Judgment Kamla Sahai, J. 1. This application is directed against an order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate in charge of Hajipur, dated the 7th September, 1960, whereby he has called upon the petitioner to furnish an interim bond of Rs.1,000/- with two sureties of Rs.500/- each. He has passed this order in a proceeding under Sec.107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was pending against the petitioner. 2. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Ramen-shwar Prasad Sinha has urged three points. His first point is that the stage at which an order under Sec.117 (3) could be passed had not been reached when the order dated the 7th September was passed. His contention is that an order tinder that sub-section can only be passed after the Magistrate has started taking evidence in accordance with Sub-section (1) of Sec.117. His second point is that an order under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 cannot be based upon a police report. The last point is that the Magistrate was bound to give reasons for passing the order under Sub-section (3 ). In support of all these arguments, he has relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Jagdish Prasad Verma V/s. The State, AIR 1957 Pat 106 . 3. In my judgment the learned counsel has misconceived the scope of the above decision. In that case, the learned Magistrate had, by the same order, drawn up a proceeding under Sec.107 against the petitioners and had called upon them to execute bonds under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117. Their Lordships held that an order under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 could only be passed when the stage of Sub-section (1) of Sec.117 was reached or, in other words, when the Magistrate was proceeding to enquire into the truth of the information on the basis of which he had drawn up the proceeding under Sections 107, 108, 109 or 110. Sec.112 provides, when the Magistrate considers it necessary to take preventive action under any of these four sections, he shall make an order in writing setting forth several matters mentioned in the section. If the person who is proceeded against is present in Court, the order drawn up under Sec.112 has to be read over or explained to him under Sec.113. If he is not present in Court, the Magistrate has ordinarily to issue a summons, under Sec.114, requiring him to appear. If the person who is proceeded against is present in Court, the order drawn up under Sec.112 has to be read over or explained to him under Sec.113. If he is not present in Court, the Magistrate has ordinarily to issue a summons, under Sec.114, requiring him to appear. If he is in custody, a warrant has to be issued directing the officer, in whose custody he is detained, to produce him before the Court. The proviso to Sec.114, lays down that, whenever it appears to the Magistrate that there is reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace and that such breach of the peace cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of the person concerned, he may issue a warrant in the very first instance. Under Sec.115, every summons or warrant issued under Sec.114 is to be accompanied by a copy of the order made under Sec.112, and the copy has to be delivered by the officer serving or executing the summons or warrant to the person upon whom it is served or executed. It is perfectly clear from Ss.113, 114 and 115 that they provide a complete procedure for making the terms of the order drawn up under Sec.112 known to the person against whom preventive action is taken Tinder any of the four sections mentioned above. Sub-section (1) of Sec.117 provides for the Magistrate to enquire into the truth of the information upon which he has taken action. It lays down that the Magistrate will proceed with the enquiry after the order under Sec.112 has been read or explained under Sec.113 or the person concerned has been brought before him in compliance with, or in execution of, the summons or warrant issued by him under Sec.114. If it appears to the Magistrate at any time before the person proceeded against is brought to his Court that there is likelihood of a brench of the peace and that it cannot be prevented otherwise than by immediate arrest of the person proceeded against, he may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of that person. If it appears to the Magistrate at any time before the person proceeded against is brought to his Court that there is likelihood of a brench of the peace and that it cannot be prevented otherwise than by immediate arrest of the person proceeded against, he may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of that person. There is no provision for keeping the person in custody after he has been brought to Court in compliance with the summons or in execution of the warrant issued under Sec.114 except that in Sec.117 (3), which empowers a Magistrate to detain the person in custody until he executes the interim bond or the enquiry is concluded. It seems to me therefore, that, when the person proceeded against is present in Court and the order under Sec.112 is read or explained to him under Sec.113, or, when he is brought to Court to compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant issued under Sec.114, the manner in which the Magistrate can safeguard against commission of a breach of the peace by that person is provided for in Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 only. It is not at all necessary that he should start taking evidence before taking action under that Sub-section. In other words, the stage at which a Magistrate can take recourse to Sub-section (3) is reached as soon as the stage of Sec.113 or Sec.114 is passed. Banerji, J. , who delivered the judgment of the Bench in Jagdish Prasad Vermas case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 has made this clear by the following observation: "it is only when the person is present in Court or has been brought before the Court that a Magistrate can take into consideration whether circumstances do exist for taking immediate measures and, when he is fully satisfied that such circumstances do exist, then and then only he can direct the execution of an ad interim bond, but, before taking re-course to this action, he has to put his reasons in waiting. " In my judgment, therefore, there is absolutely no substance in the argument that an order under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 cannot be passed until the Magistrate has started recording evidence. In the present case, it was by his order dated the 10th May, 1960, that the learned Magistrate directed a proceeding under Sec.107 to be drawn up against the petitioner. In the present case, it was by his order dated the 10th May, 1960, that the learned Magistrate directed a proceeding under Sec.107 to be drawn up against the petitioner. He passed the order which is impugned by the present application only after the petitioner appeared before him in pursuance of the summons issued under Sec.114. The first point, therefore, fails. 4. There is also no merit in the second point. There is nothing in the decision in Jagdish Prasad Vermas case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 which can be construed to mean that a Magistrate cannot act upon a police report for the purpose of taking action under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117. Mr. Ravneshwar Prasad Sinha has relied upon one observation of Bnerji, J. in that case which reads: "later, on the date fixed for execution of the ad interim bonds, he merely expressed that the police report indicated that the members of the opposite party were likely to create a breach of the peace. To my mind, even this reason is not sufficient to pass an order under Sec.117 (3)". In my opinion, this observation does not mean that the Magistrate cannot act upon a police report. Indeed, there is nothing in Sec.117 to indicate that the Magistrate must take some preliminary evidence before taking action under Sub-section (3 ). A police report or any other material may be sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate that it is necessary for him to take action under that sub-section, and there will be absolutely no illegality if he takes action after being so satisfied on the material, which is before him. The reference to the police report in the Magistrates order was not considered sufficient in the decision in Jagdish Prasad Vermas case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 for the simple reason that the Magistrate, though required by Sub-section (3) to give his reasons in writing, had not done so. In these circumstances, this point also fails. 5 The last point which learned counsel has urged is perfectly correct, as the Magistrate is bound under the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 itself to record his reasons in wriiing for taking action under that sub-section. In the present case, the Magistrate has not given his reasons in writing in the order which is impugned. This omission is wrong. In the present case, the Magistrate has not given his reasons in writing in the order which is impugned. This omission is wrong. In view of the plain wording of Sub-section (3) and also in view of the fact that the mistake generally committed by Magistrates has been pointed out in the decision in Jagdish Prasad Verms case, AIR 1957 Pat 106 Magistrates must pass self-contained orders, and they must give their reasons in writing for taking ation under Sub-section (3) in the very same Order which they pass under that sub-section. I do not, however, fuel disposed to interfere in this case because there has been a substantial compliance with the requirements of the section. In an order, dated the 29th June, 1950, the Magistrate has recorded that a petition has been filed to show that the opposite parties (i. e. , the present petitioner and others) are committing overt acts even during the pendency of the proceeding. In another order, dated the 2nd July, 1960 the Magistrate has stated that he had heard parties and perused papers including copies of sanahas. He has also said that it was stated on the 25th May, 1960, that the opposite parties had been committing overt acts in spite of the proceeding having been drawn up against them, that they were asked to show cause why interim bonds should not be required from them, that the Opposite parties had denied the allegation, that the applicant (Lalit Singh, at whose instance the proceeding under Sec.107 was drawn up) had filed another petition on the 29th June, I960, enclosing copies of three station diary entries, and that this was compered by the opposite party by saying that the Hajipur police was against them. On these facts, he directed the Circle Inspector of Hajipur to verify the samaha entries and to report whether the opposite party were still misbehaving with Lalit Singh. The Inspector of Police, accordingly, submitted a report dated the 5th September, 1960, to the Sub-division.1 Magistrate, stating that he had verified the station diary entries, that he was satisfied that the members of the opposite party were doing overt acts which might load to serious trouble any day, and that it was necessary for the sake of peace to take action against them under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117. This report was placed before the Magistrate on the 7th September, and it was then urged on behalf of the opposite party that the Inspector of Police was a relation of Lalit Singh. The Magistrate did not accept this allegation, and directed that the opposite party should execute interim, bonds. The petitioner was one of those effected by the order as he was one of the Opposite Party before the Magistrate. If all the orders which I have referred to are read together along with the report of the Inspector of Police, it is perfectly clear that there were good reasons on which the Magistrate could take action under Sub-section (3) of Sec.117 which he has done against the petitioner. The only technical mistake which he has committed is that he has not made reference in his order dated the 7th September, 1960, to the reasons which are apparent upon his own orders and upon the Inspectors report as the reasons on the basis of which he was taking action. This is deprecated, and it is hoped that he would not commit even such technical mistakes in future. 6. For the reasons which I have given above, I do not find any merit in this application. It is, accordingly, dismissed.