the contract or any matter connected with or arising out of the contract. Admittedly the contract was for the supply of six lakhs cubic feet boulders and three lakhs cubic feet of ballast and the contract does not provide for any extra supply. (8) Reliance is placed on clause 6 (e) of the con­tract which runs as follows : "No claim for extra or additional work or works not provided for by the contract of any kind whatever shall be admitted (even though shown to be neces­sary) unless they shall have bean executed under the written orders of the Engineer-in-charge which orders the contractor must produce as vouchers for the claim." Relying upon this clause Mr. Goswami contends that if the extra supply was made under the orders of the Engineer-incharge, then it will be treated to be a supply under this contract and thus any dispute with regard to the price of the supply will be a dispute arising out of the contract, or at any rate in connection with this contract. In our opinion this interpretation of cl. 6 (e) is not correct. In our opinion this interpretation of cl. 6 (e) is not correct. This clause only lays down that the Railway will not consider the claim with regard to the extra or additional work or works not provided for by the contract, unless the order has been given by the Engineer-in charge. Bat that clause does not mean that the additional supply if any, made will be treated to be a supply under the contract. There may be a separate contract for supply of the additional material. It may be that if there was an order made by the Engineer-in-charge. the Railway may have given out in this clause that that will be treated as a sufficient contract for the supply of the materials. But that does not mean that the additional supply made even under the orders of the Engineer-in-charge will be treated to be a supply under the contract and thus any dispute relating to such a supply cannot be said to be a dispute arising out of the contract or con­nected with this contract. It should be pointed out that even though the Government may have entered into a reference and rosy have participated in the pro­ceedings, nonetheless there is no bar to the Railway challenging the validity of the award on the ground that the contract on which the claim is made was a void contract within the meaning of the Constitution. (9) In this connection reference may be made to the case of 'Union of India v.. A. L. Rallia Ram' reported in AIR 1963 S C 1685, wherein it was held : "The view that the Government of India having agreed to refer differences to arbitration and having taken part in the proceeding before the arbitrators and the umpire, had waived the objection as to the illegality of the contract and could not therefore rai?3 any such objection in application for setting aside the award cannot be accepted as correct. The requirements of S. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act are mandatory, and the fact that the Government of India did not contend before the arbitrator that there was in law no arbitration agreement on which the arbitrator was competent to act would not invest the arbitration agreement with any validity. The requirements of S. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act are mandatory, and the fact that the Government of India did not contend before the arbitrator that there was in law no arbitration agreement on which the arbitrator was competent to act would not invest the arbitration agreement with any validity. It is from the terms of the arbitration agreement that the arbitrator derives his authority to arbitrate; if in law there is no valid arbitration agreement, the proceed­ings of the arbitrator would be unauthorised." Unless we hold that by virtue of cl. 6 (e) of (he con­tract any additional supply will be treated to be a supply under this contract, any dispute with regard to that supply, cannot be referred to arbitration under cl. 15 of the contract. As we have already pointed out, the effect of cl. 8 (e.) is that the Railway may consider a claim of the contractor if a supply is made under the orders of the Engineer-in-charge and this may constitute a fresh contract for supply be­tween the Railway and the contractor, but it cannot be treated to be a supply under the contract in ques­tion. In the result, therefore, we see no force in this appeal and it is rejected. Parties will bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal rejected.