ORDER Krishnan, J.—This is an application by the loosing party (in a writ application, and also in a Letters Patent Appeal from it) for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on two grounds; the first, that under Article 133(I)(b) they are entitled to a certificate straightway and secondly, that in any event, the appeal involves a substantial question of law The first ground takes us into a consideration as to whether the Single Judge of a High Court, from whose decision a Letters Patent Appeal is filed, is the Court immediately be-low; and the second, into whether the Petitioner's belated objection to a procedural step taken by the Industrial Tribunal does really involve a substantial question of law- 2. The facts of this case have been set out at some length both in the judgment of the Single Judge in Civil Misc. Case No. 94 of 1956 a petition by the present applicant, for a writ of certiorari and supervisory order and in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 7 of 1959 from the Single Judge's judgment rejecting that petition. The applicants run a textile mill; there were disputes between them and their employees which were referred to a Tribunal. Three headings were set out in the reference, out of which the Tribunal took up one for separate consideration with the initial acquiescence of the present applicants; they objected at a later stage, but were ruled out by the Tribunal. The award on this heading (treated as a separate dispute) was favourable to the employees; they became less enthusiastic about decision on the two other headings, which might have turned out to their disadvantage. Certainly, this was a surprise to the applicants, who seem to have been banking on a balance of decisions on all the three headings, the inconvenience, if any, caused by that on one being compensated by the advantage in that in regard to the two others. The crucial question both in the original case and in the Letters Patent Appeal was, whether by splitting up the reference with the initial acquiescence of the present applicant, the Tribunal had gone beyond its reference, and this step was one affecting its basis jurisdiction not curable by the applicant's acquiescence. The crucial question both in the original case and in the Letters Patent Appeal was, whether by splitting up the reference with the initial acquiescence of the present applicant, the Tribunal had gone beyond its reference, and this step was one affecting its basis jurisdiction not curable by the applicant's acquiescence. This matter has been considered at some length in paragraphs II to 14 of the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal which negatives this and holds that the real inconvenience to the applicants had been the result of their accepting procedural measure which the tribunal was competent to take. 3. Ground No. I-The requirements for this are that there should at this stage be a decree or final order involving directly or indirectly some claim valuable at not less than Rs. 20,000; secondly, the judgment appealed from should not be one of affirmance(sic) of the decision of the Court immediately below. Certainly, this application answers to the first test. The total number of employees is about 1500 and 800 are directly involved. Possibly, the others also will get the same benefit. At all events, the 800 are to get an additional amount of Rs. 4 per month which works out in round figures to Rs. 3200 per month and Rs. 38,400 per year. If one capitalizes a monthly payment of Rs. 3200 or takes into account the award which has been affirmed throughout, the applicant's stage at this stage is certainly not less than Rs. 20,000. 4. But automatically, to get a certificate another condition has also to be fulfilled, namely, the order appealed from should not be one of affirmance of the decision of "the Court immediately below". Usually, there is little doubt as to the identity and status of the Court immediately below, or in other words, the subordination or otherwise of the Court, the order of which is itself the subject matter in appeal or revision of the final order sought to be challenged in the appeal to the Supreme Court. But where a larger Bench of a High Court is reconsidering the decision of a Single Judge, the position is not clear and, in fact, there has been difference of opinion between various High Courts. There may be different circumstances, in which the larger Bench is acting. But where a larger Bench of a High Court is reconsidering the decision of a Single Judge, the position is not clear and, in fact, there has been difference of opinion between various High Courts. There may be different circumstances, in which the larger Bench is acting. When it is a reference proper to the larger Bench, the question of subordination does not arise because there is, strictly speaking, no final decision given by the smaller or the Single Bench. But when it is a Letters Patent Appeal, there is all the appearance of subordination, and generally speaking, one would say that the Single Bench is the Court immediately below the larger Bench that entertains the appeal. Firstly, the Single Bench may be discharging the functions of a regular Civil or Criminal Court of original jurisdiction, the most common example being when in the Presidency towns as they used to be, the original side of the High Court deals with certain litigation at the first instance. This does not happen in the High Courts outside the Presidency. Where it does happen, there is a clear case of subordination to the larger Bench that hears the appeal. Secondly, the single Judge might have decided a case in appeal from the decision of the Courts below and the aggrieved party takes it up before a larger Bench in a Letters Parent Appeal, after obtaining the leave of the Single Bench itself. Thirdly, where a decision of the Single Bench is, as in the present case, a decision on an original petition, the Letters Patent Appeal is filed without such certificate. In regard to whether in "secondly" and "thirdly" the Single Bench is the "Court immediately below", there is a difference of opinion between the High Courts which, to this day, remains unresolved. 6. One view is that a Judge of a High Court sitting alone, is not a Court subordinate to the larger Bench, but performs a function directly to be performed by the High Court [Debendra Nath Das v. Bibubhendra Man Singh AIR 1916 Cal 973 )]. In a recent case the Allahabad High Court has held the same view ( Deoki Nandan Vs. In a recent case the Allahabad High Court has held the same view ( Deoki Nandan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, : No real distinction can be drawn between a Judge sitting singly in the exercise of original jurisdiction and in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; in either case he is exercising a function which is directed to be performed by the High Court. It is logically untenable to hold that the High Court is not one Court and, if that be so, then "the Court (sic) below" (sic) the meaning (sic) Clause (1) of Article 133 must be a Court other than the High Curt. The same view has been set out in a Madras judgment in Sathappa Chettier Umayal Achi (AIR 1959 Mad 39), with further elaborotion referring the cases of category 1, which would normally, not arise in a High Court outside the Presidency towns. 7. As against this, the view that a Single Bench from whose decision appeals are heard by a larger Bench is, for those purposes, a subordinate Court and comes under the description "Court immediately below" has been held by other High Courts. These two view really originated in different interpretations of a passage in the old Privy Council decision in Toolsi Prasad v. Benayak 23 Indian Appeals 102. But now they have become part of the case law of different High Courts. The earlier judgment of the Lahore High Court took the view that the Single Bench was a Court subordinate to the larger Bench hearing the Letters Patent Appeal; but the majority view in AIR 1944 458 (Lahore) was, there was no such subordination. The Nagpur view has been to the effect that the Single Bench from whose decisions a larger Bench hears the Letters Patent Appeal, is for these purposes, "the Court below". [Kishanlal v. Vithal, AIR 1956 Nag 276): For the purpose of Section 110 the decision of the Single Judge must be treated as that of a "Court below" because by his leave the Single Judge creates a superior tribunal for reconsidering his own decision, to the extent of reversing it. 8. Certainly much can be said in support of each of these views; but we are bound by the view that has been taken in this High Court, which in our opinion does not call for reconsideration at this stage. 8. Certainly much can be said in support of each of these views; but we are bound by the view that has been taken in this High Court, which in our opinion does not call for reconsideration at this stage. On behalf of the applicants, it is sought to distinguish, this ruling; it was a case where the Single Judge had to give leave before the Letters Patent Appeal could be filed, where as the present case is one where no such leave is necessary. In our opinion this difference is not essential. The question is not whether leave is granted or not; the decision of the Single Bench goes to the larger Bench for reconsideration to the extent of reversal. Actually, where no such certificate is needed, the argument is stronger that the Single Bench is the "Court below". Thus, the first ground urged by the applicant that he is entitled to a certificate as a matter of course, cannot be accepted. He should, therefore, show that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. Ground No. 2.- 9. The applicant has tried to convince us that the stay taken by the tribunal in taking up for early and separate consideration one of the three headings set out in the reference is not merely one of procedure, but one going against the reference itself. The question formulated is, whether in a case like the present one, where more than one headings of dispute are included in the reference to the tribunal, there is an implied direction that, in no event, the tribunal should split up the headings, and dispose them of one after another, or whether the manner and the sequance in which the headings of the dispute are to be taken up for consideration is left to the tribunal itself. This having been considered at some length in the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal, it is unnecessary to repeat the reasoning. We have already, held that it is a matter of procedure pure and simple, and there is no indication that all the headings should be disposed of by one award, the tribunal is being bound to treat as a single non-separable dispute. The step taken is procedural, fair and reasonable in itself, and acquiesced in by the applicants themselves. We have already, held that it is a matter of procedure pure and simple, and there is no indication that all the headings should be disposed of by one award, the tribunal is being bound to treat as a single non-separable dispute. The step taken is procedural, fair and reasonable in itself, and acquiesced in by the applicants themselves. No doubt, this has led to a separate decision, on the minimum wage in favour of the employees; the applicants have lost the opportunity of using this as bargaining counter in the two other disputes. But this result which is certainly inconvenient to the applicants is the result of a procedure which they had accepted. 10. For these reasons, it is not possible for this Court to grant a certificate to the effect that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. The result is, the application for leave is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Razzaque, J. I agree.