ORDER :- The petitioner was holding the permanent post of a Lower Division Assistant in the Judicial Department from June, 1953 to January, 1957. On 14-1-1957, he was appointed by the Inspector-General of Police, Manipur, as Sub-Inspector of Police. He underwent training for a period of one year and on the completion of training he joined the Police Force at Imphal in January, 1958. On 25-10-1959, there was a written complaint against him that under the influence of liquor he used abusive language and indecent words in the Hotel of one Srimati Purnimashi Devi at Naoremthong. He was kept under suspension from 27-10-1959 by the Inspector-General of Police and an enquiry was ordered. The petitioner submitted written statement on 27-11-1959 on the charges framed against him. The enquiry was conducted by Dy. Superintendent of Police Shri A. Kaminibudhu Singh. He took down statements from certain witnesses, but it was not done in the presence of the petitioner and no opportunity was given to him to cross-examine the witnesses. The Enquiring Officer submitted a report on 21-2-1960 holding that the petitioner drunk liquor in the hotel and created nuisance under the influence of drink and that his conduct was not above reproach and that in view of his unsatisfactory conduct during his probationary period, it was not desirable to retain him in the force and that he may be discharged from service if there was nothing irregular. On this report, the Inspector-General of Police, issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 7-3-1960 calling upon him to state in writing within 8 days why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner filed a written statement in reply. On this report, the Inspector-General of Police, issued a show cause notice to the petitioner on 7-3-1960 calling upon him to state in writing within 8 days why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner filed a written statement in reply. Thereafter on 24-6-1960, Shri L. Gopal Singh, who had by then been reverted as Superintendent of Police from the original post of Inspector-General of Police passed the order Annexure A/7, which is now complained against in this writ petition stating that he was satisfied that the petitioner under the influence of drink had uttered indecent things causing annoyance to many members of the public, that his explanation was not satisfactory, that he was a probationer who had not passed his departmental examination completely, that in view of his young age he felt inclined not to take drastic action leading to his dismissal and that he was therefore discharged from service with effect from the date on which he was placed under suspension. 2. Now the contention of the petitioner is that he was holding a permanent post both in the Office of the District and Sessions Judge as well as in the Police Department, that he was therefore entitled to the protection under Article 311 of the Constitution, that he was not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the enquiry, that the said enquiry was in contravention of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution that the order of discharge Annexure A/7 amounted to an order of dismissal and was not passed by proper authority and that therefore a writ of certiorari should be issued quashing the said order. 3. According to the respondents, the petitioner was only a probationer who cannot claim any right to hold the post, that until the satisfactory completion of his probation he could be discharged from service, that the order Annexure A/7 did not amount to a dismissal, but only to a discharge, that Article 311 of the Constitution will not apply to the petitioner and that therefore Annexure A/7 is not liable to be set aside. 4. 4. The petitioner had produced a copy of the order of the discharge as Annexure D and it was seen to have been signed by the Additional Superintendent of Police and it was the case of the petitioner that the Additional Superintendent of Police had no authority to order his discharge amounting to his dismissal. But the respondents produced the copy, Annexure A/7 of the original order which was seen to have been signed by the Superintendent of Police Shri L. Gopal Singh. In view of the contradiction between Annexure D and Annexure A/7 the original order was called for and it was seen that the original order was signed by Shri Gopal Singh, Superintendent of Police. At the time of hearing of this application the contention of the petitioner was that he was appointed by the Inspector-General of Police and that the order of discharge which amounted to dismissal cannot be made by the Superintendent of Police, but only by the Inspector-General of Police. That will depend on the question whether the petitioner was a permanent Sub-Inspector of Police and not a probationary Sub-Inspector of Police. 5. Thus the main point to be decided in this case is whether the petitioner was a permanent Sub-Inspector of Police as contended by him or only a Sub-Inspector of Police on probation as contended by the respondents on the day when the Order Annexure A/7 was passed, namely, 27-6-1960. It is admitted by both parties that the petitioner was first appointed on 14-1-1957 and he was sent for training for a period of one year and after his return from training he was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police in January, 1958. In the case of the Police Force in Manipur, it is the Assam Police Manual, which has been made to apply. Rule 13 in Part III of the Assam Police Manual will apply to the case of the petitioner. Under that Rule, Sub-Inspectors of Police are appointed on probation as cadets. The cadets had to undergo training and after passing out of the Training College successfully, they are posted as probationary Sub-Inspectors of Police undergoing practical training in Districts for two years. It is stated in the Rule that they will be continued to be on probation in Districts until they have finished the practical training and have been confirmed on passing the prescribed departmental examinations completely. It is stated in the Rule that they will be continued to be on probation in Districts until they have finished the practical training and have been confirmed on passing the prescribed departmental examinations completely. Thus in the case of the petitioner the probationary period must continue for a period of two years from January, 1958. It was during this period of probation that the alleged occurrence which led to his discharge took place on 24-10-1959. Thus, there can be no doubt that at the time of the occurrence the petitioner was a probationer as the period of two years practical training had not expired. During probation he has to pass the departmental examinations completely. The order of discharge Annexure A/7 shows that he has not passed his departmental examinations completely. It is not the petitioners case that he has passed all the departmental examinations. Again, the file relating to the departmental enquiry against him which was produced in Court showed that the petitioner had passed all the subjects except revolver practice from the P. T.C. Barrackpore and that he has not passed the revolver practice. The petitioner has not been declared as having satisfactorily completed his probation and no order of confirmation has been passed in his case. Thus, it is clear that on 24-6-1960 when the order of discharge was passed the petitioner was still only a probationer. It may also be mentioned here that on 24-3-1959, the letter Annexure A/8 was written by the Inspector-General of Police to the District and Sessions Judge that the petitioner was a probationer and he may be confirmed in the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police in due course. Evidently, this was in reply to a query from the District and Sessions Judge in whose Office the petitioner held a permanent appointment as to whether his lien in the Judicial Department should be terminated or not. Thus, as he was only a probationer his lien in the Judicial Department still remained on the date he was discharged from the Police Department by the order Annexure A/7. 6. In view of his not passing the departmental examinations completely and in view of no order of confirmation being passed in his case as required under Rule 13 Part III of the Assam Police Manual, he has still to be treated as only a probationer. 6. In view of his not passing the departmental examinations completely and in view of no order of confirmation being passed in his case as required under Rule 13 Part III of the Assam Police Manual, he has still to be treated as only a probationer. The petitioner relied on the appointment certificate Annexure B and it was pointed out for him that there was no mention in Annexure B that he was appointed on probation or that he has to pass any departmental examinations. But the appointment certificate is a document issued under Rule 30 Part III of the Assam Police Manual and under Section 8 of Act V of 1861 and the appointment certificate will not indicate whether the Officer was permanent or on probation. Actually, Rule 30, referred to above, provides for such appointment certificate being issued to officers on probation. It is intended to enable them to function as Police Officers under Act V of 1861. The conditions of appointment of Sub-Inspectors of Police are provided for under Rule 13 of Part III of the Assam Police Manual and it is clear from the same that all appointees as Sub-Inspectors after training in the Trailing College will be on probation for a period of two years and that during that period they have to complete their practical training and pass all the departmental examinations completely. Until then they will be on probation. At the end of the probation an order of confirmation has to be passed. The petitioner has not gone through all that process and hence there can be no doubt that he was only a probationer. 7. In the case of a probationer, he has no right to the post as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 . A similar case came before the Supreme Court recently in the State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, reported in AIR 1961 SC 177 . In that case the person concerned was a Sub-Inspector of Police appointed in the year, 1950 on probation. A similar case came before the Supreme Court recently in the State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, reported in AIR 1961 SC 177 . In that case the person concerned was a Sub-Inspector of Police appointed in the year, 1950 on probation. Under Rule 681 of the Orissa Police Manual, Sub-Inspectors appointed direct shall be on probation for a period of two years and at the end of that period, those pronounced competent and fit will be confirmed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and the others will be discharged by the same authority. No such order of confirmation had been passed in the case of the Officer concerned until July, 1954. In July, 1954 notice was served on him to show cause why he should not be discharged from service for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work. He submitted an explanation and asked for an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But the Deputy Inspector-General of Police considered his explanation and passed an order stating that it was no good retaining the Officer further in service and that he was discharged from the date on which the order was served on him. The High Court of Orissa held that reasonable opportunity ought to have been given to the Officer within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the order of discharge was therefore invalid and set aside the same. The supreme Court set aside the order of the High court and quoted extensively from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhingras case, AIR 1958 SC 36 and held that the Officer concerned being a probationer had no right to the post held by him and as such a termination of his employment did not carry with it any evil consequences. The Supreme Court stated that the expression "discharge" in the order terminating the employment of a public officer was not decisive and that even an order discharging a temporary public servant may or may not amount to dismissal and as to whether it amounted to an order of dismissal depended upon the nature of the enquiry, if any, the proceedings taken therein and the substance of the final order passed on such enquiry. 8. In that particular case Rule 55-B of the Civil Services. 8. In that particular case Rule 55-B of the Civil Services. (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 applied and under the said rule the probationer had to be apprised of the grounds of the proposal to terminate his employment and given an opportunity to show cause against it before orders were passed by the authority competent to terminate the appointment. The enquiry in that particular case was treated as one to ascertain whether he was fit to be confirmed. To such an enquiry, Article 311 (2) of the Constitution was held not to apply. 9. In our present case, Rule 55-B of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 will not apply as Manipur is a Union Territory and the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 would apply and there is no provision in the said Rules for any enquiry to decide whether a probationer was fit for confirmation. Even, if such an enquiry was necessary, the enquiry which took place against the petitioner can be treated as such an enquiry and it has actually been more elaborate than the enquiry in the Supreme Court Case AIR 1961 SC 177 . The petitioner was given a copy of the charges and he was allowed to submit an explanation and after that the Deputy Superintendent of Police Kamini Bidhu Singh made an enquiry. In the said enquiry, it is true that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses. The Enquiring Officer, in his report only suggested that the probation of the petitioner may be ordered to cease and he may be discharged from service. A copy of that order was given to the petitioner. Of course, the Inspector-General of Police thereafter issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner submitted a second explanation showing cause. This also was taken into consideration by the Superintendent of Police, Shri Gopal Singh, who had by then reverted to that post from the post of Inspector-General of Police. In the order Annexure A/7, the question was considered whether the petitioner should be dismissed from service or only discharged. It was mentioned in the said order that in view of the petitioners young age, no drastic action leading to his dismissal need be made and that it was sufficient if he was discharged from service. In the order Annexure A/7, the question was considered whether the petitioner should be dismissed from service or only discharged. It was mentioned in the said order that in view of the petitioners young age, no drastic action leading to his dismissal need be made and that it was sufficient if he was discharged from service. The wording of the order itself shows that if the Superintendent of police had decided to dismiss him drastic action leading to his dismissal would have been taken. That will mean a further enquiry as contemplated under Article 311 (2) after giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to meet the charge brought against film. Thus it is clear that the intention of the Superintendent of Police was only to discharge him from service and not to dismiss him. Thus, as pointed out in the Supreme Court decision, the discharge in the present case was not intended as a dismissal but only as a mere termination of the service as a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Police Department. In such a case Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted as it will not amount to dismissal or removal. I am not in a position therefore to hold that the provisions of Article 311 have been violated in passing the order and no writ can therefore issue against such an order and this application will have to be dismissed. 10. I must however refer to one aspect of the matter which evidently has missed the attention of the Superintendent of Police. The petitioner held a permanent post in the Judicial Department and had a lien on it when he was discharged from service in the Police Department on 24-6-1960. Thus, when he was discharged from the Police Department, he must revert to his permanent post in the Judicial Department. The proper order that should have been passed by the Superintendent of Police was that the petitioner was discharged from the police Department and that he would revert to the Judicial Department to his permanent post. It is clear from Annexure 8 that the Superintendent of Police was quite aware that the petitioner held a permanent post and had a lien in the Judicial Department. Hence on the day he was discharged from the Police Department, he has to be reinstated in the Judicial Department. It is clear from Annexure 8 that the Superintendent of Police was quite aware that the petitioner held a permanent post and had a lien in the Judicial Department. Hence on the day he was discharged from the Police Department, he has to be reinstated in the Judicial Department. Thus, the discharge from the Police Department can only be with effect from 24-6-1960, the actual date when the order of discharge was passed. Actually, in Annexure A/7, the order was passed that he was discharged from service with effect from the date on which he was placed under suspension, that is, from 27-10-1959. There is no prevision permitting a probationer being discharged from a date anterior to the date on which the order of discharge is passed. I may point out here that in the case in AIR 1961 SC 177 , the order of discharge took effect only from the date of the actual order and not from an anterior date as in the present case. In the case of the Officer concerned in the Supreme Court decision, he did not hold a permanent post in another Department when he was appointed on probation in the Police Department as in the present case. Thus, it is all the more reason why in the present case, the order of discharge cannot take effect from an anterior date, because the difficulty will arise regarding the position of the petitioner as a public servant during the period of his suspension from 27-10-1959 till 24-6-1960. Further, it will mean that the petitioner will have to refund the allowance paid to him during the period of suspension and to that extent it will mean that evil consequences will ensure from the order of discharge. This appears to have been lost sight of by the Superintendent of Police when passing the order of discharge. That portion of the order has, therefore, got to be set aside in the present case and it has to be held that the order of discharge with effect from 27-10-1959 was wrong and it has to take effect only from the actual date of the order, namely 24-6-1960. It has also to be made clear that with effect from 24-6-1960, the petitioner shall be deemed to hold his permanent post in the Judicial Department wherein he had a lien. It has also to be made clear that with effect from 24-6-1960, the petitioner shall be deemed to hold his permanent post in the Judicial Department wherein he had a lien. It was the duty of the first respondent the Union Territory of Manipur, to have passed a further order that the petitioner will revert to his original Department with effect from 24-6-1960. It has to be declared that from 24-6-1960 the petitioner is to be deemed to be holding his permanent post in the Judicial Department. With this modification this writ application has to be dismissed. 11. As there has been no violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the order of discharge under Annexure A/7 cannot be set aside except to the extent that the order shall effect only from 24-6-60 and not from 27-10-1959. It is accordingly ordered that the order Annexure A/7 in so far as it seeks to terminate the service of the petitioner with effect from 27-10-1959 is set aside and the order of discharge shall take effect only from 24-6-1960. It is also declared that from the date of the order of discharge the petitioner shall be deemed to hold his permanent post in the Judicial Department. In other respects, this application is dismissed. Under the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Order accordingly.