JUDGMENT : R.K. Das, J. - This revision is directed against an order dated 26-11-1960 of Sri B. Misra, Sessions Judge of Balasore passed in Cr. App. No. 99 of 1960, confirming an order of conviction and sentence passed by Sri U.C. Misra, Magistrate, First Class, Balasore, on 11-7-1960 in CI135 of 1960. 2. The facts of the case out of which this revision arises may be stated as follows: On 15-1-1960 the Supervisor of Supplies, Balasore, while on patrol duty, found the Petitioner with a huge quantity of paddy stored in a boat in the river Dubudubi, at a distance of about 3 miles from the mouth of the river. The boat was brought back to Sulpeta and after weighment the paddy was found to be 425 mds. 10 seers. On demand the Petitioner could not produce any license or permit for the possession of the said paddy. He wag, therefore, prosecuted u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act Central Act X of 1955)-hereinafter called 'the Act' for having contravened Clause 3, sub-clause (1) of the Orissa Food grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1959 (hereinafter called the 'the order'), which order was made by the State Government of Orissa in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Act. 3. The Petitioner admits the stock of paddy in his possession. According to him he was merely a carrier for hire in respect of the said paddy in his boat which, in fact, had been delivered to him by ten different producers and that he was only a licensed Majhi of the boat in question. 4. The evidence is not clear as to the place of destination of the said boat, but it was suspected that the paddy was meant to be carried beyond Orissa to the State of West Bengal by river and sea as the boat from which the seizure of the paddy was made is a Jolly boat having its Branded No. CI8207 belonging to one Janab Ashed Ali Khan of Alipore, Thana Shyampur, District Howrah and the Petitioner holds the Manjee's license No. 3617 dated 17-9-1959 granted by the commissioners for the port of Calcutta, but that is not material for this case. 5. The prosecution examined two witnesses and the defence none. Two P.Ws. 5. The prosecution examined two witnesses and the defence none. Two P.Ws. have proved, and it is not disputed, that the Petitioner was found in possession of the above quantity of paddy loaded in his boat. P. W. 1 has further proved that the accused was not a producer of the paddy and claimed the paddy to be his. 6. It may be noted that this paddy was loose paddy and was not, kept in bags there was nothing to indicate that in fact ten different producers had separately stacked their paddy and entrusted the same to the Petitioner. The learned Magistrate, who tried the Petitioner, disbelieved the story of the accused and found him guilty u/s 7 of the Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. He also made an order for forfeiture of the entire paddy seized from Petitioner. Against this order of the learned Magistrate, the Petitioner filed an appeal before the Sessions Judge who also confirmed the order of conviction and sentence as well as of the forfeiture of the paddy and it is against this order of the learned Sessions Judge the Petitioner ha; filed the present revision in the Court. 7. Mr. Chatterji, appearing on behalf of the Petitioner contoured that in the absence of any evidence that the Petitioner was a dealer within the meaning of clause (2) of the Order, he could not be convicted for the alleged contravention of Clause 3(1) of the Order. Clause 2, Sub-Clause (1) of the Order defines 'dealer' as follows: "Dealer" means any persons who is engaged in the business of (i) purchase and/or sale of anyone or more of the food grains in quantities of 50 standard maunds or more in a single calender day: and/or (ii) storage for sale in quantities exceeding 200 standard maunds of anyone or more of the food grains for purposes of sale. It is not disputed that the paddy is one of the food grains to which the Order applies. Clause 3 of the Order deals with licensing of dealers and provides as follows: (1) No person shall carry on business as a dealer in food grains except under condition of a license issued in this behalf by the licensing authority. It is not disputed that the paddy is one of the food grains to which the Order applies. Clause 3 of the Order deals with licensing of dealers and provides as follows: (1) No person shall carry on business as a dealer in food grains except under condition of a license issued in this behalf by the licensing authority. (2) For purpose of this clause, any person who stores any food grains in quantity of two hundred maunds or more shall unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to store the food grains for the purposes of sale. According to Clause 3(2), therefore, a person, who stores any food grains in excess of 200 standard maunfls, shall be deemed to have-stored the same for the purposes of sale, and shall thus come within the definition of a 'dealer' under Clause 2(a)(ii) of the Order. 8. It was contended by Mr. Chatterji that this presumption "for purposes of sale" would not be applicable to the case of a boatman or a carrier who stored the goods in his boat for the Limited purpose of carrying the goods of another on hire. In view of the provisions of Clause 2, sub-clause (a)(ii) read with clause 3(2) of the order, however, it is clear, as aforesaid, that it will apply any person who carries on the business of carrying paddy on hire and who is found to have stored food grains in excess of 200 maunds. It is open to any person who is in possession of such stock in excess of the prescribed quantity to prove how he came to possess the said stock. In fact, in this case, the Petitioner could have easily shown by some evidence that some producers entrusted him with the said stock of paddy. In this connection, Section 14 of the Act may be seen, which runs thus: Where a person is prosecuted for contravening any order made u/s 3 which prohibits him from doing any act or being in possession of a thing without lawful authority or with a permit, license or other document, the burden of proving that he has such authority, permit, licence or other document shall be on him. The burden, therefore, was upon the Petitioner or who was in possession in excess of the permitted quantity to show that he obtained it from the producers or by any other lawful authority, permit, licence or other document. 9. Mr. Chatterji contended that once the Petitioner had disclosed the names of the ten producers to the Supervisor of Supplies and thus had given a reasonable explanation of his possession, he had discharged the onus and it was for the prosecution to examine those different persons to prove that the statement made by the Petitioner was false. In support of his contention he relied upon a decision reported in Lalco Kahar v. Emperor AIR 1942 Pat 439 (2) where their Lordships while dealing with a case of possession of stolen property u/s 412, Indian Penal Code, held that the presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act would not apply to a case where the accused had given a satisfactory explanation of his possession, Here, however, no such explanation had been offered except saying that he received the paddy from ten producers. The facts in this case are entirely different. This decision, therefore, has no application to the present case. On this point, however, the case reported in Maheswar Ram Vs. The State, and relied upon by learned Counsel for the State may be seen. This is a case where the mode of discharge of the onus u/s 14 of the Act hail been dealt with in a case of violation of Clause (3) of the Orissa Foodgrains Licensing and Storage (Regulation) Order, 1958 which is essentially similar in nature to the present order. In this case his Lordship held: Under Section 14 of the Central Act 10 of 1955 the burden is undoubtedly heavy on the Petitioner to explain that his possession of the rice and paddy was lawful. This burden can be discharged either by examining independent witnesses on his own behalf or by eliciting favourable answers from prosecution witnesses in cross-examination. In that case the Petitioner was found to be in unlawful possession of 263 mds and 20 seers of paddy for which his explanation was that a part of the stock was covered by a licence, issued by the District Magistrate, and the balance was the produce of his own land and the Petitioner was in fact an agriculturist. In that case the Petitioner was found to be in unlawful possession of 263 mds and 20 seers of paddy for which his explanation was that a part of the stock was covered by a licence, issued by the District Magistrate, and the balance was the produce of his own land and the Petitioner was in fact an agriculturist. His Lordship, therefore, found that in this state of evidence the Petitioner had discharged the burden cast upon him by Section 14 of the aforesaid Act. In the present case, however it was open to the Petitioner, as I have said already, to examine at least some of the producers who had entrusted him with the paddy for being carried to certain place or places and he would have easily discharged the onus u/s 14 of the Act. But he did not do so and remained satisfied by merely giving out certain names to the Supervisor of supplies. It was his duty to have examined them or at least some of them which could have given some reasonable explanation regarding his possession of such a huge stock of paddy. The producers, who are the owners of the seized paddy, had not come forward to depose in favour of the Petitioner, which rather shows that the story told by the Petitioner is true. Had the paddy belonged to different persons, it could not have been mixed up but kept separately. No doubt the extent, nature and onus in the case of prosecution and that in the case of an accused are different and the onus is not so heavy on the accused as it is on the prosecution. But there must be some sort of evidence as laid down in the aforesaid case reported in Maheswar v. State 26 (1960) C.L.T. 549. It is clear, therefore, that the Petitioner has failed to discharge the onus enjoined upon him by Section 14 of the Act. 10. Mr. Chatterji contended that unless it is proved that the Petitioner is a dealer, the presumption provided under Clause 3(2) of the Order has no application to him and he relied upon a decision reported in Kamla Prasad v. Emperor 3 in support of his contention. 10. Mr. Chatterji contended that unless it is proved that the Petitioner is a dealer, the presumption provided under Clause 3(2) of the Order has no application to him and he relied upon a decision reported in Kamla Prasad v. Emperor 3 in support of his contention. That was a case where the accused was found with 4 cartloads of rice weighing 60 maunds, 20 maunds being the permissible limits under the Bihar Food grains Control Order and a presumption for sale was to follow in case of excess possession. The explanation was that the rice did not belong to him exclusively but to him and to his three brothers. Witnesses were examined on his behalf to prove that he had no grain shop nor did he deal in grain. His Lordship found that when the Petitioner purchased 60 maunds of rice he did not engage in any undertaking in the sense of trade or business and he might have purchased the rice on behalf of himself and other cosharers or members of the family and held: It was for the prosecution to prove that he had engaged in an undertaking which involved the purchase of food grain in wholesale quantity. Mere purchase of more than 20 maunds at a time without proof of engaging in an undertaking does not, in my opinion, amount to a contravention of clause 3 Control order. The presumption mentioned in Sub-clause (2) of Clause 3, Control Order can arise only when there is storage; no such presumption arises out of a mere purchase or out of an act preparatory to storage. No such evidence was given in this case and moreover the decision clearly supports the application of such presumption in a case of storage as in this case, and it was held that in that case it was not a case of storage. His Lordship has categorically stated that the presumption mentioned in Clause 3 of the Control Order (which is similar to the Orissa Order) can only arise when there is storage. This decision therefore does not help Mr. Chatterji's contention in any way. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions of fact and law I am of opinion that the order passed by the Courts below is justified and is, therefore, upheld. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed