ORDER:- This is a petition to revise the order of the learned District Judge, Manipur, vacating the order of temporary injunction granted by the Subordinate Judge in favour of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner filed the suit for a declaration of title to a land covered by Dag No.2580 under patta No.51/1370 against the respondent. His case was that he and one Joy Singh purchased the said land along with another land Dag No.2581, which was also then included in the said patta number, in a Revenue auction, that the said auction was confirmed in 1942, that since then they have been in possession paying the revenue, that subsequently, on their application the two lands were partitioned in revenue case No.106 of 1950-51-B. T., and a separate patta issued to Joy Singh for the land under Dag No.2581, while Dag No.2580 remained in the old patta number, that in 1958 the petitioner came to know that the respondent had managed to get his name mutated for patta No.51/1370 behind the back of the petitioner, that he applied for cancellation of the respondents name from the patta which was allowed by the S.D.C, but was later disallowed in appeal and hence he had to come forward with a suit for declaration by filing T.S. No.1/3 of 1960. 3. The respondent contested the suit and stated that the petitioner was not in possession of the property, that the respondent became the owner of the property by virtue of an oral transaction for Rs.300/- in the year, 1947 and that the suit for a. mere declaration would not lie. In the meantime, the petitioner applied for a temporary injunction against the respondent under Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C. stating that after the suit was filed the respondent with his men was attempting to interfere with the petitioners possession of the land through his tenants and threatening to beat his tenants. The respondent, of course, denied this. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge granted a temporary injunction to the petitioner stating that the respondent had not even disclosed from whom he got the land by oral purchase in 1947, while the petitioner through his relevant documents has prima facie proved his case of possession. The learned Subordinate Judge did not discuss file documents produced in the case before coming to the conclusion regarding the prima facie case of the petitioner. The learned Subordinate Judge did not discuss file documents produced in the case before coming to the conclusion regarding the prima facie case of the petitioner. The respondent took the matter in appeal to the District Judge and the District Judge appears to have mainly relied on the fact that the respondent had produced the auction receipt for the purchase of the property in the Revenue Auction by the petitioner and Joy Singh in 1942 and on the fact that the petitioners tenant was in possession, that he was not a party to the suit, that the petitioner could leave his tenant to take care of his own rights, that the petitioner could claim exemplary damages from the respondent if he succeeded in the suit and that the petitioner will not suffer irreparable loss if the injunction was vacated. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and vacated the temporary injunction. Thereupon the petitioner has come up in revision. It will be seen that the District Judge also did not consider the documents produced by the petitioner in support of his case of title and possession. It is better that the lower Courts in dealing with such applications discuss the documents of the parties in support of their respective cases before they decide whether a temporary injunction should be granted or not. 5. I do not propose to discuss the documents in this revision. But I must say that the production of the auction receipt by the respondent did not prove any title in the respondent and the learned District Judge erred in relying on that document, as it did not prove the case of the respondent in any way. Again, the petitioner had every right to defend the possession of his tenant and he was entitled to apply for temporary injunction to protect the possession of his tenant, which was on his own behalf even though the tenant was not party to the suit. Thus the grounds mentioned by the District Judge for vacating the temporary injunction were not valid grounds. 6. But there is another vital objection to an application for temporary injunction which the lower Courts have lost sight of. The suit was merely for a declaration of title on the basis that the petitioner was in possession. Thus the grounds mentioned by the District Judge for vacating the temporary injunction were not valid grounds. 6. But there is another vital objection to an application for temporary injunction which the lower Courts have lost sight of. The suit was merely for a declaration of title on the basis that the petitioner was in possession. The respondent denied the possession of the petitioner and set up his own possession from 1947 and he raised the plea that the suit for mere declaration without a prayer for consequential relief should fail. On these contentions, specific issues will arise in the suit as to whether the petitioner was in possession and as to whether the suit for mere declaration without consequential relief would lie at all. Actually, I find that these issues were raised in the suit subsequent to the disposal of the petition for temporary injunction. Thus, the question of possession was a substantial question to be decided after taking proper evidence in the case. On the finding on the question of possession would depend the very maintainability of the suit. Unless the suit is maintainable, no temporary injunction can be granted. Thus, in order to decide whether the suit was maintainable, it would have been better for the Subordinate Judge to frame the issue regarding possession, treat the issue as a preliminary issue have evidence adduced on the issue and decide the question of possession, instead of taking up the application for temporary injunction and deciding it on the basis of a prima facie case being made out. 7. The petitioner deliberately restricted his claim in the suit to a declaration of title to the suit property on the basis that he was in possession and he did not want a finding by the Court on the question of his possession. If he had wanted it he could have claimed the consequential relief of a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with his possession and paid the necessary court-fee for it. The question of possession entered into the picture only at the instance of the respondent who denied the petitioners possession and contended that the suit for a mere declaration of title was not maintainable. The question of possession entered into the picture only at the instance of the respondent who denied the petitioners possession and contended that the suit for a mere declaration of title was not maintainable. Thus, in making this application for temporary injunction, when there was no prayer in the suit for a permanent injunction the petitioner was trying to get an order in his favour on the question of possession which he did not want to be decided in the suit itself by restricting his prayer to a mere declaration of title. 8. Under those circumstances, it seems to me that Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C. cannot be applied to the present case. It is true that under Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C., when in a suit, it is proved that any property in dispute is in danger of being wasted, or damaged by any party to the suit, the Court may grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act. But in applying Order 39, Rule 1, the Court has to see the reliefs claimed in the suit and see whether the injunction would be necessary in the face of the reliefs asked for. Thus in a case where a party claims declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of a property, if he applies for a temporary injunction pending the suit, the Court will be entitled to see whether the opposite party should be restrained by a temporary injunction pending the suit. But in a suit claiming a mere relief of declaration of title on the basis that the party is in possession, the claim or the grant of a temporary injunction will be meaningless, because even granting that the party succeeds in the suit to get the relief of declaration, it will not amount to a relief of permanent injunction which the party deliberately desisted in asking for. Thus, the temporary injunction would become useless even if he succeeds in the suit in getting a declaration, because even the declaration of title will not prevent the opposite party from claiming possession after the decree in the suit. Thus, the petitioner, if he wanted any relief in the suit regarding his possession, should have asked for the consequential relief of a permanent injunction in addition to the declaration and paid the necessary court fee for it in which case he could certainly have claimed a temporary injunction. Thus, the petitioner, if he wanted any relief in the suit regarding his possession, should have asked for the consequential relief of a permanent injunction in addition to the declaration and paid the necessary court fee for it in which case he could certainly have claimed a temporary injunction. But if he omits to do so and restricts his claim to a mere declaration and when the opposite party disputes his case of possession, he cannot in this indirect manner be allowed to claim a relief of injunction thereby attempting to enlarge the relief claimed in the suit without paying the necessary court-fee. In a suit for mere declaration of title, it cannot be said that there is a property in dispute within the meaning of Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C. 9. I may in this connection refer to the decision of Bose, J., in Fakira Mahadaji v. Mt. Ramsukhibai, AIR 1946 Nag 428. That was a case which arose under Order 41, Rule 5 C.P.C. But his Lordship has also considered the scope of Order 39, Rule 1 C.P.C. and even held that in a suit for a declaration simpliciter there is really no property in dispute in the suit, but that only an incorporeal right in the property is litigated, that the fight is not about the property, but about the right to property and that in such a suit, O.39, R.1 C.P.C. will not entitle the party to get a temporary injunction in the suit. I entirely agree with that decision. 10. For the petitioner, the decision L.D. Meston School Society v. Kashi Nath Misra, AIR 1951 All 558 , was relied upon. In that decision there is an observation that in a suit for declaration, where no relief for mandatory injunction is prayed for, the Court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction merely to preserve the status quo, but that it has no jurisdiction to deprive one person from the possession of a certain property which he holds, or to give possession to one party after taking it away from another. But a reading of that decision shows that the temporary injunction granted in that case in the lower Court was actually set aside by the High Court in appeal. But a reading of that decision shows that the temporary injunction granted in that case in the lower Court was actually set aside by the High Court in appeal. The question of preservation of status quo will arise only in a case where a relief is asked for the preservation of the status quo by a decree of Court. But in a suit for mere declaration, there is no prayer for relief that status quo should be preserved. In such a case, an order to preserve the status quo cannot be passed by means of a temporary injunction. 11. Further in this case, the Court has still to decide what was the status quo on the date of the suit. The respondent, as I said, denied the possession of the petitioner ever since 1947. The question of possession has to be decided in the suit itself to see whether the suit filed by the petitioner for a mere declaration was itself maintainable. When that preliminary question of the maintainability of the suit has itself not been decided, the petitioner cannot attempt indirectly to get such a decision by an application for temporary injunction. 12. Thus, it was wrong on the part of the Subordinate Judge to have dealt with the petition for temporary injunction in a suit for mere declaration of title. His duty was to have dealt with the preliminary issue regarding the possession of the petitioner and regarding the maintainability of the suit for mere declaration. Thus for reasons which are quite different from the reasons given by the District Judge, the order of the District Judge vacating the temporary injunction in appeal has to be upheld. I must however make it clear that the vacating of the temporary injunction will not in any manner mean the acceptance of the case of possession of the respondent regarding the property. That is a matter to be decided in the suit. 13. For the above reasons, the Civil Revision is dismissed. But under the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Revision dismissed