ORDER Shivdayal, J.—The Petitioner was a Superintendent in the office of the Accountant General, Madhya Bharat. On April 1, 1950, the establishment of the Accountant General, M. B., was taken over by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (hereinafter called the Auditor General). By a Memo dated July 2, 1951, the Petitioner was informed that the Auditor General had approved the gradation of the non gazetted staff of the office of the Accountant General, Madhya Bharat, and according to it the Petitioner had been "considered fit for absorption in the Selection Grade of the Upper Division Clerks (provisional) in I. A. A. D." 2. Since several men had been 'provisionally graded' in the different grades, the Auditor General issued his "Instructions" to the Accountant General Madhya Bharat (hereinafter referred to as the Accountant General), in pursuance of which the following Order dated September 8, 1951, was issued in respect of the Petitioner: Shri B. P. Bhatnagar, is hereby informer that he has been categorised by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, only provisionally as a Selection Grade Clear. His basic place will, therefore, be in the U. D. with effect from the 1st April, 1951, but he has been allowed to officiate in the Selection Grade with effect from the sar(sic) date. The question of his absorption the Selection Grade will be decided on the results of his work for one year with effect from the 1st April, 1951. The Petitioner remained a Selection Grade Clerk with effect from April 1, 1951 to November, 7, 1956. Throughout this period he received his salary as a Selection Grade Clerk as also the usual annual increments. During the aforesaid period he also worked as a Superintendent in the Commercial Audit, a post higher than that of Selection Grade, from 1-4-51 to 13-8-55 and he was paid Rs. 30 p. m. as special pay for the post of Superintendent over and above his pay in the Selection Grade. 3. On November 7, 1956, the Petitioner was reverted to the post of an ordinary Upper Division Clerk by a telegraphic order issued by the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh. 4. All these facts are substantially admitted by the Respondent. 30 p. m. as special pay for the post of Superintendent over and above his pay in the Selection Grade. 3. On November 7, 1956, the Petitioner was reverted to the post of an ordinary Upper Division Clerk by a telegraphic order issued by the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh. 4. All these facts are substantially admitted by the Respondent. It is, however stated, in the Return that the Petitioner who was posted to work as a Superintendent was styled as a 'Clerk-in-charge' from 1-4-50 to 9-8-1955 (not 13-8-55) with a break from 23-11-53 to 1-12-53, during which period he was reverted as a Selection Grade Clerk. 5. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Petitioner's case is that he was categorized and integrated as a Selection Grade Clerk on probation for one year with effect from April 1, 1951. Since on the expiry of the said period of one year he was not reverted to the post of Upper Division Clerk, nor was his period of probation extended by the Auditor General, his services ripened into permanent service and he acquired the right to hold the post of a Selection Grade Clerk. His reversion from the Selection Grade to Upper Division Grade, Clerk amounts to punishment and he is entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. Admittedly, no opportunity was given to him to show cause against the action taken nor was any inquiry held. It is further contended that his reduction in rank was in contravention of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 6. This petition is resisted by the Accountant General on the ground that the Petitioner was never absorbed permanently as a Selection Grade Clerk, although he was allowed to officiate as such. His reversion to his substantive post of an Upper Division Clerk cannot be called a reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311. It is denied that the Petitioner was ever appointed 'on probation'; it is emphasised that his appointment in the Selection Grade was an 'officiating' one and was not fettered by any time limit. It is admitted in the Return that the question of his absorption in the Selection Grade was certainly to be considered at the end of one year as indicated in the relevant order. It is admitted in the Return that the question of his absorption in the Selection Grade was certainly to be considered at the end of one year as indicated in the relevant order. But it is alleged that although the question of his absorption in the Selection Grade was considered from time to time he was never confirmed in that grade and his services never ripened as such. 7. On a perusal of the two orders, viz., of the 2nd July and the 8th September together there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Petitioner had been categorised by the Auditor General of India as a Selection Grade Clerk, but he was to be 'tried' before he was finally absorbed and the trial penned was also fixed by him as 1-4-51 to 31-3-52, By virtue of the first order the Petitioner was considered fit for absorption in the Selection Grade although this was qualified by the word 'provisional' which was put within brackets in the said Memo. The second order was only a clarification of the word 'provisional', as rightly stated in the Return. This clarification was strictly in terms of paragraph IX of the "Instructions" dated August 11, 1961, issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in regard to the "Treatment to be accorded to the men graded provisionally" To quote the relevant instructions: Selection Grade Clerks. The basic place of the men graded provisionally in the selection grade will be in the U. D. on 1-4-51, but they will be allowed to officiate in the selection grade from the same date. The Question of their final absorption in the selection grade will be decided on the results of their work for one year with effect from 1-4-51. No other instructions were subsequently issued by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India in this behalf To me it seems incontestible that the nature of the provisional absorption of the Petitioner in the Selection Grade was purely and simply this. He was to be finally absorbed as a Selection Grade Clerk or was to be reverted as Upper Division Clerk on the result of his work done during that named period and not as a result of any other consideration. The basis of the 'decision' contemplated in his second order was particularly specified and circumscribed by the Auditor General himself 8. The basis of the 'decision' contemplated in his second order was particularly specified and circumscribed by the Auditor General himself 8. Having these premises in view, one thing which readily leaps to the eye is that the impugned order did not say (nor is it said in the Return) that the Petitioner was reverted from Selection Grade to UDC grade "on the result of his work for the one year from 1-4-51 to 31-3-52". Therefore, the order of reversion dated 7-11-56 was, on its very face, unauthorised. The reversion of the Petitioner in derogation of the terms laid down by the Auditor General amounted to punishment with- in the meaning of Article 3(sic) of the Constitution. This itself is sufficient to set aside the impugned order, 9. In the above view of the matter it becomes unnecessary to deal with the other questions canvassed before us. However, I purpose to consider one of them, which is equally significant. 10. The Petitioner calls his appointment in the Selection Grade to be 'on probation', while the Accountant General is not prepared to accept that term and calls it 'officiating'. In my opinion, such an appointment is a probationary appointment for, after all, what is 'probation' ? According to its dictionary meaning, 'probation' means testing': 'preliminary time or condition appointed to allow fitness or unfitness to appear." There can be no denying the fact that the word 'provisional' used in the case of the Petitioner really meant that he was to work as a Selection Grade Clerk and to prove himself suitable for it during the trial period of one year specified as 1-4-51 to 31-3-52. No other meaning is possible, having regard to the explanatory order of September 8, 1951. This was admittedly not a case where a person officiated temporarily a waiting the appointment of return or another incumbent. Nor was this a case where a servant was appointed to another post awaiting it to fall vacant for him to permanently occupy it, (as in the case of a provisional appointment in place of another, who goes on leave preparatory to retirement). This quarrel about the words aside, here it is admitted in paragraph 6 of the 'Return: The question of his absorption in the, selection grade was certainly to be considered at the end of the one year as indicated in the relevant order. This quarrel about the words aside, here it is admitted in paragraph 6 of the 'Return: The question of his absorption in the, selection grade was certainly to be considered at the end of the one year as indicated in the relevant order. It is not the Respondent's case that the Petitioner was reverted to the post of an Upper Division Clerk on the expiry of the said one year or that the said period of one year was extended before or on the expiry of it. It is true that no express order was either passed confirming him in the Selection Grade. Right from 1-4-5 to 7-11-56, for more than five years, the Petitioner continuously worked on the post of a Selection Grade Clerk without any break. As already stated, he actually worked as a Superintendent (or Clerk-in-charge) in the Commercial Audit, a post higher than that of a Selection Grade Clerk from 1-4- 51 to 9-8-55. It is stated in paragraph 5 of the Return that there was a break from 23-11-53 to 1-12-53, during which period he was reverted as a Selection Grade Clerk (not as an ordinary Upper Division Clerk). 11. It is certainly not the case for the Accountant General that he took four long years to take a decision whether to finally absorb the Petitioner or not in the Selection Grade on the result of the work done by him during the specified period of one year, that is, 1-4-51 to 31-3-52. A decision was to be taken on the expiry of the trial period whether to absorb him finally in the Selection Grade or to revert him as Upper Division Clerk. Since throughout the said trial period of one year, the Petitioner worked in his own office, the Accountant General Madhya Bharat could immediately take a decision one way or the other. There was no voluminous record to be examined by the Accountant General. There was only one remark dated February 13, 1952, "slow to grasp and slow to act. Further he is not getting on well with his assistant". It was open to the Accountant General either to revert the Petitioner if his work during the trial period did not prove him worthy of the Selection Grade or to confirm him inspite of the above remark. Further he is not getting on well with his assistant". It was open to the Accountant General either to revert the Petitioner if his work during the trial period did not prove him worthy of the Selection Grade or to confirm him inspite of the above remark. If he thought desirable to extent his trial period, it was open to the Accountant General to get such instructions from the Auditor General, or to extend it on his own (in fact no such power was given to him in the 'Instructions'.) The fact remains that the Petitioner was neither reverted nor was his trial period extended, nor was an express order of bis confirmation passed. It must, therefore be held that the Petitioner was impliedly absorbed in the Selection Grade when he was allowed to work for 4 years after the expiry of the trial period and was allowed to draw the usual annual increments of that post. Shri Mungre read out to us a role under which annual increments are to be given to those on probation but not to those who simply officiate. This, in my opinion, goes against the Respondent. Perhaps, there would have been some room for an argument by stressing a distinction between "on probation" and "officiating" if the Auditor General in his instructions had merely said that the Petitioner's substantive place would be in the U. D. but he would officiate as a Selection Grade Clerk, and the last sentence, "the question of his absorption in the Selection Grade will be decided on the results of his work for one year with effect from 1st April 1951", had not been there. It is stated in the Return before us: The question of Petitioner's absorption in the selection grade was certainly to be considered at the end of the one year period as indicated in the relevant order and the same was considered from time to time." It is at once striking that there was no warrant for a consideration of the Petitioner's work 'from time to time'. It is not the case for the Respondent that the initial period of probation was extended before or on its expiry. Nor is it the Respondent's case that the Petitioner had been reverted to the post of an ordinary Upper Division Clerk at any time before November 7, 1956 three reports are on the record before us. It is not the case for the Respondent that the initial period of probation was extended before or on its expiry. Nor is it the Respondent's case that the Petitioner had been reverted to the post of an ordinary Upper Division Clerk at any time before November 7, 1956 three reports are on the record before us. They are dated: February 13, 1952: November 25, 1953; and February 29, 1956. No other report has been filed in this Court. The first one runs thus: Shri B. P. Bhatnagar is slow to grasp and slow to act. Further he is not getting on well with his assistants". 12. But by this report the trial period was not extended by the Accountant General (nor, perhaps, he could). In the second report of November 1953 the Deputy Accountant General warned the Petitioner to work hard, study the code books and rules thoroughly and earn good reports if he wanted to be confirmed as a Selection Grade Upper Division Clerk. And it was also remarked that his post for confirmation would be reviewed "after six months". But this remark was made by the Deputy Accountant General and that too one and a half years after the trial period had terminated. Likewise, in the third report the Accountant General told the Petitioner that as he had been earning adverse reports it had not been possible to consider his confirmation in the Selection Grade and directed him to work hard, study code books and rules throughly and earn good reports for his work and conduct. It is obvious enough that both these reports of 1953 and 1956 are irrelevant because, according to the aforementioned "Instructions" from the Auditor General, the decision in regard to the Petitioner's final absorption was to rest on the result of his work from 1-4-51 to 31-3-52" That apart, this is not a case where a probationer's period is extended from time to time so as to give it a continuity. Here, as already stated, it is conceded by the Respondent that the question of the Petitioner's absorption was to be considered at the end of the relevant period of one year. 12. Here, as already stated, it is conceded by the Respondent that the question of the Petitioner's absorption was to be considered at the end of the relevant period of one year. 12. I confess it is not clear to me what startling emergency impelled the Respondent to revert the Petitioner by a telegraphic order when he had been allowed to work in the Selection Grade for more than four years in excess of his probationary period. In Dr. Kanshi Ram Anand Vs. The State of U.P. and Another, , the Petitioner who was serving the U. P. State Government in the Public Health Service, had completed the prescribed period of probation and had served the Government for more than one year after the expiry of that period. It was held that it could not be said that the Petitioner was on probation thereafter. In K. Ramchandra v. State of Mysore and another, AIR 1960 Mys 65, it is held: Appointment to a permanent service on probation can be terminated at any time during the period of probation. After the expiry of the period of one year, the Petitioner did not continue as probationer but became a permanent servant, and therefore, was entitled to all the protection guaranteed by the Constitution; the orders extending the period of probation and discharging the Petitioner were illegal and should be quashed. For all these reasons it must be held that the Petitioner's probation (or provisional absorption) ripened into a permanent absorption to the Selection Grade. He acquired a title to that post and his reduction in rank (or reversion) was itself a punishment as held in Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India (UOI), : The principle is that when a servant has the right to a post or to a rank under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the termination of the services of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. In State of Bihar v. Gopikishore Prasad, AIR 1960 SC 869, while dealing with the case of a person holding a post on probation, his Lordship the Chief Justice extracted five propositions from the authorities (see at page 691 of the report). The third proposition reads thus: But if instead of terminating such a person's service without any inquiry, the employer chooses to hold an inquiry into his alleged misconduct, or inefficiency; or for some similar reason, the termination of service is by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his competence and thus affects his future career. In such a case, he is entitled to the protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 13. Shri Mungre relies on the The State of Orissa and Another Vs. Ram Narayan Das, , where it has been laid down that a probationer can be discharged in the manner provided by R. 55-B Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules But Article 311 (2) of the Constitution does not apply where a probationer is discharged following upon an enquiry to ascertain whether he should be confirmed. In that case Ramnarayan Das had been appointed a sub-Inspector on probation in 1950. In view of adverse reports against him a notice was served on him in 1954 calling upon him to show cause why he should not be discharged from service for gross neglect of duties and unsatisfactory work. In the notice ten specific instances of neglect of duty and two instances of misconduct were set out. After considering his explanation but without giving him an opportunity to be heard and without taking any evidence on the charges framed, the Deputy Inspector General of Police discharged him. Their Lordships found as a fact that he was undoubtedly a probationer at the times, when he was discharged from service. In the present case the period of trial which had been fixed as one year (1-4-51 to 31-3-52) had expired long before and it was never extended by the Comptroller and Auditor General, so that the Petitioner must be deemed to have been, by implication, finally absorbed w.e.f 1-4-52. Then again, in that case their Lordships quoted Rule 55-B and observed that a notice which was required under that Rule had actually been given by the appointing authority. Then again, in that case their Lordships quoted Rule 55-B and observed that a notice which was required under that Rule had actually been given by the appointing authority. The Rule reads thus: Where it is proposed to terminate the employment of a probationer, whether during or at the end of the period of probation, for any specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service the probationer, shall be apprised of the grounds of such proposal and given an opportunity to show cause against before orders are passed by the authority competent to terminate the employment. In the present case no such notice was given. That case, therefore, does not help the Respondent here; it helps the Petitioner. To sum up the above discussion: (1) Since the Petitioner was not "reverted" because of a decision on the result of his work for the specified period of one year (1-4-51 to 31-3-52), the impugned order is beyond the purview of the orders of the Auditor-General and necessarily tantamounts to punishment (2) Since, as conceded, the question of Petitioner's final absorption was to be considered on the expiry of the said period of one year and since that period was not extended by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (who had fixed the terms of the trial) nor by the Accountant General during or at the end of the period of probation, nor was the Petitioner reverted to his substantive post of the upper Division Clerk on or soon after April 1, 1952, but he was allowed to continue to work as a Selection Grade Clerk for a long time after 1-4-52 he was by implication finally absorbed in the Selection Grade with effect from that date. Having thus acquired a title to that post, his reversion as an Upper Division Clerk is itself a punishment and calls for aid of Article 311. The impugned order must be struck down. 14. This petition is allowed. The order reverting the Petitioner from the Selection Grade to the Upper Division Clerk grade is quashed. A mandamus shall be issued to the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh directing him to treat the order dated November 7, 1956, as null and void and to give effect to the necessary consequences which entail this result, The Petitioner shall get his costs in this petition. Counsel's fee Rs. A mandamus shall be issued to the Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh directing him to treat the order dated November 7, 1956, as null and void and to give effect to the necessary consequences which entail this result, The Petitioner shall get his costs in this petition. Counsel's fee Rs. 75 cash deposited by the Petitioner as security for costs of the Respondent shall be refunded.