ORDER S.P. Bhargava, J. These are two connected appeals [Misc. (first) Appeal No. 45 of 1953 and 44 of 1958] by husband and wife arising out of a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') decided by the Second Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, on 16-1-1958. The salient facts of the case are that the Rehabilitation Department of the State Government acquired the land in dispute along with other lands situate in the village Baragwan and Tikuri for establishing the Katni township to rehabilitate displaced persons. Notification u/s 4 of the Act was published in the Government Gazette on 24-9-1952. Some portion of the land that was sought to be acquired was from before in the occupation of the Defence Department of the Government of India. At the request of the State Government, it was derequisitioned from 31st of May 1953. On the notice u/s 9 of the Act being issued to persons known or believed to be interested in the said land, several persons filed their written claims. In the present appeals, we are only concerned with the claims of Mr. T.C. Dunne and Mrs. M.G. Dunne. The land which is the subject-matter of this dispute is situated in village Baragwan. Mr. Duune is interested in 19.55 acres of land consisting of nine khasra numbers. Mrs. Dunne's interest is continued to two acres of land only. The Land Acquisition Officer allowed the total compensation of Rs. 5 606-15-0 to Mr. Dunne and this amount was improved to Rs. 9,505 by the Second Additional District Judge, Jabalpur. Similarly the Land Acquisition Officer allowed compensation of Rs. 673-7-0 to Mrs. Dunne. Instead of this amount, the Additional District Judge allowed Rs. 1,013 to her. In this appeal, Mr. Dunne claims a compensation of Rs. 3,66,608 for his area and Mrs. Dunne claims Rs. 27,750. The chief bone of contention between the parties in this case is that the compensation has been fixed by the lower Court on the basis of the entire land as purely agricultural. The appellants desire that the compensation should have been fixed on the basis that it was land suitable for non-agricultural and building purposes. Shri R.S. Dabir, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that there was no real antithesis between agricultural and non-agricultural lands. The same land may be useful for both the purposes. The appellants desire that the compensation should have been fixed on the basis that it was land suitable for non-agricultural and building purposes. Shri R.S. Dabir, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that there was no real antithesis between agricultural and non-agricultural lands. The same land may be useful for both the purposes. He urged that the lower Court was wrong in utilising the statement of the appellant, Mr. Dunne, to the effect that it was not fit for building purposes when this very land was desired to be requisitioned by the Defence Department. The Additional Government Advocate in reply stated that the admission made by Mr. Dunne was a valuable piece of evidence and the lower Court cannot be held to have been wrong in believing and acting on that admission. In our view, the stand taken on behalf of the State Government is not fully acceptable. It may be ordinarily correct to say that admissions made by any person constitute valuable evidence against him, yet in the instant case, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the land acquired had potential value as building site, as it was actually acquired for establishing township and has been so utilised. It has been held in Ramabai Shriniwas v. Bombay Government AIR 1941 Bom. 144:- A party is not bound by an admission in his pleading except for the purposes of the suit in which the pleading is delivered. It frequently happens that a party is prepared in a particular suit to deal with the case on a particular ground and to make an admission, but that admission is not binding in any other suit, and certainly not for all time. Further it is important to note that on the prior occasion when Mr. Dunne said that the land was not fit for building purposes, no decision was taken in accordance with the admission. If such decision were taken, the land would not have been requisitioned for the purposes of the Defence Department. The second point raised by Shri Dabir is that the learned Additional District Judge had based his award on evidence which was not produced before him and had further wrongly ignored the statement of Dalpratapsingh who was the solitary witness examined before him. The second point raised by Shri Dabir is that the learned Additional District Judge had based his award on evidence which was not produced before him and had further wrongly ignored the statement of Dalpratapsingh who was the solitary witness examined before him. We have carefully gone through the judgment, and find that the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge contains a discussion of the evidence of the witnesses who were examined before the Land Acquisition Officer but does not at all refer to the statement of Dalpratapsingh. Further, we find that the Land Acquisition Officer, in coming to his conclusions, had relied upon the sales made in the years 1950, 1951 and 1953 in adjoining villages of Fadarwara, Anokhi and Kelawara Khurd, as given in the register of sales. We do not find even the extracts of these sales statistics to be on record. The record does not reveal as to how many sales were made in the years 1950, 1951 and 1953 and of what different qualities of land and at what prices. Shri Dabir rightly points out that these sales have not been proved and the appellants had no opportunity to cross-examine the vendees to show the situation, nature and quality of lands covered by the sales. It is correct that the enquiry by the Land Acquisition Officer is more or less administrative and he can base his conclusions on materials obtained by him from official record. However, it was essential for the State Government to bring these sale-statistics on record before the Additional District Judge if any advantage was sought to be desired from those statistics and to examine the relevant witnesses to prove the basic transactions. The proceedings before the Additional District Judge were of a judicial character and so, it was his bounden duty to base his findings strictly on that evidence which was adduced before him or was brought on record before him with the consent of the parties from the proceedings of the Land Acquisition Officer. It has been observed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Assistant Development Officer v. Tayabali AIR 1953 Bom. 361 :- The acquiring officer's award is, of course, strictly speaking, not an award at all, but an offer. It is based on inquiry and inspection and the officer responsible for it is usually a man of experience and local knowledge. 361 :- The acquiring officer's award is, of course, strictly speaking, not an award at all, but an offer. It is based on inquiry and inspection and the officer responsible for it is usually a man of experience and local knowledge. He may take evidence but he is not bound to do so, and his proceedings are administrative rather than judicial. But if his award is not accepted and the matter is taken into Court, the proceedings are thenceforward judicial in character. The lower Court and the Land Acquisition Officer were very much impressed by the fact that the appellants had chosen to make a very tall and fantastic claim. It does appear that their claim is very exaggerated but that in itself cannot be taken to be a reason on the basis of which they should be deprived of whatever can be found to be just compensation for the land on adequate grounds. The evidence on record to furnish any reasonable basis for proper fixation of compensation is very unsatisfactory and it appears that the parties have laboured under a misapprehension of treating the evidence given before the Land Acquisition Officer as being the evidence in the case. In our view, considering the material on record, it is not possible to decide the case fairly. Under the circumstances, we consider it necessary to afford an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence with regard to the valuation of the land acquired in the year 1952 at the time that the notification u/s 4 of the Act was issued and to remand the case for this purpose. It is not necessary for us to say that the parties may agree that the evidence that was produced before the Land Acquisition Officer or any part thereof may be read as evidence in the case. We, therefore, set aside the award passed and remand the case to the lower Court with direction that it shall afford an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence about the valuation of the land acquired in the light of the observation, made above, and shall determine again the amount of compensation payable to the appellants. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed