This is a reference by a Division Bench. The point referred to is:— Whether a person holding under a lease (written or oral) for a fixed period is a tenant or a trespasser in the event of his retaining possession over the lease land after the expiry of the stipulated period (for purposes of ejectment)? The circumstances leading to the reference shortly are that a Division Bench deciding the case Ghisa Vs. Gyarsa preferred in RRD 1958, 37-39) came to the conclusion that a tenant remaining in possession after the expiry of the period fixed in the lease is a tenant for the purposes of ejectment and could not be ejected as a trespasser. In a subsequent case Bhonriya Vs. Devi Sahai another Division Bench arrived at a different view i.e. a person retaining possession after the expiry of his fixed term becomes a trespasser, as defined in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. As the same question arose before the Bench seized of the present case by this reference it seeks a decision of Full Bench to resolve the divergence of the views expressed in the two aforementioned cases on the same point of law, We have heard shri Roop chand Sogani and Shri Madan Mohan Tiwari appearing for the two opposite view?, Ski Sogani supported the view taken in Ghisa Vs. Gyarsa. His contention is that a tenancy commencing under a lease does not extinguish by merely efflux of time and therefore notwithstanding the fact that the stipulated period in a lease has expired, the tenancy remains in tact. Therefore a person holding under such a lease would be a tenant and cannot be trespasser. Shri Tiwari appearing for the opposite view i.e. the one taken in Bhonriya Vs. Devi Sahai placed reliance on the definition of the word trespasser as given in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and in support of his contention relied upon a High Court decision, A.I.R. 1957-362. The facts of Ghisa Vs. Gyarsa were that a tenant entered into the possession of the holding through a proper lease duly executed by the co-khatedars but subsequent lease under which the tenant wanted to remain in possession was void as it was only executed by one of the two khatedars. The facts of Ghisa Vs. Gyarsa were that a tenant entered into the possession of the holding through a proper lease duly executed by the co-khatedars but subsequent lease under which the tenant wanted to remain in possession was void as it was only executed by one of the two khatedars. It was held by the majority of the Bench that the tenant entered the holding lawfully under the first lease and after the expiry of the period of the lease his status remained that of a tenant holding over and not of a trespasser. On the facts of the case the two members relied on the decision contained in AIR 1954 Bom., 858 and observations of Chhagla C.J. The facts of Devi Sahai Vs. Bhonriya were that the respondent Bhoriya was admitted as a tenant by the appellant khateder for one year on payment of 18 maunds of barley as fixed rent and an agreement Ex.P1 was executed. A suit was filed by the appellant khatedar. The respondent repudiated the title of the khatedar and set up adverse possession on the ground that he acquired khatedari rights under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. In the second appeal it was held after distinguishing the facts of this case from that of Ghisa Vs. Gyarsa that the respondent was clearly a trespasser as he retained possession without lawful authority as defined in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and he should be ejected under sec. 183 of the Rajas:han Tenancy Act as a trespasser. It is not where disputed that a trespasser who unlawfully enters into possession of a holding is a trespasser ab initio and could be evicted under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The question arises therefore whether a person whose entry into possession of a holding was lawful but who retains possession of the holding unlawfully is a trespasser or not. The High Court of Bombay in AIR 1954-338 in a case under the Government Premises (Eviction) Act 1950 came to the conclusion that a tenant whose entry into the premises was lawful does not ipso facto become a trespasser on the expiry of the term of the lease unless evicted by a due process of law. The High Court of Bombay in AIR 1954-338 in a case under the Government Premises (Eviction) Act 1950 came to the conclusion that a tenant whose entry into the premises was lawful does not ipso facto become a trespasser on the expiry of the term of the lease unless evicted by a due process of law. C.J. Chhagla observed that under the Indian law, however different the English Law may be, his possession is protected by law because after the termination of the tenancy his possession was juridical and was protected under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He has a right to sue for possession against the landlord if he deprives him of his possession otherwise than in due course of law. Such remedy was not available to a trespasser but only to an erstwhile tenant. Shri Madan Mohan Tiwari has cited Sawa V Naki Mohd. AIR 1957 Rajasthan 362 in support of the proposition that a tenant after the expiry of the period of lease becomes a trespasser. In this case the point involved for determination was entirely different. The main question related to jurisdiction over a suit for redemption of mortgage of agricultural land. It was held that a suit for possession with respect to an agricultural land against a person who unlawfully retains possession inasmuch as against a person who came upon it unlawfully in the very first instance must be held to be a revenue suit. It was further held that the deed of mortgage being unregistered the position in law was that the defendant was either a trespasser from the very beginning or he was a trespasser when he had been called upon to restore possession but had declined to do so. Obviously therefore this decision is not of any guidance while deciding the point referred to us. As far as the law of tenancy relating to non-agricultural land is concerned the position is perfectly clear and it is well settled law as laid down by Chhagla C. J. in AIR. 1954 Bombay 358 that a tenant who enters possession of a holding in a lawful manner is not a trespasser after the lease has been determined because his possession is juridical and is protected by law under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. 1954 Bombay 358 that a tenant who enters possession of a holding in a lawful manner is not a trespasser after the lease has been determined because his possession is juridical and is protected by law under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. It clearly means that a tenant who does not voluntarily surrender possession of the land after the expiry of the lease has to be evicted under the due process of law and not by use of force which could be used against a trespasser. The question remains whether this doctrine of juridical possession and protection extends to the cases falling under the,agricultural tenancies and a tenant whose tenancy has expired is entitled to any protection of the law or not. The provision of the determination of the tenancy on the expiry of a term for which it was created does not find place in Chapter V sec. 63 of the Act. The aforesaid section only relates to 7 cases under which the given tenancy could be extinguished and there is no provision of the extinction of the tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiry of the period for which it was created. Even then sec. 74 of the same Act further provides that when a tenants interest is extinguished he has to vacate his holding, but he would have the same right as he would have upon ejectment under the provisions of that Act and would; not be treated as a. trespasser. Further no tenant can be ejected except in accordance with the provisions contained in sec. 161 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. A tenant has a remedy by way of restoration of his possession for wrongful possession under sec. 187 A and 187 B of the same Act, Sec. 180 provides additional circumstances for ejectment of a khudkash or Ghair khatcdar tenant or sub-tenant. Under the same section a tenant holding from year to year or under a lease the period of which has expired is liable to be ejected, the lease after the commencement of the Act has to be made under sec. 45 of the Act only. Thus before a tenant could be ejected on the expiry of the period of the lease all the provisions of law under sec. 180 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act will have to be satisfied. 45 of the Act only. Thus before a tenant could be ejected on the expiry of the period of the lease all the provisions of law under sec. 180 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act will have to be satisfied. Therefore in the agricultural tenancy scheme there is semblance of the juridical possession of the tenant whose term of lease has expired and has not been evicted and his possession is protected by law. Sec. 180 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides additional grounds for the ejectment of khudkasht or Ghair Khatedar tenants and sub-tenants as below :— (1) Tenant or sub-tenant holding from year to year or (2) A tenant or sub-tenant under a lease or sub-lease granted after the commencement of this Act under sec. 45 of which the period has expired or will expire before the and of the agricultural year. The words which are of material significance for our present purposes are "the period of which has expired" which make it manifestly clear that even after the expiry of the period of the lease the tenant: holding thereunder is liable to eviction under this provision of law. We have no hesitation in saying that the only purpose of this express provision is to protect a person from ejectment as a trespasser. To arrive at any different conclusion would clearly be inconsistent with the terms of this unambiguous provision of law. We therefore hold that the only provision | of law for the ejectment of a tenant or a sub-tenant after the expiry of his period of the lease :is sec. 180(1)(b) and he cannot be ejected as a trespasser Before leaving the case we may observe some thing about the definition of the term trespasser, as contained in sec. 5 (44) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It has been defined as a person who takes or retains possession of land without authority or who prevents another from occupying land duly let out to him. It was argued that a tenant after the expiry of the lease period retained land without authority. It was therefore further argued that he should be deemed to be a trespasser. There is no substance in this contention for a variety of reasons. The definitions contained in sec. 5 are subject to the all pervading restriction "unless the context otherwise requires". It was therefore further argued that he should be deemed to be a trespasser. There is no substance in this contention for a variety of reasons. The definitions contained in sec. 5 are subject to the all pervading restriction "unless the context otherwise requires". This clearly means that if the context requires otherwise the definition as given in sec. 5 shall not be allowed to prevail but shall be the same as may be in conformity with the requirements of the context. As pointed out above sec. 180 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act lays down that a tenant on the expiry of the period shall nevertheless continue to be a tenant for purposes of ejectment and as such the definition shall stand as demanded by the context. Secondly, the term "authority" cannot necessarily be confined to authority derived from the landholder. An authority which may accrue under the operation of law shall also be as effective as authority derived from the landholder. The protection of statute would thus be authority and hence the possession of a tenant after the expiry of the period of lease would not be of a trespasser. We therefore over-rule the decision given in Devi Sahai Vs. Bhonriya and uphold that given in Ghisa Vs. Gyarsa. The case be now returned to the Bench concerned for being proceeded with further in accordance with law.