JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal by leave against the decision 01 our learned brother Barman, J., dismissing a second appeal filed by the Defendants, against the reversing decision of the District Judge of Bolangir, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 1500.00 due on the basis of a hand note excluded by the father of the Defendant-Appellants in favour of the Plaintiff. The hand note is dated 9th June, 1951 and the stipulated interest is 12 percent per annum. The main defence was a complete denial of the taking of the loan by the Defendant's father. There were also other defences such as the inadmissibility of the hand note in evidence, observes of legal necessity for the loan etc. 2. The trial court the learned Subordinate Judge, Bolangir found that the Defendants father did take a loan of Rs. 1500/- from the Plaintiff on the basis of the document in question, but he held the document to be inadmissible as it was inadequately stamped. Hence be dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge held the hand note to be a mere receipt for the money paid and as such to be duly stamped and admissible in evidence and hence decreed the Plaintiff's claim. 3 The learned single Judge who beard the second appeal, upheld the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge but one of the points which bad been taken no in the lower courts and which was agitated before him was that though the Plaintiff was a 'registered money-lender' he did not comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Orissa Money-lenders Rules, 1939 which runs thus: 11. Every plaint by a money-lender as defined in Sub-clause (1) of Clause (j) of Section 2 shall in addition to any other particulars that may be required by any law, contain the following particulars: (i) The date and number of his registration certificate. (ii) the maximum capital in respect of which he holds certificate, and (iii) a copy of the account referred to in;' clause (a) of Section 7 of the Act, relevant to the "case." In the plaint the date and the number of the Registration certificate were mentioned but neither the maximum capital in respect of which be held the certificate nor a copy of the accounts referred to in Clause (a) of Section 7 was mentioned. The learned single Judge, following his own earlier view in Gandhi Behera v. Natabar Panda C.R. No. 390 of 1958-D/30.10-n59 held that noncompliance with Rule 11 of the Orissa Money-lenders Rules was only an irregularity and not an illegality which affected the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree. He differed from some earlier single Judge decisions of this Court where the provisions of the said Rule were held to be mandatory, but, granted leave to appeal under the Orissa High Court Order, 1948. 4. In the Orissa Money-lenders Act a sharp distinction was made between a professional money-lender advancing a loan in the regular course of business on the one hand and a person advancing lone casually and not in the regular course of his business. This person may be conveniently described as a casual money-lender. In the definition clause (Clause (j) of Section 2 of the Act) there are two Sub-clauses (1) and (2) referring to the aforesaid two classes of money-lenders. A professional moneylender is required to get himself registered u/s 5 of the Act and be is also required to keep accounts and to grant receipts as provided in Section 7. Contravention of this section is made punishable u/s 19 of the Act. An absolute disability is imposed on him by Section 8 of the Act, from instituting any suit for recovery of the loan unless he holds a valid registration certificate under the Act from instituting any suit for recovery of the loan unless he holds a valid registration certificate under the Act. There are other distinctions between these two classes of money-lenders but these are not material here. Rule 10 of the Orissa Money-lenders. Rules requires a registered money-lender to send to a debtor on demand a statement of accounts signed by him or by his agent showing the outstanding balance. Rule 11 has already been quoted. Rule 12 applies to a casual money-lender. It reads as follows: Every plaint filed in a suit by a money-lender as defined in Sub-clause (2) of Clause (j) of Section 2 shall, in addition to any other particulars that may be required by any law, contain the following particulars, namely, the maximum amount of capital of the Plaintiff's money-lending business. In both Rule 11 and Rule 12 the word "shall" is used which has ordinarily a mandatory force. In both Rule 11 and Rule 12 the word "shall" is used which has ordinarily a mandatory force. But as pointed out by their Lordsips of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, the use of the word 'shall' in a statute though generally taken in a mandatory sense does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the word's of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding would be invalid". On the question as to whether the provision of a statute is mandatory or directory, I may quote the following passage from Crawford on Statutory Constructions (Article 261 p. 516), referred to at page 918 in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court: The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provisions, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other.... 5. The main question for decision therefore, is: what will be the consequence of the failure on the part of a moneylender to comply with any of the provisions of Rule 11 or Rule 12 according as he is a registered money-lender or a casual money-lender. Are those provision mandatory in the sense that failure to comply with them even if noticed, for the first time, at the first appellate stage, or the Second appellate stage or at the revisional Stage, is Sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the suit or else are those provisions directory in the sense that unless prejudice is shown to have been caused the suit cannot be thrown out solely on the ground of such non-compliance. 6. From the language used in Rules 11 and 12 of the Money-lenders Act it is obvious that they are in the nature of supplementary provisions to Order 7, Rule 1, CPC which prescribes the particulars to be mentioned in any plaint. 6. From the language used in Rules 11 and 12 of the Money-lenders Act it is obvious that they are in the nature of supplementary provisions to Order 7, Rule 1, CPC which prescribes the particulars to be mentioned in any plaint. Hence the provisions of the CPC which have a bearing on the effect of non-compliance with Order 7, Rule 1 CPC may throw some light on the main question at issue here. Order 7, Rule 11, CPC afford such a guide. Of the four clauses in that Rule, Clauses (a) and (d) refer to those instances where the plaint shall be rejected. There can be no doubt about the mandatory nature of those clauses. But Clauses (b) and (c) say that where the plaint is defective in some particulars, the plaint shall be rejected, only if on being required by the Court to supply the omission within the time fixed by the Court, the Plaintiff fails to do so. This aspect was emphasised in Rameshwar v. Sadandda Jha AIR 1920 Pat. 82 where it was pointed out that a plaint can be rejected under Order 17, Rule 3, CPC only if, after due notice, the Plaintiff omits to cure the defect. This shows that some of the particulars required in a plaint by Rule 1 of Order 7, CPC are not mandatory in the sense that even if they are not supplied, the Court must give sufficient time for the Plaintiff to supply the omission. There is nothing in the description of the particulars required to be given in Rules 11 and 12 of the Orissa Money-lenders Rules which would show that the Court cannot grant any time to the Plaintiff to supply the requisite particulars before rejecting the plaint. The particulars required by Rule 11 are obviously intended to enable the Defendant to put up a proper defence and also to enable the Court to decide whether the suit itself is liable to be dismissed u/s 8 of the Orissa Money-Lender Act on the ground that the registration certificate is not a valid certificate under the Act the necessary information is not given in the plaint, the reasonable course would be for the Court to point out the omission and give the Plaintiff an opportunity to supply the same. 7. 7. The Court's attention may be drawn to this omission either when it makes a preliminary scrutiny of the plaint or else when an objection is raised by the Defendant in his written statement or otherwise. As pointed out in Sadhu Kathalia v. Dhirendranath AIR 1913 Cal. 425 the trial Court has a duty to see whether a plaint contains the particulars required by law. Similarly, in Jagadish Chandra Deo Vs. Debendra Prosad Bagchi Bahadur and Others, the duty of the Court to look into the plaint to see whether it conforms to the legal requirements was emphasised. It is true that the primary duty of furnishing particulars is on the Plaintiff but when the court also has the equally important duty of checking the plaint and detecting such omission, it will be difficult to say that the Rules become mandatory unless it is further shown that the Plaintiff neglected to supply the omissions after his attention was to the same. 8. It will be interesting to discuss the case law in respect of parallel provisions in some other enactments. Thus Section 80, CPC says that no suit against a Government or public officer shall be filed until a notice in the prescribed form has been served on the party concerned, and further says: The plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. Thus in the main section of the CPC it is expressly mentioned that the plaint shall contain the aforesaid statement about the service of notice. A question arises as to what is the effect of non-compliance with this portion of Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. Does such non-compliance render the suit void the initio, or is it curable by giving an opportunity to the Plaintiff to supply the omission, if in fact the requisite notice has been served on the party, but through oversight the plaint does not contain such a statement of fact. In the well known Privy council decision on Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, AIR 1927 176 (Privy Council) it was held that Section 80, CPC is "express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no implication or exception." Nevertheless in Tipan Prosad v. Secretary of State. AIR 1935 Pat. In the well known Privy council decision on Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, AIR 1927 176 (Privy Council) it was held that Section 80, CPC is "express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no implication or exception." Nevertheless in Tipan Prosad v. Secretary of State. AIR 1935 Pat. 86 the learned Judge (Fazl Ali, J. as he then was) held that the omission to supply the aforesaid particulars can be corrected by giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to supply the omission. This view was re-affirmed in a later decision of the same High Court reported in Governor General. Kashi Ram AIR 1949 SC 368 where the action of Court in allowing a subsequent amendment to the plaint, with a view to supply the omission, was held to be proper. In Bhikaji Keshao Joshi and Another Vs. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani and Others, which was a decision arising out of the Representation of the Peoples Act it was pointed out that even if the election petition did not strictly conform to the requirement of Section 83 of that Act, nevertheless the election petition should not have been thrown out, but the Petitioner should have been called upon to remove the lacuna within a reasonable time. The language of Section 83 of the Representation of the Peoples Act is as mandatory as the language of Rules 11 and 12 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Rules. It also contain the word 'shall'. Nevertheless their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not hold the provisions of that section to be mandatory so as to justify the summary dismissal of a petition which did not contain all the requisite particulars. 9. Thus the case law dealing with, Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC and Section 83 of the Representation of the Peoples Act seems to' in'dicate that mere omission to furnish the particulars required statute may not be a ground for throwing out the plaint unless the Plaintiff is given a reasonable opportunity to supply the omission and fails to avail himself of it. Rules 11 and J2 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Rules cannot therefore be regarded as mandatory in the extreme sense as contended for by the other side. 10. I may now discuss the various decisions of this Court on this question. Rules 11 and J2 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Rules cannot therefore be regarded as mandatory in the extreme sense as contended for by the other side. 10. I may now discuss the various decisions of this Court on this question. The earliest is Bahadur Thakur v. Bata Sahu 23 C.L.T. 468 decided by Rao J. on 25th October 1957. That was a civil revision against the appellate judgment of the District Judge reversing the judgment of the Munsif who dismissed the suit brought by the Plaintiff on the basis of a promissory note. The Defendant denied execution of the note and receipt of consideration thereon. The Plaintiff was admittedly a registered money-lender and some of the particulars required, by Rule 11 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Rules were admittedly not entered in the plaint. The learned Munsif held that the Plaintiff failed to prove due execution and passing of consideration under the said document and also adversely commented on the failure of the Plaintiff to produce the books of accounts. The District Judge, on appeal, reversed this finding holding that the non-production of the books of account was not material. The learned single Judge of this Court (Rao, J.) held that the finding of the Munsif as regards the failure of the Plaintiff to prove the due execution and passing of consideration under the hand note should not have been reversed by the District Judge. This was sufficient for the disposal of the Revision Petition. But the learned Judge made a further observation as regards non -compliance with Rules 11 and 12 of the Money-Lenders Rules. This portion of hi judgment is obviously in the nature of an obiter. When a similar question arose in a subsequent case, Raghunath Prusty v. Sauddin Khan 24 C.L.T. 28 which the same learned single Judge disposed of on 28th October, 1957, he himself pointed out in paragraph is of his judgment that the question whether non-compliance with Rules 11 and 12 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Rules entails dismissal of the suit "requires full consideration". This point arose directly for decision in that case, and after examining" all the relevant provisions he held that the suit should not be thrown out merely on account of such non-compliance but that the Court should call upon the Plaintiff money-lender to furnish the required particulars within a specified time. This point arose directly for decision in that case, and after examining" all the relevant provisions he held that the suit should not be thrown out merely on account of such non-compliance but that the Court should call upon the Plaintiff money-lender to furnish the required particulars within a specified time. Hence he refused to set aside the judgment and decree of the lower court even though it was found as a fact that many of the particulars required by Rule 11 were not disclosed in the plaint. This view of Rao, J. was followed by Barman, J. in Gandhi Behera's Case (1) already referred to and also in the judgment under appeal before us. A contrary view was taken by Mohapatra J. in Mahendra Mohanty v. Khira Bewa 26 C.L.T. 264 decided on January 11, 1950. That was civil revision against the judgment of a Small Cause Court Judge decreeing the registered money-lender's claim. In the plaint before the Small Cause Court it was stated that the Plaintiff was a registered money-lender but the other partic'lars required by Rule 11 were not given. The learned Judge held that the provisions of Rules 11, and 12 were mandatory and non-compliance with those provisions affected the jurisdiction of the Court. Hence the suit was dismissed. Following this view Das J. in Nath v. Achutandnda 26 C.L.T. 583 Samara Munda v. Kartik Sahu 26 C.L.T. 623 and Deba Raj Misra v. Bata Sahu 26 C.L.T. 644 dismissed the suit if the Plaintiff for non-compliance with the provisions of Rules 11 and 12. The judgments of Rao, J. were also noticed by him but he preferred the opinion given by Mohapatra J. in Mohendra Mohanty v. Khira Bewa 26 C.L.T. 264. But in these decisions the question as to whether the particulars required by Rules 11 and 12 were necessary for the decision of those cases, whether the Defendant took any objection on that ground, and whether he was prejudiced by the failure of the Plaintiff-money-lender to furnish those particulars was not conjured at all. It also appears that in some of the later decisions Mohapatra, J., himself felt that the extreme view that non-compliance with any of the provisions of Rules 11 and 12 would entail the dismissal of the suit itself may require some modification and that it may suffice if there was "substantial" compliance with the Rules. It also appears that in some of the later decisions Mohapatra, J., himself felt that the extreme view that non-compliance with any of the provisions of Rules 11 and 12 would entail the dismissal of the suit itself may require some modification and that it may suffice if there was "substantial" compliance with the Rules. Thus in Harekrishna v. Mulcunda 27 C.L.T. 72 decided by him on 20th her, 1960, the learned Judge pointed out that the original application for registration was proved before the Court and that it gave complete information about the maximum capital in respect of which the certificate of registration was asked for. Here, according to him, the particulars required in clause (ii) of Rule 11 were available before the Court sufficiently before the cause of action had been extinguished and the claim was barred by limitation. Hence he held that there was substantial compliance with Rule 11 and the suit should not be dismissed. Thus according to him even if the information required by Rule 11 is not furnished in the plaint, if it is subsequently furnished before the trial Court, prior to the date on which the claim would be barred by limitation, there would be substantial compliance with the provisions of Rule 11. In earlier unreported Division Bench decision of Mohapatra, J. and Barman, J. in Kumar Harish Chandra v. Banshidar. F.A. No. 6 of 195-1-. D/16.7.196J decided on 26th July, 1960, it was found that a copy of the accounts required by clause (iii) of Rule 11 had not been furnished with the plaint, but the learned Judges held that as it was the admitted case of both parties that no payment had been made since the date of their incurring of the loan and there was no other term agreed to between the money-lender and the debtor, there was substantial compliance that the provisions of Rule 1. The aforesaid two decisions would show the dangers involved in taking an extreme view. 11. It is indeed unfortunate that such a sharp conflict in the opinion of single Judges of this High Court should have continued so long without the matter having been referred to a Division Bench earlier. The aforesaid two decisions would show the dangers involved in taking an extreme view. 11. It is indeed unfortunate that such a sharp conflict in the opinion of single Judges of this High Court should have continued so long without the matter having been referred to a Division Bench earlier. In the interests of judicial comity and with a view to preserve harmony in courts and avoid confusion which would necessarily arise due to the uncertainty of law, it is necessary that a decision of a single Judge of this Court should not be ignored or dissented from by another single Judge in a subsequent case. (If he considers that the previous view is incorrect the obvious course is for him to order the matter to a Division Bench as provided in the High Court Rules, unless the earlier view has already been over-ruled by a Division Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, (If both benches) differ from each other the decision of the earlier Bench would prevail-see M. Subbarayudu and Others Vs. The State, Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh Vs. Muttiah and Another, Sashi Busan v. Bhubaneswar Rai AIR 195 Pat 124 Jamuna Rai and Others Vs. Chandradip Rai and Others, and Atma Ram Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, . 12. I would therefore in agreement with the view taken by Rao, J. hold that though Rules 11 and 12 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Rules should be strictly complied with by the money-lender, nevertheless, where there is omission to furnish the required particulars the Court should in the first instance notice the omission while scrutinising the plaint and give the Plaintiff an opportunity to rectify the same. It is only when, in spite of that, he fails to furnish the required particulars that the Court may be justified in dismissing the suit however the Court fails to notice the omission and the Defendant also does not raise any objection on this ground before the trial Court it will not be proper for the first appellate court or the second appellate court or the court of revision to dismiss the suit merely on the ground of non-compliance with Rules 11 and 12 unless prejudice is shown to have been caused. In considering whether any prejudice has been caused to the Defendant the question as to whether he raised an objection on this ground at the earliest stage, will be relevant. 13. In considering whether any prejudice has been caused to the Defendant the question as to whether he raised an objection on this ground at the earliest stage, will be relevant. 13. In the present case no prejudice to the Defendant has been shown to have been caused. It is not disputed that the particulars required by clause (i) of Rule 11 of the Orissa Money-lenders Rules were furnished in the plaint and the registration number and date of registration were described therein. But neither the maximum capital nor the copy of the accounts was furnished and there was thus non-compliance with Clauses (ii) and (iii) of that Rule. The Defendant, however, completely denied the loan. There was no question of any part payment or scrutiny of accounts to see whether the Plaintiff's claim was correct. Hence non-compliance with Sub-clause (iii) of Rule 11 is wholly immaterial, especially when the Defendant did not raise any objection at the first stage. Mr. R.N. Misra however laid some emphasis on Clause (ii) of Rule 11 and urged that in the first paragraph of the written statement the Defendant had pointed out that the "Plaintiffs have not registered themselves to the extend they are advancing loans to otters" and that in view of the objection taken the Plaintiffs should have supplied the omission. There might have been Some force in this argument if at the time of framing issues in the presence of parties this objection was reiterated but I find that no specific issue was raised on the ground that the Plaintiff though registered as a money-lender was carrying on money-lending transactions in excess of the maximum capital for which the certificate of registration: was granted to him. Neither in the cross examination of the Plaintiff nor in the evidence of the Defendant was any question put to find out the total extent of the money-lending transactions of the Plaintiff. The entire litigation was fought out on the main question as to whether the loan was taken by the Defendants' father and whether the hand note was admissible in evidence. Hence I must hold that no prejudice has been caused to the Defendant in this case. The entire litigation was fought out on the main question as to whether the loan was taken by the Defendants' father and whether the hand note was admissible in evidence. Hence I must hold that no prejudice has been caused to the Defendant in this case. I would accordingly agree with the view taken by Rao J. in Raghunath Prusty v. Sauddin Khan 24 C.L.T. 28 and disagree with the technical view taken by Mohapatra J. in Mohendra Mohanty v. Khira Bewa 26 C.L.T. 264 with which jag J. agreed in his decision in Nath v. Achyutandnda 26 C.L.T. 583 Samara Mundo v. Kartick Sahu 26 C.L.T. 623 and Debaraj Misra v. Bata Sahu 26 C.L.T. 644. 14. For these reasons the order of the learned single Judge, under appeal, is upheld and this appeal is dismissed. But there will be no order for costs. Both parties will bear their own costs throughout. R.K. Das, J. 15. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed